THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE, VS. ELSIE BAGISTA Y BANGCO, ACCUSED-APPELLANT.

Appeal by accused-appellant
Elsie Bagista from the decision dated September 26, 1988 of the Regional Trial
Court of La Trinidad, Benguet, Branch 10, finding her guilty beyond reasonable
doubt of violating Section 4, Article II of Republic Act No. 6425, and
sentencing her to suffer the penalty of life imprisonment and to pay a fine of P20,000.00, with subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency,
and to pay the costs.

The facts of the case are as follows: On July 4, 1988,
at around 8:00 o’clock in the morning, the Narcotics Command (NARCOM)
Detachment Office located at the Arix Building, Bokawkan Road, Baguio City,
received information from one of its regular informants that a certain woman,
23 years of age, with naturally curly hair, and with a height of 5’2″ or
5’3″, would be transporting marijuana from up north.^[1]
Acting upon this piece of information, Sgt. Oscar Parajas testified that he,
Sgt. Godofredo Fider and a civilian NARCOM agent proceeded to Km. 16, Acop,
Tublay, Benguet. Upon arriving at said
location at around 11:00 o’clock that same morning, they established a
checkpoint and flagged down all vehicles, both private and public, coming from
the north to check if any of these vehicles were carrying marijuana leaves on
board.^[2]

After about 4 1/2 hours, the NARCOM agents stopped a Dangwa
Tranco bus with Plate No. AVD 938 and body number 428, which came from Lepanto,
Benguet. Sgts. Parajas and Fider
boarded the bus and thereupon Sgt. Parajas announced to the passengers that
they were NARCOM agents and that they were going to search their baggages. Sgt. Parajas then proceeded to the rear of
the bus while Sgt. Fider began inspecting the bags in the front.^[3]

While at the back, Sgt. Parajas noticed a woman with curly hair
seated at the right side (as one is facing the driver) of the last seat of the
bus, with a travelling bag with black and orange stripes^[4] on
her lap. Sgt. Parajas inspected the bag
and discovered three (3) bundles of marijuana leaves covered by assorted
clothing. The bag and the contents
thereof were confiscated and the woman arrested; she was later brought to the
NARCOM office in Baguio City where she was booked and investigated. The woman was then identified as
accused-appellant.^[5]
The confiscated bundles were subjected to laboratory examination, and found
positive for marijuana.^[6]

Accused-appellant’s defense rests solely on denial. She claimed that she was engaged in the
buying and selling of vegetables, particularly cabbages. On the day in question, she boarded the
Dangwa Tranco bus at Abatan, Benguet, bringing with her ten (10) sacks of
cabbages which she intended to sell to a certain Maria Opino in Baguio
City. While inside the bus, she
approached the conductor for her ticket to cover the fare for her sacks of
cabbages, but was told by the latter that he would attend to her later.

When the bus reached
Tublay, Benguet, it was stopped by the NARCOM agents who boarded the same and
began inspecting the baggages of the passengers. Accused-appellant claimed that the bag containing the marijuana
was taken from the luggage carrier above the passenger seats. When nobody admitted owning the bag, the
NARCOM agent approached her, took the shoulder bag on her lap, and asked her to
come with them for investigation as she fits the description of the would-be
transporter of the marijuana given by the NARCOM informer. She denied having anything to do with the
marijuana found on the bus.

To corroborate her story, accused-appellant presented the
conductor of the Dangwa Tranco
bus, Nestor Yangkin. He testified that
when the NARCOM agents boarded the bus at Tublay, Benguet, one of them got a
bag from the luggage carrier, opened it, and smelled the contents. The agent then asked the passengers who
among them owned the bag; when nobody answered, he walked to the back of the
bus, all the time looking at the faces of the passengers. When the agent approached accused-appellant,
who was seated at the rear of the bus, the former talked to her, then escorted
her out of the bus.^[7]

During Yangkin’s cross-examination, it came out that the 10 sacks
of vegetables that were loaded at Abatan were brought by a man who told him
that the fare for the sacks will be paid upon arrival at the Dangwa Station in
Baguio City but that the owner of the sacks would be riding in the bus. And yet, Yangkin did not seek out the
alleged owner of the sacks. The witness
also testified that none of the passengers approached him and offered to pay for the fare of the sacks,^[8]
contrary to accused-appellant’s testimony.

In convicting accused-appellant, the trial court found the testimony of Sgt. Parajas
credible. Said the court a quo:

“. . . The testimony of Sgt. Oscar Parajas
was direct and straightforward as he gave all the requisite details of the
entrapment operation they conducted based on an information provided by a
coordinating individual. His testimony
reveals that the bag containing the marijuana leaves was found on the lap of
the accused. There is nothing in the
record to suggest that Sgt. Parajas was moved by any motive than simply the
carrying out of his official mission or duty. Where there is no evidence and nothing to indicate that the principal
witness for the prosecution was actuated by improper motives, the presumption
is that he was not so actuated and his testimony is entitled to full faith and
credit (People vs. Francia, L­-69253, September 30, 1987, 154 SCRA
495).”^[9]

The trial court brushed aside the defense’s observation that
there were discrepancies between the testimony of Sgt. Parajas and the evidence
presented, such as the color of the bag allegedly taken from accused-appellant
and the kind of marijuana taken from the bag, as immaterial. Similarly brushed aside was the defense’s
contention that the evidence against accused-appellant, such as the Receipt of
Property Seized^[10]
and her signature thereon,^[11] and
the Booking Sheet and Arrest Report^[12] and
her signature thereon,^[13] were
inadmissible due to the absence of counsel, since these were not confessions or
extra-judicial statements.

Finally, the trial court did not give credence to the testimonies
of accused-appellant and her witness Nestor Yangkin, in view of the testimony
of Sgt. Parajas that he took the bag containing the marijuana from
accused-appellant’s lap. Moreover, the
court a quo observed that there was a discrepancy
between the testimonies of accused-appellant and Yangkin on the matter of the
10 sacks of cabbage, which led the court to conclude that the former was in the
act of transporting marijuana at the time of her arrest.

Accused-appellant filed a motion for reconsideration, alleging that
the marijuana leaves found in the bag taken from her was inadmissible in
evidence as it was the product of a warrantless search, which motion was denied
by the trial court for lack of merit on November 22, 1988.

Aggrieved, accused-appellant filed the instant appeal, alleging
that the court a quo erred
(1) in not finding the warrantless search conducted by the NARCOM agents as
illegal and unconstitutional, and (2) in
admitting the illegally obtained evidences and convicting her on the
basis of said evidences.

Accused-appellant is in error.

The general rule regarding searches and seizures can be stated in
this manner: no person shall be
subjected to a search of his person, personal effects or belongings, or his
residence except by virtue of a search warrant or on the occasion of a lawful
arrest.^[14]
The basis for the rule can be found in Article III, Section 2 of the 1987 Constitution, which states:

“The right of the people to be secure in their persons,
houses, papers, and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures of
whatever nature and for any purpose, shall be inviolable, and no search warrant
or warrant of arrest shall issue except upon probable cause to be determined
personally by the judge after examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant
and the witnesses he may
produce, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons
or things to be seized.”

Article III, Section 3 (2) further ordains that any evidence
obtained in violation of the aforementioned right shall, among others, “be
inadmissible for any purpose in any proceeding.”

The constitutional proscription against warrantless searches and
seizures admits of certain exceptions. Aside from a search incident to a lawful arrest, a warrantless search
had been upheld in cases of a moving vehicle,^[15] and
the seizure of evidence in plain view.^[16]

With regard to the search of moving vehicles, this had been
justified on the ground that the mobility of motor vehicles makes it possible
for the vehicle to be searched to move out of the locality or jurisdiction in
which the warrant must be sought.^[17]

This in no way, however, gives the police officers unlimited
discretion to conduct warrantless searches of automobiles in the absence of
probable cause. When a vehicle is
stopped and subjected to an
extensive search, such a warrantless search has been held to be valid only as
long as the officers conducting the search have reasonable or probable cause to
believe before the search that they will find the instrumentality or evidence
pertaining to a crime, in the vehicle to be searched.^[18]

The NARCOM officers in the case at bar had probable cause to stop
and search all vehicles coming from the north at Acop, Tublay, Benguet in view
of the confidential information they received from their regular informant that
a woman having the same appearance as that of accused-appellant would be
bringing marijuana from up north. They
likewise have probable cause to search accused-appellant’s belongings since she
fits the description given by the NARCOM informant.

Since there was a valid warrantless search by the NARCOM agents,
any evidence obtained during the course of said search is admissible against
accused-appellant.

At any rate, no objection was raised by the accused-appellant in
the court below on the inadmissibility of the evidence against her on the
ground that the same was obtained in a warrantless search. This amounts to a waiver of the objection on
the legality of the search and the admissibility of the evidence obtained
therefrom.^[19]
Amid a waiver, the court is duty bound to admit the evidence.^[20]

Reviewing the evidence, We find the same sufficient to prove
accused-appellant’s guilt beyond reasonable doubt.

The prosecution had shown, primarily through the positive
testimony of Sgt. Parajas, that the bag containing the dried marijuana leaves
was taken from accused-appellant’s possession.

She denies this fact and contends that the bag in question was actually taken from the
luggage carrier above the passenger seats and not from her. Indisputably, We
have two opposing versions of what actually happened at the checkpoint in Km.
16, Acop, Tublay, Benguet, resulting in the accused-appellant’s apprehension,
that of the prosecution and that of the defense. In situations like this, the matter of assigning values to the
testimony of witnesses is best performed by the trial courts because, unlike
appellate courts, they can weigh such testimony in the light of the demeanor,
conduct and attitude of the witnesses at the trial.^[21]
The exception is when the trial court has overlooked certain facts of substance
and value that, if considered, might affect the result,^[22]
which We do not find in the
instant case.

Moreover, accused-appellant’s defense was weakened by the fact
that her witness Nestor Yangkin contradicted her on the matter of the 10 sacks of vegetables appellant claims
to have brought with her at the time of her arrest. Appellant claims she loaded the sacks of vegetables on the bus
and tried to pay for its fare, but that conductor Yangkin, put her off. Yangkin claims otherwise: the sacks of vegetables were loaded by a man
who told him that the fare for
the sacks will be paid upon arrival in Baguio City, and that no one on the bus
offered to pay for the same.

In weighing contrary declarations and statements, greater weight
must generally be given to the positive testimonies of the prosecution
witnesses than the denials of the accused-appellant.^[23]

Given the discrepancy on this point, the trial court correctly
disregarded the corroborative
testimony of Nestor Yangkin. The matter
of the ownership of the 10 sacks of vegetables is material since appellant’s
reason for being on the bus was to deliver these sacks to Baguio City. If the sacks of vegetables are not hers,
then the only conclusion that can be drawn is that she was on her way to Baguio
City to sell the marijuana found in her possession.

As to the alleged discrepancies in the prosecution’s case, such
as the color of the stripes of the bag which contained the marijuana and
whether the items seized from accused-appellant were marijuana leaves or
marijuana fruit tops, these are minor in character and do not detract from the
prosecution’s case since it was shown by the Receipt of Property Seized,^[24]
which was signed by accused-appellant, that these were the very items taken
from her at the time of her arrest.

WHEREFORE, finding no error in the decision appealed from,
the same is hereby AFFIRMED in toto. Costs against accused-appellant.

SO ORDERED.

Narvasa, C.J., (Chairman), Regalado, and Melo, JJ., concur.

Padilla, J., see dissenting
opinion.

^[1]
Testimony of Sgt. Oscar Parajas, T.S.N., August 3, 1988, pp. 3-6.

^[2]
Id., pp. 6-9.

^[3]
Id., pp. 10-11, 15.

^[4]
Exhibit “D”.

^[5]
T.S.N., August 3, 1988, pp. 15-18.

^[6]
Exhibit “E”.

^[7]
T.S.N., September 13, 1988, pp. 25-29.

^[8]
Id., pp. 34-37.

^[9]
Decision, pp. 3-4.

^[10]
Exhibit “G”.

^[11]
Exhibit “G-1”.

^[12]
Exhibit “B”.

^[13]
Exhibit “B-1”.

^[14]
See the dissent of then
Justice (now Chief Justice) Andres R. Narvasa in People vs. Malmstedt,
198 SCRA 401, 413.

^[15]
See Carroll vs.
U.S., 267 U.S. 132, 153 (1925).

^[16]
Dissent of the Chief Justice Narvasa, supra note 14, 198 SCRA 401, 414.

^[17]
Carrol vs. U.S., supra.

^[18]
Valmonte vs. de Villa, 185 SCRA 665, at 670, citing Dyke v.
Taylor, 361 U.S. 216, 20 L Ed 538, 88 S Ct 1472.

^[19]
Dimaisip vs. Court of Appeals, et al., 193 SCRA 373, 382. (1991).

^[20]
Id.

^[21]
People vs. Catalino, 22 SCRA 1091, 1098.

^[22]
People vs. Cabling, 74 SCRA 285.

^[23]
People vs. Barbano, 76 Phil 702.

^[24]
Exhibit “G”.

200

6 pt
6 pt
0
3