LUZ FARMS, PETITIONER, VS. THE HONORABLE SECRETARY OF THE DEPARTMENT OF AGRARIAN REFORM, RESPONDENT.

This is a petition for prohibition
with prayer for restraining order and/or preliminary and permanent injunction
against the Honorable Secretary
of the Department of Agrarian Reform for
acting without jurisdiction in enforcing the assailed provisions
of R.A. No. 6657, otherwise known as the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law of
1988 and in promulgating the Guidelines and Procedure Implementing Production
and Profit Sharing under R.A. No. 6657, insofar as the same apply to herein
petitioner, and further from performing an act in violation of the
constitutional rights of the petitioner.

As gathered from the records, the factual background of this
case, is as follows:

On June 10, 1988,
the President of the Philippines
approved R.A. No. 6657, which includes the raising of livestock, poultry and swine
in its coverage (Rollo, p. 80).

On January 2, 1989, the Secretary of Agrarian Reform promulgated
the Guidelines and Procedures Implementing Production and Profit Sharing as
embodied in Sections 13 and 32 of R.A. No. 6657 (Rollo,
p. 80).

On January 9, 1989,
the Secretary of Agrarian Reform promulgated its Rules and Regulations
implementing Section 11 of R.A. No. 6657  (Commercial Farms).  (Rollo,
p. 81).

Luz Farms, petitioner in this case, is a corporation engaged in
the livestock and poultry business and together with others in the same
business allegedly stands to be adversely affected by the enforcement of
Section 3(b), Section 11, Section 13, Section 16(d) and 17 and Section 32 of
R.A. No. 6657 otherwise known as Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law and of the
Guidelines and Procedures Implementing Production and Profit Sharing under R.A.
No. 6657 promulgated on January 2, 1989 and the Rules and Regulations
Implementing Section 11 thereof as promulgated by the DAR on January 9, 1989 (Rollo, pp.
2-36).

Hence, this petition praying that aforesaid laws, guidelines and
rules be declared unconstitutional. 
Meanwhile, it is also prayed that a writ of preliminary injunction or
restraining order be issued enjoining public respondents from enforcing the
same, insofar as they are made to apply to Luz Farms and other livestock and
poultry raisers.

This Court in its Resolution dated July 4, 1989 resolved to deny, among others, Luz Farms’
prayer the issuance of a preliminary injunction in its Manifestation dated May
26 and 31, 1989.  (Rollo, p. 98).

Later, however, this Court in its Resolution dated August 24, 1989 resolved to grant
said Motion for Reconsideration regarding the injunctive relief, after the
filing and approval by this Court
of an injunction bond in the amount of P100,000.00.  This Court also gave due course to the
petition and required the parties to file their respective memoranda (Rollo, p. 119).

The petitioner filed its Memorandum on September 6, 1989 (Rollo,
pp. 131-168).

On December 22, 1989,
the Solicitor General adopted his Comment to the petition as his Memorandum (Rollo, pp. 186-187).

Luz Farms questions the following provisions of R.A. 6657,
insofar as they are made to apply to it:

(a)  
Section 3(b) which
includes the “raising of livestock (and poultry)” in the definition of
“Agricultural, Agricultural Enterprise or Agricultural Activity.”

(b)  
Section 11 which defines “commercial farms” as “private agricultural lands
devoted to commercial, livestock, poultry and swine raising x x x.”

(c)  
Section 13 which
calls upon petitioner to execute a production-sharing plan.

(d)  
Section 16(d) and
17 which vest on the Department of Agrarian Reform the authority to
summarily determine the just compensation to be paid for lands covered by the
Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law.

(e)  
Section 32 which
spells out the production-snaring plan mentioned in Section 13 -?

“x x x (W)hereby three percent (3%) of the gross sales from the
production of such lands are distributed within sixty (60) days of the end of
the fiscal year as compensation to regular and other farmworkers
in such lands over and above the compensation they currently receive:  Provided, That these individuals or entities
realize gross sales in excess of five million pesos per annum unless the DAR,
upon proper application, determine a lower ceiling.

In the event that the individual or entity realizes a profit, an additional ten (10%) of the net
profit after tax shall be distributed to said regular and other farmworkers within ninety (90) days of the end of the
fiscal year.  x x x.“

The main issue in this petition is the constitutionality of
Sections 3(b), 11, 13 and 32 of
R.A. No. 6657 (the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law of 1988), insofar as the said law includes the raising
of livestock, poultry and swine in its coverage as well as the Implementing
Rules and Guidelines promulgated in accordance therewith.

The Constitutional provision under consideration reads as
follows:

ARTICLE XIII

xxx                xxx                  xxx

AGRARIAN AND NATURAL
RESOURCES REFORM

Section 4.  The State shall,
by law, undertake an agrarian reform program founded on the right of farmers
and regular farmworkers, who are landless, to own
directly or collectively the lands they till or, in the case of other farmworkers, to receive a just share of the fruits
thereof.  To this end, the State shall
encourage and undertake the just distribution of all agricultural lands,
subject to such priorities and reasonable retention limits as the Congress may
prescribe, taking into account ecological, developmental, or equity considerations,
and subject to the payment of just compensation.  In determining retention limits, the State
shall respect the rights of small landowners. 
The State shall further provide incentives for voluntary land-sharing.

xxx                   xxx                   xxx.”

Luz Farms contended that it does not seek the nullification of
R.A. 6657 in its entirety.  In fact, it
acknowledges the correctness of the decision of this Court in the case of the
Association of Small Landowners in the Philippines, Inc. vs. Secretary of Agrarian Reform (G.R.
78742, 14 July 1989) affirming the constitutionality of the Comprehensive
Agrarian Reform Law.  It, however, argued
that Congress in enacting the said law has
transcended the mandate of the Constitution, in including land devoted to the raising of livestock, poultry and swine in its coverage (Rollo, p. 131). 
Livestock or poultry raising is not similar to crop or tree
farming.  Land is not the primary
resource in this undertaking and represents
no more than five percent (5%) of the total investment of commercial livestock
and poultry raisers.  Indeed, there are
many owners of residential lands all over the country who use available space
in their residences for commercial livestock and raising purposes, under
“contract-growing arrangements,” whereby they supplement the
requirements of meat processing corporations and other commercial livestock and
poultry raisers (Rollo, p. 10).  Lands support the buildings and other
amenities attendant to the raising of animals
and birds.  The use of land is
incidental to but not the principal
factor or consideration in productivity in this industry.  Excluding backyard raisers, about 80% of
those in commercial livestock and poultry production occupy five hectares or
less.  The remaining 20% are mostly
corporate farms (Rollo, p. 11).

On the other hand, the public respondent argued that livestock
and poultry raising is embraced
in the term “agriculture” and the inclusion of such enterprise under
Section 3(b) of R.A. 6657 is proper.  He
cited that Webster’s International Dictionary, Second Edition (1954), defines
the following words:

“Agriculture –
the art or science of cultivating the ground and raising and harvesting crops,
often, including also, feeding, breeding and management of livestock, tillage,
husbandry, farming.

It includes farming,
horticulture, forestry, dairying, sugarmaking x x x.

Livestock – domestic animals used or
raised on a farm, especially for profit.

Farm – a plot or tract of land devoted to
the raising of domestic or other animals.” (Rollo,
pp. 82-83).

The petition is impressed with merit.

The question raised is one of
constitutional construction.  The primary task in constitutional construction is to ascertain and thereafter
assure the realization of the
purpose of the framers in the adoption of the Constitution (J.M. Tuazon & Co. vs. Land Tenure Administration, 31 SCRA
413 [1970]).

Ascertainment of the
meaning of the provision of Constitution begins with the language of the
document itself.  The words used in the Constitution are to be
given their ordinary meaning except where technical terms are employed in which case the significance thus
attached to them prevails (J.M. Tuazon & Co. vs.
Land Tenure Administration, 31 SCRA 413 [1970]).

It is generally held that, in construing constitutional
provisions which are ambiguous or of doubtful meaning, the courts may consider
the debates in the constitutional convention as throwing light on the intent of
the framers of the Constitution.  It is true that the intent of the
convention is not controlling by itself,
but as its proceeding was
preliminary to the adoption by the people of the Constitution the understanding
of the convention as to what was
meant by the terms of the constitutional
provision which was the subject of the deliberation, goes a long way
toward explaining the understanding of the people when they ratified it (Aquino, Jr. v. Enrile, 59 SCRA
183 [1974]).

The transcripts of the deliberations of the Constitutional
Commission of 1986 on the
meaning of the word “agricultural,” clearly show that it was never
the intention of the framers of the Constitution to include livestock and
poultry industry in the coverage of the constitutionally-mandated agrarian
reform program of the Government.

The Committee adopted the
definition of “agricultural land” as defined under Section 186 of R.A. 3844, as land devoted to any
growth.  Including but not limited to
crop lands, saltbeds,
fishponds, idle and abandoned land (Record, CONCOM, August 7, 1986, Vol.
III, p. 11).

The intention of the Committee is to limit the application of the
word “agriculture.” Commissioner Jamir
proposed to insert the word “ARABLE” to distinguish this kind of
agricultural land from such lands as commercial
and industrial lands and residential properties because all of them fall under
the general classification of the word “agricultural”.  This proposal, however, was not considered
because the Committee contemplated that agricultural lands are limited to
arable and suitable agricultural lands and therefore, do not include
commercial, industrial and residential lands (Record, CONCOM, August 7, 1986,
Vol. III, p. 30).

In the interpellation, then Commissioner Regalado
(now a Supreme Court Justice), posed several questions, among others, quoted as
follows:

xxx                xxx                   xxx

“Line 19 refers to genuine reform program founded on the
primary right of farmers and farmworkers.  I
wonder if it means that leasehold tenancy
is thereby proscribed under this provision because it speaks of the
primary right of farmers and farmworkers to own directly
or collectively the lands they till.  As
also mentioned by Commissioner Tadeo, farmworkers include those who work in piggeries and poultry
projects.

I was wondering whether I am wrong in my appreciation that if somebody puts up a piggery or a poultry
project and for that purpose hires farmworkers
therein, these farmworkers will automatically have the right to own eventually, directly or
ultimately or collectively, the land on which the piggeries and poultry
projects were constructed.  (Record,
CONCOM, August 2, 1986, p. 618).

xxx                xxx                   xxx.”

The questions were answered and explained in the statement of
then Commissioner Tadeo, quoted as follows:

xxx                xxx                   xxx

“Sa pangalawang katanungan
ng Ginoo ay medyo hindi kami
nagkaunawaan.  Ipinaaalam ko kay
Commissioner Regalado na hindi namin inilagay
ang agricultural worker sa kadahilanang kasama rito ang piggery, poultry at
livestock workers.  Ang
inilagay namin dito ay farm worker kaya hindi kasama ang
piggery, poultry at livestock workers (Record, CONCOM, August 2, 1986, Vol. II, p. 621).

It is evident from the foregoing discussion that Section II of
R.A. 6657 which includes “private agricultural lands devoted to commercial
livestock, poultry and swine raising” in the definition of “commercial
farms” is invalid, to the extent that the aforecited
agro-industrial activities are made to be covered by the agrarian reform
program of the State.  There is simply no
reason to include livestock and poultry lands in the coverage of agrarian
reform (Rollo,
p. 21).

Hence, there is merit in Luz Farms’ argument that the requirement
in Sections 13 and 32 of R.A. 6657 directing “corporate farms” which include
livestock and poultry raisers to execute and implement “production-sharing
plans” (pending final redistribution of their landholdings) whereby they are
called upon to distribute from three percent (3%) of their gross sales and ten
percent (10%) of their net profits to their workers as additional compensation is unreasonable for being
confiscatory, and therefore violative of due process (Rollo,
p. 21).

It has been established that this Court will assume jurisdiction over a constitutional question only
if it is shown that the
essential requisites of a judicial inquiry into such a question are first
satisfied.  Thus, there must be an actual
case or controversy involving a
conflict of legal rights susceptible judicial determination, the constitutional question must have been
opportunely raised by the proper party, and the resolution of the question is
unavoidably necessary to the decision of the case itself (Association of Small
Landowners of the Philippines, Inc. v. Secretary
of Agrarian Reform, G.R. 78742; Acuna v. Arroyo, G.R.
79310; Pabico
v. Juico, G.R. 79744; Manaay
v. Juico, G.R. 79777, 14 July 1989, 175 SCRA 343).

However, despite the inhibitions pressing upon the Court when
confronted with constitutional issues, it will not hesitate to declare a law or
act invalid when it is convinced that this must be done.  In arriving at this conclusion, its only
criterion will be the
Constitution and God as its conscience gives it in the light to probe its
meaning and discover its purpose. 
Personal motives and political considerations are irrelevancies that
cannot influence its decisions. 
Blandishment is as ineffectual as intimidation, for all the awesome
power of the Congress and Executive, the Court will not hesitate “to make
the hammer fall heavily,” where the acts of these departments, or of any
official, betray the people’s will as
expressed in the Constitution (Association of Small Landowners of Philippines,
Inc. v. Secretary of Agrarian Reform, G.R. 78742; Acuna
v. Arroyo, G.R. 79310; Pabico v.  Juico, G.R. 79744; Manaay v. Juico, G.R. 79777, 14
July 1989).

Thus, where the legislature or the executive acts beyond the scope
of its constitutional powers, it becomes the duty of the judiciary to declare
what the other branches of the government had assumed to do as void.  This is the essence of judicial power
conferred by the Constitution “(I)n one
Supreme Court and in such lower courts as may be established by law” (Art.
VIII, Section 1 of the 1935 Constitution; Article X, Section I of the 1973
Constitution and which was adopted as part of the Freedom Constitution, and
Article VIII, Section 1 of the 1987
Constitution) and which power this Court has exercised in many instances (Demetria
v. Alba, 148 SCRA 208 [1987]).

PREMISES CONSIDERED, the instant petition is hereby
GRANTED.  Sections 3(b), 11, 13 and 32 of
R.A. No. 6657 insofar as the inclusion of the raising of livestock, poultry and swine in its coverage
as well as the Implementing Rules and Guidelines promulgated in
accordance therewith, are hereby DECLARED null and void for being
unconstitutional and the writ of preliminary injunction issued is hereby MADE
permanent.

SO ORDERED.

Fernan, C.J., Narvasa,
Melencio-Herrera, Gutierrez, Jr., Cruz, Gancayco, Padilla, Bidin, Griño-Aquino, Medialdea, and Regalado, JJ., concur.

Feliciano, J., on leave.

Sarmiento, J., see separate opinion.