UNIVERSITY OF THE PHILIPPINES AND UP SCHOOL OF ECONOMICS, PETITIONERS, VS. THE HON. TEODORO P. REGINO, PRESIDING JUDGE, RTC, BR. 84 NATIONAL CAPITAL REGION, Q.C., ANGEL PAMPLINA…

Private respondent
Angel Pamplina, a mimeograph operator at the University of the Philippines School of Economics, was
dismissed on June 22, 1982, after he was found guilty of dishonesty and grave
misconduct for causing the
leakage of final examination questions in Economics 106 under Prof. Solita Monsod.^[1]

His
appeal was denied by the UP Board of Regents, prompting him to seek relief from
the Merit Systems Board (MSB), created under Presidential Decree No. 1409. Under Section 5(1) thereof, the MSB has the
power to “hear and decide administrative cases involving officers and employees
of the civil service.”

The
University of the Philippines filed a motion to dismiss for lack of
jurisdiction on the part of the MSB. UP
relied heavily on the case of University of the Philippines vs. Court of
Appeals,^[2] where it
was held that administrative matters involving the discipline of UP employees
properly fall under the jurisdiction of the state university and the UP Board
of Regents.

The
motion was denied. Thereafter, in its
decision dated July 5, 1985, the MSB exonerated Pamplina and ordered his
reinstatement with back wages.^[3] UP,
represented by its Office of Legal Services, moved for reconsideration, but
this was denied on January 10, 1986.

UP
then appealed to the Civil Service Commission, which on November 4, 1987,
issued Resolution No. 87-428, sustaining the MSB.^[4] The
motion for reconsideration was denied on April 13, 1988.

On June 10, 1988, the petitioners, through their new counsel of
record, the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), filed a second motion for
reconsideration. This was also denied
on August 31, 1988, on the basis of Section 39(b) of PD 807, providing in part
that “only one petition for reconsideration shall be entertained” by the Civil
Service Commission.

Pamplina filed a “Manifestation and Motion for Execution of
Judgment” of the Commission, copy of which was received by the Office of the
Solicitor General on October 4, 1988.^[5] This
was opposed by the petitioners, but in an order dated November 7, 1988, the
Commission granted the motion. Nevertheless, Pamplina was still not reinstated. UP claimed that the resolutions of the
Commission had not yet become final and executory.

Pamplina’s reaction was to file a petition for a writ of mandamus
on November 11, 1988. Judge Teodoro P.
Regino of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City granted the petition on April
27, 1989. The respondents (herein
petitioners) were ordered to immediately reinstate Pamplina “to his former
position as mimeograph operator without change of status as permanent employee with back wages from June
22, 1982, up to his reinstatement, plus salaries for the period of his
preventive suspension covering December 15, 1981 to March 15, 1982.”^[6]

On June 19, 1989, the present petition for certiorari
was filed with this Court to seek the annulment of the decision of the trial court and the orders of the Commission
directing the reinstatement of Pamplina. The petitioners also
pray that the decision of the UP President and Board of Regents ordering
Pamplina’s dismissal be upheld.

UP contends that
under its charter, to wit, Act 1870, enacted on June 18, 1908, it enjoys not
only academic freedom but also institutional autonomy. Section 6(e) of the said Act grants the UP
Board of Regents the power “to appoint, on recommendation of the president of
the university, professors, instructors, lecturers, and other employees of the
university, to fix their compensation and to remove them for cause after an
investigation and hearing shall have been had.” Pamplina was dismissed by
virtue of this provision.

The Civil
Service Law (PD 807) expressly vests in the Commission appellate jurisdiction
in administrative disciplinary cases involving members of the Civil
Service. Section 9(j) mandates that the
Commission shall have the power to “hear and decide administrative disciplinary
cases instituted directly with it in accordance with Section 37 or brought to
it on appeal.” And Section 37(a), provides that, “The Commission shall decide upon
appeal all administrative disciplinary cases involving the imposititon of a penalty of suspension for more than thirty
(30) days, or fine in an amount exceeding thirty days’ salary, demotion in rank
or salary or transfer, removal or dismissal from office.” (Emphasis
supplied)

Under the 1972
Constitution, all government-owned or controlled corporations, regardless of
the manner of their creation, were considered part of the Civil Service.^[7] Under the 1987 Constitution only government-owned or controlled
corporations with original charters fall within the scope of the Civil Service
pursuant to Article IX-B, Section 2(1), which states:

The Civil Service embraces all branches, subdivisions, instrumentalities,
and agencies of the government, including government-owned or
controlled corporations with original charters.”

As a mere government-owned or controlled corporation, UP was clearly a part of the Civil Service under
the 1973 Constitution and now continues to be so because it was created by a special law and has an original
charter. As a component of the Civil Service, UP
is therefore governed by PD 807 and administrative cases involving the
discipline of its employees come under the appellate jurisdiction of the Civil
Service Commission.

Coming now to
the petition itself, we note that the petitioners received a copy of the
resolution denying their motion for reconsideration on April 22, 1988.

In Article IX-A,
Section 7, of the 1987 Constitution, which was already in effect at that time,
it is provided that:

x x x Unless otherwise provided by this Constitution or by law, any
decision, order or ruling of each Commission may be brought to the Supreme
Court on certiorari by the aggrieved party within thirty days
from receipt of a copy thereof.

This provision was reproduced almost verbatim in Section 28 of the Administrative
Code of 1987.

The petitioners
therefore had thirty days from April 22, 1988, or until May 22, 1988, within
which to elevate their case to this Court. They did not do so and instead filed a second motion for reconsideration, which was not allowed under
Article IX, Section 39(b) of PD 807. On top of this, the second motion for reconsideration was filed only on June 10, 1988, or 19 days beyond the 30-day
reglementary period.^[8]

In this
connection, it is stressed that where a motion for reconsideration of a decision, order or ruling of any Constitutional Commission is
denied, the 30-day reglementary period does not begin anew. The petitioner has only the balance of that period (after
deducting the time elapsed before the motion was filed) to come to this Court on certiorari.

The assailed
orders having become final and executory, Pamplina had every right to seek mandamus
to compel their execution. Respondent
Judge Regino was quite correct when he issued the questioned writ.

The case cited
repeatedly by the petitioners, viz. University of the Philippines vs. Court of Appeals,^[9] cannot apply to the present controversy. The reason is that at the time it was promulgated on January 28, 1971, PD 807 had not yet been enacted. PD 807 took effect only in 1975.

In ruling in
that case “that the President and Board of Regents of the University of the
Philippines possess full and final authority in the disciplining, suspension and removal of the civil service
employees of the University, including those of the Philippine General
Hospital, independently of the Commissioner of Civil Service and the Civil
Service Board of Appeals,” Justice J.B.L. Reyes relied on the Civil Service Law
of 1959, which then empowered the Civil Service Commission:

Except as otherwise provided by law, to have final authority
to pass upon the removal, separation and suspension of all permanent officers
and employees in the competitive or classified service and upon all matters relating to the conduct, discipline,
and efficiency of such officers and employees; and to
prescribe standards, guidelines and regulations governing the administration of
discipline; (Emphasis supplied)

Article V,
Section 9(j), of PD 807 simply gives the Commission the power to “hear and
decide administrative disciplinary cases instituted directly with it in
accordance with Section 37 or brought to it on appeal,” without the qualifying
phrase appearing in the above-quoted provision. The petitioners cannot invoke that phrase to justify the special
power they claim under Act 1870.

WHEREFORE, the instant petition for certiorari is DISMISSED and the assailed
decision of respondent Judge Teodoro P. Regino dated April 27, 1989, and the
challenged orders of the Civil Service Commission, are AFFIRMED, with
costs against the petitioners. It is so
ordered.

Narvasa, C.J., Feliciano, Padilla, Bidin, Griño-Aquino,
Regalado, Davide, Jr., Nocon, Bellosillo, Melo, and
Quiason, JJ., concur.

Romero, J., no part.

^[1]
Decision of UP President Edgardo J. Angara
dated June 22, 1982, Rollo, pp. 30-31.

^[2]
37 SCRA 64.

^[3]
Rollo, pp. 88-94. Decision
penned by Commissioner Alfredo B. Deza with the concurrence of Commissioners
Villones and Amilhasan.

^[4]
Rollo, pp. 119-124. Resolution
penned by Commissioner Celerino G. Gotladera with the concurrence of
Commissioners Yango and Deza.

^[5]
Rollo, p. 202.

^[6]
Ibid., pp.
190-195.

^[7]
Article XII-B, Section 1(1).

^[8]
Rollo, p. 171.

^[9]
Supra.