G.R. No. 87318. September 02, 1992
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE, VS. JAIME SERDAN Y GAMAYON, ACCUSED-APPELLANT.
REGALADO, J.:
Accused-appellant
Jaime Serdan y Gamayon was charged on September 23, 1987 in Criminal Case No.
5630-MN of the Regional Trial Court of Malabon, Metro Manila, Branch 72, with
the crime of murder and, on a plea of not guilty,[1] was tried therefor upon an information which alleges –
“That on or about the 14th day of September, 1987, in the
Municipality of Malabon, Metro Manila, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction
of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, conspiring and confederating
together with four (4) John Does, whose true identities and present whereabouts
are still ‘unknown and all
of them mutually helping and aiding one another, armed with a .45 caliber gun
and other guns of unknown caliber, with intent to kill, evident premeditation
and treachery, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously attack,
assault and shoot one Ricardo Sy y Co on the vital parts of his body, thereby
inflicting upon the latter shot gun (sic) wounds which directly caused his
death.”[2]
The prosecution’s presentation of this case is closely in accord with the following findings
of the court a quo:
“On September 14, 1987, at around 7:30 a.m., Fortunato Piquiz, a
long time resident of Macopa Road, Potrero, Malabon, Metro Manila, was walking
along the nearby Gov. Pascual Avenue in that place on his way to buy bread when
all of a sudden he heard a gunshot. Piquiz stopped walking and saw a gray colored car being shot at by a man
who turned out to be the herein accused Jaime Serdan. He later on saw two (2) other men firing at the car from the
other side thereof. Two (2) other men
in checkered shirts also appeared and began firing their guns at the car. Because the car did not stop when first
fired at by Serdan, the latter moved as if to follow the car up to the middle
of the Gov. Pascual Avenue. When the
car slammed against a wall, Piquiz saw Serdan in a sitting position, writhing
in pain. Two (2) of Serdan’s companions
approached him and took his gun which Piquiz
did not know what kind it was. The two (2) then looked at the car and then left the place. Piquiz
also left.
“Four (4) or five (5) days later, the police went to his place
because they learned that he saw the incident. He was asked to be a witness in this case. His statement (Exh A) was taken by the police at the
headquarters. After about four (4) or
five (5) days more, the police again went to his place and brought him to the
National Orthopedic Hospital to identify the accused, which he did by pointing
to him. It was only shortly before he
was brought to the hospital that he learned that the victim was one Mr. Sy
(whom he first named as Mr. Lim) whom he never knew.
“Bernardita Tongco, a resident of Gov. Pascual St., also happened
to be in the place when the shooting incident occurred. She had just bought ‘pan de sal.’ She heard
shots and then saw a car slammed or ‘nakasadsad.’ Later, she saw two (2) men
near the car holding guns. These two
(2) men came from the corner of Atis
Road or the canteen of Jam B. They
talked to another man at the middle of the road who was shot in the leg. This man was in T-shirt and shorts and he
had already been shot when she saw him. He turned out to be accused Jaime Serdan after Tongco identified him in
court. Tongco was, however, f(a)rther
from the scene than Piquiz. She was a
block away when she heard the shots.
“Tongco was investigated by the police and gave a statement. (Exh. B).
“Pfc. Daniel Cruz of the Malabon Police, together with other
policemen, went to the scene of the shooting upon orders of the Station
Commander to conduct an investigation.
“He found a man inside the car slumped on the driver’s seat,
already dead. The man turned out to be
Ricardo Sy y Co. He sustained gunshot
wounds. Pfc. Cruz also found three (3)
slugs, 1 empty shell cal. 45, 1 empty shell, 9 MM and, in the grassy portion of the
shoulder of the road, an ID card of one Jaime Serdan (Exh. I) whom he later
learned was a dismissed employee of the P.I. Manufacturing.
“Through the police radio, Pfc. Cruz learned also that a man with a
gunshot wound was at the MCU hospital. Cruz went there and found Serdan’ lying in a stretcher in the emergency
room. Serdan told Cruz that he was at
Atis Road-Gov. Pascual Avenue because he was going to a relative in
Blumentritt.
“The security guard at the hospital told Cruz that a man who gave
his name brought Serdan to the hospital. This man, however, immediately left the hospital.
“Pfc. Cruz further investigated the shooting incident and took the
statements of witnesses, particularly Piquiz and Tongco. He was the one who brought Piquiz to the
National Orthopedic Hospital for a confrontation with Serdan. Piquiz identified Serdan as one of those who
shot and killed Sy.
“Technical witnesses in the persons of Dr. Prospero Cabanayan and Forensic Chemist Nicanor Cruz, both of
the National Bureau of Investigation, were also presented by the prosecution.
“Dr. Cabanayan testified that he conducted an autopsy examination
on the cadaver of the victim and found that he sustained five (5) gunshot
wounds, four (4) of which exited from his body (Exhs. F, F-1 to F-10). The wound that did not have a point of exit was at the right side of the neck of
the victim and from it he
recovered a slug he referred to the ballistician of the NBI.
“Dr. Cabanayan prepared a report (Exh. E) containing his findings
that the victim’s death was due to the gunshot wounds he sustained (Exh.
E-4). He also identified the reports of
the NBI and PCCRL ballisticians (regarding) recovered slug from the body of the
victim and the recovered slugs and empty shells from the scene of the incident
(Exhs. G and H).
“The forensic chemist, on the other hand, declared that the
examination he conducted revealed that both hands of the accused were positive
for nitrates (Exhs. C and C-2) which can be caused by firing a gun with both
hands handling of fertilizer, lighting a firecracker or handling tobacco. He added that dorsal sides of both hands of
the accused have nitrates (Exh. D).”[3]
The defense, in refutation, presented this version of the
antecedent facts to and as related by the trial court:
“Accused Jaime Serdan, on the other hand, claimed that he was at
the corner of Gov. Pascual and Atis Road waiting for a friend who was a co-worker
at the P.I. Manufacturing, Inc. to borrow money. While waiting, he had his breakfast in an eatery thereat. When the friend did not pass by, Serdan
decided to proceed to Blumentritt, to borrow money from a relative. As he was about to board a passenger jeep,
Serdan heard gunshots. He felt he was
hit. He fell down and felt pain in his
right thigh. There was also numbness,
as if he was electrocuted. He looked
for the one who shot him – front and back – but all he could see were people
running away. He could not recognize
anyone because he was already dizzy. He
could remember, however, that people approached him and boarded him on a
car. He was brought to the MCU Hospital
where he stayed for about six (6) hours.
“Policemen arrived and asked him his name, address, employment and
from what province he was. Serdan was
then transferred to the National Orthopedic Hospital where he was confined for
about two (2) weeks.
“At the NOH, Serdan talked to policemen/investigators – even to a
Fiscal who asked him if he was willing to submit himself to an inquest
investigation. An NBI paraffin expert
also came. A policeman named Belloga
arrived with an old man and two (2) photographers. Belloga stopped by his bed but the old man went on walking. This prompted Belloga to call for the old
man by saying: ‘Oy, dito, iyan,
ituro’. (W)hen the old man did not
point to him, Belloga said once more: ‘Ituro mo, ituro mo.’ When the old man finally pointed at him, Belloga
prodded the old man some more by adding: ‘Sige, ituro mong mabuti.’ Serdan asked Belloga why he was being
photographed but Belloga even balked (sic) at him saying: ‘Keep quiet, this is
our job.’ After Belloga, the old man and the photographers ha(d) left, Serdan
asked the policeman guarding him why he was photographed and he was told: ‘Iyan ay testigo, Iyan ay matanda at ang
matanda ay hindi marunong magsinungaling.’ Serdan was later transferred to the
hospital at Camp Panopio allegedly for his own protection, upon orders of Gen.
Aguirre. At the military hospital, he
inquired if there is a warrant for his arrest because he thought he was being
detained, but nothing was shown to him. On his last day at the orthopedic hospital, Col. San Diego visited him
and he was asked about what really happened. After telling his story to San Diego, the latter remarked to him: ‘Tiisin mo na lang.’
“Serdan added that from the time he woke up, up to the time he was
‘shot he had already smoked three (3) sticks of cigarettes which he lighted
with a match and that he learned the driver of the car that brought him to the
MCU Hospital gave his name as Norberto Cruz y Cartela of 56 Tugatog Street.
“Drs. Santiago F. Cruz and Norman Garcia of the NOH and the MCU
Hospital, respectively, testified that Serdan sustained a gunshot wound at the
right leg in the area of the knee, whose point of entry was at the back and the
point of exit in front with the latter four (4) inches higher than the former
(Exhs. 5, 5-A, 7 and 9).
“Roger Laurente, a housemate of Serdan, testified that the latter
was his co-worker at the P.I, Manufacturing, Inc. who was never suspended as
such. Although Serdan ran for a
position in the labor union thereat, he never attacked its management and had
never even met the owner of the firm. Serdan, like him, resigned and was not dismissed from his work; Laurente
added.
“Danilo Layug; a patient of the same/adjoining ward of the NOH at
the time Serdan was confined thereat, testified that the old man who pointed at
Serdan really passed the bed of Serdan without even recognizing him. When the old man was told: ‘O, dito na lang. Ituro mo na lang yan,’ the old man even replied, ‘Ah, hindi
iyan.’ But the old man pointed to Serdan just the same. Serdan remarked when photos were taken: ‘Hindi ko kayo kilala, hindi ninyo ako
kilala, bakit ninyo ako kukunan ng litrato.’ Layug added, however, that Serdan
did not say anything when the old man pointed to him.
“Cpl. Leopoldo Belloga, the policeman who accompanied the ‘old man’
Piquiz when the latter identified Serdan at the NOH as the man who first shot
at the car and who was in turn shot and fell at the road, was presented by the
prosecution to rebut the testimony of Serdan and Layug on what the latter
claimed had transpired during the confrontation between Piquiz and Serdan. Belloga claimed that Piquiz
identified/pinpointed the suspect (Serdan) without any prodding.
“Accused Jaime Serdan was a former laborer at the P.I.
Manufacturing, Inc. This is the reason
he had an ID card issued by the firm to him. He said he placed it between the
folds of his wallet and not inside the same. For this reason, it must have fallen when he fell after being shot or
when he was being put on board a car. A
policeman, Pfc. Daniel Cruz, later found it in the grassy area by the side of
the road.”[4]
After trial, the court below promulgated its decision[5]
dated February 10, 1989, finding the accused guilty of the crime charged,
sentencing him to suffer the penalty of life imprisonment together with all its
accessory penalties, and to pay to the heirs of the victim one-fifth (1/5) of
P30,000.00 as his share of the indemnification for the loss of the victim’s
life and to pay the costs.[6]
Appellant now comes to us
for the reversal of the aforequoted judgment, faulting the trial court (1) for
giving credence to the testimony of the star witness for the prosecution,
Fortunato Piquiz, and holding that his testimony is sufficient to render a
judgment of conviction; (2) in not appreciating the evidence of the accused
which directly contradicts the testimony of the prosecution witnesses and
raises grave doubts on the prosecution’s case; and (3) in not acquitting the
accused on reasonable doubt.[7]
Again, as in most criminal cases, the controversy here is reduced
to one essentially of credibility a weighing of the evidence of the prosecution
against that of the defense. In this
regard, the consistent teachings in our jurisdiction is that the findings of
the trial court are given weight and the highest degree of respect by the
appellate court.[8]
Long settled in criminal jurisprudence is the rule that when the
issue is one of credibility of witnesses, appellate courts will generally not
disturb the findings of the trial court, considering that the latter is in a
better position to decide the question, having heard the witnesses themselves
and observed their deportment and manner of testifying during the trial, unless
it has plainly overlooked certain facts of substance and value that, if
considered, might affect the result of the case.[9] The
said exceptive circumstance, however, does not obtain in the instant case.
The testimonies of the prosecution witnesses are positive in
character while that of appellant is negative, making the former prevail over
the latter.[10]
Besides, no improper motive had been imputed to any of the arresting officers
who testified for the prosecution. They
are, therefore, presumed to have regularly performed their official duty in
the absence of any evidence to the contrary.[11]
Insofar as prosecution star witness Fortunato Piquiz is
concerned, no dubious or evil
motive whatsoever has been proved which would cause or impel him to falsely
testify against appellant. It is much a matter of judicial acceptance that witnesses would not falsely impute to an accused a serious criminal
offense if it is not the untarnished
truth,[12]
especially where, as in this case, they
did not even know any of the dramatis personae involved; in the
crime. This is a truism which we recognize
as correctly based on and confirmed by ordinary human behavior and experience.
What makes the case against appellant weightier is the fact that
he had been positively identified by two prosecution witness, Piquiz and
Tongco,[13]
which categorical identification should be given full faith and credit,
especially in the total absence of any ill motive, grudge or animosity on the
part of the witnesses. Greater weight
is given to the positive identification of the accused by the prosecution
witnesses than to the accused’s denial and explanation concerning the
commission of the crime.[14] This
positive identification establishes the guilt of appellant to a moral
certainty.[15]
Piquiz’s testimony alone is sufficient to hold appellant criminally liable
concordant with the rule that the testimony of one witness, if credible,
positive and if it satisfies the court beyond reasonable doubt, is sufficient
to convict.[16]
As observed by the Solicitor General, the defense charges that
Piquiz had made inconsistent statements on the relative positions of the
gunwielders and the victim. It also
attempts to cast doubt on said witness’ opportunity to recognize appellant in
the course of the shooting incident. It
now claims that these alleged inconsistencies should be viewed against
appellant’s evidence, directly contradicting that of the prosecution.[17]
We reject these contentions of the defense.
Piquiz, who was only about seven (7) meters away from the scene
of the crime,[18]
was rather firm and sure of his account that appellant was on the left side of
the victim at the time of the shooting incident.
“COURT:
You ask the question again but first ask
where Jaime Serdan was.
x x x
A Jaime Serdan was (o)n
the left side near the restaurant.” [19]
This is an explicit and forthright
affirmation of what he stated when he was investigated in the Malabon Police
Headquarters on September 21, 1987, a few
days after the shooting of the victim:
“18. T: Ang tao pong itinuro ninyo sa National
Orthopedic Ospital, saang gawi po ng kotse ninyo siya nakita?
S: Sa gawing kaliwa, doon sa may lugar ng driver x x x.”[20]
and which was clarified in the ocular
inspection conducted by the trial court at the crime scene on January 15, 1988.[21]
We have carefully scrutinized the records and we are satisfied
that in the instances when this witness stated that appellant was on the right
side of the victim, the same were innocent errors due to confusion as to the
particular positions referred to for lack of a clear point of reference, since
the vehicle was moving and the questions did not specify the direction toward
which appellant was facing at the particular moments involved. Such statements are mere minor
inconsistencies which cannot destroy his credibility but, on the contrary, are
indicative of his truthfulness and of the fact that he had not been coached or
rehearsed.[22]
Moreover, these contradictions could be attributable to the well-known fact
that the atmosphere of the courtroom can affect the accuracy and manner of a
witness in answering questions.[23]
The defense also attempts to discredit the testimony of Piquiz on
the ground that the other eyewitness, Bernardita Tongco, was sure that
appellant was not holding any gun while he was slumped in the middle of Atis
Road; and neither did appellant pass on any gun to the two armed persons who
approached and talked to him.[24]
We note, however, that Tongco herself admitted that she was
standing a block away from appellant and his companions and that she witnessed
only a part of the incident, thereby making her conclusions inaccurate for
being incomplete, thus:
“Q: – When the shooting
incident took place, did you see this person who was hit in the leg during the
shooting incident?
A: – I just saw him after
he was shot in the leg.
x x x
Q: – Mrs. Tongco, how far approximately, how far
were you from the persons that you saw talking in the middle of the Atis Road?
A: – Around
one block away.”[25]
Furthermore, appellant’s version of the incident is highly
improbable. We are, therefore, constrained
to reiterate the cardinal rule in the law of evidence that to be believed, the
testimony must not only proceed from the mouth of a credible witness; it must
be credible in itself such as the common experience and observation of mankind
can approve as probable under the
circumstances.[26]
We cannot subscribe to the story of appellant that he merely
happened to be in the vicinity where the victim was killed, and only because he
was allegedly contemplating to go to his friend’s house at Atis Road in order
to borrow money. What is perplexing is
the fact that he did not proceed to said house but, instead, he just decided to
wait for him at a store near the corner of Atis Road and Gov. Pascual Street,
where he ate his breakfast. What is
more, when his friend did not
pass by, he did not even think of proceeding to the factory where the latter
works, but thought of going to a relative instead.[27]
It is too much of a coincidence that he happened to be in the
same place where the victim was shot. As the lower court observed, appellant unwittingly made his theory of
defense harder to believe when he took the foregoing posturings. He had, however, no other alternative but to
contrive that story, although it was evidently a lame excuse under the
circumstances, since his identification card was found by policemen in the
scene of the ambush slaying and because he was found soon thereafter in a
hospital with a gunshot wound.[28]
It is also noteworthy that appellant was found positive for
nitrates on the outer sides of both hands after the diphenylamine-paraffin test
conducted by the Forensic Chemistry Section of the National Bureau of
Investigation on September 14, 1987 at 2:30 P.M.,[29]
the afternoon of the fatal day, which supports the prosecution’s theory that he
killed the victim by firing a gun with the use of both hands.[30]
Appellant likewise asserts that had he been one of the
assailants, he could not have been shot at his “alak-alakan” with the bullet
exiting in front about four (4) inches higher than the point of entry,[31]
because he was about to board a passenger
jeep or was actually boarding the same.[32] This
pretension is readily explained and refuted.
In his aforestated sworn statement, witness Piquiz pointed out
that because the car did not stop when first fired at, appellant moved as if to
follow the car up to the middle of Gov. Pascual Street, explaining it in this
wise: “x x x pagputok nga ng baril niya
sinundan pa niya ng tutok ang kotse, tapos marami na akong narinig na
putok. x x x” [33]
It is highly reasonable to conclude, therefore, that logically it
was at this point, when he was in pursuit of the victim’s car, that appellant
was hit at his “alak-alakan.” He was not, therefore, an innocent bystander
victimized by a stray bullet but was actually one of the assailants. We quote with approval the lower court’s
analysis on the matter, and for which it should be duly given credit:
“Common experience in boarding a passenger jeep would place the
area of ‘alak-alakan’ exposed to a gunshot of the trajectory taken by the bullet
that hit Serdan above his right ‘alak-alakan’ only to a shot fired by one lying prone on his stomach slightly
to the right of Serdan but no more than a foot in front and away from him. With Serdan’s right foot resting or about to
rest on the rear running board of the passenger jeep, which is at the exact
rear middle portion of the jeep, the gunwielder must be somewhere after the
right rear wheel of the jeep facing forward but under the body of the jeep
already. This position of the gunman in
relation to Serdan’s position will necessitate the gunman’s being first overrun
by at least the right rear wheel, if not by both the right side wheels of the
jeep, before he could fire his gun to hit Serdan where the bullet pierced his
right leg so that said bullet can exit in front thereof four (4) inches higher
than the point of entry.
“Even if we are to assume that these positions of Serdan and the
gunman are possible; one other point must be considered – the flooring of the
jeep will be in the way of the trajectory of the bullet – meaning the floor,
made of metal, may have to be pierced first by the bullet before it could hit
Serdan in the area of his right ‘alakalakan’.”[34]
The defense also charges prosecution witness Pat. Belloga with
having instructed or coached Piquiz to
point to appellant at the National Orthopedic Hospital and the latter did so
reluctantly.[35]
Aside from appellant’s declaration to this effect, the defense relies heavily
on the testimony of one Danilo Layug, a co-patient of appellant at said hospital,
who corroborated and confirmed this testimony of appellant.[36]
We find, however, that the very testimony of Layug is
self-refuting. He testified in open
court that appellant was in Room No. 2 while he was in Room No. 3, and that a
divider separates the two rooms, in this manner:
“Q You said that when you
were confined at the National Orthopedic Hospital you were in Room No. 3, Bed
No. 6, is that correct?
A Yes, sir.
Q While Serdan was
confined in Room 2, is that also correct?
A Yes, sir.
x x x
Q And when you said that it is a room, there is a partition
between Room No. 2 and Room No. 3, am I correct?
A Yes, sir.”[37]
On these physical facts and arrangements, therefore, we hold that
it is highly improbable for Layug to clearly hear the conversation among
appellant, Pat. Belloga and Piquiz considering their relative positions, and
especially since Layug would not have had a special reason to make extra
efforts to listen in or eavesdrop on the conversation among said three persons.
Appellant, submits further that he had no motive to attack the
victim. Be that as it may, such
argument loses sight of the fact that motive is immaterial in this case because
of the positive identification made by the two eyewitnesses.[38]
Motive is essential where there is doubt as to the identity of the culprit and
not where the accused has been positively identified as the assailant.[39]
The court below found that conspiracy, evident premeditation and
treachery were attendant in the killing of the victim.[40]
We agree, except with respect to the circumstance of evident premeditation
since there is no substantial evidence as to when the assailants agreed on
their murderous plan and the interval of time between such determination and
the actual commission of their objective.
Conspiracy is nonetheless established by evidence of unity of purpose at the time of the
commission of the offense and unity in its execution.[41]
While proof of the agreement need not rest on direct evidence, the agreement
itself may be inferred from the conduct of the parties, disclosing a common
understanding among them with respect to the commission of the offense.[42]
In the case at bar, singularity of purpose, as well as unity in
its execution, were evident when appellant and the four other assailants fired
at the victim almost
simultaneously resulting in the latter’s death as found by the trial court and
stated at the start of this opinion:
“x x x Piquiz stopped walking and saw a gray colored car being shot
at by a man who turned out to be the herein accused Jaime Serdan. He later on saw two (2) other men firing at
the car from the other side thereof. Two (2) other men in checkered shirts also appeared and began firing
their guns at the car. x x x” [43]
It is undeniable that treachery was present in this case. Considering the mode of attack employed by the assailants in the instant
case, the victim was rendered totally helpless and was in no position to defend
himself. The attack was synchronal, sudden and unexpected. Moreover, in view of the fact that the
victim was then on board his car while his assailants lay in wait, the inescapable conclusion is that the attack was
coolly and deliberately adopted by the latter, their purpose being to deprive
the victim of a chance to either
fight or retreat.
With the weight of evidence strongly for the prosecution and the
scales of justice tilting against and sufficient to overcome the presumption of
innocence claimed by appellant, we are constrained to affirm the ruling of the
court a quo, except that the proper penalty should be reclusion
perpetua and the indemnity for the heirs should be P50,000.00 in
accordance with the latest jurisprudential
policy.[44]
Considering the recency of this case, we take this opportunity to
once again remind the bench and the bar of the oft-repeated and long standing
rule that in a judgment of conviction for a felony, the appropriate name of the
penalty should be specified inasmuch as under the scheme of penalties in the Revised Penal Code, the principal
penalty for a felony has its own specific duration and corresponding accessory
penalties.[45]
Life imprisonment does not have any definite extent or duration nor does it
carry accessory penalties. It is
imposed as a penalty for serious offenses penalized by special laws. The crime of murder committed by appellant
being penalized under the Revised Penal Code, the proper imposable penalty
should, therefore, be reclusion perpetua instead of life
imprisonment. It is imperative that the
correct legal terminology be used in the imposition of penalties because of the
aforementioned substantial differences.[46]
WHEREFORE, the judgment of the court a quo is hereby AFFIRMED,
with the modification that the penalty imposed on accused-appellant be, as it is hereby, changed to reclusion perpetua; and he is hereby ORDERED to pay the heirs of
the victim death indemnity in the amount of P50,000.00, and to further pay the
costs.
SO ORDERED.
Narvasa, C.J., (Chairman), Padilla, Nocon, and Melo, JJ., concur.
[1]
Rollo, 23.
[2]
Original Record, 2.
[3]
Rollo, 23-25.
[4]
Ibid., 25-27.
[5]
Per Judge Benjamin M. Aquino, Jr.
[6]
Rollo, 29.
[7]
Brief for the Appellant, 2; Rollo, 48.
[8]
People vs. Caraig, 202 SCRA 357 (1991).
[9]
People vs. Pascual, G.R. No. 88282, May 6, 1992; People vs.
Simon, G.R. No. 56925, May 21, 1992; People vs. Blas, G.R. No. 97930,
May 27, 1992.
[10]
Bayasen vs. Court of Appeals, 103 SCRA 197 (1981).
[11]
Section 5(m), Rule 131, Rules of Court.
[12]
People vs. Caraig, supra, Fn. 8.
[13]
Rollo, 28.
[14]
People vs. De Mesa, 188 SCRA 48 (1990).
[15]
People vs. Eswan, et al., 186 SCRA 174 (1990).
[16]
People vs. Orzame, 17 SCRA 161 (1966).
[17]
Brief for the Appellee, 7; Rollo,
78.
[18]
TSN, January 6, 1988, 7.
[19]
Ibid., id., 18-19.
[20]
Original Record, 192.
[21]
TSN, January 15, 1988, 2-21.
[22]
People vs. Bustos, 17 SCRA 243 (1989).
[23]
People vs. Como, 202 SCRA 200 (1991).
[24]
Brief for the Appellant, 7; Rollo, 53.
[25]
TSN, February 15, 1988, 92-94.
[26]
People vs. Nabayra, 203 SCRA 75 (1991).
[27]
TSN, June 1, 1988, 4-7.
[28]
Rollo, 27.
[29]
Exh. C-2; Original Record, 194.
[30]
TSN, January 6, 1988, 35.
[31]
Brief for the Appellant, 9; Rollo, 47.
[32]
Rollo, 27.
[33]
Exh. A; Original Record, 192.
[34]
Rollo, 27-28.
[35]
Ibid., 26.
[36]
Brief for the Appellant, 11; Rollo, 57.
[37]
TSN, November 28, 1988, 5.
[38]
Rollo, 28.
[39]
People vs. Danico, G.R. No. 95554, May
7, 1992.
[40]
Rollo, 29.
[41]
People vs. Damaso, et al., 190 SCRA 595 (1990).
[42]
People vs. De la Cruz, 190 SCRA 328 (1990).
[43]
Rollo, 23-24.
[44]
People vs. Aguiluz, G.R. No. 91662, March 11, 1992.
[45]
People vs. Aquino, 186 SCRA 851 (1990).
[46]
People vs. Literado, G.R. No. 77114, May 27, 1992.