SOCIAL SECURITY SYSTEM EMPLOYEES ASSOCIATION (SSSEA), DIONISIO T. BAYLON, RAMON MODESTO, JUANITO MADURA, REUBEN ZAMORA, VIRGILIO DE ALDAY, SERGIO ARANTE, PLACIDO AGUSTIN, VIRGIL…

Primarily, the issue
raised in this petition is whether or not the Regional Trial Court can enjoin
the Social Security System Employees Association (SSSEA) from striking and
order the striking employees to return to work. 
Collaterally, it is whether or not employees of the Social Security
System (SSS) have the right to strike.

The antecedents are as
follows:

On June 11, 1987, the SSS filed with the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City a complaint
for damages with a prayer for a writ of preliminary injunction
against petitioners, alleging that on June 9, 1987, the officers and members of
SSSEA staged an illegal strike and barricaded the entrances to the SSS Building, preventing non-striking
employees from reporting for work and SSS
members from transacting business with the SSS; that the strike was reported to the Public
Sector Labor-Management Council, which ordered the strikers to return to work;
that the strikers refused to return to work; and that the SSS suffered damages as a result of the strike.  The complaint prayed that a writ of
preliminary injunction be issued to enjoin the strike and that the strikers be ordered to return to work; that the defendants
(petitioners herein) be ordered to pay
damages; and that the strike be declared illegal.

It appears that the SSSEA went on strike after the SSS failed to act on the union’s
demands, which included:  implementation
of the provisions of the old SSS-SSSEA collective bargaining agreement (CBA) on
check-off of union dues; payment of accrued overtime pay, night differential
pay and holiday pay; conversion of temporary or contractual employees with six (6) months or more of service into
regular and permanent employees and their entitlement to the same salaries,
allowances and benefits given to other regular employees of the SSS; and payment of the children’s
allowance of P30.00, and after the SSS deducted certain amounts from the
salaries of the employees and allegedly committed acts of discrimination and
unfair labor practice’s [Rollo; pp. 21-24.]

The court a quo,
on June 11, 1987,
issued a temporary restraining order pending resolution of the application for a writ of preliminary injunction [Rollo, p. 71.]
In the meantime, petitioners filed a motion to dismiss alleging the trial
court’s lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter [Rollo, pp. 72-82.] To this motion, the SSS
filed an opposition, reiterating its prayer for the issuance of a writ of
injunction [Rollo, pp. 209-222.] On July 22, 1987, in a four-page order, the court a quo denied the motion to dismiss and converted
the restraining order into an injunction upon posting of a bond, after
finding that the strike was illegal [Rollo, pp.
83-86.] As petitioners’ motion
for the reconsideration of the aforesaid order was also denied on August 14, 1988 [Rollo, p.
94], petitioners filed a petition
for certiorari and prohibition
with preliminary injunction before this Court.  Their petition was docketed as G.R. No.
79577.  In a resolution dated October
21, 1987, the Court, through the Third Division, resolved to refer
the case to the Court of Appeals. 
Petitioners filed a motion
for reconsideration thereof, but during its pendency
the Court of Appeals on March 9, 1988
promulgated its decision on the referred case [Rollo, pp. 130-137.] Petitioners moved to
recall the Court of Appeals’ decision. 
In the meantime, the Court, on June 29, 1988 denied the motion for reconsideration in
G.R. No. 79577 for being moot and academic. 
Petitioners’ motion to recall the decision of the Court of Appeals was also denied in view of this Court’s denial of the motion for reconsideration [Rollo, pp. 141-143.]
Hence, the instant petition to review the decision of the Court of Appeals [Rollo, pp. 12-37.]

Upon motion of the SSS on
February 6, 1989, the Court
issued a temporary restraining
order enjoining the petitioners from staging another strike or from pursuing
the notice of strike they filed with the Department of Labor and Employment on January 25, 1989 and to maintain the status quo [Rollo, pp.
151-152.]

The Court, taking the
comment as answer, and noting the reply and supplemental
reply filed by petitioners, considered the issues joined and the case submitted
for decision.

The position of the petitioners is that the Regional Trial Court
had no jurisdiction to hear the case initiated by the SSS and to issue the
restraining order and the writ of
preliminary injunction, as jurisdiction lay with the Department of Labor
and Employment or the National Labor Relations Commission, since the case
involves a labor dispute.

On the other hand, the SSS
advances the contrary view, on the ground that the employees of the SSS
are covered by civil service laws and rules and regulations, not the Labor Code, therefore they do not have the right to strike.  Since neither the DOLE nor the NLRC has
jurisdiction over the dispute, the Regional Trial Court may enjoin the
employees from striking.

In dismissing the
petition for certiorari and prohibition with preliminary injunction
filed by petitioners, the Court of Appeals held that since the employees of the
SSS, are government employees, they are not allowed to strike, and may be
enjoined by the Regional Trial Court, which had jurisdiction over the SSS’
complaint for damages, from continuing with their strike.

Thus, the sequential
questions to be resolved by the Court in deciding whether or not the Court of
Appeals erred in finding that the Regional Trial Court did not act without or in excess of jurisdiction when it took cognizance of the case and enjoined
the strike are as follows:

1. Do the employees of the SSS have the right to strike?

2. Does the Regional Trial
Court have jurisdiction to hear the case initiated by the SSS and to enjoin the
strikers from continuing with the strike  and to order them to return to work?

These shall be discussed
and resolved seriatim.

I

The 1987 Constitution, in
the Article on Social Justice and Human Rights, provides that the State
“shall guarantee the rights of all workers to self-organization,
collective bargaining and negotiations, and peaceful concerted activities,
including the right to strike in accordance
with law” [Art. XIII, Sec. 3.]

By itself, this provision
would seem to recognize the right of all workers and employees, including those
in the public sector, to strike.  But the
Constitution itself fails to expressly confirm this impression, for in the
Sub-Article on the Civil Service Commission, it provides, after defining the
scope of the civil service as “all branches, subdivisions,
instrumentalities, and agencies of the Government, including
government-owned or controlled corporations with original charters,” that
“[t]he right to self-organization shall not be denied to government employees” [Art. IX(B),
Sec. 2(1) and (5).] Parenthetically, the Bill of Rights also provides that
“[t]he right of the people, including those employed in the public and
private sectors, to form unions, associations, or societies for purposes not
contrary to law shall not abridged” [Art. III, Sec. 8.] Thus, while there
is no question that the Constitution recognizes the
right of government employees to organize, it is silent as to whether such
recognition also includes the right to strike.

Resort to the intent of
the framers of the organic law becomes helpful in understanding the meaning of
these provisions.  A reading of the
proceedings of the Constitutional Commission that drafted the 1987 Constitution
would show that in recognizing the right of government employees to organize,
the commissioners intended to limit the right to the formation of unions or
associations only, without including the right to strike.

Thus, Commissioner Eulogio R. Lerum, one of the
sponsors of the provision that “[t]he right to self?organization
shall not be denied to government employees” [Art. IX(B),
Sec. 2(5)], in answer to the apprehensions expressed by Commissioner Ambrosio B. Padilla, Vice?President of the Commission,
explained:

MR. LERUM. I think what I will try to
say will not take that long.  When we
proposed this amendment providing for self-organization of government
employees, it does not mean that
because they have the right to organize, they also have the right to
strike.  That is a different matter.  We are only talking about organizing, uniting
as a union.  With regard to the right to strike, everyone
will remember that in the Bill of Rights, there is a provision that the right to form associations
or societies whose purpose is not
contrary to law shall not be abridged. 
Now then, if the purpose of the state is to prohibit the strikes coming
from employees exercising government functions, that could be done because the
moment that is prohibited, then the union which will go on strike will be an
illegal union.  And that provision is
carried in Republic Act 875.  In Republic Act 875, workers, including those from the government-owned
and controlled, are allowed to organize but they are prohibited from striking.  So, the fear of our honorable a Vice-President is unfounded.  It does not mean that because we approve this
resolution, it carries with it the right to strike.  That is a different matter.  As a matter
of fact, that subject is now being
discussed in the Committee on Social Justice because we are trying to find a
solution to this problem.  We know that this problem exists; that the
moment we allow anybody in the government to strike, then what will happen if
the members of the Armed Forces
will go on strike?  What will happen to
those people trying to protect us?  So
that is a matter of discussion in the Committee on Social Justice.  But, I repeat, the right to form an
organization does not carry
with it the right to strike.  [Record of the Constitutional Commission, vol. I, p. 569.]

It will be recalled that the Industrial Peace Act (R.A. No. 875), which was repealed by the Labor Code (P.D. 442) in 1974,
expressly banned strikes by employees in the Government, including
instrumentalities exercising governmental functions, but excluding entities
entrusted with proprietary functions:

Sec. 11. 
Prohibition Against Strikes
in the Government. 
– The terms and conditions of employment in the Government, including
any political subdivision or instrumentality thereof, are governed by law and
it is declared to be the policy of this Act that employees therein shall not strike for the purpose of securing changes
or modification in their terms and conditions of employment.  Such employees may belong to any labor organization
which does not impose the obligation to strike or to join in strike:  Provided, however, That this section shall apply only to employees employed
in governmental functions and not those employed in proprietary functions of
the Government including but not limited to governmental corporations.

No similar provision
found in the Labor Code, although at one time it recognized the right of
employees of government corporations established under the Corporation Code
to organize and bargain collectively and those in the civil service to
“form organizations for purposes
not contrary to law” [Art. 244, before its amendment by B.P. Blg. 70 in 1980], in the same breath it provided that
“[t]he terms and conditions of employment of all government employees,
including employees of government owned and controlled corporations, shall be
governed by the Civil Service Law,
rules and regulations” [now Art. 276.] Understandably,
the Labor Code is silent as to whether or not government employees
may strike, for such are excluded from its coverage [Ibid.] But then the
Civil Service Decree [P.D. No. 807], is equally silent on the matter.

On June 1,
1987, to implement
the constitutional guarantee of the right of government employees to organize,
the President issued E.O. No. 180 which provides guidelines for the exercise of
the right to organize of government employees. 
In Section 14 thereof, it is provided that “[t]he Civil Service law
and rules governing concerted activities and strikes in the government service
shall be observed, subject to any legislation that may be enacted by
Congress.” The President was apparently referring to Memorandum Circular
No. 6, s. 1987 of the Civil Service Commission under date April 21, 1987 which,
“prior to the enactment by Congress of applicable laws concerning strike by
government employees . . . enjoins under pain of administrative sanctions, all
government officers and employees from staging
strikes, demonstrations, mass leaves, walk-outs and other forms of mass action
which will result in temporary stoppage or disruption of public service.” The air was thus cleared of the
confusion.  At present, in the absence of
any legislation allowing government employees to strike, recognizing their
right to do so, or regulating the exercise of the right, they are prohibited
from striking, by express provision of Memorandum Circular No. 6 and as implied in E.O. No. 180.  [At this
juncture, it must be stated that the validity of Memorandum Circular No. 6 is
not at issue.]

But are employees of the SSS covered by the prohibition against strikes?

The Court is of the
considered view that they are. 
Considering that under the 1987 Constitution “[t]he civil  service embraces all    branches, subdivisions, instrumentalities, and agencies of the
Government, including government-owned or controlled corporations with original
charters” [Art. IX(B), Sec. 2(1); see also Sec. 1 of E.O. No. 180 where the employees in the civil service
are denominated as “government employees”] and that the SSS is one
such government-controlled corporation with an original charter, having been
created under R.A. No. 1161, its employees are part of the civil service
[NASECO v. NLRC, G.R. Nos. 69870 & 70295, November 24, 1988] and are
covered by the Civil Service Commission’s memorandum prohibiting strikes.  This being the case, the strike staged by the
employees of the SSS was illegal.

The statement of the
Court in Alliance of Government Workers v.
Minister of Labor and Employment [G.R. No. 60403, August 3, 1983, 124 SCRA 1] is
relevant as it furnishes the rationale for distinguishing between workers in
the private sector and government employees with regard to the right to strike:

The general rule in the past and up to the present is that
“the terms and conditions of employment in the Government, including any
political subdivision or instrumentality thereof
are governed by law” (Section 11, the Industrial Peace Act, R.A. No. 875, as amended and Article 277, the Labor Code, P.D. No. 442, as amended).  Since the terms and conditions of government employment are fixed by
law, government workers cannot
use the same weapons
employed by workers in the private sector to secure concessions from their
employers.  The principle behind labor unionism in private
industry is that industrial peace cannot be secured through compulsion by
law.  Relations between private employers
and their employees rest on an essentially voluntary basis.  Subject to the minimum requirements of wage laws and other labor and welfare
legislation, the terms and conditions of employment in the unionized private
sector are settled through the process of collective bargaining.  In government employment, however, it is the
legislature and, where properly given delegated power, the administrative heads
of government which fix the terms and conditions of employment.  And this is effected
through statutes or administrative circulars, rules, and regulations, not
through collective bargaining agreements. 
[At p. 13; underscoring supplied.]

Apropos is the
observation of the Acting Commissioner of Civil Service, in his position paper
submitted to the 1971 Constitutional Convention, and quoted with approval by
the Court in Alliance,
to wit:

It is the stand, therefore, of this Commission that by reason of
the nature of the public employer and the peculiar character of the public
service, it must necessarily regard the right to strike given to unions in
private industry as not applying to public employees and civil service
employees.  It has been stated that the Government, in contrast to the private
employer, protects the interest of all people in the public service, and that
accordingly, such conflicting interests as are present in private labor
relations could not exist in the
relations between government and those whom they employ.  [At pp. 16-17; also quoted in National
Housing Corporation v. Juco, G.R. No. 64313, January
17, 1985, 134 SCRA 172, 178-179.]

E.O. No. 180, which
provides guidelines for the exercise of the right to organize of government
employees, while clinging to the same philosophy, has, however, relaxed the
rule to allow negotiation where the terms and conditions of employment involved
are not among those fixed by law.  Thus:

SECTION 13.  Terms and conditions of employment or improvements
thereof, except those that are fixed by law, may be the subject of negotiations
between duly recognized employees’ organizations and appropriate government
authorities.

The same executive order has also provided for the general mechanism for the settlement of labor
disputes in the public sector, to wit:

SECTION 16.  The Civil Service and labor laws and
procedures, whenever applicable, shall be followed in the resolution of
complaints, grievances and cases involving
government employees.  In case any
dispute remains unresolved after exhausting all the available remedies under
existing laws and procedures, the parties may jointly refer the dispute to the [Public Sector
Labor-Management] Council for appropriate action.

 Government employees may, therefore, through their unions or associations, either petition the
Congress for the betterment of the terms
and conditions of employment
which are within the ambit of legislation or negotiate with the appropriate
government agencies for the improvement of those which are not fixed by
law. 
If there be any
unresolved grievances, the dispute may be referred to the Public Sector
Labor-Management Council for appropriate action.  But employees in the civil service may not
resort to strikes, walkouts and other temporary work stoppages, like workers in
the private sector, to pressure the Government to accede to their demands.  As now provided under Sec. 4, Rule III of the
Rules and Regulations to Govern the Exercise of the Right of
Government-Employees to Self-Organization, which took effect after the instant
dispute arose, “[t]he terms and conditions of employment in the
government, including any political subdivision or instrumentality thereof and
government-owned and controlled corporations with original charters are
governed by law and employees therein shall not strike for the purpose of
securing changes thereof.”

II

The strike staged by the
employees of the SSS belonging to petitioner union being prohibited by law, an
injunction may be issued to restrain it.

It is futile for the
petitioners to assert that the the subject labor
dispute falls within the exclusive jurisdiction of the NLRC and, hence, the Regional Trial Court had
no jurisdiction to issue a writ of injunction enjoining the continuance
of the strike.  The Labor Code itself
provides that terms and conditions of employment of government employees shall
be governed by the Civil Service Law, rules and regulations [Art. 276.] More
importantly, E.O. No. 180 vests the Public Sector Labor-Management Council with
jurisdiction over unresolved labor disputes involving government employees
[Sec. 16.] Clearly, the NLRC has no jurisdiction over the dispute.

This being the case, the
Regional Trial Court was not precluded, in the exercise of its general
jurisdiction under B.P. Blg. 129, as amended, from
assuming jurisdiction over the SSS’s complaint for
damages and issuing the injunctive writ prayed for therein.  Unlike
the NLRC, the Public Sector
Labor-Management Council has not been granted by law authority to issue
writs of injunction in labor disputes within its
jurisdiction.  Thus, since it is the Council, and not the NLRC, that has
jurisdiction over the instant labor dispute, resort to the general courts of
law for the issuance of a writ of injunction to enjoin the strike is appropriate.

 Neither
could the court a quo be
accused of imprudence or overzealousness, for in fact it had proceeded with caution. 
Thus, after issuing a writ of injunction enjoining the continuance of the strike to prevent any further disruption of public
service, the respondent judge, in
the same order, admonished the
parties to refer the unresolved
controversies emanating from their employer-employee relationship to the Public
Sector Labor-Management Council for appropriate action [Rollo,
p. 86.]

III

In their
“Petition/Application for Preliminary and Mandatory Injunction,” and
reiterated in their reply and supplemental reply, petitioners allege that the SSS unlawfully withheld bonuses and benefits due the individual petitioners
and they pray that the Court issue a
writ of preliminary prohibitive
and mandatory injunction to restrain the SSS and its agents from withholding
payment thereof and to compel the SSS to pay them.  In their supplemental reply, petitioners
annexed an order of the Civil Service Commission, dated May 5, 1989, which
ruled that the officers of the SSSEA who are not preventively suspended and who
are reporting for work pending the resolution of the
administrative cases against them are entitled to their salaries, year-end
bonuses and other fringe benefits and affirmed the previous order of the Merit
Systems Promotion Board.

The matter being
extraneous to the issues elevated to this Court, it is Our
view that petitioners’ remedy is not to petition this Court to issue an
injunction, but to cause the execution of the aforesaid order, if it has
already become final.

WHEREFORE, no
reversible error having been
committed by the Court of Appeals, the instant petition for review is hereby
DENIED and the decision of the
appellate court dated March 9, 1988
in CA-G.R. SP No. 13192 is AFFIRMED.  Petitioners’ ”Petition/Application for
Preliminary and Mandatory Injunction” dated December 13, 1988 is DENIED.

SO ORDERED.

Fernan, C.J., Gutierrez, Jr.,
Feliciano, and Bidin,
JJ., concur.