HON. GEMILIANO C. LOPEZ, JR., IN HIS CAPACITY AS CITY MAYOR OF MANILA, PETITIONER, VS. THE CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION, HON. DANILO R. LACUNA, IN HIS CAPACITY AS VICE-MAYOR AND PRE…
Listen, read along, or open presentation mode.
Lopez versus Civil Service Commission
The Case
This is a petition brought by the Mayor of Manila against the Civil Service Commission and the Vice-Mayor of Manila, questioning who holds the power to appoint the officers and employees of the City Council of Manila. The Mayor claims that the old charter provision vesting that power in the City Council has been repealed by the Decentralization Law and the Local Government Code, which give mayors the appointing power. The case matters because it settles the relationship between a special charter and later general laws on local autonomy, and because it clarifies the narrow scope of the Supreme Court's review over the Civil Service Commission.
Procedural History
The Vice-Mayor submitted the appointments of nineteen officers and employees of the Executive Staff of the Office of the Presiding Officer to the Civil Service Commission. The City Legal Officer opined that the proper appointing officer is the City Mayor, and that opinion was transmitted to the Commission. The Commission issued a resolution holding that the proper appointing authority is the City Council of Manila and that the signatory of the individual appointments is the City Vice-Mayor. The Mayor then brought the matter to the Supreme Court, styling it a direct appeal under the Constitution and the Judiciary Reorganization law. The Court noted that no appeal lies from decisions of the Commission, but accepted the petition as one for certiorari under Rule 65 because of the important public interest involved and because it was filed within the thirty-day period.
Facts
On September 13, 1988, the Vice-Mayor of Manila, acting as Presiding Officer of the City Council, submitted to the Civil Service Commission the appointments of nineteen officers and employees in the Executive Staff of the Office of the Presiding Officer. He did so pursuant to Section 15 of the Charter of the City of Manila.
The City Budget Officer later asked the Personnel Bureau of the Mayor's office whether the payroll of these newly appointed employees could be paid on the basis of appointments signed by the Vice-Mayor. The Personnel Bureau forwarded the query to the City Legal Officer, who rendered an opinion that the proper appointing officer is the City Mayor and not the City Council. That opinion was transmitted to the Commission.
On February 1, 1989, the Commission promulgated its resolution, holding that contrary to the City Legal Officer's opinion, the appointing power is vested in the City Council, and that the signatory of the individual appointments is the City Vice-Mayor. The Mayor then came to the Supreme Court.
Issues
- Whether or not the City Council of Manila still has the power to appoint its officers and employees under the Charter of the City of Manila, or whether that power has been transferred to the City Mayor by the Decentralization Law and the Local Government Code.
- Whether or not the Supreme Court may entertain the petition, which was styled a direct appeal rather than a petition for certiorari.
Applicable Provisions
Section 15 of the Charter of the City of Manila provides:
The Board shall appoint and the Vice Mayor shall sign all appointments of the other employees of the Board.
This is the special charter provision the Court holds was not repealed.
Section 7 of Article IX of the Constitution provides:
Unless otherwise provided by this Constitution or by law, any decision, order, or ruling of each Commission may be brought to the Supreme Court on certiorari by the aggrieved party within thirty days from receipt of a copy thereof.
This governs the mode and period for challenging the Commission's ruling.
Section 4 of the Decentralization Law provides, in part:
All other employees, except teachers, paid out of provincial, city or municipal general funds, road and bridge funds, school funds, and other local funds, shall, subject to civil service law, rules and regulations, be appointed by the Provincial Governor, City or Municipal Mayor upon recommendation of the office head concerned.
This is the general law the Mayor invokes as having repealed the charter provision.
Section 171 of the Local Government Code provides, in part:
Appoint, in accordance with civil service law, rules and regulations, all officers and employees of the city, whose appointments are not otherwise provided in this Code.
This is the second general law relied upon by the Mayor.
Ruling
On the first issue, the Court ruled that the City Council of Manila retains the appointing power. The Charter of the City of Manila is a special law, while the Decentralization Law and the Local Government Code are general laws. It is a canon of statutory construction that a special law prevails over a general law, regardless of their dates of passage, and the special law remains an exception to the general. The Court stressed that every effort must be exerted to avoid a conflict between statutes, and that repeals by implication are not favored; the repugnancy must be very clear to warrant a holding that the later law repeals the earlier one. The Court also explained that the general laws were meant not to vest city mayors with comprehensive powers, but to transfer the power of appointment over local officials and employees from the President to the local governments and to highlight local autonomy. They were not meant to deprive the City Council of Manila of its appointing power under its existing statute.
On the second issue, the Court held that no appeal lies from decisions of the Civil Service Commission. The Commission is the single arbiter of all contests relating to the civil service, and its judgments are unappealable and subject only to the Supreme Court's certiorari jurisdiction. The Court nevertheless accepted the petition, treating it as one for certiorari under Rule 65, because of the important public interest involved and because it was filed within the thirty-day period.
Doctrine
A special law prevails over a general law, regardless of their dates of passage, and the special law is considered as remaining an exception to the general. Repeals by implication are not favored; the repugnancy between two statutes must be very clear before a later law may be held to have repealed an earlier one. Every effort must be exerted to reconcile statutes if a reasonable construction is possible. The general provisions of the Decentralization Law and the Local Government Code on the appointing power of mayors did not repeal the special charter of the City of Manila, which vests the appointing power over Council employees in the City Council, with the Vice-Mayor signing the appointments. Finally, decisions of the Civil Service Commission are unappealable and may be brought to the Supreme Court only on certiorari within thirty days from receipt.
Disposition
The petition was dismissed, and the Commission's resolution upholding the City Council's appointing power was sustained.
Remember This
Memorize the line that a special law prevails over a general law regardless of dates of passage, and that repeals by implication are not favored. Examiners use this case on statutory construction and local government appointing power, and on the rule that Civil Service Commission rulings are reviewable only by certiorari.