THE UNITED STATES, COMPLAINANT AND APPELLANT, VS. SECUNDINO MENDEZONA, DEFENDANT AND APPELLEE.
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United States versus Mendezona
The Case
This is a criminal case in which the United States, as complainant and appellant, prosecuted Don Secundino Mendezona, manager of the firm of Mendezona and Company, for the crime of estafa — the Spanish-law crime of swindling or fraud. The charge arose from two large loans Mendezona obtained from the Spanish-Philippine Bank, for which he promised to mortgage a building known as the procuration house of the Franciscan Friars, and which he later sold as unencumbered. The case matters because the Supreme Court draws a firm line between a broken promise and a crime: a mere failure to deliver a promised mortgage is a civil matter, not estafa, unless the deceit existed at the very moment of contracting.
Procedural History
Counsel for the Spanish-Philippine Bank filed a complaint with the Court of First Instance charging Mendezona with estafa. The court admitted the complaint and conducted the corresponding preliminary investigation. At the close of that investigation, the court below issued an order declining to hold the accused for trial, and the complainant appealed. The case reached the Supreme Court by appeal from that order, and the Supreme Court affirmed it.
Facts
In November 1899, Mendezona, as manager of Mendezona and Company, entered into a verbal contract to buy the procuration building on Isla de Romero Street from the Franciscan Friars for 190,000 dollars, with the price to remain on deposit with the firm at eight per cent interest. He took possession toward the end of that month and began making alterations. The formal deed of conveyance, however, was not drawn until the twenty-first of July 1900, because the title deeds remained with the friars and were delivered to the notary, Mr. Barrera, only two or three months before that date.
Meanwhile, on the fifth of January 1900, Mendezona obtained a loan of 300,000 dollars from the bank, offering the building among other property as security by letter. On the nineteenth of February he obtained a further credit of 300,000 dollars, again offering the same property. When the bank demanded the mortgage deed, he put it off, saying the notary held the title papers. On the sixth of August 1900, sixteen days after his own deed of sale was executed, he sold the building to the Augustinian Fathers for 400,000 dollars, subject to a right of redemption, declaring in the deed that the property was free from all encumbrances.
The complaint alleged two acts of estafa: first, that he fraudulently delayed the promised mortgage through subterfuge, and second, that he sold the property as unencumbered knowing it had been offered as security. The complaint used only the generic term estafa and cited no article of the Penal Code; the specific articles were supplied only in the complainant's printed briefs.
Issues
- Whether or not the mere nonperformance of a promise to constitute a mortgage, unaccompanied by deceit at the time of contracting, constitutes the crime of estafa.
- Whether or not the sale of the property as unencumbered, after it had merely been promised as security, constitutes estafa under the Penal Code.
- Whether or not the accused may be held criminally liable on facts not alleged in the complaint but raised for the first time in the complainant's brief.
Applicable Provisions
Article 1862 of the Civil Code provides:
The promise to mortgage or pledge only produces a personal action between the contracting parties, without prejudice to the criminal liability incurred by him who defrauds another offering in pledge or mortgage, as unencumbered, things which he knew to be encumbered or pretending to be the owners of things which do not belong to him.
This is the pivotal provision: it confines a bare promise to mortgage to a personal civil action, reserving criminal liability for the specific frauds it describes, none of which the Court finds present here.
Ruling
On the first issue, the Court held that the nonperformance of the promise to mortgage is not a crime. Criminal liability under the Civil Code article attaches only to one who offers as unencumbered things he knew to be encumbered, or who pretends to own what he does not; Mendezona did neither, for he owned the building and it was unencumbered. The delay in executing the mortgage was not chargeable to him, since the title deeds were with the friars and the notary took months to draft the sale. The Court laid down the governing rule: the deceit, in cases of fraud, must be antecedent to the obligation in which it originates, and be the cause of the latter and not supervenient thereto.
On the second issue, the Court held that the sale as unencumbered was likewise not estafa. A promise to mortgage does not by itself create a mortgage; the gravamen must be legally constituted through the formalities of the Civil Code and the Mortgage Law. Hence the property was truly unencumbered on the date of sale, and the accused, as owner in possession under a valid verbal contract, could lawfully transfer it.
On the third issue, the Court held that the two acts actually falling under the cited articles of the Penal Code were never alleged in the complaint, and the complaint was never amended to include them; the accused is entitled to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation.
Doctrine
A promise to mortgage produces only a personal obligation between the parties; its breach is not estafa absent fraud existing at the time of contracting. The deceit must be antecedent to the obligation and the cause of it, not supervenient. A mortgage exists only when constituted with the legal formalities and recorded, so property merely promised as security is not thereby encumbered. And an accused may be convicted only of the acts alleged in the complaint.
Disposition
The Supreme Court affirmed the order of the court below, with costs of both instances declared de oficio; Mendezona was not held for trial.
Remember This
Memorize the line that a promise to mortgage creates only a personal action, and that the deceit in estafa must be antecedent to the obligation, never supervenient. Examiners use this case to test the civil-criminal boundary in fraud, and to test whether a complaint's allegations can be expanded by the prosecutor's brief.