G.R. No. 87186. April 24, 1992
CAMILO VILLA, PETITIONER, VS. SANDIGANBAYAN AND PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, RESPONDENTS.
CRUZ, J.:
The herein petitioners’ basic contention is that as their alleged
co-conspirators have been acquitted by the Court of Appeals, they too should
have been absolved by the Sandiganbayan under the
doctrine of “the law of the case.” They also submit that, in any
event, the evidence against them was insufficient to prove their guilt and, on
that ground, they should have also been presumed innocent and acquitted.
These are the relevant facts.
Investigation of alleged anomalous transactions at the Civil
Aeronautics Administration (CAA), Mactan
International Airport, led to the filing in 1975 of criminal charges in the
Circuit Criminal Court of Cebu City against Casimiro David, administrative assistant at CAA, Mactan, and chairman of the Bidding Committee; Estanislao Centeno, cash aide;
Fernando Dario, airport attendant; and Serafin
Robles, janitor, for violation of Section 3, paragraphs (a)[1]
and (h)[2]
of R.A. 3019 in relation to the Unnumbered Presidential Memorandum dated April
22, 1971,[3]
as well as Sec. 12, Rule XVIII of the Civil Service Rules[4]
and Section 1(x) of Presidential Decree No. 6 dated September 27, 1972.[5]
The case involved questionable payments made by the CAA Mactan to Rocen Enterprises and Sprayway Corp., dealers in paper products and printed
matter, for the purchase of electrical items and the cost of their
installation, in the total amount of P299,175.00.
Dario, Centeno and Robles represented
these firms in the transaction. Another
accused, Mactan Airport General Manager Arturo
Jimenez, was dropped from the amended information after a reinvestigation.
On October 20, 1978, the Circuit Criminal Court of Cebu City then presided by Judge Romeo Escareal
(now Associate Justice and Chairman of the Second Division of the Sandiganbayan) rendered a decision finding all the
accused guilty beyond reasonable doubt of violation of Section 3, paragraphs
(a), (e),[6]
(h), and (i)[7]
of R.A. 3019. All the accused appealed
the judgment of conviction to the Court of Appeals.
The decision of the trial court included findings that Arturo
Jimenez; Rodolfo Montayre, assistant airport
general manager for operations; Camilo Villa, chief,
logistics section; Josefina Sucalit, technical
inspector, COA, assigned at CAA Mactan; Hereto Leonor, acting chief accountant; and Manuel Bustamante, regional auditor of Region 7, COA, conspired
and were equally liable with the convicted accused.
Accordingly, Judge Escareal directed
Chief State Prosecutor Juan A. Sison of the Ministry
of Justice to assign a State Prosecutor to conduct an investigation for
possible violations of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, falsification
of public documents, malversation of public funds,
overpricing, unexplained wealth, and violation of accounting and auditing rules
and regulations, and to file the corresponding charges if warranted.
The investigation was conducted as directed and led to the filing
of an information with the Sandiganbayan, where it
was docketed as Criminal Case No. 5915, against Jimenez, Montayre,
Villa, Bustamante, Leonor
and Sucalit for violation of Section 3, R.A.
3019. The information read as follows:
That during the period from June 9 to 30, 1975, or thereabout, at Lapu-Lapu City, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of
this Honorable Sandiganbayan, the acccused
Arturo Somosa Jimenez, then Airport General Manager, Mactan International Airport; Rodolfo Evangelista Montayre, Assistant Airport General Manager; Camilo Gido Villa, Chief of the
Logistics Section, CAA Mactan; Josefina Sanchez Sucalit, Technical Inspector of the COA, Cebu City; Manuel Raneses Bustamante, Regional Auditor, Cebu
City; and Hereto Cabrera Leonor, Chief Accountant,
CAA, Manila, taking advantage of their public positions and while in the
performance of the duties of their office, together with Fernando Dario, Estanislao Centeno, Serafin Robles and Casimiro
David, who had already been convicted in the Criminal Circuit Court of Cebu in Criminal Case No. CCC-XIV-1457-Cebu, entitled
“People v. Casimiro David, et al.,”
confederating together and mutually helping one another or otherwise, acting in
concert, with intent to defraud and gain, did then and there, wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously cause to influence
other public officials, or allow to be influenced, to violate rules and regulations
duly promulgated by competent authority relative to their respective duties,
and for financial and pecuniary interest, by then and there permitting,
promoting and approving the negotiation, perfection and consummation of the
purchase and payments of the Civil Aeronautics Administration (CAA), Mactan International Airport, of which the accused are by
law called upon to officially intervene and take part, the following items or
articles, to wit:
1 set three phase
primary metering 13.8 KV 400 KVA, 60 cycles complete with demand metering,
voltage and current transformers valued at P30,000.00;
3 pieces 150KVA Distribution
Transformers, single phase, 60 cycles 2400 volts-240 V/120V oil cooled valued
at P69,000.00;
3 pieces 150 KVA Power transformers, single phase, 60 cycles, 138
KV/2400 volts oil cooled valued at P90,000.00;
4 sets high voltage change over switch 3 poles double throw KV
valued at P12,050.00;
6 sets high voltage use cut-outs valued at P33,000.00; and
cost of installation – P9,000.00
costing all in all P299,175.00, Philippine
Currency, from “Rocen Enterprises” knowing
fully well that the said entity is not a reputable manufacturer and/or supplier
of the above-enumerated articles, thus, giving said “Rocen
Enterprises” unwarranted benefits, advantage or preference, in violation
of prohibitions of the Presidential Memorandum, dated April 22, 1971, Sec. 2,
Rule XVIII of the Civil Service Rules and Regulations and of Sec. 1(x), of
Presidential Decree No. 6, dated September 27, 1972, to the damage and
prejudice of the Philippine Government.
CONTRARY TO LAW.
Upon arraignment, all the accused pleaded not guilty. The case against Manuel Bustamante
was, on motion of the prosecution, dismissed without prejudice for lack of a prima
facie case. Jimenez, Montayre, Villa and Sucalit were
later suspended from public office during the pendency
of the case.
Through the testimonial and documentary evidence it presented at
the trial, the prosecution sought to establish the following facts:
Dario Centeno and Robles negotiated
with Jimenez for the purchase of transformers and electrial
supplies for the Mactan
International Airport. The three were on leave during that
time. On June 1, 1975, Montayre issued
Requisition and Issue Voucher 6-513-75 for the following articles:
1 set three phase
primary metering 13.8 KV 400 KVA, 60 cycles complete with demand
metering, voltage and current
transformers;
3 piece 150 KVA
Distribution Transformers, single phase, 60 cycle 2400 volts-240 V/120V oil
cooled;
3 pieces 150 KVA
Power transformers, single phase, 60 cycles, 138 KV/2400 Volts oil cooled;
4 sets high voltage Changeover Switch, 3 poles double throw 15 KV;
6 sets High Voltage fused cut outs, 15 KV;
750 feet of 750 MCMTHW 600 Volts Copper conductor.
Purpose: For installation of
commercial power at Mactan Centralized
Emergency Power STM.
Jimenez approved the requisition and Leonor
certified to the availability of funds.
Jimenez signed Advertisement No. 16-75, and in due time the required
invitations to bid calling for sealed proposals for the furnishing and delivery
of the supplies were issued.
On June 15, 1975,
Jimenez sent Sucalit to Manila
to canvass the subject supplies at various reputable dealers or manufacturers
in Manila. Sucalit delivered
Advertisement Forms to Rocen Enterprises in Pasay City,
Utilities Equipment and Supply Corporation (UTESCO) in Quezon City, and Intrade Corporation in Makati.
On June 25, 1975,
the sealed bids were opened by the Bidding Committee. The Committee prepared an Abstract of Bids
signed by David, Villa, Sucalit, Wigberto
Fuentebella, Leonardo Mahinay,
and Fermin Beltran, approving the lowest bid, which
was that of Rocen Enterprises. On the same day, a Purchase Order addressed
to Rocen Enterprises was prepared and signed by David
and approved by Jimenez, with Leonor certifying to
the availability of funds.
From June 25-30, 1975, four reports of inspection were prepared
and signed by Sucalit, Villa and Montayre;
four certificates of delivery were signed by Montayre
and Villa; and four general vouchers for P70,180, P75,900, P99,000 and P53,020
respectively were prepared and signed by Villa, Montayre,
Leonor and Jimenez.
On June 30, 1975,
four treasury warrants in the amounts respectively of P70,180, P57,980,
P99,000, P53,020, all payable to Rocen Enterprises
and/or Fernando Dario, were issued in payment for
the articles requisitioned. The Warrant
Register at the airport shows that five checks in the separate amounts of
P70,180, P99,000, P53,020, P57,980, P17,920, were delivered to Centeno.
It turned out that the requisitioned articles were delivered at Cebu City
only on July 6, 1975, and
were shipped by UTESCO, a losing bidder, to Rocen
Enterprises, c/o Mrs. Remedios Centeno
via the vessel Sweet Faith. The freight
and handling charges of P5,500.00 incurred in connection with the delivery were
reimbursed under a General Voucher signed by Jimenez, Montayre
and Leonor to Rocen
Enterprises.
Rocen Enterprises, the winning bidder,
was ostensibly owned by Remedios Centeno,
wife of Estanislao Centeno. Its line of business, as registered with the
Bureau of Domestic Trade on August 9,
1974, was “paper products and printed matters.” On August 11, 1975, the firm was
incorporated and registered with the Securities and Exchange Commission as
“Rocen Trading Incorporated” with an
authorized capital stock of P100,000, P20,000 of which had been subscribed and
P5,000 paid up. The incorporators were Remedios Centeno, Priscilla
Robles, Glicerio Efren,
Rogelio Santos, Estanislao Centeno
and Serafin Robles.
The common defense of all the accused was as follows:
The acquisition of the electrical items was an emergency measure
necessitated by the brownout at Mactan
Airport on the night of June 1, 1975. Incoming flights had to be diverted as the
runway and taxiway lights necessary for a proper landing were all out. Jesus Singson, CAA
Director, directed Mactan officials to implement a
plan to install commercial power at Mactan Airport
which at that time depended on the Mactan Electric
Company and the Philippine Air Force for its power source. For this purpose, Cash Disbursement Ceilings
(CDC) in the total amount of P310,000.00 were released.
As the CDCs would expire on June 30, 1975, it was necessary to
make it appear in the vouchers, supporting documents, reports of inspection,
and certificates of delivery that the items requisitioned were delivered and
inspected on or before June 30, 1975. The CDCs had to be
utilized before the end of the fiscal year as otherwise they would revert to
the general fund. In view of the
emergency nature of the purchase, there was no time to advertise and the
Bidding Committee had to adopt the more expeditious mode of procurement. Anyway, the prices paid by the government
were reasonable.
Jimenez testified that he approved the vouchers after verifying
that all the supporting documents were in order and duly certified by the
proper officers. He disclaimed
responsibility in determining the reputability of the supplier. He admitted he knew Dario, Centeno and Robles but denied that they were in his office
at Mactan Airport
to follow up the transaction.
Montayre contended that his
participation in the transaction was limited to requisitioning the electrical
items. He was not a member of the
Bidding Committee and so had nothing to do with the canvassing of the prices,
the determination of the winning bidder, and the verification of reputability
of the supplier.
Villa, a member of the Bidding Committee, argued that he did not
participate in the canvass of the requistioned
items. As chief of the logistics
section, it was his duty to determine the items needed for the airport but not
the availability of funds for their acquisition. He processed the vouchers before June 30, 1975, because the funds
needed for the items requisitioned would not be available if not disbursed
before that date. He did this upon Montayre’s direction.
Sucalit testified that she made a
canvass of the items requisitioned independent of the Bidding Committee, to use
as a basis for determining the reasonableness of the prices quoted by
suppliers. She acted pursuant to the
National Accounting and Auditing Rules.
She added that she went to Manila
to make the canvass because there was no supplier in Cebu City
that could furnish the needed items. She
had no responsibility to determine who were qualified to participate in the
bidding as she was not a member of the Bidding Committee. She pre-audited and initialed the vouchers
after verifying all supporting documents and certifications. She also said she signed the inspection
reports ahead of the actual delivery of the items because the CDCs would expire on June 30, 1975.
In its decision dated July 28, 1988, the First Division of the Sandiganbayan found all the accused guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of violating Section 3, paragraphs (a), (c)[8]
(h), and (i) of R.A. 3019, in relation to the
Unnumbered Memorandum of the President dated April 22, 1971, Section 12, Rule
XVIII of the Civil Service Rules and Section 1(x) of P.D. No. 6.
Each of the accused was sentenced to suffer an indeterminate
penalty ranging from a minimum of 3 years to a maximum of 6 years imprisonment
and perpetual disqualification from public office.
The Sandiganbayan said:
Carefully evaluating the evidence on record, it has become
abundantly clear to Us that accused Arturo S. Jimenez, Rodolfo E. Montayre, Camilo G. Villa,
Josefina S. Sucalit, and Hereto C. Leonor had conspired with Fernando Dario, Estanislao Centeno, Serafin Robles and Casimiro David
in the commission of the crime for which the last four were convicted by the
Circuit Criminal Court in Case No. CCC-XIV-1457, namely, “Violation of
Section 3, paragraphs (a), (c), (h), and (i), of
Republic Act 3019, otherwise known as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act,
in relation to the Unnumbered Memorandum of the President of the Philippines
dated April 22, 1971, Section 12, Rule XVIII of the Civil Service Rules, and
Section 1(x) of Presidential Decree No. 6.”
We are not disposed to disregard the finding of the court in that
case that “a massive and gigantic conspiracy existed between and among the
four accused herein, namely, David, Centeno, Dario,
and Robles, as well as practically all of the high-ranking officials of CAA Mactan” (namely, Airport General Manager Arturo S.
Jimenez, Asst. Airport General Manager Rodolfo E. Montayre,
Camilo G. Villa as Chief of the Logistics Section,
Mrs. Josefina S. Sucalit, Technical Property
Inspector of the COA detail, and Chief Accountant Hereto C. Leonor),
the purpose of which was to corner and monopolize all requisitions and
purchases of supplies and equipment at CAA Mactan,
regardless of the source or the reputability of the suppliers.
The Sandiganbayan observed that there
was an overcharge in the four vouchers between the prices quoted by Rocen as reflected in the Abstract of Bids and the amounts
actually paid. The overcharge, totaling
P27, 100, was meant to represent the cost of installation, but there was no
justification for including this item in the vouchers and no proof either that Rocen undertook the installation. On the contrary, this work appeared to have
been undertaken by Montayre and personnel from the
Bureau of Air Transportation.
The Sandiganbayan held:
From all facts and circumstances, admitted or undisputed, as well
as those inferences, deductions, and conclusions logically and reasonably
proceeding therefrom, We are drawn into the
conclusion that accused Arturo S. Jimenez, Rodolfo E. Montayre,
Camilo G. Villa, Josefina S. Sucalit
and Hereto C. Leonor, indeed, had conspired with Casimiro David, Estanislao Centeno, Fernando Dario and Serafin
Robles in a dastardly scheme to defraud the government.
When accused Jimenez, Montayre, Villa, Sucalit and Leonor signed,
approved and/or executed the documents that facilitated the consummation of the
transaction in question, in conspiracy with David, Centeno,
Dario and Robles, in direct violation of existing rules and regulations
promulgated by competent authority, they have become criminally liable under
Section 3, paragraph (a), of Republic Act No. 3019, as amended. They not only persuaded, induced, or
influenced each other as public officers to commit such flagrant violations,
but also allowed themselves to be so persuaded, induced or influenced to
railroad the transaction in question.
They had wittingly allowed the questioned purchase from Rocen Enterprises, an entity which is not a reputable
manufacturer or a duly registered and licensed distributor of the equipment
purchased, the same being engaged in the business only of “paper products
and printed matters.”
By the questioned transaction, Rocen
Enterprises was also given unwarranted benefits, advantage, or preference, to
the exclusion of more established and/or reputable establishments manufacturing
or dealing in the kind of equipment purchased.
There was manifest partiality, evident bad faith, and inexcusable
negligence in accepting the bid of Rocen Enterprises
and approving the same within a period of only one day, in accomplishing the
purchase order and general vouchers in payment of the requisitioned equipment
within a period of one week, and delivering the corresponding warrants or
checks in payment of the same, through a CAA employee, even before
delivery of said equipment. Section 3,
paragraph (3) of Republic Act No. 3019, as amended, was thereby violated.
By combining, confederating, and conspiring with Centeno, Dario, and Robles to promote or facilitate efforts
that led to the violation of Section 3, paragraph (h) of Republic Act No. 3019,
for which Centeno, Dario, and Robles were convicted, accused
Jimenez, Montayre, Villa, Sucalit
and Leonor rendered themselves equally liable.
Finally, there can be no doubt at all that Jimenez, Montayre, Villa, Sucalit and Leonor are liable under Section 3, paragraph (i) since they participated in or were responsible for the
approval of a manifestly unlawful, inequitable, or irregular transaction, by
which actuations interest for personal gain shall be presumed against them.
While the Sandiganbayan case was
pending, the Court of Appeals, in a decision promulgated on January 29, 1988, reversed the
judgment of conviction rendered by the Circuit Criminal Court, on the ground of
insufficient evidence. This decision was
subsequently, and quite understandably, invoked by the herein petitioners in their
separate motions for reconsideration of the decision of the Sandiganbayan.
In a resolution dated February
17, 1989, the Sandiganbayan denied all
these motions for reconsideration.
Hence, four separate petitions for review were filed with this Court, by
Villa, in G.R. No. 87186; Montayre, in G.R. No.
87281; Sucalit, in G.R. No. 87466; and Jimenez, in
G.R. No. 87524. Leonor
did not appeal.
On May 4, 1989,
G.R. No. 87466 was dismissed for non-compliance with Circular No. 1-88. Sucalit filed a
motion for reconsideration, which was denied with finality. On October
3, 1989, however, this Court resolved to hold in abeyance
enforcement of final judgment on the petition pending resolution of the other
petitions. On August 22, 1989, we resolved to consolidate these
cases upon motion of the Solicitor General, who was directed to file a
Consolidated Comment on all the cases.
The common issues raised in these petitions are:
1. Whether or not the
decision of acquittal of the Court of Appeals promulgated 6 months before the
decision of the Sandiganbayan bars their conviction
pursuant to the doctrine of “the law of the case.”
2. Whether or not the
testimonies of prosecution witnesses, which were discredited by the Court of
Appeals as biased, merit belief by the Sandiganbayan.
3. Whether or not there
was conspiracy among the petitioners.
The petitioners contend that since their cases in the Sandiganbayan were merely an offshoot of Criminal Case No.
CCC-XIV-1457 in the Circuit Criminal Court of Cebu
City, which was reversed by the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. No. 24142, the
decision of the Court of Appeals has become the “law of the case”
which cannot now be overturned by any court and should be applied in the case
at bar. Accordingly, they should also be
acquitted.
This contention is erroneous.
The doctrine has been defined as “that principle under which
determinations of questions of law will generally be held to govern a case
throughout all its subsequent stages where such determination has already been
made on a prior appeal to a court of last resort. It is merely a rule of procedure and does not
go to the power of the court, and will not be adhered to where its application
will result in an unjust decision. It
relates entirely to questions of law, and is confined in its operation to
subsequent proceedings in the same case.”
In Jarantilla v. Court of Appeals,[9]
we held:
“Law of the case” has been defined as the opinion
delivered on a former appeal.
More specifically, it means that whatever is once irrevocably
established, as the controlling legal rule of decision between
the same parties in the same case continues to be the law of the case,
whether correct on general principles or not, so long as the facts on which
such decision was predicated continue to be the facts of the case before the
court (21 C.J.S. 330) (Italics supplied).
It need not be stated that the Supreme Court being the court of last
resort, is the final arbiter of all legal questions properly brought before it
and that its decision in any given case constitutes the law of that
particular case. x x x (Emphasis supplied). It is a rule of general application that the
decision of an appellate court in a case is the law of the case on the points
presented throughout all the subsequent proceedings in the case in both the
trial and the appellate courts, and no question necessarily involved and
decided on that appeal will be considered on a second appeal or writ of error
in the same case, provided the facts and issues are substantially the same as
those on which the first question rested and, according to some authorities,
provided the decision is on the merits.
In light of these definitions, we find that the Sandiganbayan did not err in holding as follows:
The decision of the Court of Appeals reversing the judgment of the
Circuit Criminal Court in Case No. CCC-XIV-1457, was not, however, a
determination of a question of law. The
present case is not merely a stage or subsequent proceedings of that case. Although related, they are entirely distinct
and separate cases. While in both cases,
the transaction involved, the charges laid, and the persons alluded to as
co-conspirators are one and the same there is definitely no identity of parties
between the two cases. The persons
accused in one differ from those in the other.
There is, therefore, no way whereby the doctrine of the law of the case
would apply. If ever the findings of the
Court of Appeals in the case decided by it would be considered operative as the
“law of the case,” the same would he confined in its operations
solely to the case and to those accused therein.
The petitioners also invoke res judicata, pointing out that in Criminal Case No.
CCC-XIV-1457 and the case at bar, there was identity of the transaction
involved, the witnesses and documentary evidence presented, and the offenses
charged.
The judgment of acquittal in CA G.R. No. 24142 does not
constitute res judicata
so as to bar a judgment of conviction in Criminal Case No. 5915. One of the requisites of res
judicata is that there must be substantial
identity of parties,[10]
which is not present in the instant case.
The petitioners claim that the Sandiganbayan
“relied very heavily, if not mainly” on and has merely adopted the
findings of facts of the Circuit Criminal Court in arriving at its judgment of
conviction. With the reversal of the
decision of the Circuit Criminal Court, the Sandiganbayan
decision has also lost its basis.
This argument is also unacceptable.
While the Sandiganbayan did consider
the decision of the Circuit Criminal Court in finding the petitioners guilty,
this was not the sole reason for their conviction. Apart from the conclusions of that court, the
Sandiganbayan made its own findings of fact based on
the testimony of witnesses and documentary evidence submitted to it during the
trial. In fact, the major part of its
decision dwelt on its own analysis of such evidence.
The petitioners also invoke the decision of the Court of Appeals
rejecting the charge of conspiracy and contend that its finding that David, Centeno, Dario and Robles did not conspire among themselves
or with the herein petitioners precluded the Sandiganbayan
from arriving at a contrary conclusion.
This defense is also untenable.
In United States
v. Remigio,[11]
the Court held that although “a conspiracy is in
its nature a joint offense . . . it does not follow that one person only
cannot be convicted of conspiracy. So long as the acquittal or death of a
co-conspirator does not remove the bases for a charge of conspiracy, one
defendant may be found guilty of the offense.”
Notably, the judgment of acquittal of the Court of Appeals
invoked by the herein petitioners was based on the insufficiency of the
evidence of guilt of the accused therein and not on a finding that no offense
had been committed.
The petitioners complain that the Sandiganbayan
erred in giving credence to the testimony of the prosecution witnesses who had
earlier been disbelieved by the Court of Appeals as biased. The answer to this is that the findings of
fact of the Sandiganbayan in the cases before us are
binding on this Court in the absence of a showing that they come under the
established exceptions. It is also worth
noting that the Sandiganbayan, being a trial court,
was in a position to observe the demeanor of the witnesses, unlike the Court of
Appeals which had to rely only, in the words of the Solicitor General, “on
a mute transcript of stenographic notes.”
It is asserted that the omission to ascertain the reputability of
the supplier would result only in administrative and not criminal liability, as
held by the Court of Appeals. We do not
think so. Not only administrative but
also criminal liability under the aforementioned paragraphs (a) and (e), Section
3, of R.A. 3019 was incurred. The
failure to ascertain the reputability of Rocen
Enterprises constituted a violation of the rules and regulations promulgated by
competent authority and comes under paragraph (a). The manifest partiality that resulted in
unwarranted benefits to Rocen was in contravention of
paragraph (e).
Also invoked is our ruling in Bayot v. Sandiganbayan,[12]
to wit:
Petitioner herein, Reynaldo R. Bayot,
together with his co-accused Lorenzo Ga. Cesar, was one of the those charged
and convicted in a joint decision by the Sandiganbayan,
of the crime of estafa thru falsification of public
documents. Both were sentenced to a
total of 577 years imprisonment by the Sandiganbayan
on exactly the same evidence which this Court had pronounced as “woefully
inadequate” and “too conjectural and presumptive to establish personal
culpability.” (Cesar v. Sandiganbayan, 134 SCRA
105). The petition for review filed by
Lorenzo Ga. Cesar was granted by this Court and in the decision rendered on January 17, 1985 in G.R. Nos.
L-54719-50, 134 SCRA 105, the Court en banc, reversed the decision
of the Sandiganbayan and acquitted Lorenzo Ga.
Cesar. The charge and the evidence
submitted against Lorenzo Ga. Cesar being one and the same against the herein
petitioner Reynaldo R. Bayot, the Court should do no
less with respect to the latter.
In Cesar v. Sandiganbayan,[13]
it was this Court en banc that reversed the decision convicting
the accused of estafa through falsification of public
documents because it had not been proved that Cesar signed the questioned
vouchers. This served as the
basis for acquitting Bayot in his own petition for
review as they were charged under identical informations
and convicted in a joint decision based on the same evidence presented
before Sandiganbayan.
In the case at bar, the first three accused were convicted by the
Circuit Criminal Court and later acquitted by the Court of Appeals. The second batch of accused, the petitioners
herein, were convicted directly by the Sandiganbayan.
Obviously, we cannot rule on the decision of the Court of Appeals
because it is not before us. What is is the decision of the Sandiganbayan,
which is the case we can review. In so
doing, we are not bound by the findings of the Court of Appeals, which have not
been appealed to this Court. We are
confined only to the examination of the proceedings in the Sandiganbayan
because it is its decision that has been elevated to us. From the records of that case, to repeat, we
are satisfied that there was a conspiracy among some of the petitioners.
The failure to show that the petitioners profited from the
transaction would not necessarily result in acquittal. In Luciano v. Estrella,[14]
Justice J.B.L. Reyes, in interpreting paragraph (g), Section 3 of R.A. 3019,
said:
” x x x
the act treated thereunder partakes of the nature of malum prohibitum;
it is the commission of that act as defined by the law, not the character or
effect thereof, that determines whether or not the provision has been
violated. And this construction would be
in consonance with the announced purpose for which Republic Act 3019 was
enacted, which is the repression of certain acts of public officers and
private persons constituting graft or corrupt practices or which may lead
thereto. Note that the law does not
merely contemplates repression of acts that are unlawful or corrupt per se,
but even of those that may lead to or result in graft and corruption x x x.”
The petitioners stress that the investigating fiscal who
conducted the preliminary investigation cleared them of liability (while Tanodbayan Fernandez maintained there was conspiracy) and
argue that the findings of the former should prevail pursuant to Quizo v. Sandiganbayan.[15]
That case, in fact, argues against them.
In Quizo, it was the Tanodbayan
himself who moved for the dismissal of the information with the Sandiganbayan which denied the same and which denial we set
aside. The investigating fiscal being
the subordinate of the Tanodbayan, the latter’s
decision should prevail.
Also cited is the case of Pajaro v. Sandiganbayan,[16]
where it was held:
In view of the findings of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. No.
SP-07493, April 30, 1987,
the prosecution of petitioner in the Sandiganbayan
should be discontinued for the Sandiganbayan may not
review, revise or reverse the findings of the Court of Appeals in relation to
which the Sandiganbayan, a special court with special
and limited jurisdiction, is inferior.
In that case, Pajaro, as
officer-in-charge of the Office of the City Treasurer of Dagupan
City, was charged before the Tanodbayan with
violation of R.A. 3019 for having given undue advantage and benefits to a
delinquent taxpayer by allowing it to pay in installments instead of collecting
the taxes due within the period fixed in the Local Tax Code. While the case was pending, Llamas filed a
petition for mandamus to compel Pajaro
to collect the delinquent’s tax liabilities.
The trial court dismissed the suit and on appeal was upheld by the Court
of Appeals on the ground that no prejudice had been caused to the city, which
in fact stood to gain more from the promissory note than the amount awarded by
the trial court.
The Tanodbayan filed the information
against Pajaro but later recommended its dismissal,
which the Sandiganbayan denied. Citing the Court of Appeals decision, Pajaro moved for reconsideration, which the Sandiganbayan also denied.
This prompted the petition for certiorari and prohibition,
where we ruled in favor of Pajaro.
The Pajaro Case is not applicable
because, as correctly observed by the Solicitor General, one and the same act
of the same party was the subject of separate cases before the Court of Appeals
and the Sandiganbayan. In the cases before us, the parties absolved
by the Court of Appeals are different from the parties in the Sandiganbayan case and the acts committed by the accused in
this case are different from the acts committed by the accused in Criminal Case
No. CCC-XIV-1457.
Lastly, it is contended that there was denial of due process
because the case against them was heard by several sets of justices as follows:
Nov 8, 1983 Pamaran Molina Purisima
Jan. 30, 1984 Pamaran Consolacion Jabson
Jan. 31, 1984 Pamaran Consolacion Quimbo
Mar. 26, 1984 Pamaran Molina Consolacion
Sept. 25, 1984 Pamaran Escaral Molina
Mar. 11, 1985 Pamaran Molina Amores
May 28, 1985 Pamaran Jabson Amores
Sept. 23, 1985 Pamaran Amores Vera
Cruz
July 1-2, 1986 Garchitorena Jabson Joson
Sept. 8-10, 1986 Garchitorena Jabson Joson
Nov.
4-6, 1986 Garchitorena Jabson Joson
Moreover, the decision of conviction was signed by Justices Joson, Garchitorena and Chua
while the resolution on the motion for reconsideration was signed by Justices Joson, Garchitorena and Hermosisima.
Invoked is the case of Cabigao vs. Sandiganbayan,[17]
where this Court held:
At the same time, the too frequent rotation of Justices hearing
this particular case borders on unfairness.
The Sandiganbayan should devise a better
system whereby, as much as possible, the same Justices who hear a case shall be
the ones to decide it. The procedure in
the Court of Appeals cannot be used as a precedent. Except in some isolated instances provided in
Batas Pambansa Blg. 129,
the Court of Appeals reviews and decides cases on the basis of the records and
does not conduct trials. In reducing
temporary changes in its divisions to the barest minimum, the Sandiganbayan also reduces the possibility of one Justice
who hears all the witnesses, influencing the findings of the Justices who did
not have the same opportunity.
In that case, we set aside the decision of the Sandiganbayan and ordered a new trial not solely on
the basis of the “too frequent rotation of justices” but also because
“in addition to the newly-discovered evidence, there (were) serious
allegations which call(ed) for a more thorough examination.”
Furthermore, temporary vacancies in a division of a collegiate
court are to be expected and unavoidable.
The “frequent rotation of justices” decried by the petitioners
was not deliberately done to prejudice them.
It must also be noted that there was no categorical statement in Cabigao that “frequent rotation of justices”
would result in the nullity of the proceedings.
We now proceed to the liabilities of the petitioners.
The petitioners submit that their acts of requisitioning the items,
approving and signing documents relative to the transaction and issuing the
checks in payment of the items requisitioned were made in good faith to beat
the expiry date of the CDCs on June 30, 1975, and allow their utilization before
their reversion to the general fund.
We agree that the issuance of and signatures on the reports of
inspection, certificates of delivery and general vouchers, all before June 30,
1975, prior to the actual delivery of the requisitioned items, were innocent
and justified by the emergency nature of the purchase and the need to beat the
expiry dates of the CDCs. What we cannot come to terms with, however,
is the glaring fact that the winning bidder, Rocen
Enterprises, which was represented by Centeno, Robles
and Dario, deals only in paper products and printed matter and merely procured
the electrical items it supplied to CAA Mactan from
UTESCO, one of the losing bidders. This
transaction reveals that unwarranted advantage through manifest partiality were
accorded Rocen notwithstanding its lack of
reputability as a supplier of electrical equipment.
Who and what made this possible?
A close scrutiny of the circumstances of this case clearly
indicates that Jimenez and Sucalit were indeed
involved in a scheme violative of the Anti-Graft and
Corrupt Practices Act.
Dario, Centeno and Robles were CAA
Manila employees and were on leave during the period of the questioned
transaction. They were seen by
prosecution witnesses at Mactan
Airport in the company of Jimenez,
who admitted he knew the three. Robles
and Centeno are incorporators of Rocen
Trading, Inc., which was the Rocen Enterprises at the
time the transaction was consummated.
This was a sole proprietorship registered in the name of Remedios Centeno, wife of Estanislao Centeno, and engaged
only in the business of dealing in “paper products and printed
matter.”
When the requisition of the items was made, Sucalit
went to Manila pursuant to a travel
order issued by Jimenez to canvass prices of the articles. It is not explained why she delivered an
advertisement form to Rocen Enterprises, which was a
supplier only of paper products and printed matter but not of the needed
electrical items. Curiously, Rocen submitted the lowest quotation for the items
requisitioned. When the contract was
awarded to it, Rocen merely procured the items
requisitioned from UTESCO, a losing bidder.
Arturo Jimenez, Airport General Manager, had the responsibility,
as head of office, to see to it that the purchases made were from reputable
suppliers pursuant to the Unnumbered Presidential Memorandum dated April 22, 1971. Instead of discharging this responsibility,
Jimenez approved the award to Rocen Enterprises,
which was represented by Centeno, Robles and Dario.
Josefina Sucalit, who was sent by
Jimenez to Manila to make a
canvass, inexpicably delivered an advertisement for Rocen Enterprises, which was not a reputable supplier of
the needed items. In her Travel Report,
she certified that she made a canvass from reputable suppliers.
These acts and omissions of Jimenez and Sucalit
violated paragraph (a) of Section 3 of R.A. 3019 in relation to the Unnumbered
Presidential Memorandum. They were
persuaded, induced or influenced, and persuaded, induced or influenced each
other, to award the purchase of electrical items to an entity which was not
even a supplier of electrical items in disregard of the Presidential Memorandum
directing that procurement of supplies by government offices should be from
reputable suppliers. Rocen
was not a “reputable supplier” as it was dealing only in paper
products and printed matter at the time of the transaction in question.
Paragraph (e) was likewise violated by Jimenez and Sucalit because, with manifest partiality in the discharge
of their official and administrative functions, they gave unwarranted benefits,
advantage or preference to Rocen Enterprises.
The circumstances of this case are sufficient to establish
conspiracy between Jimenez and Sucalit in violating
the pertinent provisions of R.A. 3019 adverted to above. Direct evidence is not necessary to prove
such conspiracy, for as we held in People vs. Roa:[18]
A resort to circumstantial evidence is in the very nature of
things, a necessity. Crimes are usually
committed in secret and under conditions where concealment is highly probable;
and to require direct testimony would in many cases result in freeing criminals
and would deny proper protection to society.
(20 Am. Jur. 261).
We believe, however, that Montayre and
Villa are not criminally liable.
Montayre was convicted as a conspirator
for having signed the reports of inspection, certificates of delivery, and
general vouchers before delivery of the items requisitioned. As already stated, these were innocent acts
in view of the emergency nature of the purchase and the need to beat the expiry
date of the CDCs.
No criminal intent can be imputed to his having made the requisition
because the same was necessary. He had
no responsibility in determining the reputability of the supplier and did not
take part in making the canvass and awarding the purchase to Rocen.
Villa was likewise convicted as involved in the conspiracy for
having signed invoices, reports of inspection, certificates of delivery and
general vouchers before delivery of the items requisitioned. He is absolved of this charge like Montayre, for the same reasons. Villa, moreover, did not take part in the
canvassing of supplies.
It is true that he was a member of the Bidding Committee and he
signed the Abstract of Bids and the approval of the lowest bid to Rocen Enterprises.
However, this act cannot be considered criminal as he relied in fact on
the canvass made and sealed bids procured by Sucalit
in Manila. Such reliance may have constituted negligence
but certainly not the gross inexcusable negligence punishable by law.
Regarding the offenses involved, the Court finds that only
paragraphs (a) and (e) of Section 3, R.A. 3019, in relation to this Unnumbered
Presidential Memorandum dated April 22, 1971, were violated.
There was no violation of paragraph (h) of R.A. 3019 as proof of
financial or pecuniary interest in the transaction on the petitioners’ part did
not follow from the Sandiganbayan finding that there
was overpricing.
Paragraph (i) was also not violated
because the Bidding Committee did not exercise discretion in the award
of the contract for purchase of the equipment, which had to be given
to the lowest bidder.
WHEREFORE, the appealed judgment of the Sandiganbayan is AFFIRMED insofar as petitioners Jimenez
and Sucalit are concerned. Petitioners Villa and Montayre
are hereby ACQUITTED.
SO ORDERED.
Narvasa, C.J., Melencio-Herrera,
Gutierrez, Jr., Paras, Feliciano, Padilla, Bidin, Griño-Aquino, Medialdea, Regalado, Romero, Nocon, and Bellosilo, JJ., concur.
Davide, Jr., J., no part as one of the parties, Mr. Montayre used to be his client.
[1]
(a) Persuading, inducing or influencing another public officer to perform an
act constituting a violation of rules and regulations duly promulgated by
competent authority or an offense in connection with the official duties of the
latter, or allowing himself to be persuaded, induced, or influenced to commit
such violation or offense (Sec. 3(a), R.A. 3019).
[2]
(h) Directly or indirectly having financial or pecuniary interest in any
business, contract or transaction in connection with which he intervenes or
takes part in his official capacity, or in which he is prohibited by the
Constitution or by any law from having any interest (Sec. 3[h], R.A. 3019.)
[3]
Effective immediately, in order to preclude overpricing, it is directed that
all government offices shall purchase their supplies, materials, equipment and
the like directly from reputable manufacturers or their duly registered and
licensed distributors in the Philippines, to the exclusion of middlemen.
The Department of General Services
is directed to make a list of such manufacturers and their duly registered or
licensed distributors in the Philippines.
In the event that the needed
materials, supplies and equipment and the like are not available in stock, a
certification to that effect issued by the General Manager of reputable
manufacturers or his duly authorized representative or the firm’s duly
registered and licensed distributor shall be the basis to procure thru
competitive public bidding of the materials, supplies, equipment, etc. The certification shall be included in the
claim for payment.
Any purchase of supplies,
materials, equipment and the like in violation of this Memorandum shall be
considered irregular and shall not be passed in audit.
[4] SECTION 12.
No officer or employee shall engage directly in any private business,
vocation, or profession or be connected with any commercial, credit,
agricultural or industrial undertaking without a written permission from the
head of Department: Provided,
That this prohibition will be absolute in the case of those officers and
employees whose duties and responsibilities require that their entire time be
at the disposal of the Government: Provided,
further, That if an employee is granted permission to engage in outside
activities, the time so devoted outside of office hours should be fixed by the
chief of agency to the end that it will not impair in any way the efficiency of
the officer or employee: And provided,
finally, That no permission is necessary in the case of investments,
made by an officer or employee, which do not involve any real or apparent
conflict between his private interests and public duties or in any way
influence him in the discharge of his duties, and he shall not take part in the
management of the enterprise or become an officer or member of the board of
directors. (Rule XVIII of the Civil
Service Rules)
[5]
SECTION 1. Grounds for disciplinary
action. – The following shall be
grounds for disciplinary action:
x x
x
(x) Pursuit of
private business, vocation or profession without the permission required by
these rules or existing regulations.
(P.D. No. 6)
[6]
(e) Causing any undue injury to any party, including the Government, or giving
any private party any unwarranted benefits, advantage or preference in the
discharge of his official administrative or judicial functions through manifest
partiality, evident bad faith or gross inexcusable negligence. This provision
shall apply to officers and employees of offices or government corporations
charged with the grant of licenses or permits or other concessions. (Sec. 3[e], R.A. 3019)
[7] (i) Directly or indirectly interested, for personal gain, or
having a material interest in any transaction or act requiring the approval of
a board, panel or group of which he is a member, and which exercises discretion
in such approval, even if he votes against the same or does not participate in
the action of the board committee, panel or group.
Interest for personal gain shall be
presumed against those public officers responsible for the approval of
manifestly unlawful, inequitable, or irregular transactions or acts by the
board, panel or group to which they belong.
(Sec. 3 [i], R.A. 3019)
[8]
Paragraph C should be considered par. e, per body of the decision.
[9]
171 SCRA 429.
[10]
Smith Bell & Co., Inc. v. Court of Appeals, 190 SCRA 362.
[11]
37 Phil. 599.
[12]
146 SCRA 304.
[13]
134 SCRA 105.
[14]
34 SCRA 769.
[15]
149 SCRA 108.
[16]
160 SCRA 763.
[17]
150 SCRA 483.
[18]
167 SCRA 116.