THE ROMAN CATHOLIC BISHOP OF NUEVA SEGOVIA, PLAINTIFF AND APPELLEE, VS. THE MUNICIPALITY OF BANTAY, ILOCOS SUR, DEFENDANT AND APPELLANT.

The prayer of; the complaint in this action is that certain lands therein
described, now in the possession of the defendant municipality, be “declared to
be the property of the plaintiff” and that “the defendant be ordered to deliver
these lands to the plaintiff.”

In support of his contentions plaintiff relies wholly and exclusively on a
single document (Exhibit A), read together with the testimony of a single
witness. No other evidence was offered in support of the allegations of the
complaint.

Exhibit A is, in the language of the trial judge, “a certificate issued by
the provincial fiscal of Ilocos Sur, in his capacity of register of deeds of the
Province of Ilocos Sur, wherein it is set forth that the Church of Bantay,
Ilocos Sur, then represented by its former parish priest, applied for a
possessory information of the properties in question and in the proceedings had
for the purpose proved the possession of the Church of Bantay, Ilocos Sur, now
the plaintiff, over the said properties for a period of more than thirty years,
in which proceedings record was also made of the encumbrances that bear on the
real estate mentioned and which are as follows:

“(1) That the church, the initiator of these proceedings, shall never sell,
mortgage, or alienate the properties without the knowledge and consent of the
residents of the pueblo of Bantay, who donated them to the said church; (2) that
the usufruct of the said lands shall, upon payment of rent, or canon, always
pertain to the residents of the pueblo of Bantay; (3) that the administration of
the properties shall always lie with the parish priest of the church of the said
pueblo; and, (4) that, when the municipality has not sufficient revenue to meet
its required expenditures, an amount not exceeding P200 may be expended for this
purpose from the income of the said land.

“On April 18, 1895, the parcels above mentioned, together with the charges on
each of them, were recorded in the property registry of the Province of Ilocos
Sur, section of the pueblo of Bantay, by virtue of the said possessory
information.”

It nowhere, appears that the defendant municipality was cited to appear, or
did in fact appear in the course of the proceedings.

The single witness called on behalf of the plaintiff testified substantially
as follows: That he was a clerk (escribiente) of the Church at Bantay; that he
had formerly been one of the headmen (principalia) of the municipality of
Bantay; that formerly the lands in question were owned by the citizens of Bantay
administered by the headmen (principalia) of that municipality; that thereafter
the headmen of the town donated the land in question to the Church of Bantay;
that although he himself signed the document donating the land he could not say
when it was executed; that the parish priest at one time was administrator of
the land in question, but he was not able to say when or under what conditions;
that he knew that this was so, because in the performance of his duties as a
clerk of the church, he remembered having helped to store the crops from these
lands underneath the convent of the Church of Bantay, though he could not say
when nor how often this had been done.

In connection with the testimony of this witness it is worthy of observation
that in the “informacion posesoria” executed in 1895 at the instance of the
parish priest of Bantay, there is no intimation that the alleged donation of the
lands in question was made or evidenced in a written instrument. On the
contrary, in reference to one of the smaller parcels included in the larger
tract now in question, we find the following:

“Friar Lizardo Villanueva, an Augustinian brother and parish priest of the
pueblo of Bantay, went to the justice of the peace court of that town and prayed
that he be allowed to prove that the church under his charge had been in
possession of the above-described hacienda for more than thirty years; that it
had acquired it by donation from the residents of the said pueblo, and that the
property had been acquired without any written instrument.”

This express admission, taken together with the fact that in the execution of
the “informacion posesoria” in the year 1895, the applicant, the parish priest
of Bantay, relied wholly on the oral testimony of a few witnesses in support of
his allegations as to a gift (donaci6n) from the municipality of the entire
tract, and made no claim that the alleged gift had been made in writing, and the
further fact that no Written instruments were offered at the trial of the case
at bar other than the “informacion posesoria” justifies the inference that no
writing evidencing the alleged gift was in fact executed. And however this may
be, it is certain that the existence of such a writing was neither alleged nor
proven in the court below.

The evidence submitted on behalf of the defendant municipality consisted in
part of authentic, undisputed documents, conclusively establishing the fact that
two of the parcels of land composing the entire tract in question were conveyed
to the defendant municipality by the Augustinian Fathers in or about the years
1791 and 1803; and that the third was conveyed to it by one Dona Calixta del
Castillo about 1851. The fact that this property was thus acquired by the
defendant municipality is not denied by the plaintiff, who, indeed, claims title
through the municipality by virtue of an alleged gift (donacion).

Two witnesses, former headmen of the municipality of Bantay, were called by
jthe defendant municipality, who swore positively that no such gift had ever
been made as that alleged in the complaint, and that neither the church nor its
representatives ever had possession or control of the land in question.

It is manifest that plaintiff’s allegations of title and of right to
possession, as set forth in the record in this case, must stand or fall in
accordance with the effect which should be given to the registered “informacion
posesoria” (possessory information) prepared in the month of March, 1895, and
registered on the 18th of April of that year. Indeed, counsel for plaintiff rest
their contentions in this court wholly and exclusively on the probative value
which they insist should be accorded that instrument.

“Possessory informations” of the nature of the one under consideration herein
were ex parte proceedings had before a judge of first instance or a justice of
the peace, wherein one in possession of real estate, claiming the right to
possession, was permitted after notice to the adjoining landowners to set forth
the fact that he was in actual possession of such real estate and the nature of
the title under which he claimed the right of possession, and to call such
witnesses and to produce such evidence in support of his claim as he thought
necessary and proper. If the evidence thus submitted appeared to be
satisfactory, and the applicant’s claims were not successfully rebutted by some
interested person the proceedings were approved by the judge before whom they
were had, who at the same time ordered that they be registered “without
prejudice to third persons having a better right in the premises.” From a
consideration of the very nature of such ex parte proceedings it is
clear that in themselves they could in no event have the effect of prejudicing a
third person who has a better right to the ownership than the claimant in the
possessory proceedings. When executed in due form, they furnish, at most, prima
facie evidence of the fact that at the time of their execution, the claimant was
in possession, claiming the right to possession as set forth in his application.
Accordingly we find in article 394 of the Mortgage Law the following:

“The period of possession which appears to have elapsed at the time said
entries are made shall be computed for the prescription which does not require a
just title, unless a person prejudiced thereby denies it, in which case said
period of possession must be proven in accordance with the common law.

“Entries of possession shall prejudice or favor third , persons from the date
of their record, but only with regard to the effects which the laws attribute to
mere possession.

“The entry of possession shall not prejudice the person who has a better
right to the ownership of the realty, although his title has not been recorded,
unless the prescription has confirmed and secured the claim recorded. Between
the parties the possession shall be effectual from the date prescribed by the
common law.”

It is true that provision is made whereby the possession evidenced by a
registered possessory information may ripen and be converted into a record of
ownership after twenty years of uninterrupted possession have elapsed from the
date of entry (art. 393, Mortgage Law), but the title thus secured is no more
than a statutory title by prescription, and, as we have seen, until the full
period of twenty years has elapse, a registered possessory information cannot
prejudice a third person with a better right in the premises. It is true also
that under the provisions of the Maura Law, persons holding under a registered
possessory information secured during the very short period during which it was
in force, were given a title—as against the Government—to public lands claimed
by them; but the provisions of this law in no wise affected the rights of
claimants other than the Government itself. It is very clear therefore, that the
possessory information submitted by plaintiff in the case at bar cannot prevail
against the authentic and undisputed proof of title to the lands in question in
the defendant municipality.

Let judgment be entered reversing the judgment entered in the court below and
dismissing the complaint filed in this case, without costs to either party.

Arellano, C, J., Torres, Moreland, Trent, and Araullo, JJ.,
concur.