THE BOARD OF MEDICAL EDUCATION AND THE HON. LOURDES R. QUISUMBING, IN HER CAPACITY AS SECRETARY OF THE DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION, CULTURE AND SPORTS AND CHAIRMAN, BOARD OF MEDICAL…

Petitioners, the Board of Medical Education, the government
agency which supervises and regulates the country’s medical colleges, and
Secretary Lourdes R. Quisumbing of the Department of
Education, Culture and Sports, as Chairperson of the Board, pray for a writ of certiorari
to nullify and set aside the order issued by respondent Judge Daniel P.
Alfonso, Regional Trial Court, Antipolo, Rizal, in Civil Case No. 1385 restraining the enforcement
of petitioner Quisumbing’s order of closure of the
respondent Philippine Muslim-Christian College of Medicine Foundation, Inc. (hereafter simply the College).

The College, a private educational institution, was founded in
1981 for the avowed purpose of producing physicians who will “emancipate
Muslim citizens from age-old attitudes on health.” The unstable peace and
order situation in Mindanao led to the establishment of
the College in Antipolo, Rizal,
which granted it a temporary permit to operate in the municipality, instead of
in Zamboanga
City where the school was first
proposed to be located.  It has since
adopted Antipolo as its permanent site and changed
its name to the Rizal College of Medicine.

In 1985, the
Department of Education, Culture and Sports (DECS) and the Board of Medical
Education (BME) authorized the Commission on Medical Education to conduct a
study of all medical schools in the Philippines.  The report of the Commission showed that the
College fell very much short of the minimum standards set for medical schools.^[1]
The team of inspectors, composed of Doctors Florentino
Herrera, Jr., Elena Ines Cuyegkeng,
Horacio Estrada, Jose V. Silao,
Jr. and Andres L. Reyes, recommended the closure of the school^[2]
upon the following findings, to wit:

(a)  the
College was not fulfilling the purpose for which it had been created because of
its inappropriate location and the absence
in its curriculum of subjects relating to Muslim culture and welfare;

(b)  its
lack of university affiliation hindered its students from obtaining a
“balanced humanistic and scientific” education;

(c)  it
did not have its own base hospital for the training of its students in the
major clinical disciplines, as required by the DECS;

(d)  more than 60% of the
college faculty did not teach in the College full-time, resulting in shortened
and irregular class hours, subject overloading, and in general, poor quality
teaching.

The school disputed these findings as biased and
discriminatory.  At its request, the
Board of Medical Education, in May, 1987, sent another team of doctors^[3]
for a re-evaluation of the College.  After inspection, the team confirmed the
previous findings and recommended the phase-out of the school.^[4]

The first two reports were verified on June 23, 1987 by a third
team of inspectors.^[5]
A year thereafter, the College failed another test — what was in effect the
fourth evaluation of its fitness to continue as a medical school — conducted
on March 4 and 5, 1988 by a team
from the Board of Medical Education determining the eligibility of medical
schools for government recognition.  The
College was adjudged “inadequate” in all aspects of the survey, to wit, college, curriculum,
facilities, teaching hospital, and studentry.^[6]
The inspectors, Doctors Nilo Rosas, Macario Tan and Elena Ines Cuyegkeng, accordingly recommended denial of government
recognition.

Accordingly, the Board of Medical Education recommended to the
DECS the closure of the College, effective the end of the school year
1988-1989.  The College however succeeded
in having the Board form yet another team to review the previous findings.  Doctors Elena Ines Cuyegkeng, Alberto Romualdez, Artemio Ordinario, Joven Cuanang and Nilo L. Rosas conducted their inspection on June 18,
1988.  Their findings:  although there had been a “major effort
to improve the physical plant for classroom instructions and the library,
serious deficiencies remain(ed) in the areas of clinical facilities and library
operations”; “faculty continue(d) to be quite inadequate with no
prospects for satisfactory growth and development”; “student profile
* * (was) below par from the point of view of credentials (NMAT and transfer
records) as well as level
knowledge and preparedness at various stages of medical education,” and
“the most serious deficiency * * (was) the almost total lack of serious
development efforts in academic medicine – i.e., seeming lack of philosophy of
teaching, no serious effort to study curricula, almost non-existent innovative
approaches.” Again, the recommendation was to close the College with
provisions for the dispersal of its students to other medical schools.^[7]

In her letter of June
23, 1988, Secretary Quisumbing informed
the Chairman of the College’s Board of Trustees, Mr. Victor Sumulong,
of the decision of the Board of Medical Education to close the College. Mr. Sumulong instead proposed a gradual phase-out starting the
school year 1989-1990 in order not to dislocate the students and staff and to
minimize financial loss.^[8]
The Board subsequently allowed the College to continue its operations but only
until May, 1989, after which it was to be closed, this decision being
“final and unappealable.” The College was, however, assured of assistance in
the relocation of its students and in its rehabilitation as an institution for
health-related and paramedical courses.^[9]

The College appealed the decision to the Office of the President,
imputing grave abuse of discretion to the Secretary.^[10]
On February 16, 1989,
Executive Secretary Catalina Macaraig, Jr., finding
“no reason to disturb” the contested decision, affirmed it.^[11]

On March 2, 1989,
the College went to court.  It filed Civil Case No. 1385 in the court of
respondent Judge Daniel P. Alfonso against Secretary Quisumbing
in her capacity as Secretary of Education, Culture and Sports, questioning the
decision as illegal, oppressive, arbitrary and discriminatory and applied for a
writ of preliminary injunction to restrain its implementation.

The writ issued as prayed for by order of the respondent Judge
dated May 10, 1989.^[12]
His Honor ruled that the inspection of June
18, 1988 was the principal basis of the closure order, and on such
basis sustained the claim of the College that the inspection was done in an
“arbitrary and haphazard manner” by a team of inspectors who had
already prejudged the school.  Judge
Alfonso held that there was no evidence supporting the findings in the report
of June 18, 1988, and declared that his own ocular inspection of the College
disclosed that the deficiencies mentioned in the report were non-existent, and
that on the contrary, the laboratory and library areas were “big
enough,” and the operations of the proposed base hospital were “going
on smoothly at the time of the ocular inspection.”

The school thereupon promptly advertised in major newspaper
dailies for enrollees in all levels of the medical college and in its pre-board
review classes.^[13]

Hence the present petition, assailing the order of injunction
dated May 10, 1989 as
having been issued with grave abuse of discretion, and praying for a
restraining order against its enforcement as well as for the dismissal of the
action instituted in the court a quo.  The Court on June 1, 1989 ordered the respondent College to desist from
advertising and admitting students, and the respondent judge to refrain from
enforcing his injunction order.

The College in its
Comment would justify its entitlement to the questioned injunction on the
ground that the closure order against which it was directed was issued without
factual basis and in violation of the right of the College to due process of
law, and that it violates MECS Order No. 5 (Series of 1986) to the effect that
the penalty of closure cannot be imposed earlier than three (3) years from the
last evaluation, which in this instance was made on June 18, 1988.

Resort to the Courts to obtain a reversal of the determination by
the Secretary of Education, Culture and Sports that the College is unfit to
continue its operations is in this case clearly unavailing.  There is, to begin with, no law authorizing
an appeal from decisions or orders of the Secretary
of Education, Culture and Sports to this Court or any other Court.  It is not the function of this Court or any
other Court to review the decisions and orders of the Secretary on the issue of
whether or not an educational institution meets the norms and standards required
for permission to operate and to continue operating as such.  On this question, no Court has the
power or prerogative to substitute its opinion for that of the Secretary.  Indeed, it is obviously not expected that any
Court would have the competence to do so.

The only authority reposed in the Courts in the matter is the
determination of whether or not the Secretary of Education, Culture and Sports
has acted within the scope of powers granted him by law and the
Constitution.  As long as it appears that
he has done so, any decision rendered by him should not and will not be subject
to review and reversal by any court.

Of course, if it should be made to appear to the Court that those
powers were in a case exercised so whimsically, capriciously, oppressively,
despotically or arbitrarily as to call for peremptory correction — or stated
otherwise, that the Secretary had acted with grave abuse of discretion, or had
unlawfully neglected the performance of an act which the law specifically
enjoins as a duty, or excluded another from the use or enjoyment of a right or
office to which such other is entitled — it becomes the Court’s duty to
rectify such action through the extraordinary remedies of certiorari, prohibition, or mandamus, whichever may properly apply. 
Yet even in these extreme instances, where a Court finds that there has
been abuse of powers by the Secretary and consequently nullifies and/or forbids
such an abuse of power, or commands whatever is needful to keep its exercise
within bounds, the Court, absent any compelling reason to do otherwise, should
still leave to the Secretary the ultimate determination of the issue of the
satisfaction or fulfillment by an educational institution of the standards set
down for its legitimate operation, as to which it should not ordinarily
substitute its own judgment for that of said office.

In any case, the recorded facts quite clearly fail to support the
College’s claim of grave abuse of discretion tainting the order of closure, and
on the contrary convincingly show the challenged decision to be correct.  From 1985, no less than five (5) surveys were
conducted of respondent institution to determine its compliance with the
minimum standards established for a medical college.  The first survey, that undertaken by the Commission
on Medical Education, disclosed such various and significant deficiencies in
the school as to constrain the inspectors to recommend its closure.  Four (4) other surveys were thereafter made
by as many different committees or teams, at the school’s instance or
otherwise, all of which basically confirmed the results of that first
survey.  Moreover, the findings of all
five (5) surveys were affirmed by the Office of the President.  Indeed, the petitioner, through the Chairman
of its Board of Trustees, to all intents and purposes accepted the validity of
the findings of those five (5) survey groups when it proposed, in 1988, a
gradual phase-out of the school starting in 1989.  The respondent College knew that the
recommendation for its closure was made as early as 1986, that that
recommendation was reiterated and reaffirmed four (4) times thereafter until it
was finally approved and acted upon by the Secretary, whose action was
confirmed by the Office of the President. 
Said respondent was given notice in June 1988, that in consequence of
all these, the time for its definite closure had been unalterably set at May,
1989, a notice which was accompanied by assurances of assistance in the
relocation of its students before June, 1989 and in its rehabilitation as a
school for other courses.  After having
resorted to the whole range of administrative remedies available to it, without
success, it sought to obtain from the respondent Court the relief it could not
obtain from those sources, and — in what can only be described as a deliberate
attempt to frustrate and obstruct implementation of the decision for its
closure as of June, 1989 — openly solicited, by newspaper advertisements or
otherwise, enrolment of new and old students.

Given these facts, and it being a matter of law that the
Secretary of Education, Culture and Sports exercises the power to enjoin
compliance with the requirements laid down for medical schools and to mete out
sanctions where he finds that violations thereof have been committed, it was a
grave abuse of discretion for the respondent judge to issue the questioned
injunction and thereby thwart official action, in the premises correctly taken,
allowing the College to operate without the requisite government permit.  A single ocular inspection, done after the
College had been pre-warned thereof, did not, in the circumstances, warrant
overturning the findings of more qualified inspectors about the true state of
the College, its faculty, facilities, operations, etc.  The members of the evaluating team came from
the different sectors in the fields of education and medicine,^[14] and their judgment in this particular
area is certainly better than that of the respondent Judge whose sole and only
visit to the school could hardly have given him much more to go on than a brief
look at the physical plant and facilities and into the conduct of the classes
and other school activities.  Respondent
Judge gravely abused his discretion in substituting his judgment for theirs.  It is well-settled doctrine that courts of
justice should not generally interfere with purely administrative and
discretionary functions; that courts have no
supervisory power over the proceedings and actions of the administrative
departments of the government involving the exercise of judgment and findings
of facts, because by reason of their special knowledge and expertise over
matters falling under their jurisdiction, the latter are in a better position
to pass judgment on such matters and their findings of facts in that regard are
generally accorded respect, if not finality, by the courts.^[15]
There are, to be sure, exceptions to this general rule but none of them obtains
in this case.

The claim of denial of due process likewise holds no water, as
the record clearly shows that the College was given every opportunity to so
improve itself as to come up to requirements, but remained sadly sub-standard
after the inspections conducted by the evaluating teams.  It had, in fact, admitted its failure to live
up to the desired standards when it proposed its gradual phase-out in its
letter dated June 27, 1988
to Secretary Quisumbing.  It was also precisely because of its
complaints of bias and prejudice that the Board of Medical Education dispatched
new teams to survey and re-evaluate its performance.  It had even gone all the way up to the Office of the President
to seek a reversal of the order of closure. 
There is thus no reason for it to complain of a lack of opportunity to
be heard and to explain its side as well
as to seek reconsideration of the ruling complained of.

There is also no merit in respondent College’s argument that the
closure violated MECS ORDER No. 5, Series of 1986, because it was sought to be
effected before the lapse of the three-year period therein allowed, which in
this case is sought to be counted from June 18, 1988, or the date of the last
evaluation.  The provision referred to
reads:

“The following sanction shall be
applied against any medical school, for failure to comply with the specific
requirements of the essentials, viz.:

x        x         x

c.  Withdrawal
or cancellation of the school’s government authority to operate, for failure to
fully comply with the prescribed requirements after three (3) years from the
last evaluation conducted on the school.”

It must at once be obvious from a reading of the provision,
paragraph c, that the situation therein contemplated — where a school is found
to have failed to “fully comply with the
prescribed requirements,” i.e., has not complied with some requirements
and has failed to do so within three (3) years from the last evaluation — is
quite distinct from that obtaining in the case at bar — where respondent
school was found to have deficiencies so serious as to warrant its immediate
closure.  Said paragraph c should
not be construed to prohibit absolutely the withdrawal or cancellation of
government authority to operate until
after three (3) years from the last evaluation conducted on the school;
or, stated otherwise, it does not unexceptionally prescribe a three-year
waiting period before authority to operate may be withdrawn.  Rather, it should be read as giving the
Secretary of Education the discretion, depending on the seriousness of the
discovered deficiencies, to afford an educational institution which has failed
to comply with some requirement or other, time not exceeding three (3) years to
correct the deficiencies before applying the sanction of withdrawal or
cancellation of the government authority to operate.  The circumstances in the case at bar are far
from normal and, to repeat, are different from those obviously envisioned by
the paragraph in question.  There had
never been a recommendation that the College be granted an opportunity to
comply with certain requirements.  From
the outset, the proposal had been that it be forthwith closed, its discovered
deficiencies as a medical college being of so serious a character as to be
irremediable.  The other four (4) surveys
were conducted, not to determine if in the course of time the petitioner school
had already fully complied with all the prescribed requisites, but rather,
whether or not the original recommendation for its closure was correct and
should be sustained.  And, as already
mentioned, the subsequent surveys, over a period of more than three (3) years,
served but to confirm the validity of that initial proposal for its
closure.  Under these circumstances,
therefore, even if it be assumed that the provision, paragraph c, applied to
petitioner school, it must be
held that there has been substantial compliance therewith.

Having disposed of the issues raised by the facts of the case,
the Court sees no useful purpose to be served by remanding the case to the
Trial Court for further proceedings.  The
only acceptable reason for such a remand would be so that the Trial Court may
determine whether or not the petitioners have acted within the scope of their
powers or grossly abused them, a matter that this Court has already passed upon
here.  Such a remand cannot be justified
on the theory that the Trial Court
will make its own independent determination of whether or not respondent
medical institution has complied with the minimum standards laid down for its
continued operation, since, as here ruled, it has not that power.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is hereby
granted and the temporary restraining order issued by the Court is made
permanent.  The questioned writ of
preliminary injunction dated May 10, 1989 is set aside and respondent Judge is
ordered to dismiss Civil Case No. 1385.

SO ORDERED.

Fernan, C.J., Gutierrez, Jr., Cruz, Paras, Feliciano, Gancayco,
Padilla, Bidin, Sarmiento,
Cortes, Medialdea, and
Regalado, JJ., concur.

Melencio-Herrera, J., No part, Dr. FB Herrera,
Jr., having been a member of the first evaluation team.

Griño-Aquino, J., No part; I was
the legal counsel of the Board of Medical Education before my appointment to
the Court.

^[1]
as embodied in DECS Order No. 5, Series of 1986 on the Essentials and
Requirements for Medical Schools

^[2]
Annex B, Petition

^[3]
to wit, Doctors Serafin J. Juliano,
Elena Ines Cuyegkeng, Macario Tan, Horacio Estrada,
Andres L. Reyes, Jose J. Silao, Jr. and Adolfo A. Trinidad

^[4]
Annex C, Petition

^[5]
composed of Doctors Elena Ines
Cuyegkeng, Nilo L. Rosas, Macario Tan and Artemio Ordinario.  The team
gave the College very poor ratings in all five aspects of the survey
(Administration, College and Curriculum, School, Hospital and Library
Facilities, Faculty Staff and Studentry)

^[6]
Annex E, Petition

^[7]
Annex F, Petition

^[8]
Annex G, Petition

^[9]
Annex I, Petition

^[10]
Annex I, Petition

^[11]
Annex K, Petition

^[12]
Annex A, Petition

^[13]
Annex N, Petition

^[14]
e.g. the Association of Philippine Medical College in the case of Dr. Macario G. Tan and Dr. Elena Ines
Cuyegkeng; the UP College of Medicine and the
Department of Health in the case of Dr. Alberto Romualdez;
the Board of Medicine of the Professional Regulation Commission in the case of
Dr. Artemio Ordinario, and
the DECS, in the case of Dr. Nilo L. Rosas

^[15]
Ateneo de Manila v. CA, 145 SCRA 106, Liangga Bay Logging Co., Inc. v. Lopez Enage, 152 SCRA 80; Alcuaz v.
PSBA, G.R. No. 76353, May 2, 1988