THE UNITED STATES, COMPLAINANT AND APPELLEE, VS. MARCELO DE GUZMAN, DEFENDANT AND APPELLANT.
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United States versus De Guzman
The Case
This is a criminal prosecution in which the Government of the United States, as complainant and appellee, proceeded against Marcelo de Guzman, the defendant and appellant, for the murder of Pelagio Bonifacio. The case matters because it is one of the early rulings applying the amnesty proclamation issued by the President of the United States on the fourth of July, 1902, and it fixes the test for whether a killing committed during the insurrection is a political offense covered by that amnesty. The Court held that the accused, an officer of the insurgent army, brought himself within the proclamation and was entitled to be discharged upon taking and subscribing the prescribed oath of allegiance.
Procedural History
Marcelo de Guzman was charged with murder, qualified by alevosia and premeditation, before the Court of First Instance of Pangasinan. That court convicted him under article 403 of the Penal Code and sentenced him to imprisonment at hard labor in the public prison of Pangasinan for the period of his natural life, to pay the widow of the deceased the sum of 1,000 pesos, and to pay the costs of the suit. From that judgment the defendant brought the case to the Supreme Court, and there an application was made for his discharge under the amnesty granted by the President of the United States by his proclamation of the fourth of July, 1902.
Facts
Marcelo de Guzman was a captain in the insurgent army and had many posts under his command. He often visited the pueblo of Binmaley during the time the insurgents occupied that pueblo. On one of those visits, about the time the Spanish army surrendered at Dagupan, the deceased, Pelagio Bonifacio, was brought before Guzman, charged as a spy of the Spaniards.
The deceased was interrogated by Guzman and admitted that he was a spy. Thereupon the defendant, after assaulting and abusing him, ordered a couple of soldiers under his command to carry the deceased to the cemetery near by, there to be killed. The order was duly executed by the soldiers.
The defendant testified that his action was based on an order given by one Vicente Prado, his superior in command, who directed him to look out for a spy in the pueblo of Binmaley and, when found, to have him executed. He claimed that after the deceased admitted being a spy, he reported the circumstances back to Vicente Prado, who ordered him to kill the deceased. The Court found that this statement of direct orders from Prado was not borne out by the witnesses, who stated that no sooner had the deceased been brought before the defendant than the deceased was struck by the defendant and ordered to be taken off and shot. It appeared beyond doubt, however, that the offense was committed by the defendant as an officer in the insurgent army, and that it grew out of internal political feuds and dissensions between Filipinos and Spaniards, or out of the political feuds and dissensions among the Filipinos themselves, during the Spanish insurrection.
Issues
- Whether or not the defendant, an officer of the insurgent army who ordered the execution of a man charged as a Spanish spy, is comprehended within the amnesty proclamation of the President of the United States of the fourth of July, 1902.
- Whether or not the defendant is entitled to be discharged from custody upon taking and subscribing the oath of allegiance prescribed in the amnesty proclamation.
Applicable Provisions
Article 403 of the Penal Code, under which the trial court convicted the defendant, provides:
The penalty of reclusion temporal in its maximum degree to death shall be imposed upon any person who, not falling within the provisions of Article 405, shall kill another, when the crime is attended by any of the following circumstances: with treachery, or by means of inundation, fire, poison, explosion, or the use of any other artifice involving great waste or ruin; for a price, reward, or promise; or by means of the deliberate premeditation of the crime.
This is the offense provision under which the defendant was charged and convicted below, and it frames the crime that the amnesty is invoked against.
The amnesty proclamation of the President of the United States of the fourth of July, 1902, grants amnesty to persons who took part in the insurrection, and the Court applies it in these terms:
Amnesty is hereby granted to all persons who, on or before the fourth day of July, nineteen hundred and two, took part in the insurrection against the authority of the United States in the Philippine Islands, or who, during the same period, committed any act of hostility against the Government of the United States or its officers, or against the persons or property of citizens of the United States, or of the inhabitants of the Philippine Islands, in furtherance of the insurrection, and who shall take and subscribe the oath of allegiance to the United States.
This is the source of the defendant's claim to discharge, conditioned on his taking and subscribing the oath of allegiance.
Ruling
On the first issue, the Court held that the defendant brings himself within the amnesty proclamation. Following the cases decided at the same term, United States versus Vicente Villamor, United States versus Ariastasio Carmona, and United States versus Jose Guzman and others, the Court ruled that where it appears beyond doubt that the commission of the offense was done by the defendant as an officer in the insurgent army, and that it grew out of internal political feuds and dissensions between Filipinos and Spaniards, or out of the political feuds and dissensions among the Filipinos themselves during the Spanish insurrection, the offense has the character of a political crime committed in the course of the insurrection and is covered by the amnesty. The Court noted that the defendant's claim of direct orders from Vicente Prado was not borne out by the witnesses, who stated that the deceased was struck by the defendant and ordered to be taken off and shot as soon as he was brought before him.
On the second issue, the Court held that the defendant is entitled to be discharged upon his taking and subscribing the oath prescribed in the amnesty proclamation before any authority in the Philippine Archipelago authorized to administer oaths. Upon such oath being presented to the Court, the defendant would be ordered discharged from custody.
Justice Willard, with whom Justices Smith and Ladd concurred, concurred in the result on the ground that the accused acted under orders from his superior, Vicente Prado, and that the testimony of the accused that Prado told him to watch for the deceased and to execute him when found had not been contradicted.
Doctrine
A killing committed by an officer of the insurgent army during the insurrection, which grows out of internal political feuds and dissensions between Filipinos and Spaniards, or among the Filipinos themselves, is a political crime committed in the course of the insurrection and falls within the amnesty proclamation of the fourth of July, 1902. The test is not the personal motive of the accused but the political character of the offense, shown by the fact that it was done as an officer in the insurgent army and arose from the political feuds and dissensions of the period. Once the accused brings himself within the proclamation, he is entitled to be discharged from custody upon taking and subscribing the oath of allegiance prescribed in the amnesty proclamation before any authority in the Philippine Archipelago authorized to administer oaths.
Disposition
The Court held that the defendant brings himself within the amnesty proclamation and is entitled to be discharged upon taking and subscribing the prescribed oath of allegiance before any authority in the Philippine Archipelago authorized to administer oaths, and upon such oath being presented, he will be ordered discharged from custody.
Remember This
The single line worth memorizing is that a killing by an insurgent officer arising from political feuds and dissensions during the insurrection is a political crime covered by the amnesty proclamation of the fourth of July, 1902. Examiners use this case to test the political offense test for amnesty and the rule that discharge follows upon taking and subscribing the oath of allegiance.