NATIONAL IRRIGATION ADMINISTRATION, PETITIONER, VS. HONORABLE TEODORO P. REGINO, PRESIDING JUDGE, REGIONAL TRIAL COURT, BRANCH 84, QUEZON CITY AND CONSTRUCTION SERVICES OF AUSTR…

This is a petition for review on certiorari with
preliminary injunction and/or restraining order seeking the annulment of (1)
the October 5, 1988 Order granting the motion for issuance of writ of
execution; (2) the Writ of Execution dated October 21, 1988 and (3) the January
18, 1989 Order denying the urgent motion to quash order of execution and to
lift notice of garnishment, all issued by the Regional Trial Court of Quezon
City, Branch 84, presided over by herein respondent Judge Teodoro P. Regino, in
Civil Case No. Q-52618.

On August 10, 1982, the private parties of this case, herein
petitioner National Irrigation Administration (NIA) and respondent Construction
Services of Australia-Philippines, Inc. (CONSAPHIL) entered into a contract
whereby NIA engaged the services of the latter for the subdivision and
development of six parcels of land owned by NIA and the construction of housing
units for the said parcels.

On April 2, 1984, NIA and CONSAPHIL executed another contract,
denominated as Supplemental Contract No. 1, due to the order of NIA for
additional housing units and completion of the site development of Area B;
NIA’s approval of change and extra work orders; and CONSAPHIL’s request to NIA
for adjustment of the contract price in order for it to continue the effective
execution of the contract.

On June 24, 1985, the NIA Board, in its 455th Regular Meeting,
adopted Resolution No. 5168-85, which reads:

“RESOLVED, as it is hereby resolved, that the request of
CONSAPHIL for the balance of their claim over and above the P2,706,627.44
already awarded by NIA for price escalation is hereby denied, and that it be
referred to the Ministry of Public Works and Highways for final study and
decision.” (p. 500, Rollo)

Pursuant to this resolution, on July 24, 1985, the then
Administrator of NIA, Mr. Cesar L. Tech, entered into a compromise agreement
with CONSAPHIL that “CONSAPHIL may pursue approval of its claim over and above
the P2,706,627.44 with the Ministry of Public Works and Highways” whose
decision shall be final and binding upon them. 
(p. 500, Rollo)

The Secretary of Public Works and Highways, in a Resolution dated
November 20, 1987, granted CONSAPHIL’s claim for price escalation.

To the aforesaid resolution, NIA filed a Motion for
Reconsideration on February 1, 1988, on the grounds that (1) the resolution was
based on a misapprehension of facts; and (2) P.D. No. 1594 and its implementing
rules do not apply to the housing project of NIA.  The same, however, was denied in an Order
dated April 14, 1988.

Meanwhile, CONSAPHIL filed with the Regional Trial Court of
Quezon City on January 5, 1988 a Petition for Confirmation of Arbitration Award
under Republic Act 876, docketed therein as Civil Case No. 52618 (Rollo, pp.
20-21); to which NIA filed its Answer dated March 21, 1988 (Ibid., pp. 22-30).

On May 26, 1988, a pre-trial conference was held.  Solicitor Amparo Cabotaje and Atty. Samuel
Basuil appeared for NIA, and Attys. Antonio G. Conde and Petronillo David
appeared for CONSAPHIL.  The respective
counsel submitted their respective powers of attorney from their clients.  Respondent judge, at the instance of
CONSAPHIL, granted the latter a period of ten (10) days within which to file a
motion to confirm arbitration award or decision; and on June 7, 1988, CONSAPHIL
filed its said motion (Ibid., pp. 31-46).

On June 17, 1988, NIA filed a Manifestation with Motion that it
is adopting the grounds adduced in the special and affirmative defenses of its
Answer dated March 21, 1988 as its opposition to CONSAPHIL’s motion to confirm
arbitration award, and that it be granted a period of thirty (30) days to file
an appropriate motion to vacate the arbitration award of the Secretary of
Public Works and Highways (Ibid., p. 47).

Respondent judge, in an Order dated July 5, 1988 (Ibid., pp.
48-55), confirmed the arbitration award –

“WHEREFORE, and in view of the facts contained in the record
and in accordance with Republic Act No. 876, this Court is of the opinion, and
so holds, that the arbitration award for Resolution dated November 20, 1987, of
the Secretary of Public Works and Highways must be, as is hereby, confirmed”.

On July 25, 1988, NIA moved for the reconsideration of the said
order (Ibid., pp. 56-60), but the same was denied in an Order dated August 2,
1988 (Ibid., pp. 61-62).

On August 18, 1988, the Office
of the Solicitor General (CSG) filed with the Court of Appeals a Motion for
Extension of Time to File Petition for Review, docketed therein as CA G.R. No.
SP-15381 (Ibid., pp. 63-66).  This was
opposed by CONSAPHIL (Ibid., pp. 67-75), but the same was granted by the Court
of Appeals.

On September 6, 1988, CONSAPHIL filed a Supplemental to
Opposition to Motion for Extension to File Petition/Motion to Dismiss (Ibid.,
pp 77-83); and the Court of Appeals, in a Resolution of the same date, required
NIA to comment (Ibid., p. 76).  In
compliance, NIA filed its Comment on September 22, 1988 (Ibid., pp. 84-93); and
thereafter, filed its Petition for Certiorari dated September 28, 1988
(Ibid., pp. 333-354).

Meanwhile, on August 23, 1988, CONSAPHIL filed with the lower
court a Motion for Execution Pending Appeal (Ibid., pp. 94-97), opposed by NIA
(Ibid., pp. 98-101), and respondent judge, in an Order dated September 5, 1988,
denied the motion on the ground that such order of execution would be to render
moot and academic any appeal (Ibid., p. 102).

CONSAPHIL, prior to the denial of its above said motion, or on
August 31, 1988, filed with the lower court a Motion for Execution, claiming
therein that the July 5, 1988 order of the Court is already final and executory
(Ibid., pp. 103-106).  The same was
opposed by NIA, but respondent judge, in an Order dated October 5, 1988,
granted the motion –

“WHEREFORE, this Court holds that in view of the facts
contained in the record, the motion for execution must be granted and,
accordingly, let the corresponding writ of execution issue in this case.”

On October 10, 1988, NIA filed with the Court of Appeals a Most
Urgent Motion for Issuance of Temporary Restraining Order (Ibid., pp. 102-122).

On October 21, 1988, respondent judge issued a writ of execution
(Ibid., pp. 123-124).

On November 11, 1988, the Court of Appeals issued a temporary
restraining order enjoining respondent judge from enforcing his order of
October 5, 1988 (Ibid., p. 132).

On November 16, 1988, NIA filed in the lower court an Urgent
Motion to Quash Order of Execution and to Lift Notice of Garnishment (Ibid.,
pp. 125-130).  This was opposed by
CONSAPHIL (Ibid., pp. 133-144).

On December 5, 1988, CONSAPHIL filed a Manifestation and Motion
for Resolution of Pending Motions, claiming that the lifespan of the temporary
restraining order issued by the Court of Appeals against the implementation of
the October 5, 1988 order had already expired.

Respondent judge, in an Order dated January 18, 1989 (Ibid., pp.
145-146), denied NIA’s motion to quash order of execution and to lift notice of
garnishment –

“WHEREFORE, the Court grants the Motion of petitioner but denies
respondent’s motion to quash order of execution and to lift notice of
garnishment.  Accordingly, the Manager of
the Philippine National Bank branch at NIA building, EDSA, is hereby directed
to release and turn over the garnished money of respondent NIA to the extent of
P8,647,272.52 within five (5) days from receipt of this Order.”

 The Court of Appeals, in a Resolution
dated March 9, 1989, gave due course to NIA’s petition and required the parties
to file their respective memoranda. 
CONSAPHIL filed its Memorandum, while NIA filed a manifestation that its
petition be considered as its memorandum.

The Court of Appeals, in a Decision promulgated on May 8, 1989
(Ibid., pp. 357-376), set aside the questioned orders of respondent judge and
entered a new one denying CONSAPHIL’s motion to confirm the arbitration award.

Meanwhile, on January 30, 1989, NIA had filed with this Court the
instant petition.  The Court En Banc,
in a Resolution dated February 7, 1989, resolved to issue a temporary restraining
order (Ibid., p. 153); and after the parties have filed the required pleadings,
in a Resolution dated September 14, 1989, resolved to give due course to the
petition and to require the parties to file simultaneously their respective
memoranda (Ibid., p. 450), CONSAPHIL filed its Memorandum on December 16, 1989
(Ibid., pp. 460-484), while NIA filed its Memorandum on January 12, 1990
(Ibid., pp. 485-499).

The sole issue raised by petitioner is –

WHETHER OR NOT RESPONDENT JUDGE ACTED WITH GRAVE ABUSE OF
DISCRETION IN HOLDING THAT ITS ORDER OF JULY 5, 1988 HAD BECOME FINAL AND
EXECUTORY.

The instant petition is devoid
of merit.

Petitioner claims that the record of this case discloses that its
main counsel is the OSG; that its request for legal representation to the OSG
is with the advise that “(A) special attorney of this Agency shall
collaborate/assist your Office in the defense of the case”; and that Atty.
Simeon Basuil is only a special attorney, not authorized to decide on his own
what action to be taken on any incident regarding the case, but must refer the
incident to the OSG for final decision. 
Likewise, petitioner claims that the record discloses that OSG received
a copy of the July 5, 1988 Order of respondent Judge on July 14, 1988; that it
filed a Motion for Reconsideration of the said order on July 26, 1988; that on
August 4, 1988, Atty. Basuil received a copy of respondent judge’s order of
August 2, 1988 denying the motion for reconsideration; that the said order was
transmitted to OSG only on August 16, 1988; and that on August 18, 1988, OSG
filed with the Court of Appeals a Motion for Extension of Time to File Petition
for Review.  With the above as its
premise, petitioner contends that respondent judge erred in holding that the
receipt of the said order of August 2, 1988 on August 4, 1988 by Atty. Basuil
constitute legal service to petitioner and that the period to appeal started to
run on the said date, August 4, 1988, and not on August 16, 1988, the date the
OSG learned of the said order.  It argues
that Atty. Basuil receipt of the said August 2, 1988 order of respondent judge
could not have amounted to a valid legal service upon OSG as a counsel of
record.  That the rule is settled that
where a party is represented by counsel, the period of appeal starts running
from receipt by counsel of the decision, not from the party’s receipt
thereof.  That its motion for extension
of time was filed on the fourteenth day of the 15-day reglementary period.  Petitioner, likewise, contends that respondent
judge had unduly shortened the period of OSG in taking whatever steps might be
necessary to protect its client’s (petitioner’s) interest.

Petitioner’s contentions are untenable.

The Special Power of Attorney executed by petitioner in favor of
the Solicitor General and Atty. Basuil, which was presented to the lower court,
clearly provides that petitioner “appoints and constitutes the SOLICITOR
GENERAL, or any member of his legal staff and/or ATTY. SIMEON S. BASUIL, to be
its true and lawful attorneys-in-fact” to appear for and in its behalf in
the pre-trial and subsequent hearings of the case.  The same did not only give notice that the
Solicitor General and Atty. Basuil are the counsel of record of petitioner, but
likewise gave notice that either of them, with equal force, can represent and
appear for petitioner and bind it.  In
addition, it must be stated that, under Section 2, Rule 13 of the Rules of
Court, when a party is represented by an attorney or attorneys, service upon
him shall be made upon his attorneys or one of them unless service upon the
party himself is ordered by the court. 
Besides, as aptly argued by private respondent, the Solicitor General
did not appoint Atty. Basuil a special attorney or his deputy; that neither did
the Solicitor General clarify the position of Atty. Basuil when he received
copies of the orders of respondent judge, referring to him as partner-counsel
of Solicitor Amparo Cabotaje; and that circumstantial evidence clearly shows
that there was a close working relationship between the Solicitor General and
Attorney Basuil.  Although the Motion for
Reconsideration of the July 5, 1988 order was prepared and filed by the
Solicitor General for petitioner, Atty. Basuil was fast in his heels in getting
notices of respondent judge (Orders of July 5, 1988 and August 2, 1988) in
advance.  Atty. Basuil appeared in the
hearing of the Motion for Execution of Judgment Pending Appeal filed by private
respondent without the presence of Solicitor Cabotaje.  Attorney Basuil in fact attended all the
hearings held by respondent judge in the case.

Moreover, in petitioner’s Motion for Extension of Time to File
Petition for Review (Ibid., pp. 63-66) prepared by the OSG, Paragraph 2 thereof
stated that the August 2, 1988 Order of respondent judge was received by the
OSG on August 5, 1988.  In this
connection, it must be stated that admissions made by the parties in their
pleadings, or in the course of trial or other proceedings do not require proof
and can not be contradicted unless previously shown to have been made through
palpable mistake (Sec. 2, Rule 129, Rules of Court; Sta. Ana vs. Maliwat, 24
SCRA 1018, 1022-1023 [1968]).  True, the
Solicitor General claims that the same is a typographical error, but as aptly
argued by private respondent, it is highly improbable that the Solicitor
General, who prepared and filed the said motion, committed a typographical
error in alleging that he received a copy of the Order of August 2, 1988 on
August 5, 1988.  The Solicitor General’s
allegation coincides closely with the receipt by Atty. Basuil of the said Order
of August 2, 1988 on August 4, 1988.  The
alleged receipt by the Solicitor General of the letter of petitioner enclosing
a copy of the Order of August 2, 1988 on August 16, 1988 was still fresh in his
mind when he prepared the said motion which he had filed on August 18, 1988
that it is hard to believe that he erred in stating that he had received a copy
of the said order on August 5, 1988.

Furthermore, even granting that Atty. Basuil is only a special attorney,
his receipt of the said Order of August 2, 1988 is binding both on the OSG and
on petitioner.  This Court, in the case
of Republic vs. Soriano (168 SCRA 560, 567 [1988]), ruled –

“The petitioner’s contention that service of the questioned
Orders to a deputized special attorney of the OSG would not bind the OSG so
that the Orders did not attain their finality when the Motion was filed, does
not have a leg to stand on.  It is a
well-settled principle that the acts of the authorized Deputy bind the principal
counsel.  Thus service on the Deputy is
service on the OSG.

“Moreover, the records will disclose that Atty. Fidel
Evangelista, who is a deputized attorney was the one who appeared for the
petitioner in the lower court.  It is not
only lawful but also in accordance with the normal and standard practice that
notices be sent to said special Attorney to avoid delays and
complications.  Precisely, the OSG has no
time and manpower to handle all the cases of multifarious government agencies
such that deputization is authorized by law to cope with such
contingencies.”

 PREMISES CONSIDERED,
the instant petition is hereby DISMISSED.

SO ORDERED.

Fernan, C.J., Narvasa, Melencio-Herrera, Gutierrez, Jr., Cruz,
Gancayco, Padilla, Bidin, Sarmiento, Griño-Aquino, Medialdea, and Regalado, JJ., concur.

Feliciano, J., on leave.