G.R. No. 86953. November 06, 1990
MARINE RADIO COMMUNICATIONS ASSOCIATION OF THE PHILIPPINES, INC. (MARCAPI), ROBERTO GAYA, DAVID ZAFRA AND SEGUNDO P. LUSTRE, JR., PETITIONERS, VS. HON. RAINERIO O. REYES, IN HIS…
SARMIENTO, J.:
The petitioners are self-described “Filipino entrepreneurs
deeply involved in the business of marine radio
communications in the country.”[1] They are also operators of “shore-to-ship
and ship-to-shore public marine coastal radio
stations”[2] and are holders of certificates of public
convenience duly issued by the National Telecommunications Commission. Among other things, they handle
correspondence between vessel passengers or crew and the public.[3]
Sometime in July, 1988,
the Department of Transportation and Communications unveiled an
P880-million-maritime coastal communications system project, designed to
“ensure safety of lives at sea (SOLAS) through the establishment of
efficient communication facilities between coast stations and ship stations and
the improvement of safety in navigational routes at sea.”[4] It was set out to provide,
among other things, ship-to-shore and shore-to-ship public
corresponding, free of charge.[5]
On August 1,
1988, Atty. F. Reyes
Cabigao, in his capacity as counsel for the
petitioner, Marine Radio Communications Association of the Philippines, Inc.,
addressed an appeal to then Secretary Rainerio Reyes,
in the tenor as follows:
xxx xxx xxx
But you undoubtedly would understand their fears. It was their feeling that entry of the
government into their line of business would certainly spell for them financial
ruin as it would put into serious doubt the viability of the entire marine
radio communications industry. They say
that, as it is today, the industry is not viable enough. What more, they ask, if the government steps
in and eventually dips its strong fingers into the pie?[6]
xxx xxx xxx
On August 17, 1988,
the Secretary forwarded a reply, denying Atty. Cabigao’s
request, for the following reasons:
xxx xxx xxx
MARCAPI’s main business concern is public
correspondence. This means that MARCAPI
handles only correspondence between passengers or crew on board ship and their
respective offices or residences. On the
other hand, the Maritime Coastal Communications System Project to be
implemented by 1989 will offer services in watch and distress signal, medical
and meteorological services, port services, and public correspondence, in their
order of priority.
You will note that public correspondence is only fourth in the
order of priority of services to be offered by the present maritime
project. Primarily, it will offer
distress and safety communications service which is obligatory in the maritime
mobile service. This consists of
monitoring by coast stations of
distress signal from ships in trouble and relaying the messages to the
Philippine Coast Guard which will undertake the search and rescue
operations. It also includes safety
communication which refers to weather broadcast and typhoon signals that will
be broadcast by the coast stations regularly.
These services are offered to the public for free.
It is worth nothing, as it is significant, that the confidence of
the public in the competence of
private firms to carry out the aforecited objectives
has already been eroded. After that
tragic incident of the sinking of MV Dona Paz, the National Telecommunications
Commission and MARINA conducted constant monitoring by sending distress
signals. Out of 1,000 licensed private
operators, only one (1) responded to the signal.[7]
On February
20, 1989, the
petitioners brought the instant suit, alleging, in essence, that Secretary Rainerio Reyes had been guilty of a grave abuse of
discretion.
On June 7,
1990, the Court
issued a Resolution, in view of the departure of Secretary Rainerio
Reyes, requiring the present incumbent, Secretary Oscar Orbos, to inform the Court whether or not the Department is
adopting the action of Secretary Reyes.
On August 16, 1990, Assistant Secretary Wilfredo Trinidad informed us that Secretary Orbos is adopting the action complained of.
The petitioners hold that the Department can not compete in the business of public
correspondence, and rely on the provisions of Section 20,
of Article II, of the Constitution, which states:
Sec. 20. The State
recognizes the indispensable role
of the private sector, encourages private enterprise, and provides incentives
to needed investments.
The Solicitor General, on
the other hand, submits that in spite of the above provision, the
Government “cannot abandon its ministerial functions of rendering public services to the citizenry
which private capital would not ordinarily undertake, or which by its very
nature is better equipped to administer for the public welfare than by any
private individual or entity.”[8]
There is no merit in this
petition.
The duty of the State is
preeminently, “to serve…the people,”[9] and so also, to “promote a just and
dynamic social order…through policies that provide adequate social services…
and an improved quality of life for all.”[10]
The objectives of
government, as expressed in the Charter, are, among other things, “a more
equitable distribution of
opportunities, income, and wealth…[and] a sustained increase in the amount of
goods and services produced by the nation for the benefit of the
people…”[11] With respect in particular to property, the
Constitution decrees:
Sec. 6. The use of property
bears a social function, and all economic agents shall contribute to the common
good. Individuals and private groups,
including corporations, cooperatives, and similar collective organizations, shall have the right to own, establish,
and operate economic enterprises, subject to
the duty of the State to promote distributive justice and to intervene
when the common good so demands.[12]
There can hardly be any
valid argument against providing for public corresponding, free of charge. It is compatible with State aims to serve the
people under the Constitution, and certainly, amid these hard times, the State
can do no less.
The petitioners can not
legitimately rely on the provisions of Section 20, of Article II, of the Constitution,
to defeat the act complained of. The
mandate “recogniz[ing]
the indispensable role of the private sector” is no more than an
acknowledgment of the importance of private initiative in building the nation. However, it is not call
for official abdication of duty to citizenry.
The novel provisions of
the Charter prescribing private sector participation, especially in the field
of economic activity,[13] come, indeed, no more as responses to State
monopoly of economic forces which has unfairly kept individual initiative from
the economic processes and has held back competitiveness in the market. The Constitution does not bar, however, the
Government from undertaking its own initiatives, especially in the domain of
public service, and neither does it repudiate its primacy as chief economic
caretaker of the nation.
The principle of laissez faire has long been denied
validity in this jurisdiction. In 1969,
the Court promulgated Agricultural Credit and Cooperative Financing
Administration v. Confederation of Unions in Government Corporations and
Offices,[14] where it was held:
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x x x The areas which used to be left to
private enterprise and initiative and which the government was called upon to
enter optionally, and only “because
it was better equipped to administer for the public welfare than is any private
individual or group of individuals,” continue to lose their well-defined
boundaries and to be absorbed within activities that the government must
undertake in its sovereign
capacity if it is to meet the increasing social challenges of the times. Here as almost everywhere else the tendency
is undoubtedly towards a greater socialization of economic forces. Here of course this development was
envisioned, indeed adopted as a notional
policy, by the Constitution itself in its declaration of principle
concerning the promotion of social justice.[15]
The requirements of
social justice and the necessity for a redistribution of the national wealth
and economic opportunity find in fact a greater emphasis in the
1987 Constitution, notwithstanding the novel concepts
inscribed there.[16] And two decades after this Court wrote it, ACCFA’s message remains the same and its lesson holds true as
ever.
The Court is not of the
thinking that the act complained of is equivalent to a taking without just
compensation. Albeit we have held that
“[w]here the owner is deprived of the ordinary and beneficial use of his property
or of its value by its being diverted to public use, there is taking within the
constitutional sense,”[17]
it does not seem to us that the Department of Transportation and Communication,
by providing for free public correspondence,
is guilty of an uncompensated taking.
Rather, the Government merely
built a bridge that made the boat obsolete, although not entirely
useless. Certainly, the owner of the boat can not charge the builder
of the bridge for lost income. And certainly, the Government has all
the right to build the bridge.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED. No costs.
SO ORDERED.
Fernan, C.J., Narvasa,
Melencio-Herrera, Gutierrez, Jr., Cruz, Paras, Gancayco, Bidin, Cortes, Griño-Aquino, Medialdea, and Regalado, JJ., concur.
Feliciano, J., on leave.
Padilla, J., no part.
[1]
Rollo, 5.
[2]
Id., 6.
[3]
Id., 13.
[4]
Id., 55.
[5]
Id., 61.
[6]
Id., 56.
[7]
Id., 61.
[8]
Id., 78-79.
[9]
CONST., art. II, sec. 4.
[10]
Supra, sec. 9.
[11]
Supra, art. XII, sec. 1.
[12]
Supra, sec. 6.
[13]
See supra, art. XII, sec. 1; sec. 20.
[14]
Nos. L-21484 and 23605, November 29, 1969,
30 SCRA 649.
[15]
Supra, 662.
[16]
See CONST., art. II, supra; art. XII,
supra, art. XIII.
[17]
Municipality of La
Carlota v. National Waterworks and Sewerage Authority, No. L-20232, September 30, 1964, 12 SCRA 165, 167.