REP. RAUL A. DAZA, PETITIONER, VS. REP. LUIS C. SINGSON AND HON. RAOUL V. VICTORINO IN THE LATTER’S CAPACITY AS SECRETARY OF THE COM­MISSION ON APPOINTMENTS, RESPONDENTS.

After the congressional elections of May 11, 1987, the House of
Representatives proportionally apportioned its twelve seats in the Commission
on Appointments among the several political parties represented in that
chamber, including the Lakas ng
Bansa, the PDP-Laban, the
NP-Unido, the Liberal Party, and the KBL, in
accordance with Article VI, Section 18, of the Constitution.  Petitioner Raul A. Daza
was among those chosen and was listed as a representative of the Liberal Party.^[1]

On September 16, 1988,
the Laban ng Demokratikong Pilipino was reorganized, resulting in a
political realignment in the House of Representatives.  Twenty four members of the Liberal Party
formally resigned from that party and joined the LDP, thereby swelling its number
to 159 and correspondingly reducing their former party to only 17 members.^[2]

On the basis of this development, the House of Representatives
revised its representation in the Commission on Appointments by withdrawing the
seat occupied by the petitioner and giving this to the newly-formed LDP.  On December
5, 1988, the chamber elected a new set of representatives
consisting of the original members except the petitioner and including therein
respondent Luis C. Singson as the additional member
from the LDP.^[3]

The petitioner came to this Court on January 13, 1989, to challenge his removal from
the Commission on Appointments and the assumption of his seat by the
respondent.  Acting initially on his
petition for prohibition and injunction with preliminary injunction, we issued
a temporary restraining order that same day to prevent both the petitioner and
the respondent from serving in the Commission on Appointments.^[4]

Briefly stated, the contention of the petitioner is that he
cannot be removed from the Commission on Appointments because his election
thereto is permanent under the doctrine announced in Cunanan
v. Tan.^[5]
His claim is that the reorganization of the House representation in the said
body is not based on a permanent political realignment because the LDP is not a
duly registered political party and has not yet attained political stability.

For his part, the respondent argues that the question raised by
the petitioner is political in nature and so beyond the jurisdiction of this
Court.  He also maintains that he has
been improperly impleaded, the real party respondent
being the House of Representatives which changed its representation in the
Commission on Appointments and removed the petitioner.  Finally, he stresses that nowhere in the
Constitution is it required that the political party be registered to be
entitled to proportional representation in the Commission on Appointments.

In addition to the pleadings filed by the parties, a Comment was
submitted by the Solicitor General as amicus curiae in compliance
with an order from the Court.

At the core of this controversy is Article VI, Section 18, of the
Constitution providing as follows:

Sec. 18.  There shall be a
Commission on Appointments consisting of the President of the Senate, as ex
officio Chairman, twelve Senators and Twelve Members of the House of
Representatives, elected by each House on the basis of proportional
representation from the political parties and parties or organizations
registered under the party-list system represented therein.  The Chairman of the Commission shall not
vote, except in case of a tie.  The
Commission shall act on all appointments submitted to it within thirty session
days of the Congress from their submission. 
The Commission shall rule by a majority vote of all the Members.

Ruling first on the jurisdictional issue, we hold that, contrary
to the respondent’s assertion, the Court has the competence to act on the
matter at bar.  Our finding is that what
is before us is not a discretionary act of the House of Representatives that
may not be reviewed by us because it is political in nature.  What is involved here is the legality, not
the wisdom, of the act of that chamber in removing the petitioner from the
Commission on Appointments.  That is not
a political question because, as Chief Justice Concepcion explained in Tañada v. Cuenco:^[6]

…  the term “political
question” connotes, in legal parlance, what it means in ordinary parlance,
namely, a question of policy.  In other
words, x x x it refers
“to those questions which, under the Constitution, are to be decided by
the people in their sovereign capacity, or in regard to which full
discretionary authority has been delegated to the Legislature or executive
branch of the Government.” It is concerned with issues dependent upon the
wisdom, not legality, of a particular measure.

In the aforementioned case, the Court was asked by the
petitioners therein to annul the election of two members of the Senate
Electoral Tribunal of that chamber, on the ground that they had not been
validly nominated.  The Senate then
consisted of 23 members from the Nacionalista Party
and the petitioner as the lone member of the Citizens Party.  Senator Lorenzo M. Tañada
nominated only himself as the minority representative in the Tribunal,
whereupon the majority elected Senators Mariano J. Cuenco
and Francisco Delgado, from its own ranks, to complete the nine-man composition
of the Tribunal as provided for in the 1935 Constitution.  The petitioner came to this Court, contending
that under Article VI, Section 11, of that Charter, the six legislative members
of the Tribunal were to be chosen by the Senate, “three upon nomination of
the party having the largest number of votes and three of the party having the
second largest number of votes therein.” As the majority party in the
Senate, the Nacionalista Party could nominate only
three members and could not also fill the other two seats pertaining to the
minority.

By way of special and affirmative defenses, the respondents
contended inter alia that the subject
of the petition was an internal matter that only the Senate could resolve.  The Court rejected this argument, holding
that what was involved was not the wisdom of the Senate in choosing the
respondents but the legality of the choice in light of the requirement of the
Constitution.  The petitioners were
questioning the manner of filling the Tribunal, not the discretion
of the Senate in doing so.  The Court
held that this was a justiciable and not a political
question, thus:

Such is not the nature of the question for determination in the
present case.  Here, we are called upon
to decide whether the election of Senators Cuenco
and Delgado by the Senate, as members of the Senate Electoral Tribunal, upon
nomination by Senator Primicias — a member and
spokesman of the party having the largest number of votes in the Senate — on
behalf of its Committee on Rules, contravenes the constitutional mandate that
said members of the Senate Electoral Tribunal shall be chosen “upon
nomination x x x of the
party having the second largest number of votes” in the Senate, and hence,
is null and void.  The Senate is not
clothed with “full discretionary authority” in the choice of members
of the Senate Electoral Tribunal.  The
exercise of its power thereon is subject to constitutional limitations which
are claimed to be mandatory in nature. 
It is clearly within the legitimate province of the judicial department
to pass upon the validity of the proceeding in connection therewith.

‘x x x whether an election of public
officers has been in accordance with law is for the judiciary.  Moreover, where the legislative department
has by statute prescribed election procedure in a given situation, the
judiciary may determine whether a particular election has been in conformity
with such statute, and, particularly, whether such statute has been applied in
a way to deny or transgress on constitutional or statutory rights x x x.’ (16 C.J.S., 439; italics supplied)

It is, therefore, our opinion that we have, not only
jurisdiction but also the duty, to consider and determine the principal issue
raised by the parties herein.”

Although  not specifically
discussed, the same disposition was made in Cunanan
v. Tan as it likewise involved the manner or legality of the organization of
the Commission on Appointments, not the wisdom or discretion of the House in
the choice of its representatives.

In  the case now before us,
the jurisdictional objection becomes even less tenable and decisive.  The reason is that, even if we were to assume
that the issue presented before us was political in nature, we would still not
be precluded from resolving it under the expanded jurisdiction conferred upon
us that now covers, in proper cases, even the political question.  Article VII, Section 1, of the Constitution
clearly provides:

Section 1.  The judicial
power shall be vested in one Supreme Court and in such lower courts as may be
established by law.

Judicial power includes the duty of the courts of justice to settle
actual controversies involving rights which are legally demandable and
enforceable, and to determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any
branch or instrumentality of the Government.

The respondent’s contention that he has been improperly impleaded is even less persuasive.  While he may be technically correct in
arguing that it is not he who caused the petitioner’s removal, we feel that
this objection is also not an insuperable obstacle to the resolution of this
controversy.  We may, for one thing,
treat this proceeding as a petition for quo warranto
as the petitioner is actually questioning the respondent’s right to sit as a
member of the Commission on Appointments. 
For another, we have held as early as in the Emergency Powers Cases^[7]
that where serious constitutional questions are involved, “the
transcendental importance to the public of these cases demands that they be
settled promptly and definitely, brushing aside, if we must, technicalities of
procedure.” The same policy has since then been consistently followed by
the Court, as in Gonzales v. Commission on Elections,^[8]
where we held through Chief Justice Fernando:

In the course of the deliberations, a serious procedural objection
was raised by five members of the Court. 
It is their view that respondent Commission on Elections not being
sought to be restrained from performing any specific act, this suit cannot be
characterized as other than a mere request for an advisory opinion.  Such a view, from the remedial law standpoint,
has much to recommend it.  Nonetheless, a
majority would affirm the original stand that under the circumstances, it could
still rightfully be treated as a petition for prohibition.

The language of Justice Laurel fits the case:  “All await the decision of this Court on
the constitutional question. 
Considering, therefore, the importance which the instant case has
assumed and to prevent multiplicity of suits, strong reasons of public policy
demand that [its] constitutionality x x x be now resolved.” It may likewise be added that the
exceptional character of the situation that confronts us, the paramount public
interest, and the undeniable necessity for ruling, the national elections being
barely six months away, reinforce our stand.

It would appear undeniable, therefore, that before us is an
appropriate invocation of our jurisdiction to prevent the enforcement of an
alleged unconstitutional statute.  We are
left with no choice then; we must act on the matter.

Coming now to the more crucial question, the Court notes that
both the petitioner and the respondent are invoking the case of Cunanan v. Tan to support their res­pective positions.  It is best, therefore, to make a quick review
of that case for a proper disposition of this one.

In the election for the House of Representatives held in 1961, 72
seats were won by the Nacionalista Party, 29 by the
Liberal Party and 1 by an independent. 
Accordingly, the representation of that chamber in the Commission on
Appointments was apportioned to 8 members from the Nacionalista
Party and 4 from the Liberal Party. 
Subsequently, 25 members of the Nacionalista
Party, professing discontent over the House leadership, made common cause with
the Liberal Party and formed what was called the Allied Majority to install a
new Speaker and reorganize the chamber. 
Included in this reorganization was the House representation in the
Commission on Appointments where three of the Nacionalista
congressmen originally chosen were displaced by three of their party colleagues
who had joined the Allied Majority.

Petitioner Carlos Cunanan’s ad interim
appointment as Deputy Administrator of the Reforestation Administration was
rejected by the Commission on Appointments as thus reorganized and respondent
Jorge Tan, Jr. was thereafter designated in his place.  Cunanan then came
to this Court, contending that the rejection of his appointment was null and
void because the Commission itself was invalidly constituted.

The Court agreed.  It noted
that the Allied Majority was a merely temporary combination as the Nacionalista defectors had not disaffiliated from their
party and permanently joined the new political group.  Officially, they were still members of the Nacionalista Party. 
The reorganization of the Commission on Appointments was invalid because
it was not based on the proportional representation of the political parties in
the House of Representatives as required by the Constitution.  The Court held:

x x x In other
words, a shifting of votes at a given time, even if due to arrangements of a
more or less temporary nature, like the one that has led to the formation of
the so-called “Allied Majority,” does not suffice to authorize a
reorganization of the membership of the Commission for said House.  Otherwise, the Commission on Appointments may
have to be reorganized as often as votes shift from one side to another in the
House.  The framers of our Constitution
could not have intended to thus place a constitutional organ, like the Commission
on Appointments, at the mercy of each House of Congress.

The petitioner vigorously argues that the LDP is not the
permanent political party contemplated in the Constitution because it has not
been registered in accordance with Article IX-B, Section 2(5), in relation to
the other provisions of the Constitution. 
He stresses that the so-called party has not yet achieved stability and
suggests it might be no different from several other political groups that have
died “a-bornin‘,” like the UNA, or have
subsequently floundered, like the UNIDO.

The respondent also cites Cunanan but
from a different viewpoint.  According to
him, that case expressly allows reorganization at any time to reflect changes
in the political alignments in Congress, provided only that such changes are
permanent.  The creation of the LDP
constituting the bulk of the former PDP-Laban and to
which no less than 24 Liberal congressmen had transferred was a permanent
change.  That change fully justified his
designation to the Commission on Appointments after the reduction of the LP
representation therein.  Thus, the Court
held:

Upon the other hand, the constitutional provision to the effect
that “there shall be a Commission on Appointments consisting of twelve
(12) Senators and twelve (12) members of the House of Representatives elected
by each House, respectively, on the basis of proportional REPRESENTATION OF THE
POLITICAL PARTIES THEREIN,” necessarily connotes the authority of each
House of Congress to see to it that this requirement is duly complied with.  As a consequence, it may take appropriate
measures, not only upon the initial organization of the Commission, but, also,
subsequently thereto.  If by reason of
successful election protests against members of a House, or of their expulsion
from the political party to which they belonged and/or of their affiliation
with another political party, the ratio in the representation of the political
parties in the House is materially changed, the House is clothed with authority
to declare vacant the necessary number of seats in the Commission on
Appointments held by members of said House belonging to the political party
adversely affected by the change and then fill said vacancies in conformity
with the Constitution.

In the course of the spirited debate on this matter between the
petitioner and the respondent (who was supported by the Solicitor General) an
important development has supervened to considerably simplify the present
controversy.

The petitioner,    to
repeat, bases his argument heavily on the non-registration of the LDP which, he
claims, has not provided the permanent political realignment to justify the
questioned reorganization.  As he
insists:

(c) Assuming that the so-called new coalesced majority is actually
the LDP itself, then the proposed reorganization is likewise illegal and
ineffectual, because the LDP, not being a duly registered political party, is
not entitled to the “rights and privileges granted by law to political
parties” (Sec. 160, BP. No. 881), and therefore cannot legally claim
the right to be considered in determining the required proportional
representation of political parties in the House of Representatives.^[9]

x x
x

x x x the
clear constitutional intent behind Section 18, Article VI, of the 1987
Constitution, is to give the right of representation in the Commission on
Appointments only to political parties who are duly registered with the Comelec.^[10]

On November 23, 1989,
however, that argument boomeranged against the petitioner.  On that date, the Commission on Elections in
an en banc resolution affirmed the resolution of its First
Division dated August 28, 1989,
granting the petition of the LDP for registration as a political party.^[11]
This has taken the wind out of the sails of the petitioner, so to speak, and he
must now limp to shore as best he can.

The petitioner’s contention that, even if registered, the party
must still pass the test of time to prove its permanence is not
acceptable.  Under this theory, a
registered party obtaining the majority of the seats in the House of
Representatives (or the Senate) would still not be entitled to representation
in the Commission on Appointments as long as it was organized only recently and
has not yet “aged.” The Liberal Party itself would fall in such a
category.  That party was created in
December 1945 by a faction of the Nacionalista Party
that seceded therefrom to support Manuel A. Roxas’s bid for the Presidency of the Philippines
in the election held on April 23, 1946.^[12]
The Liberal Party won.  At that time it
was only four months old.  Yet no
question was raised as to its right to be represented in the Commission on
Appointments and in the Electoral Tribunals by virtue of its status as the
majority party in both chambers of the Congress.

The LDP has been in existence for more than one year now.  It now has 157 members in the House of
Representatives and 6 members in the Senate. 
Its titular head is no less than the President of the Philippines
and its President is Senator Neptali A. Gonzales, who
took over recently from Speaker Ramon V. Mitra.  It is true that there have been, and there
still are, some internal disagreements among its members, but these are to be
expected in any political organization, especially if it is democratic in
structure.  In fact, even the monolithic
Communist Party in a number of socialist states has undergone similar
dissension, and even upheavals.  But it
surely cannot be considered still temporary because of such discord.

If the petitioner’s argument were to be pursued, the 157 members
of the LDP in the House of Representatives would have to be denied
representation in the Commission on Appointments and, for that matter, also the
Electoral Tribunal.  By the same token,
the KBL, which the petitioner says is now “history only,” should also
be written off.  The independents also
cannot be represented because they belong to no political party.  That would virtually leave the Liberal Party
only – with all of its seventeen members – to claim all the twelve seats of the
House of Representatives in the Commission on Appointments and the six
legislative seats in the House Electoral Tribunal.

It is noteworthy that when with 41 members the Liberal Party was
allotted two of the seats in the Commission on Appointments, it did not express
any objection.^[13]
Inconsistently, the petitioner is now opposed to the withdrawal from it of one
seat although its original number has been cut by more than half.

As for the other condition suggested by the petitioner, to wit,
that the party must survive in a general congressional election, the LDP has
doubtless also passed that test, if only vicariously.  It may even be said that as it now commands
the biggest following in the House of Representatives, the party has not only
survived but in fact prevailed.  At any
rate, that test was never laid down in Cunanan.

To summarize, then, we hold, in view of the foregoing
considerations, that the issue presented to us is justiciable
rather than political, involving as it does the legality and not the wisdom of
the act complained of, or the manner of filling the Commission on Appointments
as prescribed by the Constitution.  Even
if the question were political in nature, it would still come within our powers
of review under the expanded jurisdiction conferred upon us by Article VIII,
Section 1, of the Constitution, which includes the authority to determine
whether grave abuse of discretion amounting to excess or lack of jurisdiction
has been committed by any branch or instrumentality of the government.  As for the alleged technical flaw in the
designation of the party respondent, assuming the existence of such a defect,
the same may be brushed aside, conformably to existing doctrine, so that the
important constitutional issue raised may be addressed.  Lastly, we resolve that issue in favor of the
authority of the House of Representatives to change its representation in the
Commission on Appointments to reflect at any time the changes that may
transpire in the political alignments of its membership.  It is understood that such changes must be
permanent and do not include the temporary alliances or factional divisions not
involving severance of political loyalties or formal disaffiliation and
permanent shifts of allegiance from one political party to another.

The Court would have preferred not to intervene in this matter,
leaving it to be settled by the House of Representatives or the Commission on
Appointments as the bodies directly involved. 
But as our jurisdiction has been invoked and, more importantly, because
a constitutional stalemate had to be resolved, there was no alternative for us
except to act, and to act decisively.  In
doing so, of course, we are not imposing our will upon the said agencies, or
substituting our discretion for theirs, but merely discharging our sworn
responsibility to interpret and apply the Constitution.  That is a duty we do not evade, lest we ourselves betray our oath.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED.  The temporary restraining order dated January 13, 1989, is LIFTED.  The Court holds that the respondent has been
validly elected as a member of the Commission on Appointments and is entitled
to assume his seat in that body pursuant to Article VI, Section 18, of the
Constitution.  No pronouncement as to
costs.

SO ORDERED.

Fernan, C.J., Narvasa,
Melencio-Herrera, Gutierrez, Jr., Paras,
Feliciano, Gancayco, Padilla, Bidin,
Cortes, Griño-Aquino, Medialdea,
and Regalado,
JJ., concur.

Sarmiento, J., no part, was the Secretary General of the L.P.

^[1] Rollo, pp. 4 and 23.

^[2] Ibid.,
p. 87.

^[3] Id.,
pp. 7 and 34.  Annex “F” of Petition.

^[4] id.,
pp. 52-53.

^[5] 5
SCRA 1.

^[6]
103 Phil. 1051.

^[7] Araneta v. Dinglasan, 84
Phil. 368; Rodriguez v. Gella, 92 Phil. 603.

^[8]
21 SCRA 774.

^[9]
Petition, p. 12; Rollo, p. 12.

^[10]
Consolidated Reply, p. 11; Ibid., p. 163.

^[11]
SPP No. 88-001 (SPC No. 88-839).

^[12] Renato Constantino, The
Philippines:  The Continuing Past, 1978
edition, pp. 181-187 & 188; Manuel Buenafe,
Wartime Philippines, 1950 edition, p. 284.

^[13]
The other seat was given to Rep. Lorna Verano-Yap,
who is now affiliated with the Liberal Party.