WEST COAST LIFE INSURANCE CO., PLAINTIFF, VS. GEO. N. HURD, JUDGE OF COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE, DEFENDANT.

This is an action for the issuance of a writ of prohibition against the
defendant “commanding the defendant to desist or refrain from further
proceedings in a criminal action pending in that court.”

The petitioner is a foreign life-insurance corporation, duly organized under
and by virtue of the laws of the State of California, doing business regularly
and legally in the Philippine Islands pursuant to its laws.

On the 16th of December, 19i2, the assistant prosecuting attorney of the city
of Manila filed an information in a criminal action in the Court of First
Instance of that city against the plaintiff, said corporation, and also against
John Northcott and Manuel C. Grey, charging said corporation and said
individuals with the crime of libel. On the 17th day of December the defendant
in his official capacity as judge of the Court of First Instance signed and
issued a process directed to the plaintiff and the other accused in said
criminal action, which said process reads as follows:

	“UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
	“PHILIPPINE ISLANDS.
	“In the Court of First Instance of the Judicial District of Manila.
		“THE UNITED STATES
			“versus	‘No. 9661.
	“WEST COAST LIFE INSURANCE CO., JOHN			“Libel.
		NORTHCOTT, AND MANUEL C. GREY.
	“To West Coast Life Insurance Co., John Northcott, and Manuel C. Grey, Manila.

“SUMMONS.

“You are hereby summoned to appear before the Court of First Instance of the
city of Manila, P. I., on the 18th day of December, 1912, at the hour of 8 a.
m., to answer the charge made against you upon the information of F. H. Nesmith,
assistant prosecuting attorney of the city of Manila, for libel, as set forth in
the said information filed in this court on December 16, 1912, a copy of which
is hereto attached and herewith served upon you.

“Dated at the city of Manila, P. L, this 17th day of December,
1912.

(Sgd.) “GEO. N. HURD,

“Judge, Court of First Instance.”

The information upon which said process was issued is as follows:

[Heading omitted.]

“The undersigned accuses the West Coast Life Insurance Company, John
Northcott, and Manuel C. Grey of the crime of libel, committed as follows:

“That on or about the 14th day of September, 1912, and continuously
thereafter up to and including the date of this complaint, in the city of
Manila, P. L, the said defendant West Coast Life Insurance Company was and has
been a foreign corporation duly organized in the State of California, United
States of America, and registered and doing business in the Philippine Islands;
that the said defendant John Northcott then and there was and has been the
general agent and manager for the Philippine Islands of the said defendant
corporation West Coast Life Insurance Company, and the said defendant Manuel C.
Grey was and has been an agent and employee of the said defendant corporation
West Coast Life Insurance Company, acting in the capacity of treasurer of the
branch of the said defendant corporation in the Philippine Islands; that on or
about the said 14th day of September, 1912, and for some time thereafter, to
wit, during the months of September and October, 1912, in the city of Manila, P.
L, the said defendants West Coast Life Insurance Company, John Northcott, and
Manuel C. Grey, conspiring and confederating together, did then and there
willfully, unlawfully, and maliciously, and to the damage of the Insular Life
Insurance Company, a domestic corporation duly organized, registered, and doing
business in the Philippine Islands, and with intent to cause such damage and to
expose the said Insular Life Insurance Company to public hatred, contempt, and
ridicule, compose and print, and cause to be printed a large number of
circulars, and, in numerous printings in the form of said circulars, did publish
and distribute, and cause to be published and distributed, among other persons,
to policy holders and prospective policy holders of the said Insular Life
Insurance Company, among other things, a malicious defamation and libel in the
Spanish language, of the words and tenor following:

” ‘First. For some
time past various rumors are current to the effect that the Insular Life
Insurance Company is not in as good a condition as it should be at the present
time, and that really it is in bad shape. Nevertheless, the investigations made
by the representative of the “Bulletin” have failed fully to confirm these
rumors. It is known that the Insular Auditor has examined the books of the
company and has found that its capital has diminished, and that by direction of
the said official the company has decided to double the amount of its capital,
and also to pay its reserve fund. All this is true.’

“That the said
circulars, and the matters therein contained hereinbefore set forth in this
information, tend to impeach and have impeached the honesty, virtue, and
reputation of the said Insular Life Insurance Company by exposing it to public
hatred, contempt, and ridicule; that by the matters printed in said circulars,
and hereinbefore set forth in this information, the said defendants West Coast
Life Insurance Company, John Northcott, and Manuel C. Grey meant and intended to
state and represent to those to whom the said defendants delivered said
circulars as aforesaid, that the said Insular Life Insurance Company was then
and there in a dangerous financial condition and on the point of going into
insolvency, to the detriment of the policy holders of the said Insular Life
Insurance Company, and of those with whom the said Insular Life Insurance
Company have and have had business transactions, and each and all of said
persons to whom the said defendants delivered said circulars, and all persons as
well who read said circulars understood the said matters in said circulars to
have said libelous sense and meaning. Contrary to law.”

On the 20th day of December, 1912, the plaintiff, together with the other
persons named as accused in said process, through their attorneys, served upon
the prosecuting attorney and filed with the clerk of the court a motion to quash
said summons and the service thereof, on the ground that the court had no
jurisdiction over the said company, there being no authority in the court for
the issuance of the process, Exhibit B, the order under which it was issued
being void. The court denied the motion and directed plaintiff to appear before
it on the 28th day of December, 1912, and to plead to the information, to which
order the plaintiff then and there duly excepted.

It is alleged in the complaint that “unless restrained by this Court the
respondent will proceed to carry out said void order and compel your petitioner
to appear before his court and plead, and submit to criminal prosecution without
having acquired any jurisdiction whatever over your petitioner.”

The prayer of the complaint is, “your petitioner prays judgment for the,
issuance of a writ of prohibition against the respondent, commanding the
respondent absolutely to desist or refrain from further proceedings against your
petitioner in the said criminal action,”

The basis of the action is that the Court of First Instance has no power or
authority, under the laws of the Philippine Islands, to proceed against a
corporation, as such, criminally, to bring it into court for the purpose of
making it amenable to the criminal laws. It is contended that the court had no
jurisdiction to issue the process in evidence against the plaintiff corporation;
that the issuance and service thereof upon the plaintiff corporation were
outside of the authority and jurisdiction of the court, were authorized by no
law, conferred no jurisdiction over said corporation, and that theywere
absolutely void and without force or effect.

The plaintiff, further attacking said process, alleges that the process is a
mixture of civil and criminal process, that it is not properly signed, that it
does not direct or require an arrest; that it is an order to appear and answer
on a date certain without restraint of the person, and that it is not in the
form required by law.

Section 5 of General Orders, No. 58, defines an information as “an accusation
in writing charging a person with a public offense.” Section 6 provides that a
complaint or information is sufficient if it shows “the name of the defendant,
or if his name cannot be discovered, that he is described under a fictitious
name with a statement that his true name is unknown to the informant or official
signing the same. His true name may be inserted at any stage of the proceedings
instituted against him; whenever ascertained.” These provisions, as well as
those which relate to arraignment and counsel, and to demurrers and pleas,
indicate clearly that the maker of the Code of Criminal Procedure had no
intention or expectation that corporations would be included among those who
would fall within the provisions thereof. The only process known to the Code of
Criminal Procedure, or which any court is by that order authorized to issue, is
an order of arrest. The Code of Criminal Procedure provides that “if the
magistrate be satisfied from the investigation that the crime complained of has
been committed, and there is reasonable ground to believe that the party charged
has committed it, he must issue an order for his arrest. If the offense
be bailable, and the defendant offer a sufficient security, he shall be admitted
to bail; otherwise he shall be committed to prison.” There is no authority for
the issuance of any other process than an order of arrest. As a necessary
consequence, the process issued in the case before us is without
express authorization of statute.

The question remains as to whether or not the court may, of itself and on its
own motion, create not only a process but a procedure by which the process may
be made effective.

We do not believe that the authority of the courts of the Philippine Islands
extends so far. While having the inherent powers which usually go with courts of
general jurisdiction, we are of the opinion that, under the circumstances of
their creation, they have only such authority in criminal matters as is
expressly conferred upon them by statute or which it is necessary to imply from
such authority in order to carry out fully and adequately the express authority
conferred. We do not feel that Courts of First Instance have authority to create
new procedure and new processes in criminal law. The exercise of such power
verges too closely on legislation. Even though it be admitted, a question we do
not now decide, that there are various penal laws in the Philippine Islands
which corporations as such may violate, still we do not believe that the courts
are authorized to go to the extent of creating special procedure and special
processes for the purpose of carrying out those penal statutes, when the
legislature itself has neglected to do so. To bring a corporation into court
criminally requires many additions to the present criminal procedure. While it
may be said to be the duty of courts to see to it that criminals are punished,
it is no less their duty to follow prescribed forms of procedure and not to go
out upon unauthorized ways or act in an unauthorized manner.

There are many cases cited by counsel for the defendant which show that
corporations have been proceeded against criminally by indictment and otherwise
and have been punished as malefactors by the courts. Of this, of course, there
can be no doubt; but it is clear that, in those cases, the statute, by express
words or by necessary intendment, included corporations within the persons who
could offend against the criminal laws; and the legislature, at the same time
established a procedure applicable to corporations. No case has been cited to us
where a corporation has been proceeded against under a criminal statute where
the court did not exercise its common law powers or where there was not in force
a special procedure applicable to corporations.

The courts of the Philippine Islands are creatures of statute and, as we have
said, have only those powers conferred upon them by statute and those which are
required to exercise that authority fully and adequately. The courts here have
no common law jurisdiction or powers. If they have any powers not conferred by
statute, expressly or impliedly, they would naturally come from Spanish and not
from common law sources. It is undoubted that, under the Spanish criminal law
and procedure, a corporation could not have been proceeded against criminally,
as such, if such an entity as a corporation in fact existed under the Spanish
law, and as such it could not have committed a crime in which a willful purpose
or a malicious intent was required. Criminal actions would have been restricted
or limited, under that system, to the officials of such corporations and never
would have been directed against the corporation itself. This was the rule with
relation to associations or combinations of persons approaching, more or less,
the corporation as it is now understood, and it would undoubtedly have been the
rule with corporations. From this source, then, the courts derive no authority
to bring corporations before them in criminal actions, nor to issue processes
for that purpose.

The case was submitted to this Court on an agreed
statement of facts with a stipulation for a decision upon the merits. We are of
the opinion that the plaintiff is entitled, under that stipulation, to the
remedy prayed for.

It is adjudged that the Court of First Instance of the city of Manila be and
it is hereby enjoined and prohibited from proceeding further in the criminal
cause which is before us in this proceeding, entitled United States vs. West
Coast Life Insurance Company, a corporation, John Northcott and Manuel C. Grey,
so far as said proceedings relate to the said West Coast Life Insurance Company,
a corporation, the plaintiff in the case.

Arellano, C. J., and Araullo, J., concur.

Carson, J., concurs in the result.

Prohibition granted.