SOUTHEAST ASIAN FISHERIES DEVELOPMENT CENTER­-AQUACULTURE DEPARTMENT (SEAFDEC-AQD), DR. FLOR LACANILAO (CHIEF), RUFIL CUEVAS (HEAD, ADMINISTRATIVE DIV.), BEN DELOS REYES (FINANC…

This is a petition for certiorari to annul and set aside
the July 26, 1988 decision of the National Labor Relations Commission
sustaining the labor arbiter, in holding herein petitioners Southeast Asian
Fisheries Development Center-Aquaculture Department (SEAFDEC?AQD), Dr.
Flor Lacanilao, Rufil Cuevas and Ben de los Reyes liable to pay private
respondent Juvenal Lazaga the amount of P126,458.89 plus interest thereon
computed from May 16, 1986 until full payment thereof is made, as separation
pay and other post-employment benefits, and the resolution denying the
petitioners’ motion for reconsideration of said decision dated January 9, 1989.

The antecedent facts of the case are as follows:

SEAFDEC-AQD is a
department of an international organization, the Southeast Asian Fisheries
Development Center, organized through an agreement entered into in
Bangkok, Thailand on December 28, 1967 by the governments of Malaysia,
Singapore, Thailand, Vietnam, Indonesia
and the Philippines with Japan as the sponsoring country (Article 1, Agreement
Establishing the SEAFDEC).

On April 20, 1975,
private respondent Juvenal Lazaga was employed as a Research Associate
on a probationary basis by the SEAFDEC-AQD and was appointed Senior External
Affairs Officer on January 5, 1983 with a monthly basic salary of P8,000.00 and a monthly allowance of P4,000.00. Thereafter, he was appointed to the position
of Professional III and designated as Head of External Affairs Office with the
same pay and benefits.

On May 8, 1986,
petitioner Lacanilao in his capacity as Chief of SEAFDEC-AQD sent a notice of termination
to private respondent informing him that due to the financial constraints being experienced by the department, his services shall be
terminated at the close of office hours on May 15, 1986 and that he is entitled
to separation benefits equivalent to one (1) month of his basic salary for
every year of service plus other benefits (Rollo, p. 153).

Upon petitioner SEAFDEC-AQD’s failure to pay private respondent
his separation pay, the latter filed on March 18, 1987 a complaint against
petitioners for non-payment of separation benefits plus moral damages and
attorney’s fees with the Arbitration Branch of the NLRC (Annex “C” of
Petition for Certiorari).

Petitioners in their
Answer with counterclaim alleged that the NLRC has no jurisdiction over
the case inasmuch as the SEAFDEC-AQD is an international organization and that private respondent must first secure
clearances from the proper departments for property or money accountability
before any claim for separation pay will be paid, and which clearances had not
yet been obtained by the private respondent.

A formal hearing was conducted whereby private respondent alleged that the non-issuance
of the clearances by the petitioners was politically motivated and in bad
faith. On the other hand, petitioners
alleged that private respondent
has property accountability and an outstanding obligation to SEAFDEC-AQD in the
amount of P27,532.11. Furthermore,
private respondent is not entitled to accrued sick leave benefits amounting to
P44,000.00 due to his failure to avail of the same during his employment with
the SEAFDEC-AQD (Annex “D”, Id.).

On January 12, 1988, the labor arbiter rendered a decision, the
dispositive portion of which reads:

“WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered
ordering respondents:

1. To pay complainant P126,458.89, plus legal
interest thereon computed from May 16, 1986 until full payment thereof is made,
as separation pay and other post-employment benefits;

2. To pay complainant
actual damages in the amount of P50,000, plus 10% attorney’s fees.

All other claims are hereby dismissed.

SO ORDERED.” (Rollo, p. 51, Annex “E”)

On July 26, 1988, said decision was affirmed by the Fifth
Division of the NLRC except as to the
award of P50,000.00 as actual damages and attorney’s fees for being
baseless. (Annex “A”, p. 28,
id.)

On September 3, 1988, petitioners filed a Motion for
Reconsideration (Annex “G”, id.)
which was denied on January 9, 1989. Thereafter, petitioners instituted this petition for certiorari
alleging that the NLRC has no
jurisdiction to hear and decide respondent Lazaga’s complaint since SEAFDEC-AQD
is immune from suit owing to its international character and the complaint is
in effect a suit against the State which cannot be maintained without its
consent.

The petition is impressed with merit.

Petitioner Southeast Asian Fisheries Development
Center-Aquaculture Department (SEAFDEC-AQD) is an international agency beyond
the jurisdiction of public respondent NLRC.

It was established by the Governments of Burma, Kingdom
of Cambodia, Republic of Indonesia, Japan, Kingdom of Laos, Malaysia, Republic of the Philippines, Republic
of Singapore, Kingdom of Thailand and Republic of Vietnam (Annex “H”,
Petition).

The Republic of the
Philippines became a signatory to the Agreement establishing SEAFDEC on
January 16, 1968. Its purpose is as
follows:

“The purpose of the Center is to contribute to the promotion
of the fisheries development in Southeast Asia by mutual cooperation among the
member governments of the Center, hereinafter called the ‘Members’, and through
collaboration with international organizations and governments external to the
Center. (Agreement Establishing the
SEAFDEC, Art. 1; Annex “H”, Petition)” (p. 310, Rollo)

SEAFDEC-AQD was organized during the Sixth Council Meeting of
SEAFDEC on July 3-7, 1973 in Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia as one of the principal
departments of SEAFDEC (Annex “I”, id.) to be established in Iloilo
for the promotion of research in aquaculture. Paragraph 1, Article 6 of the Agreement establishing SEAFDEC mandates:

“1. The Council
shall be the supreme organ of the Center and all powers of the Center shall be
vested in the Council.”

Being an
intergovernmental organization, SEAFDEC including its Departments (AQD),
enjoys functional independence and freedom from control of the state in whose
territory its office is located.

As Senator Jovito R. Salonga and Former Chief Justice Pedro L.
Yap stated in their book, Public International Law (p. 83, 1956 ed.):

“Permanent
international commissions and administrative bodies have been created by
the agreement of a considerable number of States for a variety of international
purposes, economic or social and mainly non?political. Among the notable instances are the
International Labor Organization, the International Institute of Agriculture,
the International Danube Commission. In
so far as they are autonomous and beyond the
control of any one State, they have a distinct juridical personality independent
of the municipal law of the State where they are situated. As such, according to one leading authority
‘they must be deemed to possess a species of international personality of their
own.’ (Salonga and Yap, Public International Law, 83 [1956 ed.])”

Pursuant to its being a signatory to the Agreement, the Republic
of the Philippines agreed to be represented by one Director in the governing
SEAFDEC Council (Agreement Establishing SEAFDEC, Art. 5, Par. 1, Annex
“H”, ibid) and that its national laws and regulations shall apply
only insofar as its contribution to SEAFDEC of “an agreed amount of money,
movable and immovable property and services necessary for the establishment and
operation of the Center” are concerned (Art. 11, ibid). It expressly waived the application of the
Philippine laws on the disbursement of funds of petitioner SEAFDEC-AQD (Section
2, P.D. No. 292).

The then Minister of
Justice likewise opined that Philippine Courts have no jurisdiction over
SEAFDEC-AQD in Opinion No. 139, Series of 1984 –

“4. One of the basic immunities
of an international organization is immunity from local jurisdiction, i.e.,
that it is immune from the legal writs and processes issued by the tribunals of
the country where it is found. (See
Jenks, Id., pp. 37-44) The obvious reason for this is that the subjection of
such an organization to the authority of
the local courts would afford a convenient medium thru which the host
government may interfere in their operations or even influence or control its
policies and decisions of the
organization; besides, such subjection to local jurisdiction would impair the
capacity of such body to discharge
its responsibilities impartially on behalf of its member-states. In the case at bar, for instance, the
entertainment by the National Labor Relations Commission of Mr. Madamba’s
reinstatement cases would amount to interference by the Philippine Government
in the management decisions of the SEARCA governing board; even worse, it could
compromise the desired impartiality of the organization since it will have to
suit its actuations to the requirements of Philippine law, which may not
necessarily coincide with the interests of the other member-states. It is precisely to forestall these possibilities
that in cases where the extent of the immunity is specified in the enabling
instruments of international organizations, jurisdictional immunity is
specified in the enabling instruments of international organizations,
jurisdictional immunity from the host country is invariably among the first
accorded. (See Jenks, Id.; See also
Bowett, The Law of International Institutions, pp. 284-1285).”

Respondent Lazaga’s
invocation of estoppel with respect to the issue of jurisdiction is
unavailing because estoppel does not apply to confer jurisdiction to a tribunal
that has none over a cause of action. Jurisdiction is conferred by law. Where there is none, no agreement of the parties can provide one. Settled is the rule that the decision of a
tribunal not vested with appropriate jurisdiction is null and void. Thus, in Calimlim vs. Ramirez, this Court
held:

“A rule that had been settled by unquestioned acceptance and
upheld in decisions so numerous to cite is that the jurisdiction of a court
over the subject matter of the action is a matter of law and may not be
conferred by consent or agreement of the parties. The lack of jurisdiction of a court may be raised at any stage of
the proceedings, even on appeal. This
doctrine has been qualified by recent pronouncements which stemmed principally
from the ruling in the cited case of Sibonghanoy. It is to be regretted, however, that the holding in said case had
been applied to situations which were obviously not contemplated therein. The exceptional circumstances involved in
Sibonghanoy which justified the departure from the accepted concept of
non-waivability of objection to jurisdiction has been ignored and, instead a
blanket doctrine had been repeatedly upheld that rendered the supposed ruling
in Sibonghanoy not as the exception, but rather the general rule, virtually
overthrowing altogether the time-honored principle that the issue of
jurisdiction is not lost by waiver or by estoppel.” (Calimlim vs. Ramirez,
G.R. No. L-34362, 118 SCRA 399 [1982])

Respondent NLRC’S citation of the ruling of this Court in
Lacanilao v. De Leon (147 SCRA 286 [1987]) to justify its assumption of
jurisdiction over SEAFDEC is misplaced. On the contrary, the court in said case explained why it took cognizance
of the case. Said the Court:

“We would note, finally, that the present petition relates to
a controversy between two claimants to the same position; this is not a
controversy between the SEAFDEC on the one hand, and an officer or employee, or
a person claiming to be an officer or employee, of the SEAFDEC, on the other hand. There is before us no question involving
immunity from the jurisdiction of the Court, there being no plea for such
immunity whether by or on behalf of SEAFDEC, or by an official of SEAFDEC with
the consent of SEAFDEC (Id., at 300; underscoring supplied).”

WHEREFORE, finding SEAFDEC-AQD to be an
international agency beyond the jurisdiction of the courts or local agency of
the Philippine government, the questioned decision and resolution of the NLRC dated
July 26, 1988 and January 9, 1989, respectively, are hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE for having been
rendered without jurisdiction. No
costs.

SO ORDERED.

Melencio-Herrera, (Chairman), Paras, Padilla, and Regalado,
JJ., concur.