LA CAMPANA FOOD PRODUCTS, INC., PETITIONER, VS. HON. COURT OF APPEALS AND CASCADE COMMERCIAL CORP., RESPONDENTS.

On February 15, 1982, petitioner La Campana Food Products, Inc.
leased a building and lot in Quezon City to private respondent Cascade Commercial Corporation for a period of
4 years beginning March 1, 1982.^[1]

On January 22, 1986, Cascade received a demand letter^[2] from the lessor reading in part as
follows:

In this connection, demands are hereby repeated again made to you
for the full payment of your above rentals in arrears and unpaid water bill in
the total sum of P73,902.00 within a period of three (3) days from your receipt
hereof, otherwise upon your failure, we may forward this matter to our legal
counsel for proper action thereof.

On February 19, 1986, La Campana filed against Cascade a
complaint for ejectment with preliminary attachment in the Metropolitan Trial
Court of Quezon City. The complaint
alleged non-payment of rentals since August 1985 despite repeated demands by
the plaintiff on the defendant. It prayed
that a writ of preliminary attachment be issued for the amount of P73,820.60 to
answer for the unpaid rentals. The
defendant was also asked to vacate the premises and to pay the unpaid rentals in the sum of P73,820.60 plus the
amount of P15,000 monthly starting from March 1986 as the reasonable value of
the use of the premises.^[3]

On April 4, 1986, Cascade filed a Motion to Dismiss and Motion
for Discharge of Attachment.^[4] The
motions alleged that, in view of the circumstances surrounding the case, the
complaint should be considered an action for a sum of money and not
ejectment. Since the amount claimed was
over P20,000, the Metropolitan Trial Court had no jurisdiction. Cascade also alleged that it vacated the
leased premises on March 3, 1986, and that when copies of summons and complaint
were tendered upon it on March 26, 1986, the court could no longer acquire
jurisdiction over it and the subject of the action.

The trial court denied the defendant’s motions on April 15, 1986,
and reconsideration of such denial on June 30, 1986.^[5]

Cascade then filed a petition for review on certiorari
with prohibition in the Court of Appeals, again assailing the jurisdiction of
the Metropolitan Trial Court.^[6] The
petition claimed that there was no allegation in the complaint that Cascade was
unlawfully withholding possession of the leased premises. Instead, it was averred that Cascade was
removing its properties from the leased premises, a clear admission that it had
the intention to voluntarily
vacate the premises upon the expiration of the lease contract. The allegation that the petitioner had
failed to pay the monthly rental amounting to P73,820.60 as of February 1986,
showed that the complaint was for collection of unpaid rentals and not for
ejectment.

Meanwhile, on July 25, 1986, Cascade filed its answer with
counterclaim in the Metropolitan Trial Court praying for the dismissal of the
complaint and the payment to it of actual expenses, moral and exemplary
damages, attorney’s fees, as well as the costs of the suit.^[7]

On July 28, 1986, the Court of Appeals denied the petition filed
by Cascade, holding that it was actually a special civil action for certiorari
and prohibition that should have been filed in the Regional Trial Court.^[8]

Thereafter, in a decision dated April 6, 1987, Judge Pacifico L.
Punzalan of the Metropolitan Trial Court found that the defendant had indeed
vacated the leased premises on March 3, 1986. It also ordered the defendant to pay the plaintiff the sum of P40,237.70
as unpaid rentals (after deducting the rental deposit and withholding tax),
P50,000.00 as attorney’s fees, and the costs of the suit. All the counterclaims were dismissed.^[9]

Cascade appealed to the Regional Trial Court, where it reiterated
the arguments raised in the Court of Appeals questioning the lack of
jurisdiction of the lower court.

On August 24, 1987, Judge Tomas V. Tadeo, Jr. affirmed the
appealed decision and on September 29, 1987, denied reconsideration.^[10]

In its subsequent petition for review before the Court of
Appeals, Cascade again challenged the jurisdiction of the Metropolitan Trial
Court, but this time on a different ground. It pointed out that in the complaint for ejectment, La Campana failed to
allege that prior demands had been made upon the defendant to vacate the premises. This was an indispensable averment and its
omission was fatal. The demands alleged
in the complaint were merely for payment of unpaid rentals.^[11]

On February 8, 1989, the respondent Court of Appeals reversed the
challenged decision^[12] and
dismissed the complaint, holding as follows:

Indeed, to constitute
unlawful detainer, it is not enough for the complainant to allege that
petitioner did not pay the rentals due, because failure to pay rent does not
make unlawful petitioner’s withholding of the leased premises. It is the owner’s demand for the tenant to
vacate the premises, when the tenant has failed to pay the rents on time, and
tenant’s refusal or failure to vacate, which make unlawful the withholding of
possession. The demand to vacate is
indispensable and jurisdictional, and if none is made, the
case falls within the jurisdiction of the Regional Trial Court.

La Campana and, surprisingly, even the trial judge filed separate
motions for reconsideration. On May 11,
1989, the respondent Court of Appeals denied both motions.

The petitioner invokes the case of Golden Gate Realty v.
Intermediate Appellate Court,^[13]
where a motion to dismiss was filed before the Metropolitan Trial Court on the
ground of lack of jurisdiction for failure to allege in the complaint that the
plaintiff had made prior demands on the defendant to vacate the premises. The trial court denied the motion, holding that the
complaint had alleged therein that the plaintiff gave notice to the defendant
that he would be sued for ejectment if he failed to pay the rentals. This Court, agreeing with the lower court, said that there was no necessity to categorically use the word
“vacate” in the lessor’s demand.

The January 20, 1986 letter of La Campana to Cascade, however, is
rather ambiguous. It warned that upon
failure of Cascade to pay the rentals and unpaid water bill, “we may forward
this matter to our legal counsel for proper action thereof.” We do not see
in this statement an unequivocal or even an implied demand on the defendant to
vacate the leased premises. The
doctrine covered in the Golden Gate case is therefore not applicable.

Nevertheless, we will not sustain the finding of the respondent
court that the Metropolitan Trial Court had no jurisdiction over the ejectment
case.

The reason is that the lack of the averment that there was demand
to vacate the premises was never raised by the private respondent in the
Metropolitan Trial Court and the Regional Trial Court, and not even in the
Court of Appeals in G.R. Sp No. 09550. The private respondent had questioned the jurisdiction of the Metropolitan
Trial Court in its Motion to Dismiss on the ground that the action was not for
ejectment but for the collection of a sum of money. The answer it later filed did not raise the lack of the said
allegation but in fact, recognizing the jurisdiction of the court, actually
sought affirmative relief therefrom, thus:

WHEREFORE, after due hearing, defendant prays:

1.    That
the Complaint be dismissed;

2.   That the counterclaim be granted
ordering the plaintiff to pay the defendant:

a. Actual expenses, the
amount of which to be presented during trial;

b. Moral and exemplary damages in an amount
left to the discretion of the Honorable Court;

c. Attorney’s fees in an amount equivalent to
P5,000.00, plus P300.00 per appearance;

d. Cost of suit.

Defendant further prays for such other reliefs and remedies as may
be deemed just and equitable under the premises.

In the case of Jakihaca v. Aquino,^[14] this
Court held on a similar question:

As a general rule, jurisdiction over the subject matter of a case may be objected to at any stage of
the proceeding even on appeal, but this is not without exception. In the case of Tijam v. Sibonghanoy, 23 SCRA
30, cited in Tejones v. Cironella, 159 SCRA 104, We held:

“It is not right for a party who has affirmed and invoked the
jurisdiction of a court in a particular matter to secure an affirmative relief
to afterwards deny that same jurisdiction to escape penalty. Upon this same principle is what we said x x x to the effect that we frown upon the undesirable practice of a
party submitting his case for decision and then accepting the judgment only if
favorable and attacking it for lack of jurisdiction.

Nowhere in the Answer of respondents
contain an allegation attacking
the jurisdiction of the Municipal Trial
Court based on the issue on demand. Again, in PNB v. Intermediate Appellate
Court, 143 SCRA 305, We held:

“While petitioners could have prevented the trial court from
exercising jurisdiction over the case by seasonably taking exception thereto,
they instead invoke the very same jurisdiction by filing an answer and seeking
affirmative relief from it. What is
more, they participated in the trial of the case by cross-examining respondent Planas. Upon that premise, petitioners cannot now be
allowed belatedly to adopt an inconsistent posture by attacking the
jurisdiction of the court to which they had submitted themselves
voluntarily.”

It is settled that where a party voluntarily submits to the
jurisdiction of the court and thereafter loses on the merits, he may not
thereafter be heard to say that the court had no jurisdiction after all. The party is barred from such conduct not
because the judgment or order of the court is valid and conclusive as an
adjudication but because such a practice cannot be tolerated for reasons of
public policy.^[15]

In Sibonghanoy, we held that the defense of lack of jurisdiction
of the court that rendered the questioned ruling was barred by estoppel or
laches, which we defined as “failure or neglect for an unreasonable and
unexplained length of time, to do that which, by exercising due diligence,
could or should have been done earlier. It is negligence or omission to assert a right within a reasonable time,
warranting presumption that the party entitled to assert it has abandoned it or
declined to assert it.” ^[16]

We cannot close this opinion without expressing our disapproval
of the action taken by Judge Tomas V. Tadeo in filing his own motion for reconsideration of the decision of the
respondent court. He should be
admonished for his disregard of a well-known doctrine imposing upon the judge
the duty of detachment in cases where his decision is elevated to a higher
court for its review. The judge is not an
active combatant in such proceeding and must leave it to the parties themselves
to argue their respective positions and for the appellate court to rule on the
matter without his participation. The
more circumspect policy is to recognize one’s role in the scheme of things,
remembering always that the task of a judge is to decide and not to litigate.

WHEREFORE, the decision of the respondent Court of Appeals
is REVERSED and SET ASIDE, and the decision of the Regional Trial Court
affirming the decision of the Metropolitan Trial Court is REINSTATED, with
costs against the private respondents.

SO ORDERED.

Griño-Aquino, Bellosillo, and Quiason,
JJ., concur.

^[1]
Records, Vol. 1, p. 5.

^[2]
Ibid., p. 8.

^[3] Id., p. 1.

^[4]
Id., p. 26.

^[5]
Id., pp. 35, 44.

^[6]
Id., p. 47.

^[7]
Id., p. 79.

^[8]
Id., p. 84; AC-G.R. Sp. No. 09550; penned by Justice Luis A.
Javellana with Zosa, Mendoza V., and Tensuan, JJ., concurring.

^[9]
Id., p. 129.

^[10]
Records, Vol. II, pp. 16, 26.

^[11]
Rollo, p. 50.

^[12]
Ibid, p. 77; penned by Justice Luis A. Javellana, with Cui and
Elbinias, JJ., concurring.

^[13]
152 SCRA 684.

^[14]
181 SCRA 70.

^[15]
Salen vs. Dinglasan, 198 SCRA 623; Abalos vs. Court of Appeals,
196 SCRA 596; F. David Enterprise et al.
vs. IBAA, 191 SCRA 516.

^[16]
Supra.