G.R. No. 88105. December 18, 1989
NICOLAS FECUNDO, PETITIONER, VS. HON. RAMON BERJAMEN, PRESIDING JUDGE RTC, BRANCH 20 AND JULIUS SALCEDO, RESPONDENTS.
PADILLA, J.:
Before the Court is a
petition for certiorari with prayer for a restraining order seeking to
inhibit respondent judge, Hon. Ramon Berjamen, of the
Regional Trial Court, Branch 20,
Mambusao, Capiz from
continuing with the trial of an election
protest (Election Case No. M-944) filed by hereÂin private respondent Julius Salcedo against herein petitioÂner. The grounds invoked for the inhibition of
respondent judge are his alleged partiality and bias against petitioner. Said acts of alleged partiality and bias
maybe summarized as follows:[1]
a) Use of unbecoming
language in the order dated 10
February 1988 stating therein … “that the implementation of
the order of this Court is being vehemently opposed by the municipal mayor
(herein petitioner) and his cohorts. Ours is a government of laws and not a government
of rascals. To give in to this kind
of behavior of the respondent and his cohorts, we are just like
savages in the jungle where might is might [sic right].” (emphasis
supplied)
b) Severely
reprimanding and scolding in open court petitioner’s secretary when the latter
filed on behalf of the petitioner a motion to dismiss the election protest,
then angrily adding that non-lawyers/couriers are not entertained by the court,
thereby subjecting the petitioner’s representative to the mockery and ridicule of
private respondent’s supporters who jampacked the
courtroom.
c) Personal interest
of respondent judge shown by inquiring from Arcadio
Hernandez (one of the commissioners in the revision of ballots) about the
procedural maneuvers of petitioner’s counsel.
d) Respondent judge,
beholden to Congressman Villareal whose life size
(half body) picture is displayed in the former’s
office. Villareal
is a known supporter of private respondent who engaged the services of the Villareal law office in the election protest before the
respondent judge. Congressman Villareal allegedly had worked for Judge Berjamen’s appointment to the Bench.
e) Statement of
respondent judge in open court that a motion for reconsideration (of the denial
of the motion to inhibit him) to be filed by petitioner will be denied.
Petitioner’s recourse to
this Court is basically founded on the contention that public respondent’s
above-described conduct, particularly in the election case pending before him,
involving petitioner (as protestee) and private
respondent (as protestant) is not in consonance with the standard of cold
neutrality of an impartial judge and thus he cannot render a fair and impartial
decision in the case.
The incidents leading to
this petition started when petitioner, Nicolas Fecundo,
mayoralty candidate in the MuniÂcipality of Dumalag, Capiz, during the
1988 local elections, won over private respondent Julius Salcedo
with a margin of 100 votes. On 29
January 1988,
private respondent Salcedo filed an election protest
docketed as Election Case No. M-944; a supplemental petition followed on 4 February 1988. The
case was assigned to Branch 20, RTC of Mambusao, Capiz presided over by respondent judge, Hon. Ramon Berjamen. After the
filing of the answer with counter protest, respondent judge issued an order,
dated 1 February 1988,
directing the Municipal Treasurer of Dumalag, Capiz to deliver to the court the ballot boxes subject of
the protest. On 10
February 1988, the
Municipal Treasurer of Dumalag addressed a letter to
respondent judge stating:
“S i r:
This is to inform you that I cannot execute the order of this court dated February 1, 1988, because the
Municipal Mayor of Dumalag, Capiz,
and his cohorts are preventing and threatening me if I insist to bring the
ballot boxes mentioned in your order to your court. My life is presently in danger so I ask your
assistance.
In view of this circumstance, I would like to request that the
Provincial Commander of the Philippine Constabulary, Loctugan
Hills, Roxas
City, be ordered to secure me or to get by themÂselves the ballot
boxes in question.
Thank you.”[2]
The same day, 10
February 1988,
respondent judge issued the order already adverted to. On 3 March 1988, petitioner filed a motion to withdraw his
counter protest. Another order dated 23
February 1988 was
issued for delivery of the ballot boxes and keys covered by the supplemental
petition.[3]
After several hearings
before three (3) commissioners, and based on the view that a protestant must
first be required to present and mark his evidence before the opening and
revision of ballots involved in protestee’s counter
protest, a special civil action for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus
was filed by petitioner with this Court on 27 June 1988[4] seeking to prohibit the respondent court
from proceeding with the election case.
A temporary restraining order was issued on 13 July 1988 by the First
Division of this Court but the petition was ultimately dismissed in a
resolution dated 25 January 1989 for failure to show grave abuse of discretion
or lack or excess of jurisdiction, the questioned order of respondent court
being in accordance with law and conducive to the expeditious disposition of
the election contest.[5]
Hearings were resumed
before respondent judge.
Petitioner filed a motion
for inhibition before the same judge on 18 April 1989 with notice of hearing set on 20 April
1989. Both parties failed to indicate in the
records of this case whether a hearing
actually took place on the motion but an order of 2 May 1989 issued by
respondent judge, denied the motion for non-compliance with the three (3) day
notice rule. No motion for
reconsideration was filed by petitioner due to respondent judge’s statement in
open court on 8 May 1989 that:
“If you intend to file another pleadings, [sic] you can do and
the Court will cross the bridge when it comes to it, without considering the
merits and demerits of this motion, the Court resolved to deny said
motion. So, if you file another one, the
Court will just deny when it received (sic) it.”[6]
These manifestations of
alleged partiality to private respondent (or, perhaps, antipathy to petitioner)
and the fact that petitioner’s counsel was not allegedly furnished a copy of
the 10 February 1988 order, having accidentally discovered the same from the records of the
case only sometime in May 1989,[7] are cited in support of the present
petition.
As prayed for, a temporary restraining order was issued by the
Court in its resolution of 23 May 1989 ordering the respondent judge to cease and
desist from hearing Election Case No. M-944, until further orders from the
Court, simultaneously requiring respondents to file their comments to the
petition[8].
Private respondent Julius
Salcedo contends that petiÂtioner is guilty of
deliberately delaying the resolution of the election contest. This petition, according to private
respondent, is his (petitioner’s) second attempt. The first was also thru a petition for certiorari
(G.R. No. 83779) which was ultimately dismissed by the Court’s First
Division. Now that the probability of
his losing the election case is apparent, petitioner moves for the disqualiÂfication
of the judge.
Petitioner’s charges are
moreover pure inventions, according to private respondent. The incidents constituting alleged bias or
prejudice of respondent judge occurred prior to the filing of the first
petition before the Supreme Court; the present petition is thus a violation of
the omnibus motion rule. Furthermore,
according to private respondent, in bad faith, petitioner has concealed from
the respondent judge the procedural remedies he has availed of.
Respondent judge, for his
part, denies all the accusations, imputing them to petitioner’s wild
imagination, political immaturity and childish mentality. Some words used in the order (10
February 1988) were
merely taken from the letter of the municipal treasurer; the others were
reminders and advice to petitioner to respect and recognize the
authority of the court. This petition,
according to respondent judge, is part of a scheme to delay the disposition of the election case
in violation of the Election Law, which respondent judge is seeking to uphold. He disclaims any utang na loob (debt of gratitude) to Congressman Villareal, and almost proudly states:
“x x
x. If
this fact is true, Cong. VillaÂreal was just paying
the favors he owed the undersigned so that Cong. Villareal
could not influence this representation as to how to decide a case no matter
who the parties are. With the almost
three years in office of this representation, not even one case could the
petitioner cite an instance where Cong. Villareal had
influenced the undersigned in his decisions.
x x x.”[9]
Petitioner’s reply and supplement to the reply insist that his
first petition for certiorari with this Court had a valid reason, i.e.
to prevent private respondent from fishing for evidence with the tolerance and
support of the respondent judge. The
present petition arises from the conviction that there is partiality and bias
of respondent judge. There is no objection to the speedy disposition
of the election case provided that due process is observed, according to the
petitioner.
A motion to allow petitioner to file a reply to the comment of
public respondent was received on 16
September 1989; the reply was filed on 12 October 1989.
Without requiring other pleadings, the Court treated the comments as
answers and gave due course to the petition.
The filing of a previous petition for certiorari with this
Court (ultimately dismissed) is raised by private respondent as an affirmative
defense to the present petiÂtion. An
examination of the records is thus unavoidable.
The prayer of the petition in G.R. No. 83779 reads:
“WHEREFORE, premises considered it is respectfully prayed that
Restraining Order as prayed, be issued and after hearing an Order be issued
declaring the Order dated June 21, 1988 of the public respondent as null and
void, ordering him to require private respondent to formally mark or identify
as exhibits those ballots subject of the protest, present evidence in support
of the petitioner (sic) and further ordering the public respondent, to defer
the opening of the ballot boxes of the counter protested precincts until the
private respondent has presented its (sic) evidence and has rested its [sic]
case on the basis of his Petition.”
The present petition, on
the other hand, moves for inhibition of the respondent judge, on grounds of
bias and partiality, invoking an alleged gross disregard of the Rules of Court.
Rule 137, Sec. 2 states:
Rules 137 – DISQUALIFICATION OF JUDICIAL OFFICERS.
x x x
SEC. 2. Objection that judge
disqualified, how made and effect. – If it be claimed that an official is
disqualified from sitting as above provided, the party objecting to his competency may, in
writing, file with the official his objection, stating the grounds therefor, and the official shall thereupon proceed with the
trial, or withdraw therefrom, in accordance with his
determination of the question of his disqualifiÂcation. His decision shall be forthwith made in
writing and filed with the other papers in the case, but no appeal or stay
shall be allowed from, or by reason of, his decision in favor of his own
competency, until after final judgment in the case.
Petitioner
submits that respondent judge should have met the issues raised by him, one by
one, in his motion to inhibit, instead of rejecting said motion on a
technicality (non-comÂpliance with three (3) day notice rule).
We do not, however, find
any grave abuse of discretion or excess of jurisdiction in respondent judge’s
denial of the motion to inhibit for non-compliance with the three (3) day
notice rule. Section 4, Rule 15 of the
Rules of Court requires that notice of a motion be served by the movant on all parties concerned at least three (3) days
before the hearing thereof. Section 5 of
the same Rule provides that the notice shall be directed to the parties
concerned, and shall state the time and place for the hearing of the
motion. A motion which does not meet the
requirements of Sections 4 and 5 of Rule 15 of the Rules of Court is considered
a worthless piece of paper which the clerk has no right to receive and the
court has no authority to act upon.[10] Service of copy of a motion containing notice of the time and
place of hearing of said motion is a mandatory requirement.[11]
Further, we have to
correct the statement of petitioÂner’s counsel in the supplement to his reply
which reads:
“Petitioner is also aware of the fact that although there are
several election protests pending in the various Regional Trial Courts in the
four Provinces of Panay, it is only in this election
contest where the revision of the protested ballots were already finished and
has reached the stage of presentation of evidence. In short the proceedings so far reached is
way ahead as compared with the other election contests.”[12]
This
contention or observation is a non-sequitur. Tardiness or delay in the disposition of
election cases in other courts does not connote partiality of the presiding
judge in election cases speedily disposed of.
Sec. 258 of the Omnibus
Election Code (BP Blg. 881) provides for the
preferential disposition of election conÂtests within six (6) months after
filing. If judges in the four (4)
provinces of Panay island hearing election cases are
indeed taking their time in deciding such election cases, as alluded to by
counsel, then they are not, certainly complying with the election law.
Moving to the issue of
bias and partiality as grounds
for disqualification, recently, in Genoblazo
v. CA,[13] it was enunciated:
“While it is true that partiality and pre-judgment may
constitute a just or valid reason for the trial judge to voluntarily inhibit
himself from hearing the case, it is not enough that the same be merely
alleged. It is now settled that mere
suspicion that a judge is partial to one of the parties to the case is not
enough; there should be evidence to prove the charge (Beltran v. Garcia, G.R.
No. L-30868, September 31, 1971,
41 SCRA 158.)”
But,
we still have to heed the sound admonition in Santos v. Gutierrez:[14]
“Moreover, second only to the duty of rendering a just
decision, is the duty of doing it in a manner that will not arouse any
suspicion as to its fairness and
the integrity of the Judge.
Consequently, we take it to be the true intention of the law stated in
general terms-that no judge shall preside in a case in which he is not wholly free, disinterested, impartial
and independent (30 Am. Jur. Supra) because–
‘* * * However
upright the judge, and however free from the slightest inclination but to do
justice, there is peril of his unconscious bias or prejudice, or lest any
former opinion formed ex-parte may still linger to
affect unconsciously his present judgment, or lest he may be moved or swayed
unconsciously by his knowledge of the facts which may not be revealed or stated
at the trial, or cannot under the rules of evidence. No effort of the will can shut out memory;
there is no art of forgetting. We cannot
be certain that the human mind will deliberate and determine unaffected by that
which it knows, but which it should forget in that process.'” (Ann. Cas. 1917 A, p. 1235)
In the concurring opinion
of Mr. Justice Teehankee in Beltran vs. Garcia,[15] he said:
“This case should impress upon respondents the intangible
imperatives of not only being actually impartial but also maintaining the appearance
of strict impartiality, so as not to arouse needlessly the suspicions of either
of the parties, as in the case of herein petitioners.
While bias and prejudice are not to be
presumed especially if weighed against a judge’s sacred obligation under his
oath of office to administer justice without respect to person, the Court has
at the same time admonished judges to so conduct themselves and exercise their
discretion in a way that the peoples’ and litigants’ ‘all-important confidence in the impartiality of the judiciary’
is ever nurtured and upheld.”
While the procedural
tactics and/or motives of petitioÂner’s counsel may not be all too laudable, as
it was, for instance, impossible for him to be unaware of the 10
February 1988 order, until sometime in May 1989, because on
p. 3, par. 1 of his petition in G.R. No. 83779 filed on 27 June 1988, he
already alleged:
“The aforementioned Orders for the delivery of the ballot
boxes of the 11 precincts subject of the protest were duly implemented and as a result of which the officials
mentioned in the aforesaid Orders delivered those ballot boxes and the public
respondent took custody of the same.”
yet,
the language employed by the respondent judge in his 10 February 1988 order and
even in his comment on the petition at bar, manifests at the very least an
exasperation bordering on indignation at petitioner and his tactics, which may unecessarily cloud his impartiality in deciding the
election case at hand. A spotless
dispensation of justice requires not only that the decision rendered be
intrinsically fair but that the judge rendering it must, at all times, maintain the appearance of
fairness and impartiality. His
language, both written and spoken, must be guarded and measured, lest the best
of intentions be misconstrued.
To erase any doubt
whatsoever as to the judge’s
bias and/or prejudice against petitioner in Election Case No. M-944, the Court
believes it prudent and better to serve the ends of justice to transfer the said
case to Branch 21, Mambusao, Capiz,
presided over by the newly appointed Judge thereof, Hon. Julius L. Abella.
Considering also that
this is an election contest, Judge Abella is hereby
directed to terminate the proceedings and decide the case within three (3)
months from notice of this decision.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The restraining order issued on 23 May 1989 is made permanent. Let election case No. M-944 be transferred
from Branch 20 to Branch 21, Mambusao, Capiz, presided over by Judge Julius L. Abella
who shall terminate proceedings therein and decide the case within three (3)
months from notice of this decision.
SO ORDERED.
Fernan, C.J., Narvasa,
Melencio-Herrera, Gutierrez, Jr., Cruz, Paras, Feliciano, Gancayco, Bidin, Sarmiento, Cortes, Griño-Aquino, Medialdea, and Regalado, JJ., concur.
[1]
Petition, pp. 3-5, Rollo at 4-6
[2]
Rollo at 72
[3]
Records of G.R. No. 83779, Rollo at 38 and 39
[4]
First Division – docketed as G.R. No. 83779
[5]
Per records of G.R. No. 83779
[6]
Rollo at 81
[7]
Rollo at 98
[8]
Ibid., p. 64
[9]
Rollo, pp. 132-133, G.R. No. 88105
[10]
Philippine Virginia Tobacco Administration v. de los Angeles, G.R. No. L-27829, 19 August 1988
[11]
Sembrano v. Ramirez, G.R. No. L-45447, 28 September 1988
[12]
Rollo at 138
[13]
G.R. No. 79303, 20 June 1989
[14]
112 Phil. 184, G.R. No. L-15824, May
30, 1961
[15]
Beltran v. Garcia, G.R. No. L-30868, September 31, 1971, 41 SCRA 158