PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE, VS. MARIO SORIO Y BALAD, ACCUSED-APPELLANT.

Convicted of the crime of murder by the Regional Trial Court of Valenzuela, Branch 171 of the National
Capital Judicial Region, the accused-appellant in the instant case raises a
lone assignment of error, to wit:

“THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN NOT
ACQUITTING THE APPELLANT ON THE GROUND THAT
HIS GUILT WAS NOT PROVED BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT (Brief of the
Appellant, p. 4; Rollo, p. 42)

The records of the case were erroneously transmitted for purposes
of the appeal to the Court of Appeals but were forwarded by said court to us.

The accused-appellant was
charged with murder in an information dated September
30, 1986 which
reads:

“The undersigned Asst. Provincial Fiscal accuses Mario Sorio y Balad of the
crime of murder, penalized under the provisions of Art. 248 of the Revised
Penal Code, committed as follows:

That on or about the 21st day of September 1986, in the municipality of Valenzuela,
Metro Manila, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court,
the said accused Mario Sorio y Balad,
with intent to kill one Ruben Espiritu, armed with bladed
instrument, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully
and feloniously, with evident premeditation, treachery, attack, assault, stab
with the bladed instrument he was then provided the said Ruben Espiritu, hitting the latter on the different parts of his
body, thereby causing him serious physical injuries which directly caused his
death.  (Records, p. 1)

Upon arraignment, a plea
of not guilty was entered by the accused-appellant through the assistance of
his counsel de oficio.

At the trial, the
prosecution presented as witnesses: 
Jaime Espiritu, brother of the deceased
victim, who testified that after he learned of the stabbing incident that cost
his brother’s life, he reported the matter to the police authorities who went
to the scene of the crime with him and made inquiries regarding the incident;
Patrolman Dante Dogol-Dogol who apprehended the
accused-appellant after he received information that the accused-appellant was
the main suspect in the killing of Ruben Espiritu;
Pfc. Benedicto Chua who investigated the stabbing
incident; Efren Balbastro,
an eyewitness who positively identified the accused-appellant as the person who
stabbed Ruben Espiritu; and Dr. Mariano Cueva, Jr., Chief of the NBI Medico-Legal Section who
conducted the autopsy and submitted the following report:

“POSTMORTEM FINDINGS

Pallor, generalized.

Contusion, 4.0 x 5.0 cm., cheek, left.

Lacerated wounds:  1.0 cm., helix of
right ear; 1.5 cm., temporal region, head, right side.

Stab wounds:  1)      5.0
cm. long, spindle shape, both extremities, located at pectoral region, chest, right side, 8.0 cm. from anterior median line; path of wound is
directed backward and laterally, taking an intramuscular route and severing axillary
blood vessels and nerves; approximate depth 12.0 cm.;

2)      2.0
cm. long, spindle shape, both extremities sharp, located at infrascapular
region, posterior chest, left side, 5.0 cm. from posterior median line;
directed forward downward and medially, piercing the tenth intercostal
space and perforating the lower lobe of left lung; approximate depth 13.0 cm.

Hemothorax,
left, 1,200
c.c.

Heart and its big
vessels, almost empty of blood.

Brain and other
visceral organs, pale.

Stomach, empty.

xxx                            xxx                               xxx

CAUSE OF DEATH:  Hemorrhage secondary to stab wounds of the
chest” (Records, p. 55)

The defense presented the
accused-appellant himself as its sole witness. 
He denied having been present at the time and place of the stabbing
incident.

After trial, the lower
court, on April 22, 1988, rendered a judgment of conviction.  The dispositive
portion of the decision reads:

“WHEREFORE, finding the accused Mario Sorio y Balad guilty beyond reasonable doubt
of the crime charged, the Court hereby sentences him to suffer the penalty of RECLUSION PERPETUA.

The accused is hereby ordered to indemnify the legal heirs of
deceased Ruben Espiritu the sum of P30,000.00 (People
v. dela Fuente, G.R. No.
63215-52, (sic) December 29, 1983)

SO ORDERED.” (RTC Decision, pp. 6-7; Rollo, 23-24)

The antecedent facts as
summarized by the Solicitor-General in his brief, are
as follows:

“Efren Balbastro,
31 years old, married, CSU, Police Aide of Valenzuela, Metro Manila, and
residing at 49 A. Pablo Street, Karuhatan,
Valenzuela, substantially testified that on September 21, 1986 at about 5:00
o’clock in the morning after coming from jogging and while he was at Fely’s Kitchenette located along Macarthur Highway,
Valenzuela, Metro Manila, to drink water, Aling Fely, the owner of the restaurant, and Ruben Espiritu had exchange of heated words; that aside from him,
an old man who was near the door of the kitchenette and four (4) persons
drinking at a corner were inside the kitchenette (TSN, pp. 3-4, July 22, 1987);
that after the heated argument with Aling Fely, Ruben Espiritu went out of
the kitchenette; that the four persons drinking suddenly ran after Ruben Espiritu (TSN, p. 5, ibid.); that accused Mario Sorio, one of the four persons overtook and stabbed Ruben Espiritu;
that accused Mario Sorio fled after stabbing Ruben;
that his three (3) other companions did nothing and just watched (TSN, p. 6,
ibid.); that he tried to find a telephone to call for police assistance; that
he was not able to find a telephone because all the establishments he went to
were closed; that while returning to the place, he saw policemen and approached
them; that the police officers took down his name and address and told him that
they will summon him in case the suspect is apprehended (TSN, pp. 7-8,
ibid.).  (Decision, pp. 2 & 3)”
(Appellee’s Brief, pp. 2-3; Rollo,
p. 61)

The accused-appellant, in
maintaining the defense of alibi, states in his brief that:

“From the testimony of the appellant Mario Sorio,
it appears that on September 21, 1986
at about 5:00 o’clock in the morning,
he was in his house located at Kaybiga, Novaliches, Quezon City.  The night before, that was September 20, 1986, at about 10:00 p.m., he went to sleep.  He then came from his store at Caruhatan, Valenzuela, Metro Manila, where he was vending
peanuts.  He did not go to the Fely’s Kitchenette at Karuhatan,
Valenzuela, Metro Manila to drink in the early morning
of September 21, 1986.  He did not also go there in the evening of
same day to drink.  The testimony of
prosecution witness Efren Balbastro
that he was at the aforenamed kitchenette in the
early morning of September 21, 1986
and when Ruben Espiritu went out of said eatery, he stabbed the latter is not true.  He could not have stabbed Ruben Espiritu because he (appellant) then was at his home.  (TSN, November 8, 1987, pp. 2-5)”
(Appellant’s Brief, p. 4; Rollo, p. 42)

To bolster his defense of alibi, the accused-appellant further
claims that the prosecution’s alleged eyewitness Efren
Balbastro is not a credible witness on account of the
following circumstances:

1.       Balbastro’s
name is not included in the list
of witnesses contained in the information.

2.       Balbastro
did not formally report the stabbing incident to the police nor did he give his
statement to them.  It was only in court
at the witness’ stand when he spoke about the incident for the first time.

3.       Balbastro’s
testimony that only the accused-appellant stabbed the victim contradicts the
finding of the other prosecution witness, the medico-legal expert, that the
injuries sustained by the deceased could have been inflicted by more than two
(2) persons.

4.       Balbastro
testified that there was light in the kitchenette but could not make out
whether it was red or not.  Balbastro could
not also state how many times and which part of the victim’s body did the
accused-appellant stab the said victim.

5.       Balbastro
was the only eyewitness presented by the prosecution but from his testimony it can
be gathered that allegedly there were other eyewitnesses whom the prosecution
failed to present.  (Appellant’s Brief,
pp. 5-6; Rollo, pp. 43-44)

Hence, premised on the
allegation that the entire testimony of the prosecution’s eyewitness must be
disregarded for being unreliable and tainted by serious inconsistencies, the
accused-appellant in this appeal prays for his acquittal on the ground that the
prosecution had not established his guilt beyond reasonable doubt.

Considering that the issue presented by the accused-appellant zeroes in on credibility of
witnesses, i.e., whether or not Balbastro’s positive
identification of the culprit operates to convict the accused-appellant and whether
or not the accused-appellant’s alibi suffices to exculpate him, we accord great
weight to the factual findings made by the trial court because the trial judge
was in a better position to examine as well as to observe the demeanor of witnesses while testifying in the
case and as long as he has not plainly overlooked certain facts of substance
and value that, if considered, might affect the result of the case, the trial
judge’s findings are binding on us.  (see
People v. Nestor Espejo, G.R. No. 88662, June 18,
1990 citing People v. Pimentel, et al., 147 SCRA 25 [1987]; People v. Grefiel, etc., 125 SCRA 102 [1983]; People v. Fernandez,
124 SCRA 319 [1983]; see also People v. Carlito Eswan, et al., G.R. No. 84713, June 4,
1990  citing People v. Javier, G.R. No.
77756, March 26, 1990; People v. Miranda, G.R. No. 78900, March 21, 1990).

In the case at bar, the
trial court correctly ruled that the defense of alibi interposed by the
accused-apellant cannot be given credence.  We reiterate our pronouncement in the case of
People v. Felipe Maloloy-on
(G.R. No. 85246, August 30, 1990) that:

“x x x
While it is true that the defense of alibi may sometimes be considered
exculpatory, as when the participation of the appellant is not established
beyond cavil, (People v. Gonzales, et al., G.R. No. 80762, March 19, 1990), it
is equally settled that for alibi to succeed it must be shown not only that
accused was at some other place at the time of the alleged crime and that it was physically impossible
for him to have been at the site
of the crime at the time of its commission either before or after the time he
was at such other place (People v. Brioso, et al., 37
SCRA 336 [1971]; People v. Obando, et al., G.R. No.
72742, February 12, 1990; People v. Simene, G.R. No.
86164, April 3, 1990).  If the required
physical impossibility of being present at the scene of the crime is not proved, alibi as
a defense becomes unavailing to the accused. 
(People v. Aldeguer, G.R.
No. L-47991, April 3, 1990)”
(At p. 6)

Aside from the fact that the accused-appellant did not present
evidence to corroborate his defense of alibi, the records of the instant case
are bereft of any showing that the said accused-appellant was so far away that
he could not have been physically present at the place of the crime or its
immediate vicinity at the time of its commission.  On cross-examination, the accused-appellant
stated that when there was no heavy traffic, it would not take him thirty
minutes to reach Karuhatan, Valenzuela, the place of
the stabbing incident from his place of residence at Kaybiga
Novaliches, Quezon City.  (TSN, November 18, 1987, p. 7).  He further testified that on the day of the
said stabbing incident or on September
21, 1986, he was asleep at home and woke up at 6:00 o’clock in the
morning.  (Ibid., p.
8).  Inasmuch as the time of the
stabbing incident was established at about 5:00 o’clock in the morning of
September 21, 1986, and considering that there could have been no heavy traffic between 5:00 o’clock and 6:00 o’clock in the morning from Karuhatan,
Valenzuela to Novaliches, Quezon
City, the element of physical impossibility to support the defense of alibi
cannot be appreciated considering further that the accused-appellant stated on
direct examination that he had gone to bed at 10:00 o’clock the night before
the incident.  (Ibid., p. 3) The accused-appellant had more than
enough time to commute to and from his house to the scene of the crime then back to his house again.  Clear and convincing evidence is required to
show that it was physically impossible for the accused to go to the scene of
the crime and return to his place (see People v. Aniñon,
158 SCRA 701 [1988]; People v. Perante, Jr., 143 SCRA
56 [1986]).

Besides, the defense of alibi cannot prevail over the positive identification of the
accused (People v. Felix Raquipo
y Tolentino, G.R. No. 90766, August 13, 1990 citing
US v. Garcia, 9 Phil. 434 [1907];
People v. Ocaya, 144
SCRA 165 [1986]).  The lone prosecution
eyewitness categorically pointed to the accused-appellant as the perpetrator of
the crime under consideration.  The
testimony of a lone prosecution eyewitness, as long as credible and
positive can prove beyond reasonable doubt the guilt of the accused especially
when, as in the instant case, the
evidence for the defense consists merely of denials and
alibis.  (See People v.
Melicor, 160 SCRA 580 [1988].

The accused-appellant
assails the credibility of the prosecution’s lone eyewitness by claiming that
the latter’s testimony was not corroborated
by the other persons whom the said eyewitness indicated as also present at the
scene of the crime but were not summoned as witnesses by the prosecution.  The contention of the accused-appellant
is untenable for it is a jurisprudential imperative that it is up to the parties to determine for themselves whether it is necessary
to present corroborating evidence or to rely alone on its principal evidence if
they believe this to be sufficient. 
(People v. Octavio Juanga,
G.R. No. 83903, August 30, 1990; People v. Ramon Abaya,
G.R. No. 80885, May 17, 1990).  Moreover,
the fact that the said eyewitness’ name was not listed in the Information as
one of the witnesses is not a fatal defect and does not prejudice the evidence
for the prosecution contrary to the argument advanced by the accused-appellant.

In the light of the
foregoing considerations, there is a clear indication that the finding of guilt
of the accused-appellant beyond reasonable doubt for the death of Ruben Espiritu by the trial court does not suffer from any
reversible error.  We find no need to
discuss the other points raised by the accused-appellant as they are subsumed under the issue of credibility.  The inconsistencies he mentions are
inconsequential so that they cannot alter the evidence relied upon by the trial
court in rendering a judgment of conviction.

Likewise, the trial court
is correct in ruling that the
qualifying circumstance of treachery in murder was present.  To constitute treachery, two conditions must
be present, to wit (1) the employment of means of execution that
give the person attacked no opportunity to defend himself or to retaliate
and (2) the means of execution were deliberately or consciously adopted.  (Article 14, sub-paragraph 16 and Article
248, sub-paragraph 1, Revised Penal Code; People v. Edwin Mabubay, G.R. No. 87018, May 24, 1990 citing People v. Samonte, 64 SCRA 319).

We
quote with approval the trial court’s finding that:

“xxx                           xxx                               xxx

“The autopsy report (Exh. C &
C-1) bears eloquent testimony to the accused (sic) merciless and fierce attack
with evident homicidal intent.  There
were two stab wounds on the body
of the victim, one located at the right chest and the other at the back.

“All things considered, the Court is convinced that accused
Mario Sorio inflicted the stab wounds with the clear
intent to kill a hapless target.  The
thrusts of the knife were piercing and
deep which severed axillary blood vessels and nerves
and punctured vital internal organs of the deceased.  Death was instantaneous and prompt medical
attention would not save the victim because of the gravity of the wounds
inflicted.

“The commission of the offense was attended by the aggravating
circumstance of treachery that qualified the killing to Murder.  Treachery was present, because accused
attacked the unarmed/unsuspecting victim from behind in a sudden and unexpected
manner with his weapon such that the latter was in no position to flee or
defend himself. 
It is apparent that the method of attack was consciously chosen to
insure a speedy consummation of the offense without risk to himself.”
(Rollo, pp. 22-23)

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the appealed judgment
of the trial court dated April 22, 1988 is hereby AFFIRMED except for the indemnity
which is increased to P50,000.00 following recent pronouncements of this Court.

SO ORDERED.

Fernan, C.J., (Chairman), Bidin, and Cortes, JJ., concur.

Feliciano, J., on leave.