FLORA INSON, PLAINTIFF AND APPELLANT, VS. AGUSTIN BELZUNCE, DEFENDANT AND APPELLEE.

Flora Inson versus Agustin Belzunce

The Case

This is an action by Flora Inson against Agustin Belzunce to recover damages for the breach of an alleged contract of marriage, and, in its original form, to compel the defendant to recognize and maintain the children of a marital relation said to have existed between them. It matters because the Supreme Court here states, in the clearest terms, that a promise to marry given in exchange for carnal connection rests on an unlawful consideration and cannot be the source of an action for damages — a rule every reviewee must be able to state on sight.

Procedural History

The action was commenced in the Court of First Instance of the Province of Iloilo in April 1913. The defendant demurred to the original petition, and the demurrer was sustained. The plaintiff then presented an amended complaint asking only for damages resulting from the breach of the alleged contract to marry. The case went to trial before Judge James S. Powell, who concluded that the alleged contract of marriage was illegal because it was contrary to good morals, and absolved the defendant from all liability, without costs. The plaintiff appealed to the Supreme Court after obtaining permission in the lower court to continue the litigation as a pauper, and an attorney de officio was appointed for her in this Court. That attorney, after a brief statement of the facts, concluded that no error had been committed below and recommended affirmance. The Supreme Court nonetheless examined the evidence and affirmed the judgment.

Facts

Flora Inson and Agustin Belzunce had been in a marital relation for some time before the action was brought. On the strength of that relation she sued him, originally seeking both damages for breach of a contract of marriage and an order compelling him to recognize and maintain the children of the relation.

The defendant demurred, and the demurrer was sustained. The plaintiff recast her complaint as one for damages arising from the breach of an alleged contract to marry, and the cause proceeded to trial on that issue.

At the trial the plaintiff was asked whether it was true that the defendant promised to marry her in consideration that she would first go to live with him, and she answered, "Yes." She was twenty-eight years of age at the time. On that evidence the trial judge held the contract illegal as contrary to good morals, and the case reached the Supreme Court on her appeal.

Issues

• Whether or not a promise of marriage made in consideration of carnal connection is founded upon an unlawful consideration, so that no action can be maintained by the woman against the man upon it.
• Whether or not an action for damages may be maintained under the Civil Code where the party claiming damages voluntarily consented to the very act complained of.
• Whether or not either party to an intercourse that constitutes a crime or misdemeanor common to both may claim damages against the other.

Applicable Provisions

The decision invokes Articles 1305 and 1306 of the Civil Code on the object and consideration of contracts. The Court cites them for the rule that a promise resting on an unlawful consideration is null and void, and it applies that rule to a promise of marriage based upon carnal connection.

Article 1305. A contract is a meeting of minds between two persons whereby one binds himself, with respect to the other, to give something or to render some service.

The Court treats the promise to marry as a contract, and therefore tests its consideration against the requirement of lawfulness.

Article 1306. The contracting parties may establish such stipulations, clauses, terms and conditions as they may deem convenient, provided they are not contrary to law, morals, good customs, public order, or public policy.

This is the provision that makes the stipulated consideration — cohabitation before marriage — fatal to the promise, because it is contrary to good morals.

The decision also invokes Article 1902 of the Civil Code on damages. The Court cites it to hold that an action for damages cannot be maintained where the party claiming them voluntarily consented to the act from which the damage is said to flow.

Article 1902. A person who by an act or omission causes damage to another when there is fault or negligence shall be obliged to repair the damage so done.

The Court reads the article as unavailable to a plaintiff who freely consented to the very conduct of which she complains.

Ruling

On the first issue, the Court held that the alleged contract to marry was based upon immoral and illegal considerations. It relied on the plaintiff's own testimony that the defendant promised to marry her in consideration that she would first go to live with him, and concluded that the consideration for the promise was illegal and rendered the contract, if any was ever made, null and void. The Court stated the rule squarely: a promise of marriage, based upon carnal connection, is founded upon an unlawful consideration and no action can be maintained by the woman against the man therefor.

On the second issue, the Court held that an action for damages cannot be maintained under Article 1902 of the Civil Code where the party claiming such damages voluntarily consented to the act. The plaintiff's consent to the relation removed the foundation of her claim.

On the third issue, the Court held that the intercourse between the plaintiff and the defendant, considering all of the facts and circumstances connected therewith, constituted a crime or misdemeanor common to both of them, and that neither of them, under such circumstances, can claim damages against the other. Finding no reason to reverse or modify the decision of the lower court, the Court affirmed it.

Doctrine

A promise of marriage made in consideration of carnal connection is founded upon an unlawful consideration and is null and void under Articles 1305 and 1306 of the Civil Code; no action lies by the woman against the man upon such a promise. An action for damages under Article 1902 of the Civil Code cannot be maintained by a party who voluntarily consented to the act complained of. Where the intercourse constitutes a crime or misdemeanor common to both parties, neither may claim damages against the other. For the Bar answer, the formula is simple: unlawful consideration, no cause of action; voluntary consent, no damages; common guilt, no recovery by either side.

Disposition

The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the lower court absolving the defendant from all liability, without any finding as to costs; the defendant won.

Remember This

Memorize the line: a promise of marriage based upon carnal connection is founded upon an unlawful consideration, and no action can be maintained by the woman against the man therefor. Examiners use this case to test the requisites of a valid consideration under the Civil Code and the consent bar to an action for damages.