PHILIPPINE AIRLINES, INC., PEDRO MARTIRES, JR. AND MANUEL PANLILIO, PETITIONERS, VS. NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION, LABOR ARBITER EDGARDO M. MADRIAGA, CARMENCITA NANNETTE …

This is a petition for certiorari with prayer for a
preliminary injunction and/or restraining order seeking reversal of the
decision of public respondent National Labor Relations Commission dated
November 29, 1988 ordering, inter alia,
reinstatement of private respondent Carmencita
Nannette G. De Veyra to her former position with backwages; and its resolution dated February 21, 1989
denying the motion for reconsideration.

The antecedent facts are as follows:

On September 11, 1987, private respondent Carmencita
Nannette G. De Veyra, a Duty Manager, filed a
complaint for illegal suspension, non-payment of salaries and other benefits, as well as moral and exemplary damages
against petitioners Philippine Airlines, Inc., Pedro Martires, Jr. and Manuel Panlilio.  Conciliation conferences were conducted on
September 30, 1987 and October 9, 1987. 
However, in the conciliation hearing on October 26, 1987, De Veyra’s counsel manifested that due to her dismissal in the
interim, they are no longer willing to settle the case amicably.  Hence, without prejudice to the filing of an
amended complaint by De Veyra, both parties were
directed to file their position papers on November 12, 1987 and their replies
thereto on November 23, 1987, after which the case will be deemed submitted for
decision.

On October 27, 1987, De Veyra filed an amended complaint for illegal suspension,
illegal dismissal and unpaid wages with claim for reinstatement; actual, moral
and exemplary damages; and attorney’s fees and cost of suit.

On November 23, 1987, PAL
submitted its position paper, alleging the following facts (pp. 47-50, Rollo):

“‘Sometime in August of 1987, the Internal Audit and control
(sic) Department of (PAL) conducted a review of the tickets issued by the
Interline Ticket Counter located at the 6th Floor of PAL Building because of
the uncovering of widespread fraud and manipulation of tickets by several (of
its) employees that led to their eventual termination from the firm.

“‘It was on this occasion that said department was able to
confirm cases of tampering and fraudulent manipulation of official documents
some of which involve the travel documents of x x x, Nannette de Veyra then Senior
Supervisor, ASD, and her dependents.  A
memo was issued by the Vice?President of Internal Audit and Control
Department to this effect addressed to the Senior Vice-President for Customer
Services Group, x x x.  As stated therein, the priority
classifications were tampered with enabling (De Veyra)
and her dependents to travel first class knowing very well that they are not
entitled to that privilege.

“’On August 26, 1987, a Notice of Administrative charge was sent to
(De Veyra) charging among others (sic) the fact of
knowingly using falsified trip passes to reflect a higher priority and space
classification than what she and her dependents were entitled to on vacation
travel.  Being at Senior Supervisory
level at the Passenger Handling Division with access to all aspects of our
airport operations including computer terminals installed at the airport, in
view of this incident, her presence therein was deemed a threat to company
property and to the normal operations of the company so she was place (sic) on
preventive suspension.  x x x.

“‘On September 11, 1987, (De Veyra)
submitted a letter informing the Director of PAL Manila Station International that she hired the services of a
lawyer thereby requesting for additional time within which to study and
evaluate her defense, x x x.

“‘On September 18, 1987, the Director-PAL MSI replied,
granting her request for extension of time to file her Answer to the
Administrative Charge until September 29, 1987, x x x.

“’On September 24, 1987, (De Veyra)
submitted here (sic) sworn statement alleging among others (sic) that the
tampering was done by somebody else, x x x.

“‘On October 16, 1987, the Director-PAL MSI issued a memo
terminating the services of (De Veyra) after
evaluating the evidences (sic) on record for serious misconduct in the use of
trip passes which were falsified to reflect higher priority and space
classification than what she and her spouse were entitled to on vacation travel
in violation of the Company policy on travel priority and of the PAL Code of
Discipline, x x x.

” ‘x x x.’
“

On the other hand, De Veyra in her
position paper alleged the following facts (pp. 50-57, Rollo):

“’1.  (De Veyra) joined
(PAL) as a Facilitation Representative sometime in 1967.

2.    Because of sheer hardwork
(sic) and consistent superlative performance, (De Veyra)
rose from the ranks and held the positions of Senior Ground Stewardess, Ticket
Representative, Traffic Representative, Shift Supervisor, Supervisor, Senior
Supervisor and finally Duty Manager until her illegal dismissal from the
Company’s employ on 26 August 1987.

3.    In recognition of her exemplary performance
while in the Company’s employ, (De Veyra) received
several commendations.  To cite a few:

(a) Commendation dated 24 April 1971- Case of COD Exec. Baggage-Mr. A. Mutuc, from station
manager, MSI;

(b) Commendation dated 14 February 1973-from Supervisor-Ramp
Handling;

(c) Commendation dated 26 March 1973-from Station Manager, Mnl. Stn. Int’l;

(d) Commendation dated 19 May 1973-from Manager, Mnl. Stn. Int’l;

(e) Letter of Appreciation dated 3 July 1980-from Manager
Commercial Training Division, PAL Development Academy;

(f) Commendation dated 16 February 1981-from Director, MSI; and

(g) Commendation dated 20 May 1981-from Director, MSI.

There are many others which are not presently in the possession of (De
Veyra) but are filed with the Company records.  x x
x.

4.  Sometime in August 1986, while performing her
duties as Senior Supervisor at the Manila International Airport, Ms. Minda Santiago, a Mabuhay Club
member (Travel Agent) and a long time acquaintance (sic), approached (De Veyra) and inquired about the planned trip of her husband
to the United States.  (De Veyra) informed Ms. Santiago that her husband’s trip was
not yet definite since it might distrupt (sic) their
planned vacation tour to Europe sometime in October 1986 where they will both
avail of her trip pass privilege from the Company.  A trip pass privilege is a privilege to
travel via the Company’s airlines free of charge or at certain discounted rates
granted to qualified employees and their relatives.

5.  Upon learning that (De Veyra’s)
husband’s trip was still tentative, Ms. Santiago offered to help the former’s husband to go on a quick U.S. trip.  She also offered to secure first class accomodation (sic) for both (De Veyra)
and her husband when she found out that the former was only entitled to a
maximum of executive class accomodation (sic) as a
senior supervisor representing that she was close to the Company’s top
executives and could easily get the required authorization for the upgrading of
their accomodation (sic).

6.  Relying on her representations and it being ac
(sic) common knowledge that she has strong, (sic) influence in the Company and
with high government officials, and aware that upgrading of trip pass accomodations (sic) of even the non-managerial employees is
a common practice in the company, (De Veyra) sent her
trip pass No. 883125 to Ms. Santiago’s Office (Sanyo Travel) for her Husband’s
(sic) ticket on 18 August 1986.

7.  Sometime in the afternoon of 19 August 1986,
Ms. Santiago phoned to inform (De Veyra) that her
husband’s ticket was ready for pick up. 
(De Veyra) had the ticket picked-up the
following morning, 20 August 1986.  On
the same date (De Veyra’s) husband used ticket No.
079-4401 2138460/461 with priority classification Y/F (First Class) on his trip
to the U.S.  However, on his return to
Manila on 26 August 1986, he was accomodated (sic)
only in an economy class.

8.  Sometime after her husband’s return to Manila,
(De Veyra) was able to talk to Ms. Santiago where she
narrated to the latter the embarassment experienced
by her husband on his return trip to Manila when he was given only an economy
class accomodation (sic) despite his ticket bearing
the Y/F status.  After having been
informed of this, Mrs. Santiago promised (De Veyra)
that it will not happen again and offered to have her own accomodation
(sic) upgraded to first class for her emergency trip to Washington, U.S.A.

9.  Again, relying on her representations, (De Veyra) sent her trip pass RRO No. 874047 dated 8 September
1986 to Ms. Santiago’s Office as what she had earlier done with respect to
TP/PRO No. 883125 dated 18 August 1986.

10.  On 12 September 1987, Ms. Santiago phoned (De Veyra) informing her that her ticket to the U.S. was ready
for pick up.  (De Veyra)
then instructed her driver to get said ticket. 
On 14 September 1986, (De Veyra) used her
ticket No. 079-440/2234490/489 to the U.S. and (came) back to Manila on 26
September 1986, both via first class accomodation
(sic).

11.  Meanwhile, on 16 June 1987, (De  Veyra) was promoted
to the position of Duty Manager by higher
management in recognition of her consistent hard work and efficiency despite
the reluctance of her superiors Messrs. Panlilio and Martirez (who) were forced to sign (De Veyra’s)
promotion since she was the most qualified among the contenders to the
position.

12.  Suddenly, much to (De Veyra’s)
surprise, she received a copy of a Notice of Administrative Charge dated 26
August 1987 signed by Mr. Pedro Martirez, Jr. informing her that based on an investigation
conducted by the Company’s Internal Audit and control (sic) Department, she and
her husband were found to have used trip passes which were falsified to reflect
a higher priority and space classification than what they were entitled to.  In the same Notice, she was informed that
effective upon rer (sic) receipt of the Notice, she
is being placed on preventive suspension since her continued employment poses a
serious and imminent threat to the life of her other co-employees and/or to the
property of the Company.  She actually
received the Notice on 4 September 1987. 
She was further given ten (10) days from 4 September 1987 within which
to submit her sworn statement/counter-affidavit in answer to the charges
against her, together with the sworn statements/affidavits of her witnesses in
support of her answer as to why she should not be dismissed from her
employment.  x x x.

13.  (De Veyra) was
placed under preventive suspension without giving her the opportunity to be
heard, therefore violative of her fundamental right to due process and in utter disregard of the pertinent
provisions of the Company’s Code of Discipline x x x;

x x x

14.  In a letter dated 13
September 1987, (De Veyra) requested for a fifteen
(15)-day extension of time within which to submit her sworn statement and for
the lifting of her preventive suspension for lack of legal basis.  x x
x.

15.  Meanwhile, on 14 September 1987, (De Veyra) filed a complaint for illegal suspension,
non-payment of salaries and all other benefits and moral and exemplary damages.

16.  In a Memorandum dated 18 September 1987,
signed by Mr. Pedro M. Martires, Jr., (De Veyra’s) request for extension was granted while her
request for the immediate lifting of her preventive suspension was denied.  x x
x.

17.  Because of the serious charges levelled against her by the Company, (De Veyra) engaged the services of undersigned counsel.

18.  In
a letter dated 23 September 1987, undersigned counsel submitted (De Veyra’s) sworn statement in compliance with the Notice of
Administrative Charge, where she vehemently denied the charges against her,
while formally demanding for the immediate lifting of her preventive suspension
and the immediate setting of her case for hearing to enable her, with the
assistance of counsel, to prevent (sic) evidence in support of her
defense.  x x x.

19.  In a Memorandum dated 7 October 1987 signed by
Mr. Martires, Jr., (De Veyra)
was informed by the Company that in view of (sic) request for an extension of
15 days to answer the administrative charge against her, the duration of her
preventive suspension without pay and benefit is also adjusted to end on 18
October 1987 or more than 30 days, in violation of the provisions of the Labor
Code and its implementing rules and regulations.  x x
x.

20.  Suddenly, without conducting the formal
investigation demanded by undersigned counsel dated 23 September 1987 x x x, the company issued a
Memorandum dated 16 October 1987 informing (De Veyra)
that her employment with the Company is terminated effective 26 August 1987,
retroactive (to) the date she was placed on preventive suspension in violation
of her right to due process and in an apparent attempt to cure the illegality
of her preventive suspension.  x x x.  It must be noted that (De Veyra’s)
preventive suspension actually commenced upon her receipt of the Notice of
Administrative Charge on 4 September 1987.

21.  By dismissing (De Veyra)
without a formal investigation (having been) conducted, the Company again
violated the pertinent provisions of its Code of Discipline x x x:

x x x

22.   On 27 October 1987, (De Veyra)
filed an amended complaint for illegal dismissal, illegal suspension, unpaid
wages, reinstatement of other benefits under Company policies and practices and
the CBA, actual, moral and exemplary damages, attorney’s fees and cost of suit.

23.   Based on the annexes attached to the 14
August 1987 Memorandum of the Vice President Internal Audit & Control to
Mr. Ricardo G. Paloma, SVP-Customer Services, there
is no showing that trip pass Nos. 883125 and 874047 were even falsified.  x x
x.  Even
assuming that what were falsified were the audit coupons neither (De Veyra) nor her husband could, under any circumstances have
any control, or even see them, therefore, negating any
possibility that they could have participated in the completion of said
coupons.  Moreover, the two (2) tickets
were issued by two different Ticket Clerks as shown by said annexes.

24.   Further, having used tickets bearing a higher
passage classification than what is normally given to (De Veyra)
and her husband, should not be taken against her since it is a known practice
in the Company.  It could be easily done
by mere verbal advice of the Company’s appropriate officials.  It was only in 1987 when the Company became
strict in allowing upgradings because of the rampant
occurrences and issued a written Memorandum to that effect.  Therefore, in using said tickets, (De Veyra) and her husband acted in utmost good faith and were
not participants in any wrong doing (sic) (if any), which could constitute a
ground for the Company to have lost its trust and confidence in her.

x x x.’ ”

On May 31, 1988, the Labor Arbiter rendered its decision, the dispositive portion of which reads (p. 82, Rollo):

“WHEREFORE, premises considered, respondents are declared to have
illegally suspended and dismissed complainant, and are hereby ordered to
reinstate her to her former position with full backwages
and other benefits provided by law until actually reinstated.

“Furthermore, respondents are hereby ordered to pay complainant
P200,000.00 in moral damages, P100,000.00 in exemplary damages, as well
as attorneys (sic) fees and costs of the suit.

“SO ORDERED.”

On appeal, the Labor Arbiter’s decision
was modified by the NLRC, the dispositive portion of
which reads (pp. 66-67, Rollo):

“WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered as follows:

“a) declaring the dismissal of complainant-appellee
as illegal;

“b)
respondents-appellants are ordered to reinstate complainant-appellee
to her former position with full backwages until
reinstated but not to exceed three (3) years. 
The price difference between the upgraded first class tickets and the
economy class tickets should be deducted from the backwages;

“c) the award of moral and exemplary
damages are deleted.

“SO ORDERED.”

The motion for reconsideration was denied
(p. 68, Rollo).  Hence, the present petition.

On April 10, 1989, We issued a temporary
restraining order enjoining the execution of the questioned decision and
resolution of the NLRC (pp. 98-99, Rollo).

The issue is whether or not De Veyra
was dismissed illegally from employment.

PAL imputes grave abuse of discretion on the part of the
NLRC:  (1) in disregarding its evidence
and the ineluctable conclusions therefrom; (2) in
holding that there was no basis for PAL’s loss of
trust and confidence in De Veyra; (3) in holding that De Veyra was not afforded due process; and (4) in ordering
reinstatement of De Veyra notwithstanding existing
jurisprudence on the matter.

For a clearer appreciation of the circumstances which led to the
dismissal of De Veyra from employment, it is
necessary to discuss first PAL’s policy on trip pass
benefit and the mechanics for availment thereof.  Among the various fringe benefits PAL extends
to its employees is a trip pass benefit which entitles these employees as well
as their dependents to travel via PAL free of charge.  This benefit, however, is subject to company
policies, rules and regulations.  The
extent of the benefit depends upon the employee’s rank, position and years of
service with the company.  De Veyra, who was at that time Senior Supervisor, was entitled
to economy class accommodation (pp. 83-85, Rollo).  An employee eligible for a trip pass must
apply therefor by accomplishing an application form
(p. 86, Rollo).  Tickets are then issued against the trip pass
authorization.  In the issuance of the ticket, the issuing clerk at
the ticket office writes on the blank portions of the audit coupon certain data
including the priority and travel classification code of the employee.  Entries written on the audit coupon are
automatically reproduced by carbon copying on the succeeding flight
coupons.  In the case of De Veyra’s tickets, entries written on the audit coupons were
different from the entries written on the flight coupons.  The priority code first written on the audit
coupons was Q/G4/F or first class.  This
was reproduced on the flight coupons. 
Thereafter, “Y” was superimposed an “F,” and
“C” was added after “Y” but only on the audit coupons.  Thus, as a result thereof, the priority code
on the audit coupons seemed to be Q/G4/YC to make it appear to the accountants of PAL that it conformed with the travel priority of De Veyra
appearing on the travel authorization, which was Q/G4/YC or economy class (pp.
86-87, Rollo).  As
regards De Veyra’s husband, his priority
classification was S/H5/Y or economy class. 
The audit coupons of his tickets did not indicate said code.  However, on the “Fare Basis” column
on the audit coupons, letter “Y” was written.  In contrast, the flight coupons of said
tickets showed priority code Q/F3/Y/F or first class written on the “Tour
Code” column.  On the “Fare
Basis” column, a capital letter “F” was written following letter
“Y” and therefore read “Y/F.” Priority Code Q/F3/Y/F
corresponds to the travel and space classification of employees and their
dependents who were given a seventy-five percent (75%)
discount of the regular fare.  Since his
tickets reflected an “FOC” or free of charge, this was an indication
that he did not pay the discounted fare corresponding to the priority code
Q/F3/Y/F which he used in his travel (p. 13, Rollo).

Now, upgrading of priority and space classification, such as from
economy class to first class, must be authorized by designated company
officials through the issuance of a form referred to as special airport
concession.  However, in the said
authorized upgrading, entries on the tickets are not altered to reflect a
higher space entitlement.  The ticket
would still bear economy class entitlement but during the boarding process, the
upgrading would be effected.  Special
airport concessions are issued only for valid reasons, namely, in favor of high
government officials and severely inconvenienced revenue paying passengers (pp.
25-26, Rollo). 
According to De Veyra, a certain Minda Santiago of Sanyo Travel secured their first class
accommodations.  Minda
Santiago represented to them that she was close to PAL’s
top executives and can easily get the required authorization for the upgrading
of their accommodations (p. 5, supra).  Yet,
this defense was never substantiated by De Veyra
either by presenting Minda Santiago personally to
testify or submitting her affidavit. 
More importantly, there was no authorization
for the upgrading of their accommodations, at all.

The administrative charge against De Veyra
was based on her and her husband’s use of trip passes which were falsified to reflect a higher priority and space classification than what
they were entitled to on vacation travel when the trip passes were issued (p.
91, Rollo).  It
is an established fact that the De Veyras used first
class trip passes, but what is disputed is whether or not their trip
passes/tickets were falsified.  The NLRC
and De Veyra limit the definition of the word
“falsify” either to tamper with or alter.  That is not so.  The word refers likewise either
to represent falsely, distort or violate the truth (Webster’s Third New
International Dictionary, 1986 Edition, p. 820; see Black’s Law Dictionary,
1987 Edition, p. 542).  Inasmuch as their
tickets did not speak the truth, those were undoubtedly falsified.  Having been employed with the company for
twenty (20) years and familiar with its policies and procedures, De Veyra was, therefore, aware that in accordance with PAL’s policy and in the absence of a valid authorization
for upgrading of priority and space classification, she and her husband were
entitled to economy accommodation only.

Mention may be made of another circumstance which proves the
falsity of De Veyra’s tickets.  In relation to her entitlement to travel
benefits, she secured a Philippine Tourism Authority Reduced Travel Tax
Certificate (p. 87, Rollo) entitling her to
pay a reduced travel tax of only P810.00. 
This amount represents payment for economy travel.  The certificate itself provided that it
referred only to economy class travel and not first class passage.  The certificate was purportedly presented for
the purpose of availment of the reduced travel tax
privilege of airline employees.  However,
the entries appearing on the bottom left portion of her tickets reflected a
travel tax payment of P1,350.00, corresponding to
first class passage (pp. 86-87, Rollo).

In ruling that PAL has not proven the culpability of De Veyra, the NLRC ignored PAL’s
ample evidence before it.  It resolved
the controversy based on a shallow analysis thereof, which was supported by the
Solicitor General (p. 62, Rollo):

“At this point, it is necessary to discuss the procedures on
how plane tickets are actually issued by (PAL) x x x.  A ticket booklet
consists of the audit coupon as the first page, and the succeeding coupons constitute the passenger coupon and
the agent’s coupon.  All entries in the
audit coupon are automatically reproduced in the succeeding coupons of the
ticket booklet.  Upon issuance of the
ticket, the audit coupon is detached by the issuing clerk, which coupon goes to
the Company’s Auditing Department.  The
other coupons are given to the passenger and are detached upon checking in at
the counters for the particular flight and leg of journey involved.

“Records reveal that what was tampered with was the audit
coupon by superimposing the letter “Y” over the letter “F”
and adding the letter “C” thereto. 
However, the other parts of the tickets given to (De Veyra)
were not tampered with.  It is, therefore, misleading for (PAL) to
allege that (De Veyra) used tampered tickets.  As senior supervisor at the Manila
International Airport (De Veyra) had no participation
in the issuance of plane tickets.  She
was not even personally present when the tickets were being issued by the
Company’s ticket clerks and therefore could not have had any knowledge of the
alleged tampering of the Audit coupon.  x x x.  Considering also that there is not an iota of
evidence to establish (De Veyra’s) participation in the
tampering of the audit coupons, her dismissal by (PAL) is illegal.”

While De Veyra
may not have known about the alteration performed on the audit coupons, she
cannot feign ignorance about the falsity of their tickets, as discussed
previously.  And, it is not even
necessary to prove De Veyra’s participation in the
falsification of their tickets.  What is
material is their use of trip passes which were falsified to
reflect a higher priority and space classification than what they were entitled
to on vacation travel when the trip passes were issued, supra, which
served as the basis for PAL to have lost its trust and confidence on De Veyra.  By and large,
this Court has continually recognized the right of the employer to dismiss an
employee on the ground of loss of confidence or breach of trust (Atlas
Consolidated Mining and Development Corporation v. NLRC, et al., G.R. No.
75755, November 24, 1988, 167 SCRA 758; San Miguel Corporation v. NLRC, et al.,
G.R. No. 50321, March 13, 1984, 128 SCRA 180; Central Textile Mills, Inc. v.
NLRC, et al., G.R. No. 50150, May 3, 1979, 90 SCRA 9; Valladolid v. Inciong, etc., et al., G.R. No. 52364, March 25, 1983, 121
SCRA 205; Dole Philippines, Inc. v. NLRC, et al., G.R. No. 55413, July 25,
1983, 123 SCRA 673; Tabacalera Insurance Co., et al.
v. NLRC, et al., G.R. No. 72555, July 31, 1987, 152 SCRA 667; Riker v. Ople, et al., G.R. No. 50492, October 27, 1987, 155 SCRA
85).  In fact, the mere existence of a
basis for believing that the employee has breached the trust and confidence
reposed on him by his employer is sufficient ground for dismissal (Sea-Land
Service, Inc. v. NLRC, et al., G.R. No. 68212, May 24, 1985, 136 SCRA
544).  More so, in the case of a
supervisor or other personnel occupying positions of responsibility, the loss
of the trust and confidence by their employer may justify their termination
(Associated Citizens Bank v. Ople, etc., et al., G.R.
No. L-48896, February 24, 1981, 103 SCRA 130; New Frontier Mines, Inc. v. NLRC,
et al., G.R. No. 51578, May 29, 1984, 129 SCRA 502; Reynolds Philippine
Corporation v. Eslava, etc., et al., G.R. No. L-48814, June 27, 1985, 137 SCRA 259).

Aside from finding that there was no legal cause for De Veyra’s dismissal from employment, the NLRC also ruled that
her dismissal was arbitrary because she was not granted a hearing on the charge
against her, in total disregard of PAL’s Code of
Discipline which, inter alia,
provides that (p. 65, Rollo):

“‘ARTICLE VI

INVESTIGATION PROPER

SECTION 1.  SETTING OF HEARING.  Upon the filing of the administrative charge,
the department head shall immediately set the case for hearing, with notice to
the employee concerned, copy furnished his union, if he is a member of any.

SECTION 2.  HEARING PROPER.  The employer (sic) may be accompanied to and
assisted by a representative of his choice at the hearing.  However, the presence of such representative
shall not be allowed to unduly delay or in any way detract from the summary
nature of the proceedings (Annex ‘C-2, p. 61, Rollo).'”

As stated earlier, sometime in August, 1987, the Internal Audit
and Control Department of PAL conducted a review of the tickets issued by the
Interline Ticket Counter because of the uncovering of widespread fraud and
manipulation of tickets by several of PAL’s employees
that resulted to their eventual termination from the firm.  It was on this occasion that said department
was able to confirm cases of tampering and fraudulent manipulation of official
documents, some of which involved the travel documents of De Veyra and her husband. 
A memorandum was issued by the Vice President of the Internal Audit and
Control Department to this effect addressed to the Senior Vice President for
Customer Services Group.  On August 26,
1987, the Notice of Administrative Charge was sent to De Veyra.  On September 11, 1987, she requested
additional time within which to study and evaluate her defense.  On September 18, 1987, her request was
granted.  She was allowed until September
29, 1987 to file her answer.  On
September 24, 1987, De Veyra submitted her sworn
statement wherein she admitted having used tickets bearing the upgraded
priority classification.  She mentioned Minda Santiago as the person who arranged the upgrading of
their trip passes.  On October 16, 1987,
De Veyra’s services were terminated by PAL.  Taking into account these circumstances, it
cannot be said that De Veyra was denied
administrative due process of law simply because the aforequoted
provision was not observed by PAL.  There
is no violation of due process even if no hearing was conducted where a chance
to explain a party’s side of the controversy was accorded to him.  What is frowned upon is the denial of the
opportunity to be heard (Eden, et al. v. Ministry of Labor and Employment, et
al., G.R. No. 72145, February 28, 1990, 182 SCRA 840; Asprec
v. Itchon, et al., G.R. No. L-21685,
April 30, 1966, 16 SCRA 921). 
Since De Veyra admitted in her sworn statement
having used tickets bearing the upgraded priority classification; the
documentary evidence of PAL already proved the falsity of the tickets; and De Veyra was aware of this falsity, there was no necessity for
the parties to undergo the ritual of holding a hearing.

To reiterate, there was a legal ground for PAL’s
termination of the services of De Veyra.  We are not persuaded by the opinion advanced
by the NLRC that (p. 63, Rollo):

“Even assuming, arguendo,
that (De Veyra) was guilty still, the supreme penalty
of dismissal was greatly disproportionate to the offense imputed to her.  After working for twenty (20) years with
(PAL), and receiving numerous commendations and promotions at that, (De Veyra) does not deserve the penalty of dismissal for the
violation of a company rule which, after all, is a common practice in the
company.  This is not to condone the alleged misstep committed by (De Veyra).  It is merely
to point out that in the light of the surrounding circumstances,
dismissal is too severe a penalty.  x x x.”

In the first place, the statement that De
Veyra’s violation of PAL’s
rule is a common practice in the company is misleading because of lack of
proof.  In the second place, the fact
that De Veyra has worked with PAL for twenty (20)
years, if it is to be considered at all, should be taken against her.  The infraction that she committed, vis-a-vis her long years of service with the
company, reflects a regrettable lack of loyalty.  Loyalty that she should have strengthened
instead of betrayed.  If an employee’s
length of service is to be regarded as a justification for moderating the
penalty of dismissal, it will actually become a prize for disloyalty,
perverting the meaning of social justice and undermining the efforts of labor
to cleanse its ranks of all undesirables (see Philippine Long Distance
Telephone Company v. NLRC, et al., G.R. No. 80609, August 23, 1988, 164 SCRA
671).

ACCORDINGLY, the petition is hereby GRANTED.  The decision of the National Labor Relations
Commission dated November 29, 1988 and its resolution dated February 21, 1989
with respect to paragraphs (a) and (b) are hereby MODIFIED by declaring the
dismissal of private respondent Carmencita Nannette
G. De Veyra as valid; but AFFIRMED with respect to
paragraph (c).  The temporary restraining
order issued on April 10, 1989 is made permanent.

SO ORDERED.

Narvasa, (Chairman), Cruz, and Griño-Aquino, JJ., concur.

Gancayco, J., on leave.