PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE, VS. RAFAEL VELAGA, JR., ACCUSED-APPELLANT.

Rafael Velaga, Jr., was accused of the crime of murder before the
Regional Trial Court of Dagupan City, committed as follows:

“That on or about the 16th day of December 1980 in the City of
Dagupan, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the abovenamed
Rafael Velaga, Jr., being then armed with deadly weapon, with treachery and
with intent to kill did then and there, willfully, unlawfully and criminally,
attack,    assault and use personal
violence upon the latter by stabbing and hitting him on vital parts of his body
which caused his death Virgilio dela Cruz as per Cetificate of Death issued by
Dr. Eugenio N. Deleon and Cipriano M. Macaraeg, both of Dagupan City, to the
damage and prejudice of the legal heirs of said deceased Virgilio dela Cruz to the tune of not
less than Twelve Thousand Pesos (P12,000.00) Philippine Currency and other
consequential damages.

“CONTRARY TO LAW.” (p. 54, Rollo)

Upon arraignment on October 4, 1985, appellant pleaded “not
guilty.” (p. 30, Records)

Trial proceeded with the prosecution presenting evidence on the
following facts as attending the commission of the crime:

“At about 11:00 o’clock in the evening of December 16, 1980,
Virgilio dela Cruz (victim) together with his companions namely: Bob Sison,
Josefino Siapno, Roberto Dadacay were on board a Toyota Land Cruiser driven by
Pancrasio Rodriguez on their way to Mercedes Dawel. Upon reaching the corner of Perez Blvd., Herrero and M. H. del
Pilar Streets in the City of Dagupan, a fast running motorcycle driven by
accused-appellant Jun Velaga, hit the side of the Toyota Land Cruiser. After the bumping incident, the driver of
the Toyota Land Cruiser, Pancrasio Rodriguez together with Bob Bison and Josefino Siapno, alighted
from the vehicle to inspect the damage. The three then helped accused-appellant in pushing the motorcycle to the sidewalk. Thereafter, a heated argument ensued between
Pancrasio Rodriguez and the accused-appellant blaming each other for the cause
of the accident and in the course of the incident one from the group, Virgilio
dela Cruz approached to pacify them. Standing between the two, the victim tried in vain to settle the matter
at that moment, accused-appellant suddenly drew-out a knife from his pocket and
stabbed the victim. Accused-appellant
ran to the direction of Herrero St. Some of the companions of the victim gave chase but were not able to run after him. The victim was rushed to the hospital where
he died three (3) days thereafter.” (pp. 2-9, tsn, May 29, 1986)

The defense presented an entirely different version of the
incident. The accused-appellant tried
to prove, thru his testimony and that of his witnesses that he (accused) acted
in legitimate self-defense. According
to the defense, after the bumping incident at the corner of Perez Blvd. and M.
H. del Pilar Street, accused stood and tried to lift the motorcycle but two men
riding in the land cruiser alighted and went near him. The two men (Bobby Rodriguez and Leo de la
Cruz) went near him and asked him if he had a complaint. He told them he has none if only they would
be willing to replace the signal light. All of a sudden, Bobby Rodriguez hit him at the back of his head. He asked them why but Leo de la Cruz drew
out a weapon and said “you have so
many complaints” (p. 32, Rollo). De la Cruz closed toward him and thrust the weapon. He parried the blow and held de la Cruz’
hand while he and de la Cruz were struggling for the knife, the companions of
de la Cruz alighted and started kicking him at the back causing him to fall on
top of de la Cruz, as a result of which the knife struck the latter’s stomach
leading to his death.

After the information was filed on March 31, 1981 the case was
archived by reason of the fact that the accused was then at large. It was only in September 1985 when he was arrested and charged with the
crime of murder (p. 23, Records).

The trial court found the appellant guilty beyond reasonable doubt of murder as charged and
correspondingly sentenced him to the penalty of reclusion perpertua. The decretal portion of the Decision reads:

“WHEREFORE, the Court finds accused Rafael Velaga, Jr. y
Cabrera alias Jun Velaga guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Murder,
and in view of the presence of the generic aggravating circumstance of
nighttime which is not offset by any mitigating circumstance, the court hereby
sentences the accused to suffer the penalty of Reclusion Perpetua
(life Imprisonment) and to indemnify the heirs of the deceased in the sum of
P30,000.00 plus costs.

“The accused is ordered to pay the heirs of the deceased the
amount of P20,300.00 as actual damages.

“SO ORDERED.” (P. 79, Rollo)

From this judgment, the accused Rafael Velaga, Jr. appealed.

He assigns on appeal the following alleged errors:

I

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN REJECTING
ACCUSED’S PLEAS OF SELF DEFENSE.

II

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN APPRECIATING TREACHERY
WHICH QUALIFIED THE OFFENSE TO MURDER.

III

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED
IN APPRECIATING NIGHTTIME AS CIRCUMSTANCE.

(Appellant’s Brief, p.
1; Rollo, p. 80)

After evaluating the records of this case, We find the
defendant’s version to be bereft of merit.

This court has always adhered to the rule that where the issue is
one of credibility of witnesses the appellate court will not disturb findings
of the trial court, as the latter is in a better position to decide said
question having heard the witnesses themselves and having observed their
deportment and manner of testifying during the trial (People v. Olalia, G.R.
No. 50669, March 12, 1984).

We therefore cannot disturb the trial court’s ruling in giving more
credence to the prosecution witnesses because the record reveals that there is
nothing that the trial court had overlooked in its evaluation of any fact of
substance and value which would affect the result of the case.

Moreover, appellant’s contention with regard his plea of
self-defense cannot be given credit by this court by the mere fact that he
eluded arrest for almost four and a half years (4 1/2). If flight is evidence of guilt, then
accused-appellant’s act of eluding arrest for such a long period is indicative
of his guilt and will consequently negate his plea of self-defense.

With regard to the second and third assignment of errors
enunciated by the accused-appellant, We cannot appreciate the lower court’s
finding that the accused is guilty of murder qualified by treachery. How can
treachery be imputed to a single man when his victim had four (4) companions
nearby who could respond instinctively upon seeing their injured
companion. Certainly, it could not have
been accused appellant’s intention to kill the victim in the presence of his four companions if his own safety was his
primary concern.

Noteworthy is the fact that before the stabbing incident
happened, accused-appellant already had an altercation with the driver of the
Toyota Land Cruiser and such heated argument must have placed the deceased and
his companions on their guard. All
these negate the existence of treachery in killing the victim (People v.
Gonzales, 76 Phil. 473).

Another reason why treachery cannot be considered is that the
meeting of the victim and the accused was only accidental, that is, the
stabbing followed the heated dispute between the accused-appellant Velaga and
Pancrasio Rodriguez, the driver of the Land Cruiser and one of the companions
of Virgilio de la Cruz (the victim) who tried to pacify the protagonists. The records clearly show that the attack was
done on a sudden impulse.

There is treachery when the offender commits any of the crimes
against the person employing means, methods or forms in the execution thereof
which tend directly and specially to ensure its execution, without risk to
himself arising from the defense which the offended party might make (par. 16,
Article 14 of the Revised Penal Code).

We also cannot appreciate the lower court’s ruling of nighttime
as an aggravating circumstance. The
facts and evidence show that the incident was completely unplanned. There was no showing of prior preparation of
the accused to take advantage of
the darkness of the night to prevent his being recognized and to ensure the
consummation of the offense.

Nocturnity will not be considered to aggravate the crime where
the prosecution failed to show that the accused purposely sought to commit the
crime at nighttime in order to facilitate the achievement of his objectives,
prevent discovery or evade capture (People v. Salcedo, G.R. No. 78774, 12 April
1989).

In this case the darkness of the night was merely incidental to
the collision between the two vehicles which caused the heated argument and the
eventual stabbing of the victim. We,
therefore, cannot appreciate nighttime as an aggravating circumstance.

In the absence of the qualifying circumstance of treachery, the crime committed by
accused-appellant is plain homicide. The penalty for homicide under Article 249 of the Revised Penal Code is reclusion temporal. There
is no mitigating and no aggravating circumstance. Applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, the accused?appellant
is sentenced to an indeterminate penalty ranging from twelve (12) years of prision
mayor as minimum to seventeen (17) years and four (4) months of reclusion
temporal as maximum.

In line with the new policy of his court to grant an increased
indemnity to the heirs of the deceased, the total award is hereby fixed at
P50,000.00 (People v. Daniel Sison, G.R. No. 86455, September 14, 1990).

WHEREFORE, the appealed judgment is MODIFIED accordingly.

SO ORDERED.

Melencio-Herrera, (Chairman), Padilla, Sarmiento, and Regalado, JJ., concur.