PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE, VS. ROMENALDO MURALLON, ACCUSED-APPELLANT.

In a complaint dated December 10, 1981, accused-appellant was charged
in the former Court of First Instance of Lanao del
Norte with the crime of rape by the complaining witness, Carmencita
Montes, allegedly committed by means of force, violence and intimidation on
September 6, 1981 in Barangay Balili,
Kapatagan, Lanao del Norte.^[1]

Upon arraignment, appellant pleaded not guilty.  The trial court,^[2]
however, after an evaluation of the evidence on record, convicted appellant as
charged and sentenced him to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua, “with a strong recommendation for executive clemency.”
Appellant was further ordered to pay P10,000.00 to
complainant Carmencita Montes as moral damages.^[3]

The evidence for the
prosecution is hereinunder summarized, as
gathered by the court a quo from the testimonies of the witnesses
and verified by us from the transcribed notes of the proceedings.^[4]

Sometime
before 9:00 o’clock in the evening of September 6, 1981, complainant Carmencita
Montes, then fifteen (15) years old, was alone in their house near the national
highway at Barangay Balili,
Kapatagan, Lanao del Norte,
feeding pigs while her parents were at their farmhouse about two (2) kilometers
away.  After performing her chores, she
decided to join her parents at said farmhouse.

On her way along a “human trail,” complainant noticed a
man walking very fast towards her.  This
prompted her to walk faster.  Before
long, however, the man who turned out to be the appellant overtook her, blocked
her way and immediately held her right shoulder.  As complainant struggled to free herself and
continue walking, appellant tripped her causing her to fall to the ground. 
Thereupon, appellant placed himself on top of
her, threatened her with a hunting knife and ordered her not to shout or else
he would kill her.  He then grabbed her
short pants and tore the portion covering her private parts.  Thereafter, he ripped her panties also at the “bilahan,”
the portion covering her private parts. 
Appellant then inserted his penis into her organ through the openings in
her short pants and panties.  All this
time, complainant struggled to prevent the sexual assault but she became too weak to sufficiently resist appellant.

After the consummation of the dastardly deed, appellant told
complainant to go home, which she did. 
Upon reaching their farmhouse, and on her mother’s inquiry why she was
late in coming home, complainant forthwith told her mother about her
unfortunate experience.  Taking off her
clothes, complainant noticed that there were blood stains on the portion of her
panties covering her private parts and that her dress was soiled with mud at
the back portion, which items of apparel were presented and admitted as
evidence in court.

Complainant’s mother asked a nephew to contact the barrio
captain, one Marcelino Ponce.  The latter, upon being told of what happened,
then went to the place where appellant was staying and told appellant that he was to be delivered and
surrendered, as appellant was in fact surrendered to the municipal hall for
safekeeping.  The next day, complainant
was investigated in writing by police authorities and was subjected to medical
examination.

The medical certificate
issued by Dr. Gavina V. Galbines,
who conducted the medical examination on complainant on September 7, 1981, contained the following
findings:

“Pelvic examination:  speculum examination:

Introitus
– admits one finger easily, admits two fingers with less resistance, presence
of fresh hymenal laceration.

Cervix   – closed, no cervicitis noted, bloody discharges peering from the
cervical os.

Uterus  –
not enlarged

Adnexa – negative

Discharges – bloody, non-odorous

N. B. :  Patient is menstrating.”
(sic)^[5]

On the other hand, appellant espouses a different version.^[6]
He admits having had sexual intercourse with the complainant but claims that
the coitus was mutually agreed upon by them, they being sweethearts.  Appellant moreover claims that the copulation
occurred in their house and not on the muddy trail as alleged by the
complainant.  As proof of their
relationship, appellant presented as evidence a ring and a letter allegedly
given to him by the complainant.  Hence,
appellant faults the trial court in finding him guilty of the crime of rape by
using force or intimidation.^[7]

In amplification of his plaint, appellant assails the
prosecution’s version as incredible and cites the fact that complainant did not
suffer any injury as proof that she never resisted.  The lack of an outcry from the complainant,
appellant insists, also negates complainant’s story.

We sustain appellant’s conviction.

Owing to the peculiar nature of the crime of rape, the very act
itself is oftentimes, as in this case, witnessed by only two people, the
complainant and the accused.  As a
consequence, extreme care and caution is required in weighing and appraising
their conflicting testimonies to ensure that justice is meted out.^[8]

Proceeding from this premise, we have carefully perused
complainant’s testimony and we find that the same was related with all
sincerity and candor expected of a girl truthfully recounting the terrible
experience which had befallen her.  Her
straightforward account of the events which occurred before, during and after
the rape was consistent and unwavering even during the cross-examination,
obvious proof of the veracity of her declarations.

The issue raised on the absence of any other injury on the victim
is of no moment.  That the complainant
did not sustain any additional injury does not negate the fact of rape.  Appellant found no need to employ such force
as would have battered complainant because she had already submitted out of fear
and exhaustion as she continued to free
herself from the clutches of the appellant who poked a hunting knife on
her and threatened to kill her unless she kept quiet.^[9]

Firmly settled is the rule that rape may be committed even if the
force employed was not so great nor of such character as could not be resisted;
intimidation is sufficient, and this includes the moral kind such as the fear
caused by threatening a victim with a pistol or knife,^[10]
as in the case at bar.

The lack of an outcry on the part of the complainant likewise
does not render improbable the commission of rape against her.  Human reactions vary and are
unpredictable.  A person at one moment
may cry her heart out over her misfortune but may be dry-eyed the next time she
recalls her tragic fate.^[11]
Besides, as earlier stated, the complainant was cowed into silence by the
menacing demeanor of appellant.

Moreover, complainant’s behavior immediately after the incident
adequately supports the credibility of her claim that she was raped by
appellant.  Complainant lost no time in
reporting the outrage on her honor to her parents and, later to the police,
after which she submitted herself to physical examination.  These actuations are certainly inconsistent with appellant’s allegation that he had a
romantic relationship with the complainant. 
If, in fact, complainant was in love with him, she could have easily
forgiven him; she would not have submitted herself to physical examination of
her private parts; she would not have gone to the extent of filing this charge;
nor would she have allowed herself to undergo the ordeal and embarrassment of a
public trial.^[12]

Even granting ex gratia
argumenti that complainant and accused were
lovers, the latter nevertheless committed rape when he compelled her to yield
to his sex drive, physically overcame her spirited resistance and sexually took
her against her will.  Love is not
a license for lust, at least upon a sweetheart only who,
unlike the wife, has a right to resist the passionate advances of her partner.^[13]

In any event, the
circumstances of force and intimidation attending the present case are
manifested clearly not only by complainant’s testimony but also by the physical
evidence presented during the trial consisting of the torn pants and underwear of the complainant and the medico-legal
report.  Such evidence indeed are more eloquent than a hundred witnesses.^[14]

It
is also evident that the version of appellant that he and the victim were
lovers is not only improbable but is
also full of contradictions, inconsistencies and equivocations.  As categorically found and aptly observed by
the trial court regarding appellant’s allegation that the copulation took place
in his aunt’s house where he was staying –

“The Court is not unmindful of the testimony of the accused in refutation of the testimony of the
complainant to the effect that the sexual attack took place on the ‘human
trail’ on her way to their farmhouse, when he said in effect that the sexual
intercourse was in a room in his house, but this becomes incredulous (sic) when
he further said (Ibid., pp. 22-23) that the house has only one room and there
were four persons inside the house at the time (his aunt Magdalena Pacion and her 3 children), albeit his cousins were outside
(the room).  Even married couples would hesitate to
copulate under such environment! Furthermore, the testimony of the accused is
belied by the testimony of his own aunt and witness, Magdalena Pacion, when she said in effect that at the time of the
incident she was not there (at home) – t. s. n., Salido,
p. 12., test. of Pacion.”^[15]

More telling are the perceptive findings of said court on the
ring and the letter presented by the defense as proof that appellant and
complainant were sweethearts, to wit:

“On the other hand, the thrust of the defense of the accused
is to the effect that the sexual intercourse he had with complainant was
between sweethearts and not a punishable crime (t.s.n.,
test. of Murallon, p. 4; test. of Pacion, p. 7, Salido).  As proof of this accused Murallon
said that complainant Montes gave him a ring, Exhibit ‘2’ (Ibid., p. 5) and in turn he gave her a ring similar to
Exhibit ‘2′, with the difference that the ring he gave has a reddish pearl on
top of it (Ibid., pp. 6-7); and in jail she visited him and gave him a letter,
Exhibit ‘1′.  And his aunt Pacion testified that ‘I believe they (Murallon
and Montes) are sweethearts because there is even a letter (Exh.
‘1′ of Carmencita to Romy (Murallon)’ ‘… shown to me by Romy.’
(Ibid., p. 7). 
Exhibit ‘2’ appears to be an ordinary iron or aluminum ring, which is
seldom peddled even by sidewalk vendors because it is almost worthless, or at
most, to the thinking of the Court, nobody would ordinarily buy for more than a
few pesos.  To the
thinking of the Court also, no sweetheart, even how poor, would give such kind
of a present to a loved one.  When
complainant Montes was confronted with the ring in cross-examination, she said
that she had not seen it before and did not have a ring like it (t.s.n., pp. 7-8, Anacleto).  The letter, Exhibit ‘1’, is in Cebuano-Visayan, done on a notebook sheet, the translation
of which was not made by the defense despite its reservation to do so (Ibid.,
p. 3).  It appears to be written by one Carmencita to Romey (sic) under
date of September 9, 1981, but on cross-examination (Ibid., p. 28) the complainant said the letter
is not hers and she has no idea who wrote it. 
In the cross-examination of the accused Murallon,
he said that Exhibit ‘1′ was given to him by Carmencita
on September 5, 1984 (81?) – t.s.n., p. 12, Salido
– which puts the cart before the carabao, so to say,
because the letter would have been delivered before it was written.  x x x“^[16]

The above-quoted observations of the court a quo
are findings of facts which we are inclined to accord great respect, under the
circumstances and evidence on record, bearing in mind the trial court’s advantage of
directly and at first hand observing and examining the testimonial and other
proofs as they are presented at the trial and forming its impressions and
conclusions on the basis thereof.^[17]

All told, we find the records to be amply supportive of the
factual findings of the trial court and its assessment of the credibility of
the witnesses.

WHEREFORE, finding that appellant’s guilt has
been proved beyond reasonable doubt, the decision of the trial court is hereby AFFIRMED,
except as to the amount of the indemnity which is hereby increased to
P30,000.00 conformably with current
jurisprudence.  The recommendation of the
court below for executive clemency “if only to reduce the penalty” is
a matter properly addressed to the judgmental policy of the legislature and
more directly to the discretion of the Chief Executive.

SO ORDERED.

Melencio-Herrera, (Chairman), Paras, Padilla, and Sarmiento, JJ., concur.

^[1]
Exhibit “A”; Rollo,
5.

^[2]
Presided over by Judge Tago M. Bantuas.

^[3]
Rollo, 15-24.

^[4]
Rollo, 16-18.

^[5]
Exhibit “F”; Original Records, 3.

^[6]
Rollo, 19.

^[7]
Appellant’s Brief, 47.

^[8]
People vs. Albarillo, G. R. No. 84729, July
30, 1990; People vs. Villapaña, 161 SCRA 72 (1988).

^[9]
See People vs. Corrales, G.R. No. 76922, February 21, 1990; People vs. Poculan,
167 SCRA 176 (1988).

^[10]
People vs. Hortillano, G.R.
No. 71116, September
19, 1989; People vs. Copro, 126 SCRA 403 (1983).

^[11]
Id.; Id.

^[12]
People vs. Arengo, etc., G.R. No. 85251, January 22, 1990.

^[13]
People vs. Mercado, 161 SCRA 601 (1988).

^[14]
People vs. Estrebella, 164
SCRA 114 (1988).

^[15]
Rollo, 20-21.

^[16]
IbId., 21-22.

^[17]
People vs. Alvarez, etc., 163 SCRA 745 (1988).