PRECISION ELECTRONICS CORPORATION, PETITIONER, VS. NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION & DOMINADOR C. CABRERA, JR., RESPONDENTS.

When an employer, on the pretext of retrenching, lays off an
employee with a promise to re-hire him when its economic condition improves, is
the employer bound by that promise? That is the issue presented by this case.

Respondent Dominador C. Cabrera, Jr. was employed by petitioner as Accountant II-Specialist 3 on
September 17, 1979. On June 15, 1984,
he was notified that he would be laid off effective July 16, 1984 due to the
economic situation of the company but was assured of being re-hired when its operations
returned to normal. The notice to him
reads:

“We regret to inform you that effective July 16, 1984, you
are hereby permanently laid-off in view of non-availability of imported raw materials brought about by
the current economic conditions in the country.

“Much as we would like to retain you and continue
operations, economic constraints prevent us from continuing further our
operations. Should in the future, the economic condition in our country
improves (sic) and our operation would return to normal, you may rest assure
(sic) that you will be considered a top priority in re-hiring.” (p. 58,
Rollo.)

Three years later, the petitioner announced in the newspapers
that it was hiring additional personnel because its production and sales had increased. Cabrera applied for reemployment
on May 8, 1987, but he was turned down.

On December 7, 1987,
he filed a complaint against the petitioner for illegal dismissal.

On February 29, 1988, the Labor Arbiter dismissed his complaint
on the ground that the “alleged violation of the assurance (that he would
be re-hired)*
cannot be a legal basis for the filing therein of a complaint.”

Upon appeal by Cabrera to the National Labor Relations
Commission, the latter on September 30, 1988, reversed the Labor Arbiter and
ordered the reinstatement of the respondent employee with backwages. The
NLRC held:

We do find that the Labor Arbiter committed an abuse of
discretion or a serious error in dismissing complainant’s
case for illegal dismissal.

“It should be pointed out here that respondent spoke of
‘retrenchment’ as its ground for terminating the services of complainant and many other of its employees. As we all know, retrenchment is one of the economic grounds to dismiss employees, which is resorted to by an
employer primarily to avoid or minimize business losses. The law recognizes this under Article 283 of
the Labor Code. However, the employer
bears the burden to prove his allegation of economic or business reverses with
clear and satisfactory evidence it being
in the nature of an affirmative defense (Manila Hotel Corp. vs. NLRC,
141 SCRA 169). Otherwise, if the employer fails to prove it, it
necessarily means that
the dismissal of an employee was not justified (Egypt Air, et al. vs. NLRC, G.R. No. 63185, February
27, 1987).

“In the instant case, not even a shred of evidence was
presented by respondent to prove that it suffered from economic or business
reverses so as to justify its claim of retrenchment when it terminated the
services of the complainant on July 16, 1984. No financial statement of any kind for the year 1983 or
immediately prior thereto was submitted by respondent or any document of
probative value to prove its alleged economic difficulties. No nothing, so to speak. Thus, the obvious conclusion that the mass
lay-off or dismissal of respondent’s employees, including the complainant, on
an unproven claim or non-existing ground of retrenchment was utterly
unjustified, and in violation of the constitutional and statutory right of the dismissed employees to security
of tenure.

“xxx              xxx                  xxx

“Wherefore, the judgment appealed from is hereby reversed
and set aside and a new one entered ordering respondent:

“1. To
reinstate complainant without loss of seniority rights with backwages from the
time he was illegally dismissed from the service up to the time of his
reinstatement subject to the deduction mentioned above;

“2. Or to pay complainant separation pay
equivalent to one month salary for every year of service in addition to
backwages, if the reinstatement of complainant is no longer feasible for one
reason or another as may be determined by the Labor Arbiter concerned during the
execution of this decision; and

“3. To pay the costs of the suit.” (pp. 59-60, Rollo.)

In its petition for certiorari, the petitioner alleges
that the NLRC gravely abused its discretion in allowing Cabrera’s appeal
although it was not under oath, as required under Section 13, Rule VII-A of the
Implementing Rules of the Commission. No notice of appeal was sent to the
petitioner and some exhibits were presented for the first time on appeal.

It will be seen that the petition is based on purely technical
grounds. The petitioner did not rebut
the finding of the NLRC that the dismissal of Cabrera was “utterly
unjustified,” hence, illegal, for the petitioner failed to present
“even a shred of evidence” to prove that it suffered economic or
business reverses justifying its claim that it needed to retrench. The ground for the dismissal of Cabrera was
unproven and nonexistent.

Regarding the grounds of the petition, the public respondent
pointed out in its comment that the lack of verification or oath in the appeal
(the employee prosecuted his appeal by himself) was not fatal (Del Navarro
& Sons Logging Enterprises, Inc. vs. NLRC, 136 SCRA 669). Indeed, we have
ruled in the past that a
pleading which is required by the Rules of Court to be verified, may be given
due course even without a verification if the circumstances warrant the
suspension of the rules in the interest of justice (Oshita vs. Republic,
19 SCRA 700; Villasanta vs. Bautista, 36 SCRA 160; Quimpo
vs. De la Victoria,
46 SCRA 139)”.

Neither was Cabrera’s failure to furnish the petitioner with a
copy of his appeal a sufficient cause for
dismissing it. He
could simply have been ordered to furnish
the appellee with a copy of his
appeal.

The submission of additional evidence in support of Cabrera’s
appeal did not prejudice his employer for the latter could have submitted
counter-evidence. After all, the rules
of evidence prevailing in courts of law or equity are not controlling in
proceedings before the Commission (Article 221, Labor Code).

WHEREFORE, finding that the NLRC committed no grave abuse
of discretion in rendering its assailed decision, in NLRC-NCR Case No. 00-12-04289-87,
the petition for certiorari is dismissed for lack of merit. Costs against the petitioner.

SO ORDERED.

Narvasa, (Chairman), Cruz, Gancayco, and Medialdea, JJ., concur.

*
Words in parenthesis supplied.