HUALAM CONSTRUCTION AND DEVELOPMENT CORP. AND TAN BEE GIOK, PETITIONERS, VS. HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS AND STATE INVESTMENT HOUSE, INC., RESPONDENTS.

Petitioners assail the Decision of the Court of Appeals of 5
August 1988 in C.A.-G.R. SP No. 13060^[1]
reversing the 7 August 1987 Decision of Branch 49 of the Regional Trial Court
(RTC) of Manila in Civil Case No. 87-39946 and reinstating the 27 October 1986
Decision of Branch 27 of the Metropolitan Trial Court (MTC) of Manila in an
ejectment case, Civil Case No. 111274. The decision of the RTC declared as null and void the orders of the MTC
granting the motion for execution of judgment for failure to file a supersedeas
bond and directing the ejectment of the petitioners, and set aside the
sheriff’s execution sale.

The challenged decision of the respondent Court discloses the
following antecedent facts which gave rise to the instant controversy:

Private respondent is the owner of State Centre Building located
at 333 Juan Luna Street, Binondo, Manila; the building is divided into several
office condominium units offered for sale or lease to the general public.

Pursuant to a Contract to Sell executed on 22 September 1983
between the private respondent as Vendor, and petitioner Hualam Construction
and Development Corporation^[2]
as Vendee, the latter occupied unit No. 1505 of said State Centre
Building. The pertinent provisions of
this contract read:

“3. PRICE AND
TERMS OF PAYMENT — The purchase price of the unit(s) shall be Pesos: SIX HUNDRED TWENTY TWO THOUSAND SIX HUNDRED
FIFTY THREE PESOS & 71/100 (P622,653.71), Philippine currency, payable in
the following manner:

a)    
FIVE THOUSAND TWO HUNDRED EIGHTEEN (P5,218.00) PHIL. CURRENCY,
per month for Six (6) successive month (sic) from the signing of this contract,
payable on or before 9.22.83; on or before 10.22.83; on or before 11.22.83; on
or before 12.22.83; on or before 1.22.84; on or before 2.22.84; which amount represent
(sic) the rental and aircon cost for the corresponding months over the unit.

b)    
Downpayment of ONE HUNDRED TWENTY EIGHT THOUSAND ONE HUNDRED
ELEVEN & 02/100 (P128,111.02) PESOS payable as follows:

c)       
MONTHLY AMORTIZATION — ELEVEN THOUSAND FIVE HUNDRED NINETY
& 46/100 (P11,590.46) PESOS.

FIRST MONTHLY installment payable on or before July 22, 1984 and
every 22nd day of each month thereafter for sixty (60) installments.

All payments made in accordance herewith shall be applied first to
payment (sic) of reimbursement of real estate taxes and other charges due
including airconditioning costs hereunder; second, to interests accrued to the
date of payment; and third, to the amortization of the principal obligation
herein.

x x x

12. CANCELLATION OF THIS AGREEMENT -­- Should the VENDEE fail or refuse
to make the payment of any of the monthly installments together with the
interest thereon as agreed herein on ground other than those provided in
Section 23 of P.D. 957, or of all the corresponding proportionate obligations
or dues for taxes and assessments levied on the land and the building herein
involved during the term of this contract within thirty (30) days from its due
date, this Contract shall, by the mere fact of nonpayment expire by itself and
become null and void without necessity of notice to the VENDEE of any judicial
declaration to the (sic) effect and/any and all sums of money paid under this
contract shall be forfeited in favor of the VENDOR as liquidated damages or if
VENDEE is already in possession of
the property; the amount forfeited together
with all improvements, if there are any,
made on the premises shall become rentals
on the property, and in (sic) this
effect, the VENDEE, should he be in
possession of the Unit(s) herein purchased,
shall become a mere intruder or unlawful
detainer of the same and may be
ejected therefrom by the means provided
by law for trespassers or unlawful detainers. Immediately after the expiration of the
30-day period provided for in this section, the VENDOR, shall be at liberty to
dispose of and sell said Unit(s) and its appurtenances to any interested third
person.” (Underscoring supplied)

x x x

For petitioners’ failure and refusal to pay, despite repeated
demands, the accumulated downpayment, installments, utility charges and other assessments
mentioned in the Contract to Sell — such as those for airconditioning service,
electrical consumption, rentals on telephone lines and use of the parking lot,
together with the association dues, the proportionate share in real estate
taxes and other charges ­– private respondent filed on 8 July 1985 a complaint
for ejectment against the petitioners with the MTC of Manila. The case was docketed as Civil Case No.
111274 and was raffled off to Branch 27 of said court.

On 25 July 1985, petitioners filed their Answer with Special
Defenses. They subsequently filed a
motion to dismiss which was denied by the court. Thereupon, the court calendared the case for pre-trial conference
on 7 August 1986. This setting was
postponed to 11 September 1986; the parties were given due notice thereof.

On 11 September 1986, however, petitioners and their counsel
failed to appear. Upon motion of the
private respondent, the MTC declared the petitioners as default and allowed the
private respondent to present its evidence ex-parte.

On 27 October 1986, the MTC rendered a decision in favor of the
private respondent, the dispositive portion of which reads:

“WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of plaintiff
and against the defendants, ordering the latter or any person claiming rights
under them to vacate the premises of Unit 1505 State Centre Building, 333, Juan
Luna, Binondo, Manila; to pay plaintiff the sum of P161,478.61 representing
unpaid down payment, installments and other charges and such other amount as
may become due from defendants by reason of their continued possession of the
premises, which amount will be paid jointly and severally by defendants, the
further sum of P5,000.00 as and for attorney’s fees and to pay the costs.”^[3]

On 19 January 1987, petitioners filed their Notice of Appeal
before the MTC.

Thereafter, private respondent filed on 9 January 1987 a Motion
for Immediate Execution of the decision based on Section 8, Rule 70 of the
Revised Rules of Court.

On 27 January 1987, the MTC issued an order granting the private
respondent’s Motion for Immediate Execution.

On 29 January 1987, petitioners, as defendants therein, filed a
motion to reconsider the said order, alleging, inter alia, that (1) it is
not necessary for them to post a supersedeas bond under Section 8 of Rule 70
because the case does not involve unpaid rents, but unpaid downpayment,
installments and other charges, and that the perfection of their appeal
automatically stays the execution of judgment; (2) the complaint, although
captioned as one “For Ejectment”, is in reality one for a sum of
money as alleged therein and as found by the said court; (3) the case being for
a sum of money which exceeds P20,000.00, said court has no jurisdiction to try
the same; and (4) no writ of execution having yet been issued, justice demands
that the issuance thereof be held in abeyance until after the outcome of such
motion and the pending appeal shall have become known. They then prayed that the order of execution
be set aside and the appeal be given due course. Private respondent filed an opposition thereto.

On 9 March 1987, the MTC denied the motion and directed the
issuance of a writ of execution; the writ of execution was issued on 11 March
1987.

On 16 March 1987, pursuant to the writ of execution, Deputy
Sheriff Justiniano dela Cruz of Branch 27 of the MTC restored the possession of
said Unit No. 1505 to the private respondent and simultaneously levied upon the
personal properties of the petitioners found in the premises to satisfy the
money judgment decreed in the decision. Accordingly, he issued a Notice of Levy and Sale on Execution of
Personal Properties which set the public auction sale for 26 March 1987 at
10:00 A.M..

On 23 March 1987, petitioners filed with the RTC of Manila a
petition for certiorari with injunction against the Hon. Jose R. Bueno,
presiding Judge of Branch 27 of the MTC of Manila, the Sheriff and the private
respondent. The same was docketed as
Civil Case No. 87-39946 and was raffled off to Branch 49. The petitioners sought the issuance of an
order enjoining the respondents therein from enforcing the writ of execution
issued in Civil Case No. 111274. For
such purpose, they asked that a preliminary injunction be issued and, after
hearing, for judgment to be rendered declaring such injunction permanent and
ordering the respondents to restore to the petitioners the possession of the
properties levied upon as well as of the premises in question.

At 10:00 o’clock in the morning of 26 March 1987, Sheriff dela
Cruz, Jr. proceeded with the public auction sale of the levied properties. Private respondent was the sole bidder with
a bid of P30,145.00; a Certificate of Sale was therefore issued to it on that
date. On the same day, however, the RTC
issued a restraining order enjoining the respondents in said Civil Case No.
87-39946 from enforcing the Writ of Execution earlier issued by the MTC
together with the Notice of Levy and Sale on Execution of Personal Properties. However, this order, to which a copy of the
petition for certiorari was attached, was received by the Sheriff only
at 1:35 o’clock in the afternoon; the private respondent itself received notice
thereof ten (10) minutes later. Clearly
then, notice was received by both after the termination of the public
auction sale.

On 15 April 1987, private respondent filed its Answer in Civil
Case No. 87-39946.

On 27 August 1987, the RTC rendered its decision in Civil Case
No. 87-39946, the dispositive portion of which reads:

“WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered granting the Petition
at bar, and declaring null and void the Orders, Annexes ‘F’ and ‘J’ and
Ejectment Execution (sic), Annex ‘K’, all of the Petition, issued by the
Respondent Judge, (of the MTC) and the levy on Petitioners’ personal
properties, the sale thereof at public auction and the Certificate of Sale,
Annex ‘B’ of the Supplemental Complaint, all executed by the Respondent Deputy
Sheriff.

Accordingly, the Respondents Deputy Sheriff and Private Respondent
State Investment House, Inc. are hereby ordered to return to the Petitioners
the personal properties sold at public auction to the Private Respondent and to
restore the Petitioner corporation to the possession of the aforementioned
condominium unit; and to pay the costs of suit.

SO ORDERED.”^[4]

In finding for the petitioners, the RTC ruled that since the MTC
did not, in its decision, fix the rentals due up to the rendition of the
judgment subject of the petition, it was not necessary for the petitioners to
file a supersedeas bond to stay the execution of judgment. The purpose of a supersedeas bond under
Section 8 of Rule 70 is to assure the plaintiff that the rents, damages and
costs accruing “down to the time of the judgment appealed from” will
be paid in case said plaintiff eventually prevails. Hence, the amount of the bond will depend upon the amount of
rentals or damages fixed in the decision. The decision of the MTC fixed neither the rentals nor the damages. The adjudged amount of P161,478.61
constitutes the totality of the unpaid installments on the downpayment of the
purchase price of the condominium unit, as well as the following charges: parking fees, electric bills, real estate
taxes, telephone charges, association dues and charges for the use of the
airconditioning unit. It does not,
however, include back rentals or the reasonable value for the use of the
condominium unit. Moreover, it rejected
the claim of private respondent that the award could fall under the concept of
damages provided for in Section 8 of the aforesaid Rule 70 because the damages
contemplated therein refer to and cover only the reasonable compensation for
the use and occupation of the premises, generally measured by the fair rental
value of the property, and does not include other kinds of damages such as
unpaid downpayments, association charges, costs of electricity and
airconditioning, real estate taxes, parking dues and the like.

Its motion to reconsider said decision having been denied in the
Order of 7 October 1987, private respondent filed with the Court of Appeals a
petition for certiorari, which was docketed as C.A.-G.R. No. 13060, on 2
November 1987. It alleged therein that
the RTC committed the following errors:

a)  
In holding that herein petitioners were not obliged to file
with the MTC any supersedeas bond to stay execution of said court;

b)  
In giving due course to, and granting the Petition for Certiorari
notwithstanding that appeal is the proper remedy available to them;

c)  
In holding and declaring the orders of the MTC of 27 January
1987 granting the immediate execution of the decision of 9 March 1987 denying
the Motion for Reconsideration, and of 11 March 1987 granting the so-called
ejectment execution as having been issued whimsically, capriciously and without
legal basis; and

d)  
In holding and declaring as null and void the aforesaid orders
and Ejectment Execution, and in ordering the return to the petitioners therein
of the personal properties sold at public auction and to restore them to the
possession of the condominium unit.^[5]

An Answer to said petition was filed in due course by herein
petitioners; consequently, the Court of Appeals rendered the challenged
decision on 5 August 1988, the dispositive portion of which reads:

“WHEREFORE, finding the instant petition meritorious the same
is granted and the decision of respondent court under review dated August 7,
1987 together with all subsequent orders issued thereunder is hereby REVERSED
and SET ASIDE. Another one is, hereby
entered REINSTATING the decision dated October 27, 1986 of the Metropolitan
Trial Court of Manila, Branch 27, in Civil Case No. 111274CV, together with all
subsequent orders issued thereunder. This decision, however, is without prejudice to private respondents, if
they so desire, prosecuting their appeal in the appropriate Regional Trial
Court below. Costs against private
respondents.

SO ORDERED.”^[6]

In ruling for the herein private respondent, the respondent
Court, after noting the special nature of transactions involving condominium
units — where the so-called periodic rental payments for the occupation
thereof constitute partial consideration for the eventual vesting of ownership
of the unit in the occupant-vendee — held that the amount of P161,478.61,
which the petitioners were supposed to pay by virtue of the MTC order,
represents more than just back rentals or the reasonable value for the use and
occupation of the condominium unit; thus, the filing of a supersedeas bond for
at least an equal amount in order to stay the immediate execution of judgment,
pursuant to Section 8 of Rule 70, was necessary. Citing Arcilla vs. Del Rosario,^[7]
it held that the filing of the bond to stay execution is mandatory. It further declared that the petitioners’
remedy is not a petition for certiorari but an ordinary appeal, and
since they had already filed a notice of appeal, they should have prosecuted
it. Also, a petition for certiorari
may not be availed of as a substitute for appeal.^[8]
Moreover, the execution of judgment was a fait accompli. Accordingly, the remedy of restoration may be obtained under Section 5,
Rule 39 of the Rules of Court.

Their motion for the reconsideration of the foregoing decision
having been denied by the respondent Court in its Resolution of 17 October
1988, the petitioners filed the instant petition under Rule 45 of the Rules of
Court. They contend that the respondent
Court erred:

“I

x x x IN HOLDING THAT THE PETITIONERS WERE OBLIGED TO FILE
SUPERSDEAS (sic) BOND TO STAY EXECUTION OF JUDGMENT OF THE INFERIOR COURT
DESPITE THE FACT THAT THE PETITIONERS WERE NOT ADJUDGED TO PAY RENTS OR
DAMAGES.

II

x x x IN EXPANDING THE
MEANING OF THE WORDS ‘RENTS’, ‘DAMAGES’ AND ‘COSTS’ MENTIONED IN SECTION 8,
RULE 70 OF THE REVISED RULES OF COURT TO INCLUDE ‘UNPAID DOWN PAYMENT’,
‘INSTALLMENTS’ AND ‘OTHER CHARGES’ REFERRED TO IN THE DECISION OF THE INFERIOR
COURT.

III

x x x IN HOLDING THAT CERTIORARI IS NOT THE APPROPRIATE
LEGAL REMEDY DESPITE THE FACT THAT THE INFERIOR COURT HAD ALREADY ORDERED
EXECUTION OF THE JUDGMENT RENDERING THE REMEDY OF APPEAL INEFFECTUAL, AND/OR INADEQUATE.

IV

x x x IN HOLDING THAT ORDINARY APPEAL IS THE ONLY APPROPRIATE LEGAL
REMEDY TO EFFECT THE RESTORATION OF SUBJECT PREMISES AND RESTITUTION OF THE
LEVIED PROPERTIES AFTER EXECUTION.

V

x x x IN NOT HOLDING THAT ALTHOUGH THE COMPLAINT IS DENOMINATED AS
ONE FOR ‘EJECTMENT’, IT IS IN REALITY ONE FOR A SUM OF MONEY AND/OR SPECIFIC
PERFORMANCE ARISING FROM EXECUTION OF A CONTRACT TO SELL.

VI

x x x IN NOT HOLDING THAT THE INFERIOR COURT HAS NO JURISDICTION
OVER THE SUBJECT MATTER AS THE CASE IS ONE FOR A SUM OF MONEY AND/OR SPECIFIC
PERFORMANCE AND THE AMOUNT INVOLVED EXCEEDS P20,000.00.

(VII)

EVEN ASSUMING FOR THE SAKE OF ARGUMENT THAT THE CASE IS ONE FOR
EJECTMENT AND NOT FOR A SUM OF MONEY AND/OR SPECIFIC PERFORMANCE, THE DECISION
RENDERED BY THE INFERIOR COURT IS NULL AND VOID BECAUSE IT WAS A JUDGMENT BY
DEFAULT WHICH IS NOT SANCTIONED BY THE RULE ON SUMMARY PROCEDURE.”^[9]

We gave due course to the petition after deliberating on the
private respondent’s Comment to the same, petitioners’ Reply thereto and the
private respondent’s subsequent Rejoinder.

It must at once be stressed that the main decision of the MTC in
Civil Case No. 111274 and the merits of the appeal therefrom are not in issue
in this instant petition. Consequently,
the fifth and sixth assigned errors are either entirely misplaced or adroitly
incorporated to befuddle the real issues and obtain a review of the decision
despite the fact that the petitioners had apparently neglected to further
pursue the remedy of appeal below. For
this reason, too, the dispositive portion of the challenged decision reinstating
the MTC decision is erroneous since the RTC decision did not modify, reverse or
set aside the latter.

The pivotal issue raised is whether or not it was necessary for
the petitioners to file a supersedeas bond in order to stay the execution of
the adverse judgment of the MTC. Corollary, the resolution thereof hinges on the determination of whether
the amount adjudged by the MTC represents rents, damages and costs accruing
down to the time the decision was rendered.

It is the thesis of the petitioners that the amount of
P161,478.61 does not represent back rentals or the reasonable value for the use
of the subject unit, but constitutes the totality of the unpaid downpayment and
installments of the purchase price of the condominium unit, as well as parking
fees, cost of electric consumption, real estate taxes, telephone charges,
association fees and the cost for the use of the building’s airconditioning
units. Hence, no supersedeas bond is
necessary to stay the execution of said judgment. The filing of the notice of appeal was sufficient. In fine, petitioners allege that since
“unpaid downpayment”, “installments” and “other
charges” are not the same as “rent”, “damages” and
“cost”, they do not fall within the purview of Section 8, Rule 70 of
the Revised Rules of Court which provides:

“SEC. 8. Immediate
execution of judgment. How to stay the same. — If judgment is rendered
against the defendant, execution shall issue immediately, unless an appeal has
been perfected and the defendant to stay execution files a sufficient bond,
approved by the justice of the peace or municipal court and executed to the
plaintiff to enter the action in the Court of First Instance and to pay the
rents, damages, and costs accruing down to the time of the judgment appealed
from, and unless, during the pendency of the appeal, he deposits with the
appellate court the amount of rent due from time to time under the contract, if
any, as found by the judgment of the justice of the peace or municipal court to
exist. In the absence of a contract, he
shall deposit with the court the reasonable value of the use and occupation of
the premises for the preceding month or period at the rate determined by the
judgment, on or before the tenth day of each succeeding month or period. The supersedeas bond shall be transmitted by
the justice of the peace or municipal court, with the other papers, to the
clerk of the Court of First Instance to which the action is appealed. x x x”

The term rent needs no further elucidation.

As to damages, We have on several occasions ruled that since the
only issue raised in forcible entry or unlawful detainer cases is that of
rightful physical possession,^[10]
the “damages” recoverable in these cases are those which the
plaintiff could have sustained as a mere possessor, i.e., those caused
by the loss of the use and occupation of the property, and not the damages
which he may have suffered but which have no direct relation to his loss of
material possession.^[11]
Municipal and city courts, therefore, have no jurisdiction to award damages
based on any other ground. Simply put,
“damages” in the context of Section 8 of Rule 70 is limited to
“rent” or “fair rental value” for the use and occupation of
the property.^[12]

The costs mentioned in said Section 8 refer to the costs under
Rule 142 of the Rules of Court which are, with respect to Civil Case No. 111274
(MTC), more specifically covered by Section 9 thereof. As shown earlier, the adjudged amount does
not include such costs.

Petitioners admit that the above amount adjudged by the MTC
includes unpaid downpayments and installments provided under the Contract to
Sell. Clause no. 12 thereof, which was
earlier quoted, evidences the intention of the parties to consider the monthly
installments as the reasonable rent or fair rental value for the use of the
unit. Thus, it therein provides for the
cancellation of the agreement should petitioners fail or refuse to pay the
monthly installments, etc., within thirty (30) days from the different due
dates; said cancellation shall take effect by the mere fact of
non-payment. Thereupon, the contract
shall be considered to have expired and will be deemed as null and void without
the need for any notice to be given to the petitioners or any judicial
declaration to that effect; all sums of money paid under the contract shall
then be forfeited in favor of the private respondent as liquidated damages or,
if the petitioners are already in possession of the property, the
amount forfeited together with the improvements made on the premises, if there
be any, “shall become rentals on the property.” In the body of its decision, the MTC made a
categorical declaration of default and treated the installment payments due as
rentals; in the dispositive portion thereof, it described the adjudged amount
as representing, inter alia, unpaid downpayments and
installments, and further ordered petitioners to pay “such other
amount as may become due from defendants by reason of their continued possession
of the premises.” While
concededly, the latter directive is phrased rather imprecisely, its reference
to the monthly installments provided for under the contract is unmistakable for
these are the very amounts which, in the ordinary course of events, could
become due under the said contract. However, the other charges included therein, itemized in the
Statement of Account^[13]
— namely, airconditioning charges, association dues, parking fees, telephone
charges, real estate taxes, electric bills and penalty charges — cannot be
subsumed under the concept of damages for purposes of the supersedeas bond.

Accordingly, the respondent Court erred in holding that the
supersedeas bond should fully cover the adjudged amount of P161,478.61. Nevertheless, the filing of a supersedeas
bond to cover that portion representing the unpaid downpayments and
installments was necessary to stay the execution of judgment; this is a
mandatory requirement. In short, the
adjudged amount is divisible. So much
thereof that would represent the unpaid downpayment and installments already
due as of the rendition of the decision should be covered by the supersedeas
bond.

In forcible entry and unlawful detainer cases, the execution of
judgment in favor of the plaintiff is a matter of right and mandatory.^[14]
The duty to order the immediate execution is ministerial and imperative;^[15]
it cannot be avoided.^[16]
The only way to stay execution is by perfecting an appeal from the decision and
filing a supersedeas bond, depositing from time to time with the Regional Trial
Court, during the pendency of such appeal, the amounts of rent or the
reasonable value for the use and occupation of the property as fixed by the
court of origin. The reason for this is
to prevent further damages to the plaintiff caused by the loss of his
possession of the property.^[17]
There are, of course, exceptions to this rule, as (a) where delay in the
deposit is due to fraud, accident, mistake or excusable negligence,^[18]
or (b) where supervening events occurring subsequent to the judgment bring
about a material change in the situation of the parties which makes execution
inequitable, or where there is no compelling urgency for the execution because
it is not justified by the prevailing circumstances.^[19]
The first exception also applies to the filing of the supersedeas bond.^[20]
These exceptions are not invoked in this case.

Thus, the MTC did not act without jurisdiction or with grave
abuse of discretion in granting the motion for immediate execution because no
supersedeas bond for that portion of the adjudged amount — which represents
the unpaid downpayment and installments — was filed by the petitioners. On the contrary, it was the court’s
ministerial duty to grant the same. The
respondent Court then correctly reversed the decision of the RTC which
nullified the said MTC order, together with the subsequent related orders, and
set aside the sheriff’s execution sale.

We are, however, unable to agree with the opinion and conclusion
of the respondent Court that the proper remedy to assail the orders of the MTC
is an ordinary appeal and not a petition for certiorari. Under the circumstances obtaining in this
case, the special civil action for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules
of Court could be availed of by the petitioners. They had filed a notice of appeal. The MTC took no action thereon either by denying or giving due
course to the same. In the meantime, a
motion for execution under Section 8, Rule 70 of the Rules of Court was filed
and granted by the MTC; thus, petitioners’ ouster from the premises was
imminent. If the petitioners’ theory —
that a supersedeas bond was not necessary — were correct, then certainly the
MTC, in granting the motion, would have acted without or in excess of jurisdiction
or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction. The appeal earlier interposed cannot then be
said to constitute an adequate remedy to prevent their ouster from the
premises. They cannot be confined or
restricted to the sole remedy of an appeal and, as suggested by the respondent
Court, simply wait for the judgment thereon by the RTC. Under Section 5 of Rule 39, the said court
may issue such orders of restitution as equity and justice may warrant in the
event of a partial or total reversal of the appealed decision. Under such circumstances, the appellate
process would be too slow and the wait too long; it is also evident that such
mode of review would be inadequate and insufficient. It is settled that although the extraordinary writ of certiorari
is not proper when an ordinary appeal is available, it may be granted where it
is shown that the appeal would be inadequate, slow, insufficient and will not
promptly relieve a party from the injurious effects of the order complained of,^[21]
or where appeal is inadequate and ineffectual.^[22]

Prescinding, therefore, from the foregoing discussions, it is
clear that the dispositive portion of the challenged decision of the respondent
Court is correct, except insofar as that portion reinstating the decision of
the MTC is concerned.

WHEREFORE, the Petition is DISMISSED for lack of merit and
the Decision of the respondent Court of Appeals of 5 August 1988 is AFFIRMED
subject to the modification above indicated.

Costs against petitioners.

SO ORDERED.

Gutierrez, Jr., (Chairman), Bidin, Romero, and Melo, JJ., concur.

^[1]
Rollo, 52-66; per Associate Justice Segundino G. Chua, concurred in by
Associate Justices Fidel P. Purisima and Nicolas P. Lapeña, Jr.

^[2]
Represented by co-petitioner Tan Bee Giok.

^[3]
Rollo, 56-57.

^[4]
Rollo, 52.

^[5]
Rollo, 59.

^[6]
Id., 66.

^[7]
74 Phil. 445 [1943].

^[8]
Citing Francisco vs. Caluag, 3 SCRA 694 [1961]; Fernando vs.
Vasquez, 31 SCRA 288 [1970]; Philippine Virginia Tobacco Administration vs.
Lucero, 125 SCRA 337 [1983].

^[9]
Rollo, 153-155.

^[10]
Galgala vs. Benguet Consolidated, Inc., 177 SCRA 288 [1989]; Caparros vs.
Court of Appeals, 170 SCRA 758 [1989]; Dela Cruz vs. Court of Appeals,
133 SCRA 520 [1984]; Alvir vs. Vera, 130 SCRA 357 [1984]; Dalida vs.
Court of Appeals, 117 SCRA 480 [1982] Ortigas and Co., Ltd. Partnership vs.
Court of Appeals, 106 SCRA 121 [1981].

^[11]
Vasquez vs. Garcia, 89 Phil 152 [1951] Santos vs. Santiago, 38
Phil 575 [1918]; De Castro and Morales vs. Justice of the Peace of
Bocaue, 33 Phil 595 [1916]; Veloso vs. Ang Seng Teng, 2 Phil 622 [1903].

^[12]
Shoemart, Inc. vs. Court of Appeals, 190 SCRA 189 [1990]; Felisilda vs.
Villanueva, 139. SCRA 431 [1985]; Baens vs. Court of Appeals, 125 SCRA
634 [1983]; Reyes vs. Court of Appeals, 38 SCRA 138 [1971].

^[13]
Original Records, Civil Case No. 87-39946, 21-25.

^[14]
Arcilla vs. Del Rosario; supra.; Quimpo vs. Dela
Victoria, 46 SCRA 139 [1972].

^[15]
Philippine Holding Corp. vs. Valenzuela, 104 SCRA 401 [1981].

^[16]
Sumintac vs. Court of First Instance of Rizal, 71 Phil. 445 [1941].

^[17]
Balagtas Realty Corp. vs. Romillo, 114 SCRA 28 [1982]; Ng Lit vs.
Llamas, 118 SCRA 215 [1982]; Salinas vs. Navarro, 126 SCRA 167 [1983];
Patalinghug vs. Court of Appeals, 137 SCRA 487 [1985].

^[18]
Zamora vs. Dinglasan, 77 Phil. 46 [1946]; Cunaan vs. Rodas, 78
Phil. 800 [1947]; Ng Lit vs. Llamas, supra.

^[19]
Laurel vs. Abalos, 30 SCRA 281 [1969].

^[20]
De Laureano vs. Adil, 72 SCRA 148 [1976]; Philippine Holding Corp. vs.
Valenzuela, supra.

^[21]
St. Peter Memorial Park vs. Campos, 63 SCRA 180 [1975].

^[22]
Romero vs. Court of Appeals, 40 SCRA 172 [1971].