ASIAN TRANSMISSION CORPO­RATION, PETITIONER, VS. NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION; COMMISSIONERS CEFERINO DULAY, MIRASOL CORLETO AND ROBERTO TOLENTINO; JOSE C. ESPINAS; AND B…

The special civil action of certiorari and prohibition at
bar is an offshoot of two earlier cases decided by this Court on June 27, 1988,
involving substantially the same controversy and the same parties.

These prior cases were G.R. Nos. 75271-73, entitled “Catalino N. Sarmiento
and 71 other striking workers of Asian Transmission Corporation v. Hon. Judge
Orlando R. Tuico, etc., et al.,” and G.R.
No. 77567 entitled “Asian Transmission Corporation (ATC) v. NLRC.”
Two basic questions were presented, one of which was whether or not a
return-to-work order may be validly issued by the National Labor Relations
Commission pending determination of the legality of the strike.  The directive in question reaffirmed a
return-to-work order first issued by the Ministry of Labor and Employment on June 3, 1986, reiterated on June 13, 1986 and again on November 24, 1986.

The issue was resolved in the affirmative by the Court,^[1]
the Court devoting some words to the real reason for authorizing a return to
work pending resolution of a labor dispute, viz:

It is also important to emphasize that the return-to-work order not
so much confers a right as it imposes a duty; and while as a right it may be
waived, it must be discharged as a duty even against the worker’s will.  Returning to work in this situation is not a
matter of option or voluntariness but of
obligation.  The worker must return to
his job together with his co-workers so the operations of the company can be
resumed and it can continue serving the public and promoting its interest.  That is the real reason such return can be
compelled.  So imperative is the order in
fact that it is not even considered violative of the
right against involuntary servitude, as this Court held in Kaisahan
ng Mga Manggagawa
sa Kahoy v. Gotamco Sawmills (80 Phil. 521).  The worker can of course give up his work,
thus severing his ties with the company, if he does not want to obey the order;
but the order must be obeyed if he wants to retain his work even if his
inclination is to strike.”

The Court also observed that the return-to-work order of June 3,
1986 was not only ignored but was defied by forty-four (44) employees who,
despite notice thereof, staged a strike and engaged in picketing; and it was
for this reason that when compliance with the return-to-work directive was
sought by those employees, the employer refused to accept them back.  This, despite still another return-to-work
order contained in the Resolution of the respondent Commission dated January 13, 1987,1
pertinently reading as follows:

” * *.  Considering that
the petitioner (ATC) despite the order dated 24 November 1986 of the Acting
Minister ‘to accept all the returning workers,’ continues to defy the directive
insofar as 44 of the workers are concerned, the Commission, sitting en banc,
resolved to order the petitioner to accept the said workers, or to reinstate
them on payroll immediately upon receipt of the resolution.”

The Court held the employer’s refusal to be justified.

“While the ATC has manifested its willingness to accept most
of the workers, and has in fact already done so, it has balked at the demand of
the remaining workers to be also allowed to return to work.  Its reason is that these persons, instead of
complying with the return-to-work order, as most of the workers have done,
insisted on staging the restrained strike and defiantly picketed the company
premises to prevent the resumption of operations.  By so doing, the ATC submits, these strikers
have forfeited their right to be readmitted, having abandoned their positions,
and so could be validly replaced.

The Court agrees.

The records show that the return-to-work order was first issued on June 3, 1986, and was reiterated on June 13, 1986.  The strike was declared thereafter, if we go
by the criminal complaints in G.R. Nos. 75271-73, where the alleged acts are
claimed to have been done on June 9,
1986 and July 15, 1986.  These dates are not denied.  In fact, the petitioners argue in their
pleadings that they were engaged only in peaceful picketing, which would
signify that they had not on those dates returned to work as required and had
decided instead to ignore the said order. 
By their own acts, they are deemed to have abandoned their employment
and cannot now demand the right to return thereto by virtue of the very order
they have defied.

* * *

Accordingly, the Court holds that the return-to-work order should
benefit only those workers who complied therewith and, regardless of the
outcome of the compulsory arbitration proceedings, are entitled to be paid for
work they have actually performed. 
Conversely, those workers who refused to obey the said order and instead
waged the restrained strike are not entitled to be paid for work not done or to
reinstatement to the positions they have abandoned by their refusal to return
thereto as ordered.”

The holding was reaffirmed in this Court’s Resolution dated February 22, 1989 which resolved inter
alia the motion for reconsideration filed by
the workers affected (G.R. Nos. 75271-73). 
The Resolution stressed that ?

“The NLRC had the authority to issue the return-to-work order,
subject to sanctions for non-compliance therewith.  The Court can impose such sanctions.  Those strikers who defied the order and
refused to return to work as required cannot now complain if they are deemed to
have forfeited their employment as a consequence of their intransigence.  * * .”

On remand of the case to the NLRC, the Bisig
ng Asian Transmission Labor Union (BATLU) filed on April 3, 1989 a motion for execution
in behalf of the workers seeking readmission, whose number had been reduced to
thirty-four (34) by this time.  The Union
prayed that — in line with the NLRC Resolution of January 13, 1987, which they
implied had been upheld by this Court — they be reinstated, actually or
“on payroll pending the computation of their back wages and other fringe
benefits from the time * * (they) offered * * to return to work.”1

The NLRC (Third Division) granted the motion, by Resolution dated
June 13, 1989, justifying
its action as follows:

” * *. 
Firstly, the Supreme Court * * affirmed Our resolution of 13 January
1987, which clearly underscored that the return-to-work was issued even pending
the determination of the legality or illegality of the strike; secondly, the
decision of the Supreme Court dated 27 June 1988 as well as its Resolution of
22 February 1989 held that the return-to-work order should inure to the benefit
of those who comply therewith, and regardless of the result or outcome of the
compulsory arbitration proceedings (???); and thirdly, the grant of the motion
for execution is in consonance with the essence of a return-to-work as
expounded by the Supreme Court * *.

Indeed, were We
to deny this motion for execution it would practically emasculate the very
import and objective of a return-to-work order and thus inevitably lead to
untold sufferings to the workers as well as losses to the company pending final
resolution of their dispute.  Where
national interest is at stake, the implementation of a return-to-work order
must not be subject to a selective basis by the company — who are to be
readmitted or not, as in this case where 34 workers out of the 44 ordered to be
accepted by the company, or reinstated on payroll, are still left out in the
cold.”

This Resolution is what the petitioner
ATC would have this Court annul and perpetually restrain.  The petitioner would also have Us require
“respondents to show cause why they should not be cited for contempt for
subverting or violating the Supreme Court’s decision (promulgated June 27,
1988) and resolution (dated February 22, 1989) in G.R. No. 75271-73 and No.
77567.”

The petitioner’s submittals have merit.  The writs prayed for will issue.  It is difficult to see how this Court’s
decision and its subsequent resolution on the motion for reconsideration in
G.R. Nos. 75271-73 and 77567 could be misread by both
the public and the private respondents as upholding or affirming the claim to
reinstatement of the petitioner’s forty-four (44) employees who had staged a
strike in defiance of the return-to-work order of June 3, 1986.

True said decision held valid the questioned NLRC resolutions of January 13, 1987 and February 12, 1987 reaffirming the
order of November 24, 1986
of the Acting Minister of Labor “to accept all returning workers.”
But it did so subject to an important and explicitly stated qualification; said
orders were affirmed”* * as above interpreted,”1
the clear and unmistakable reference in the quoted phrase being to the
pronouncements made in the body of the decision on the implications and
consequences of a return-to-work order — specifically, the return-to-work
order of June 3, 1986.

On that subject, the Court’s decision, after finding that on the
record the forty-four workers involved had declared a strike and, in fact,
admitted to having engaged in picketing after the issuance of said
return-to-work order and its reiteration on June 13, 1986, declared in no
uncertain terms that the benefit of readmittance and
payment for work performed applied only to the workers who complied with the
order, not to those who refused to obey it. 
Nothing can more clearly reveal what was in the mind of the Court and
the correct thrust of its ruling than this passage earlier quoted from its
decision which, for that reason, bears repeating:

“Accordingly, the Court holds that
the return-to-work order should benefit only those workers who complied
therewith and, regardless of the outcome of the compulsory arbitration
proceedings, are entitled to be paid for work they have actually
performed.  Conversely, those workers who
refused to obey the said order and instead waged the restrained strike are not
entitled to be paid for work not done or to reinstatement to the positions they
have abandoned by their refusal to return thereto as ordered.”

That disposition came as but a logical consequence of the Court’s
pronouncement stressing that the return-to-work order imposes a duty that must
be discharged more than it confers a right that may be waived, and that while
the worker may choose not to obey, he does so at the risk of severing his
relationship with his employer.

The interpretation advocated by the respondents is warranted
neither by the plain language of the Court’s decision nor by a sensible,
reasonable reading of its entire context. 
The questioned NLRC resolution being wholly premised on such an
interpretation must be struck down as issued with grave abuse of discretion.  In view of this conclusion and there
appearing no compelling reason for a show-cause order, the petitioner’s
additional plea for such an order is denied.

WHEREFORE, the NLRC Resolution of June 13, 1989 is ANNULLED and SET ASIDE.  Execution of this Court’s decision in G.R.
Nos. 75271-73 and 77567 to effect or compel reinstatement by the petitioner of
the forty-four workers declared without right thereto in said decision, is
perpetually restrained.  Costs against the private respondents.

SO ORDERED.

Cruz, Gancayco, Griño-Aquino,
and Medialdea,
JJ., concur.

^[1]
The opinion was written by Mr. Justice I. A. Cruz

1
Reiterated on February 12, 1987

1
Annex D, petition, Rollo, pp. 47, 49

1
Decision, G.R. Nos. 75271-73 and 77567, p. 13, dispositive
portion