HOME SAVINGS BANK & TRUST CO., PETITIONER, VS. HON. COURT OF APPEALS, CESAR D. DE ASIS AND DAISY B. DE ASIS, RESPONDENTS.
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Home Savings Bank versus De Asis
The Case
This is a petition for certiorari brought by Home Savings Bank and Trust Company against the Court of Appeals and the spouses Cesar and Daisy De Asis. The spouses sued the bank and several other defendants in the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, asking the court to declare that their obligation to the bank had already been extinguished by compensation, to nullify a foreclosure and public auction of their property, and to award damages. The case matters because it draws a bright line between two things students often confuse: the hypothetical admission of the facts alleged in a complaint when a motion to dismiss is resolved, and the demurrer to evidence, which truly cuts off a party's right to be heard. It teaches that no defendant may be denied its day in court simply because a co-defendant's motion to dismiss succeeded.
Procedural History
The spouses De Asis filed their complaint in the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City. Before trial on the merits could begin, two of the defendants, Abelardo Licaros and Concepcion Licaros, moved to dismiss, and the trial court granted the motion and dismissed the complaint. The trial court reasoned that since the plaintiffs sought to pierce the corporate veil and treat all the defendants as one and the same person, the dismissal should benefit all of them, including those who never joined the motion. The spouses appealed to the Court of Appeals, which set aside the order of dismissal. The appellate court held that the trial court could not dismiss the case against the other defendants on its own initiative, without any formal motion from them, and that doing so amounted to grave abuse of discretion. The Court of Appeals remanded the case for continuation of proceedings and reception of evidence. The bank's motion for reconsideration was denied, so the bank came to the Supreme Court by petition for certiorari.
Facts
Sometime in February 1984, the spouses De Asis filed a complaint against Home Savings Bank and Trust Company, Trident Mining and Industrial Corporation, Olympic Mines and Development Corporation, and the Licaros family. They alleged that their obligation to the bank in the amount of 636,537 pesos and 80 centavos had been fully paid through compensation, that is, by setting it off against the obligations owed to them by Trident and Olympic. They also asked that the foreclosure of their mortgage and the coming public auction of their property be declared void for violating the provisions of Act Number 3135, as amended, and they prayed for moral, exemplary, and actual damages, attorney's fees, and costs.
Before trial could commence, Abelardo Licaros and Concepcion Licaros moved to dismiss the complaint, and the trial court granted the motion. The trial court justified the dismissal as to all defendants by saying that the plaintiffs themselves had chosen to treat all the defendants as one and the same person.
The Court of Appeals reversed, finding no factual basis for saying the other defendants had joined the motion. It remanded the case so that the trial court could receive evidence on whether any balance remained after compensation, whether the foreclosure should be set aside, and whether damages should be awarded. Home Savings Bank then elevated the matter to the Supreme Court.
Issues
- Whether or not the Court of Appeals erred in treating the bank as having actually admitted the allegations of the complaint, rather than merely hypothetically admitting them for purposes of the motion to dismiss.
- Whether or not the remand ordered by the Court of Appeals, which allowed the other defendants their day in court, effectively denied the bank its own day in court and its right to present evidence.
Applicable Provisions
Section 1 of Rule 35 of the Rules of Court, on the effect of a judgment on a demurrer to evidence, provides:
Section 1. Effect of judgment on demurrer to evidence. After the plaintiff has completed the presentation of his evidence, the defendant without waiving his right to offer evidence in the event the motion is not granted, may move for a dismissal on the ground that upon the facts and the law the plaintiff has shown no right to relief. However, if the motion is granted and the order of dismissal is reversed on appeal, the movant loses his right to represent evidence in his behalf.
This provision is the contrast the Court uses: only a granted demurrer to evidence strips a party of the right to present evidence, and a motion to dismiss is not a demurrer to evidence.
Ruling
On the first issue, the Court ruled for the bank. It agreed with the Court of Appeals that the trial court erred in precipitately dismissing the complaint, but it held that the bank could not thereby be denied its day in court. In resolving a motion to dismiss, the truth of the facts alleged in the complaint is theoretically admitted, but this admission is merely hypothetical and only for the purpose of resolving the motion. If the motion is denied, the movant is not deprived of the right to submit its own case and to present evidence against the allegations in the complaint. Neither does the grant of the motion by the trial court, and its later reversal by an appellate court, foreclose that right.
On the second issue, the Court drew the line against the demurrer to evidence:
This rule must not be confused with a demurrer to evidence under Section 1, Rule 35, of the Rules of Court which, if granted by the trial court, will have the effect of disentitling the movant to submit further evidence and of allowing the appellate court, on appeal, to decide the case on its merits on the basis of the evidence theretofore adduced.
Because the bank's motion was a motion to dismiss and not a demurrer to evidence, the bank retained its right to be heard. The Court therefore modified the decision of the Court of Appeals so as to allow the bank its day in court.
Doctrine
First, the admission of the facts alleged in a complaint, when a motion to dismiss is resolved, is merely hypothetical and exists only for the purpose of resolving that motion. Second, the denial of the motion, or its grant followed by reversal on appeal, does not deprive the movant of the right to present evidence and to contest the allegations. Third, only a demurrer to evidence under Section 1 of Rule 35, when granted, cuts off the movant's right to offer evidence and allows the appellate court to decide the case on the record. A motion to dismiss is not a demurrer to evidence, and the two must never be equated.
Disposition
The bank won: the Supreme Court modified the decision and resolution of the Court of Appeals by allowing Home Savings Bank its day in court, with no costs.
Remember This
Memorize the line that a motion to dismiss admits the facts only hypothetically, while a granted demurrer to evidence forfeits the right to present evidence. Examiners use this case to test the difference between a motion to dismiss and a demurrer to evidence, and to test whether a defendant who never joined a co-defendant's motion may still be heard.