NG SOON, PETITIONER, VS. HON. ALOYSIUS ALDAY, REGIONAL TRIAL COURT, QUEZON CITY, BILLIE GAN AND CHINA BANKING CORPORATION, RESPONDENTS.

Applying literally the ruling on docket fees enunciated in
Manchester Development Corporation vs. Court of Appeals (L-75919, May 7, 1987,
149 SCRA 562), respondent Judge, on 11 August 1988, ordered (1) that
petitioner’s Complaint below (in Civil Case No. Q-52489), for reconstitution of
a savings account, and payment of damages and attorney’s fees, be expunged; and
(2) that the case be dismissed.  He also
denied, on 21 October 1988,
the reconsideration sought by petitioner of that Order.

The aforementioned savings account was allegedly maintained with
the China Banking Corporation (CBC) by Gan Bun Yaw,
both of whom are respondents herein. 
Petitioner, Ng Soon, claims to be the latter’s widow.

The pertinent portions of the Complaint and Prayer read as
follows:

“2. 
During his lifetime, Mr. Gan Bun Yaw
opened Savings Account No. 17591-2 with CBC wherein he deposited P900,000.00
more or less.

“3. 
Before his death on January
3, 1987 he lapsed into a coma until he finally took his last
breath.  But his passbook still showed a
deposit of P900,000.00 more or less.

x x x              x x x                             x
x x

“5. 
For almost three (3) long years, she looked for the deposit
passbook with the help of her children to no avail.

x x x              x x x                             x
x x

“7. 
She discovered further that aforesaid savings account was closed
by defendant CBC on December 8, 1988.  x x
x.

“8. 
She discovered finally that defendant Billie T. Gan connived and colluded with the officers and officials
of CBC to withdraw all of the
aforesaid savings account of Mr. Gan Bun Yaw by
forging his signature.  This has to be
done because Mr. Gan Bun Yaw slipped into a comatose
condition in the hospital and could not sign any withdrawal slip.

x x x              x x x                             x
x x

“11. Due to the wanton and unfounded refusal and failure of
defendants to heed her just and valid demands, she suffered actual damages
in the form of missing money in aforesaid savings account and expenses
of litigation.

“12. Due also to the unfounded and malicious refusal of
defendants to heed her just and valid demands, she suffered moral damages,
the amount whereof she leaves to the discretion of the Court.

“13. Due likewise to the unfounded and wanton refusal and
failure of defendants to heed her just and valid demands, she suffered exemplary
damages, the amount whereof she leaves to the discretion of the Court.

“14. Due finally to the unfounded and wanton refusal and
failure of defendants to heed her just and valid demands, she was constrained
to hire the services of
counsel, binding
herself to pay the amount equivalent to twenty percent payable to her, thereby
suffering to the tune thereof.

P R A Y E R

“WHEREFORE, plaintiff respectfully prays that this Honorable
Court render judgment:

“1. 
Ordering defendants China
Banking Corporation to reconstitute Savings Account No. 47591-2 in the name of
Mr. Gan Bun Yaw in the amount of P900,000.00 with
interest from December 8, 1977
or ordering them both to pay her the principal and interest from December 9, 1977, jointly and
severally.

“2. 
Ordering both defendants to pay moral and exemplary damages of
not less than P50,000.00.

“3. 
Ordering both defendants to pay her attorney’s fees equivalent to
twenty percent of all amounts reconstituted or payable to her, but not less
than P50,000.00.

“She prays for such other and further relief to which she may
be entitled in law and equity under the premises.” [Emphasis supplied] (pp. 11-13, Rollo)

For the filing of the above Complaint, petitioner paid the sum of
P3,600.00 as docket fees.

Respondent Billie Gan and the Bank,
respectively, moved for the dismissal of the Complaint.  Subsequently, respondent Gan,
joined by the Bank, moved to expunge the said Complaint from the record for
alleged non-payment of the required docket fees.

On 11 August 1988,
respondent Judge issued the questioned
Order granting the “Motion to Expunge Complaint.” He explained:

“It can thus be seen that while it can be considered at best as impliedly specifying the amount (namely,
P900,000.00, more or less) of
what is referred to in its par.
11 as ‘missing money’ (which apparently is the main part of the alleged actual
damages), the body of the complaint does not specify the following, to
wit:  the amount of the rest of the
alleged actual damages; the amount of
the alleged moral damages; the amount of the alleged exemplary damages; and,
the amount of the alleged attorney’s fees. 
As regards the alleged attorney’s fees, in particular, the clause ‘the
amount equivalent to twenty percent payable to her’ is vague and
indefinite.  It leaves to guesswork the
determination of the exact amount relative to which the ‘twenty percent’ shall
be reckoned.  Is it the amount of P900,000.00, more or less?  Or is it the total amount of all the actual damages?  Or is it the grand total amount of all the
damages — actual, moral, and exemplary — ‘payable to her’?

“As regards the prayer of the complaint, while it may be
regarded as specific enough as to the principal sum of P900,000.00 as actual
damages, it cannot be so regarded
with respect to the amount of moral and exemplary damages (no. 2 of the prayer)
and attorney’s fees (no. 3 of the prayer); for, evidently, the phrase ‘not less
than P50,000.00’ in each of nos. 2 and 3 of the prayer merely fixes the minimum
amount, but it does not mean that
plaintiff is not praying for an unspecified sum much higher than said
minimum.  And, again, the clause
‘equivalent to twenty percent of all amounts reconstituted or payable to her’
in no. 3 of the prayer is as vague and
indefinite as the similar clause found in the complaint’s body referred to
earlier.  What exactly is the amount
relative to which the ‘twenty percent’ shall be determined?  Is it the amount of P900,000.00,
more or less?  Or
is it the total amount of all the actual damages?  Or is it the grand total amount of all the
damages — actual, moral, and exemplary — ‘payable to her’?  Certainly, the great difference between any
of these amounts, on the one hand, and the amount of P50,000.00 in the phrase ‘not less than P50,000.00’ in no. 3 of the
prayer, on the other hand, is quite too obvious to need underscoring.

“Needless to state,
implicit in the obligation to specify is the duty to be clear and
definite.  A purported specification
which is vague and indefinite obviously is no specification, at all; indeed, it
will serve no purpose other than to evade the payment of the correct filing
fees by misleading the docket clerk in the assessment of the filing fees.

x x x                          x x
x

“WHEREFORE, the Court
hereby grants defendants’ aforesaid ‘MOTION TO EXPUNGE COMPLAINT’ and hereby
denies plaintiff’s aforesaid ‘URGENT OMNIBUS MOTION (ETC.)’ and ‘OPPOSITION
(ETC.)’ inclusive of all the prayers contained therein and, accordingly,
plaintiff’s complaint herein is hereby deemed EXPUNGED from the record.  Further, being rendered moot and academic as
a result hereof, defendant Billie T. Gan’s ‘MOTION TO
DISMISS’ dated April 25, 1988
and defendant China Banking Corporation’s ‘MOTION TO DISMISS‘ dated May 25, 1988 are hereby dismissed.” (pp. 16-18, Rollo)

Petitioner’s Motion for the reconsideration of the said Order
having been denied, she asks for its review, more properly for a Writ of Certiorari.

The Petition is anchored on two grounds, namely:

1. The doctrine laid down in the Manchester
case was incorrectly applied by respondent Judge; and

2. Respondent Judge acted with grave abuse of discretion when he
ordered the Complaint expunged from the record although petitioner had paid the
necessary filing fees.

During the pendency of this case,
respondent Gan filed a Manifestation alleging, among
others, that petitioner is an impostor and not the real Ng Soon, wife of Gan Bun Yaw, since the real Mrs. Gan
Bun Yaw (Ng Soon) died on 29 July 1933, as
shown by a Certificate
issued on 27 April 1989 by, and bearing the seal of, the An Hai
Municipal Government.

This allegation was,
however, denied by petitioner in her “Sur-rejoinder
to Manifestation” filed on 12 August 1989, to which respondent Gan
has countered with a Reply on 9 September 1989.

We resolved to give due
course to the Petition and dispensed with the submittal of Memoranda, the
issues having been thoroughly threshed out by the parties.

Upon the facts, the
pleadings, and the law, we grant the Petition.

It is true that Manchester
laid down the rule that all Complaints should specify the amount of damages prayed for not only in
the body of the complaint but also in the prayer; that said damages shall be
considered in the assessment of the filing fees in any case; and that any
pleading that fails to comply with such
requirement shall not be accepted nor admitted, or shall, otherwise, be expunged from the
record.

While it may be that the
body of petitioner’s Complaint below was silent as to the exact amount of moral
and exemplary damages, and attorney’s fees, the prayer did specify the amount
of not less than P50,000.00 as moral and exemplary
damages, and not less than P50,000.00 as attorney’s fees.  These amounts were definite enough and
enabled the Clerk of Court of the lower Court to compute the docket fees
payable.

Similarly, the principal amount sought to be recovered as “missing money” was fixed at
P900,000.00. 
The failure to state the rate of interest demanded was not fatal not
only because it is the Courts which ultimately fix the same, but also because
Rule 141, Section 5(a) of the Rules of Court, itemizing the filing fees, speaks
of “the sum claimed, exclusive of interest.” This clearly implies
that the specification of the interest rate is not that indispensable.

Factually, therefore, not
everything was left to “guesswork” as respondent Judge has
opined.  The sums claimed were
ascertainable, sufficient enough to allow a computation pursuant to Rule 141,
section 5(a).

Furthermore, contrary to
the position taken by respondent Judge, the amounts claimed need not be
initially stated with mathematical precision. 
The same Rule 141, section 5(a) (3rd paragraph), allows an appraisal
“more or less.” Thus:

“In case the value of the property or estate or the sum
claimed is less or more in accordance with the appraisal of the court, the
difference of fee shall be refunded or paid as the case may be.”

In other words, a final
determination is still to be made by the Court, and the fees ultimately found
to be payable will either be additionally paid by the party concerned or
refunded to him, as the case may be.  The
above provision clearly allows an initial payment of the filing fees
corresponding to the estimated amount of the claim subject to adjustment as to
what later may be proved.

“x x x
there is merit in petitioner’s claim that the third paragraph of Rule 141,
Section 5(a) clearly contemplates a situation where an amount is alleged or claimed in the complaint
but is less or more than what is later proved. 
If what is proved is less than what was claimed, then a refund will be
made; if more, additional fees will be exacted. 
Otherwise stated, what is subject to adjustment is the difference
in the fee and not the whole amount“ (Pilipinas Shell
Petroleum Corpn., et als.,
vs. Court of Appeals, et als., G.R. No. 76119, April 10, 1989).

Significantly, too, the
pattern in Manchester to
defraud the Government of the docket fee due, the intent not to pay the same
having been obvious not only in the filing of the original complaint but also
in the filing of the second amended complaint, is patently absent in this
case.  Petitioner demonstrated her
willingness to abide by the Rules by paying the assessed docket fee of P3,600.00.  She had also
asked the lower Court to inform her of the deficiency, if any, but said Court
did not heed her plea.

Additionally, in the case
of Sun Insurance Office Ltd., et al., vs. Hon. Maximiano
Asuncion et al. (G.R Nos. 79937-38, February 13, 1989), this Court had already relaxed the Manchester
rule when it held, inter alia,:

“1. 
It is not simply the filing of the complaint or appropriate
initiatory pleading, but the payment of the prescribed docket fee, that vests a
trial court with jurisdiction over the subject matter or nature of the
action.  Where the filing of the
initiatory pleading is not accompanied by payment of the docket fee, the
court may allow payment of the fee within a reasonable time but in no case beyond the applicable
prescriptive or reglementary period”
(Underscoring ours).

In respect of the
questioned identity of petitioner, this is properly a matter falling within the
competence of the Court a quo, this Court not being a trier of facts.

WHEREFORE, the assailed Orders of respondent Judge,
dated 11 August 1988
and 21 October 1988,
are SET ASIDE, and he is hereby directed to reinstate Civil Case No. Q-52489 for determination and proper disposition of the respective
claims and rights of the parties, including the controversy as to the real
identity of petitioner.  No costs.

SO ORDERED.

Paras, Padilla, Sarmiento,
and Regalado, JJ., concur.