PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE, VS. BIENVENIDO LEOPARTE, ALIAS “EMBEN,” ACCUSED-APPELLANT.

This is an appeal from the decision of the Regional Trial Court
of Lucena, Branch 60, convicting accused-appellant Bienvenido Leoparte, alias “Emben,” of the complex crime of forcible abduction
with rape and imposing on him the penalty of reclusion perpetua and the indemnification of the offended
party in the sum of P30,000.00.^[1]

Taking an atypical but laudable stand in this case, the Solicitor
General, in lieu of an appellee’s brief, filed a
manifestation and motion recommending the acquittal of appellant since his
guilt had not been established beyond reasonable doubt.  Rare though such instances may be, it is
tangible proof that said government counsel, although tasked with representing
the prosecution against an appeal from a judgment of conviction, yields in
proper cases to the paramount consideration that while
guilt should not escape, innocence must not suffer.  Our task then is to subject this case to a
painstaking review to ascertain the validity of the now joint submission of the
prosecution and the defense.

Appellant was charged with abduction with rape in an information which reads as follows:

“The undersigned upon complaint filed by the offended party, Marinel Idea, accuses Bienvenido Leoparte alias Emben (prisoner)
of the crime of forcible abduction with rape, committed as follows:

“That on or about the 16th day of September 1985, at Padre
Burgos, Province of Quezon,  Philippines and within the jurisdiction of
this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, armed with a deadly weapon,
moved by lewd design, did then and there willfully, unlawfully, feloniously and
forcibly abduct the complainant Marinel Idea, against
her will and consent by taking and carrying her away from her home and bringing
her, thereafter, to different places where said accused, by means of force,
threats and intimidation, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and
feloniously had (sic) carnal knowledge several times with the said Marinel Idea against her will and consent.” ^[2]

Appellee narrates that the prosecution
presented Marinel Idea, the alleged offended party,
who testified^[3]
that on September 16, 1985, at about 7:00 P.M. more or less, she was returning
home by the railroad tracks from the house of her brother which was about two
(2) kilometers away, when appellant suddenly pulled her by the right arm
threatening that if she should shout, he would kill her.  Appellant then allegedly succeeded in having
sexual intercourse with her at the nearby banana plantation.  She declared that appellant first fondled the
different parts of her body, more particularly her bust, and kissed her several
times.  Then he opened her thighs,
inserted his fingers and later, his penis inside her vagina.  She allegedly resisted the appellant, but the
latter threatened to kill her with a pointed weapon if she would not surrender
herself to him.

After the alleged assault on her honor, appellant brought her to
the house of his sister, arriving there at around 8:00
P.M. Appellant’s sister, his nephews and nieces were present.  There, appellant had carnal knowledge of her
three times, despite her resistance and her telling appellant not to do it
because she was getting married to another man. 
However, appellant allegedly boxed her in the thigh and again threatened
to kill her if she would not submit to his wishes.

The following day, September
17, 1985, at about 7:00 A.M.,
they left the house of appellant’s sister and proceeded to the house of
appellant’s uncle, Vicente Liwag, located at Barangay Marao, Padre Burgos, Quezon.  Appellant introduced her to his uncle, to the
latter’s wife and to their children telling them that she and appellant had
eloped.  She allegedly denied what
appellant said, but his uncle did not believe her.  They remained in the house of appellant’s
uncle for two days.  During the night,
they slept in a separate house which was also owned by appellant’s uncle and
built just beside the latter’s residence. 
There, she was allegedly sexually abused by appellant three (3) more
times at 8:00 P.M., 9:00 P.M. and,
finally, at 10:00 P.M.

Leaving the residence of appellant’s uncle, appellant and the
offended party proceeded to the house of appellant’s father, where appellant
himself resided.  Appellant’s parents,
his brothers and sisters were there. 
Appellant announced to his family that she eloped with him, but she
allegedly told them to bring her home because her own mother, brothers and
sisters must be looking for her.  There,
she was once again allegedly abused by appellant in a room on the third floor.  The following day, her parents, accompanied
by Philippine Constabulary soldiers, arrived and took her away and appellant
was arrested.

Thereafter, Marinel Idea went to the
municipal hall and talked to a certain
Commander Aris of the Burgos Police Station, who told
her to see a doctor.  She consulted Dr. Umali of the Padre
Burgos Hospital.  She then returned to Commander Aris to consult another physician at the Quezon Memorial
Hospital, which she did.  She also gave a copy of the examination
results to Commander Aris.  Thereafter, she was investigated by Commander
Aris, which investigation was reduced into writing
and was marked in court as Exhibit “A.”

Appellant, on the other hand, adduced evidence materially
contradicting the prosecution’s allegation of abduction with rape and intended
to establish that appellant and Marinel Idea were lovers and that they agreed to elope that night of September 16, 1985.  Hence, it is claimed complainant’s going with
appellant and the sexual relations between them were voluntary.^[4]

The defense also presented as a witness one Pastor Opo, Barangay Captain of Barangay Marao, who testified
that the accused together with the offended party went to his house and
informed him that they eloped and intended to get married, so he told
appellant’s mother to attend to the matter so that the two could get married.^[5]

On August 29, 1988,
as stated at the outset, a judgment of conviction was rendered by the court
below.  Appellant is now before us,
seeking the reversal of said decision on the following assignment of errors:

“I

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN TAKING JUDICIAL NOTICE OF THE COMPLAINT
FILED BY MARINEL IDEA AND HER MOTHER WHICH ACCORDING TO THE TRIAL COURT IS
FOUND IN THE RECORDS OF THE PROVINCIAL FISCAL;

“II

THE TRIAL COURT, NOR ANY COURT FOR THAT MATTER, DID NOT ACQUIRE
JURISDICTION TO TAKE COGNIZANCE OF THIS CASE; and

“III

THE PROSECUTION MISERABLY FAILED TO PROVE THE GUILT OF THE ACCUSED
BEYOND A REASONABLE DOUBT.”^[6]

The first and second assignment of errors are
palpably without merit.  The complaint by
the offended party provided for in Article 344 of the Revised Penal Code does
not determine the jurisdiction of the courts over crimes against chastity but
is only a condition precedent for the exercise by the proper authorities of the
power to prosecute.^[7]

The same not being jurisdictional, the failure of appellant to
raise said issue at the trial court barred him from raising said issue on
appeal, in consonance with Rule 117 of the Rules of Court, which reads:

“Sec. 8.  Failure to move to quash or to allege any
ground therefor. 
– The failure of the accused to assert any ground of a motion to quash before he pleads to
the complaint or information, either because he did not file a motion to quash
or failed to allege the same in said motion, shall be deemed a waiver of the
grounds of a motion to quash, except the grounds of no offense charged, lack of
jurisdiction over the offense charged, extinction of the offense or penalty and
jeopardy, as provided for in paragraphs (a), (b), (f) and (h) of Section 3 of
this Rule.”

Article 344 was not enacted for the specific purpose of
benefiting the accused.  When it is said
that the requirement in Article 344 that a complaint of the offended party or
her relatives is jurisdictional, what is meant is that it is the complaint that
starts the prosecutory proceeding.  It is not the complaint which confers
jurisdiction on the court to try the case. 
The court’s jurisdiction is vested in it by the Judiciary Law.^[8]
Such condition has been imposed out of consideration for the offended woman and
her family who might prefer to suffer the outrage in silence rather than go through with the scandal of a
public trial.^[9]

The overriding consideration in determining the issue of whether
or not the condition precedent prescribed in Article 344 has been complied with
is the intent of the aggrieved party to seek judicial redress for the affront
committed.^[10]
In the case at bar, the active cooperation of the offended party in the
prosecution of the case, as witness, clearly indicates said intent.  Moreover, the information filed by the fiscal
specifically states that the same was instituted upon the complaint of the
offended party.

On the third assignment of error, appellant contends that he is
entitled to an acquittal.  We agree.

In view of the severity of the penalties for the offense of rape,
the judiciary must take extreme care to avoid an injustice to the accused.  If a reasonable doubt exists, the verdict must be one of acquittal.  Rape is an accusation easy to make, hard to
prove, but harder to defend by the accused, though innocent.  The evidence for the prosecution must be
clear and convincing to overcome the constitutional presumption of
innocence.  Rape is an offense to which,
as is often the case, only two people can testify, thus requiring the most
conscientious effort on the part of the arbiter to weigh and appraise the
conflicting testimonies.  If a reasonable doubt exists, the verdict
must be one of acquittal.^[11]

In the case at bar, the evidence for the People is undeniably
insufficient to sustain a conviction. 
The uncorroborated, vacillating and inherently improbable testimony of
the offended party has itself created doubts as to the guilt of the
accused.  For one, it failed to establish
the presence of violence or intimidation which is the common element of the component offenses charged
here as a complex crime.  A number of
circumstances, culled from the testimony of the offended party, belies her claim that she was forcibly abducted and raped by
appellant.

Graphic illustrations thereof are found in the following
observations of the Solicitor General which we quote with approval:

“1.     From September 16, 1985 to September 20, 1990 appellant and
complainant transferred from one house to another.  They travelled by
the road, in broad daylight at that, meeting several people on the way.  Complainant, therefore, had more than ample
opportunity to seek the help of other people and free herself from appellant if
indeed she was abducted and abused by the latter.  She met several members of appellant’s family
and relatives.  At least one of them
could have disfavored the alleged abduction and could have helped complainant
had there been any perceivable indication of resistance on her part.  On the contrary, the allegation of
appellant’s sister that she suggested to bring complainant home because she
knew complainant’s mother, but yet complainant refused as she would rather be
with appellant.  This assertion of
appellant’s sister on the witness stand remains unrebutted.

“2.     Significantly, the
house of appellant’s sister where she and appellant spent the night after the
first sexual intercourse by the banana plantation is just a stone’s throw away
from the P.C. Detachment (tsn Leoparte,
November 18, 1987, p.
11).  Right there and then, complainant
could have readily sought the help of the P.C. authorities if she wanted
to.  That she did not only points to the inevitable conclusion that indeed she eloped
with appellant.

“3.     Per complainant’s own
testimony, the first in the series of sexual encounters between her and
appellant occurred at the banana plantation around 7:00 p.m. of September
16, 1985.  The details of
this first sexual intercourse
were revealed during the cross-examination. 
The banana plantation adverted to is about 2 kilometers away from the
railroad track where allegedly appellant first accosted complainant (tsn Idea, September 18, I986, p. 30).  There, while she was sitting down in a
squatting position, appellant started to remove her clothings:  first her maong
shorts, then her panty, the blouse, and the skirt (Ibid, Nov. 27, 1986, p. 16), and appellant also removed her
brassiere.  While appellant was engaged
in the ceremony of removing all her clothings and
underwear (according to complainant she was wearing several clothings
and underwears one after the other), he was kissing
her on the cheeks (Ibid, p. 10).  Then
appellant transferred towards her back in order to loosen and remove her
bra.  From behind appellant continued
kissing her on the lips and cheeks, at the same time caressing her nipples with
his left and right hands (Ibid, p. 13). 
Later, when both of them were totally naked, appellant made her lie down
on a banana leaf which appellant had earlier prepared as cover (Ibid, p.
18).  And the sexual act was consummated.

“This vivid description coming as it does from complainant
herself of the preliminaries and the sexual union itself between her and
appellant cannot be anything else but a
manifestation of a mutual passion and longing for each other.  Certainly, the foregoing circumstances belie
any pretense on the part of the complainant that she offered resistance
thereto.  On the contrary complainant’s
testimony is pure and simple lovemaking, immoral though it may be, yet still
lovemaking in the true sense of the art. 
For, a rapist, whose only objective at the moment is the satisfaction of
his lust, would not understandably have the time much less the concern to
remove all of his victim’s clothing, including his own, and indulge in the
sexual act preceded as it was by such intimate and elaborate foreplay.  That the sexual union was consummated when
appellant and complainant were in total nakedness, appellant having removed
complainant’s dress and underwear with such ease, only signifies that she was a
willing partner to the love tryst.  In
fact, complainant while describing the sexual intercourse,
never mentioned on her own initiative any form of resistance from her.  For that matter, the resistance she claims to
have employed, albeit weakly, was only in response to the question of counsel,
aware perhaps that without resistance the complaint for rape against appellant
is doomed.  Worse still is the reason
advanced by complainant for resisting the sexual act.  She allegedly resisted appellant not because
she does not like it but simply because she was already getting married to
another man.

“In the same vein, the subsequent sexual intercourses between
complainant and appellant in a house of the latter’s uncle, where only the two
of them stayed for two nights, and in appellant’s own house, were no less than
part of their pre-marital honeymoon. 
They indulged in the sexual activity while being completely naked and
with such frequency and regularity.  No
resistance ever came from complainant except the lame allegation that she was getting married to another man.

“4.     As complainant’s
theory of abduction with rape crumbles, appellant’s claim that they eloped
because they are sweetheart gains more solid grounds.  Complainant admitted that the various woman’s
dresses and underthings in appellant’s possession
were hers.  However, she failed to
explain why they were all in appellant’s possession.  The only logical explanation is that which
was offered by appellant.  That when he
and complainant met on the night of September
16, 1985, she was carrying with her some clothes, aside from what
she was wearing.  Here again the physical
facts of the case belie any claim of abduction. 
For when a woman leaves her own house with some extra clothes with her,
the theory of elopement is more credible than the allegation of abduction.

“5.     Appellant’s claim that
he and complainant eloped because they were lovers is further fortified by the unrebutted testimony of Pastor Opo,
the Barangay Captain, who categorically stated that
appellant and complainant appeared before him seeking his help so that they
could be married.  He even reduced their
statements into writing and let them sign it. 
The prosecution’s inability to present evidence to rebut this damaging
allegation only proves that the charge of abduction with rape is more imaginary
than real.

“6.     Finally, it is
intriguing how complainant’s parents and the P.C. authorities were able to
trace that she was with
appellant.  Her parents must have had some
idea of the blooming love affair between her and appellant such that when she
disappeared her parents knew right away where to locate her.  It can, therefore, be safely assumed, without
fear of contradiction that the criminal case against the appellant was
initiated by the family of the complainant and the latter was only freed to sustain
the same.” ^[12]

The recital of the foregoing circumstances, taken not only from
the defense evidence but from that of the prosecution itself, cannot but
support the claim of appellant that the offended party went with him
voluntarily and that their sexual relations thereafter were with their mutual
consent.  We are accordingly convinced
that, as prayed for by appellant and recommended by the Solicitor General, a
verdict of not guilty should be handed down in this case.

WHEREFORE, the
judgment of the trial court is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE and accused-appellant Bienvenido Leoparte is ACQUITTED
of the crime charged, with costs de oficio.  His immediate release from confinement is
hereby ordered, unless he is being held on other legal grounds.

SO ORDERED.

Melencio-Herrera, (Chairman), Paras, Padilla, and Sarmiento, JJ., concur.

^[1]
Penned by Judge Eriberto U.
Rosario, Jr.; Rollo, 28-37.

^[2]
Rollo, 4.

^[3]
Ibid., 86-89.

^[4]
Ibid., 89-91.

^[5]
Ibid., 92.

^[6]
Ibid., 52.

^[7]
People vs. Tañada, etc., 166
SCRA 360 (1988); People vs. Bugtong, 169 SCRA
797 (1989).

^[8]
People vs. Babasa, etc., 97
SCRA 672 (1980).

^[9]
Samilin vs.
Court of First Instance of Pangasinan, 57 Phil. 298
(1932); Valdepeñas vs. People, 16 SCRA 871
(1966).

^[10]
People vs. Ilarde, etc., et
al., 125 SCRA 11 (1983).

^[11]
People vs. Cabading, G.R. No. 74352, June 6, 1989.

^[12]
Rollo, 98-104.