G.R. No. 85140. May 17, 1990
TOMAS EUGENIO, SR., PETITIONER, VS. HON. ALEJANDRO M. VELEZ, PRESIDING JUDGE, REGIONAL TRIAL COURT, BRANCH 20, CAGAYAN DE ORO CITY, DEPUTY SHERIFF JOHNSON TAN, JR., DEPUTY SHERI…
PADILLA, J.:
On 5 October 1988, petitioner came to this Court with a petition
for certiorari and prohibition with application for restraining order
and/or injunction (docketed as G.R. No. 85140) seeking to enjoin respondent
Judge from proceeding with the Habeas Corpus case (Sp. Proc. No. 88-55, RTC,
Branch 20, Cagayan de Oro
City),* the respondent Sheriff from enforcing and
implementing the writ and orders of the respondent Judge dated 28, 29, and 30
September 1988, and to declare said writ and orders as null and void. In a resolution issued on 11 October 1988, this Court required
comment from the respondents on the
petition but denied the application for a
temporary restraining order.
The records disclose the following:
Unaware of the death on 28 August 1988 of Vitaliana
Vargas (Vitaliana, for brevity), her full blood
brothers and sisters, herein private respondents (Vargases,
for brevity) filed on 27 September 1988, a petition for habeas corpus before
the RTC of Misamis Oriental (Branch 20, Cagayan de Oro City) alleging
that Vitaliana was forcibly taken from her residence
sometime in 1987 and confined by herein petitioner in his palacial residence in Jasaan, Misamis Oriental. Despite her desire to escape, Vitaliana was allegedly deprived of her liberty without any
legal authority. At the time the
petition was filed, it was alleged that Vitaliana was 25 years of age, single, and
living with petitioner Tomas Eugenio.
The respondent court in an order dated 28 September
1988 issued the writ of habeas corpus, but the writ was returned
unsatisfied. Petitioner refused to
surrender the body of Vitaliana (who had died on 28
August 1988) to the respondent sheriff, reasoning that a corpse cannot be the subject of habeas corpus
proceedings; besides, according to petitioner, he had already obtained a burial permit from the Undersecretary
of the Department of Health, authorizing the burial at the palace quadrangle of
the Philippine Benevolent Christian Missionary, Inc. (PBCM), a registered
religious sect, of which he (petitioner) is the Supreme President and Founder.
Petitioner also alleged
that Vitaliana died of heart failure due to toxemia
of pregnancy in his residence on 28 August 1988. As her common law husband, petitioner claimed
legal custody of her body. These reasons
were incorporated in an explanation filed before the respondent court. Two (2)
orders dated 29 and 30 September 1988
were then issued by respondent court, directing delivery of the deceased’s body
to a funeral parlor in Cagayan de Oro City and its
autopsy.
Petitioner (as respondent
in the habeas corpus proceedings) filed an
urgent motion to dismiss the petition therein, claiming lack of
jurisdiction of the court over the nature of the action under sec. 1(b) of Rule
16 in relation to sec. 2, Rule 72 of the Rules of Court.[1] A special proceeding for habeas
corpus, petitioner argued, is not applicable to a dead person but extends only
to all cases of illegal confinement or detention of a live person.
Before resolving the motion to dismiss, private respondents (as
petitioners below) were granted leave to amend their petition.[2]
Claiming to have knowledge of the death of Vitaliana
only on 28 September 1988 (or after the filing of the habeas corpus petition),
private respondents (Vargases) alleged that
petitioner Tomas Eugenio, who is not in any way
related to Vitaliana was wrongfully interferring with their (Vargases’)
duty to bury her. Invoking Arts. 305 and
308 of the Civil Code,[3]
the Vargases contended that, as the next of kin in
the Philippines,
they are the legal custodians of the dead body of their sister Vitaliana. An
exchange of pleadings followed. The
motion to dismiss was finally submitted for resolution on 21 October 1988.
In the absence of a restraining order from this Court,
proceedings continued before the
respondent court; the body was placed in a coffin, transferred to the Greenhills Memorial Homes in Cagayan de Oro City, viewed by the presiding Judge of respondent court, and
examined by a duly authorized government pathologist.[4]
Denying the motion to dismiss filed by petitioner, the court a
quo held in an order,[5]
dated 17 November 1988,
that:
“It should be noted from the original petition, to the first
amended petition, up to the second amended petition that the ultimate facts
show that if the person of Vitaliana Vargas turns out
to be dead then this Court is being prayed to declare the petitioners as the
persons entitled to the custody, interment and/or burial of the body of said
deceased. The Court, considering the
circumstance that Vitaliana Vargas was already dead
on August 28, 1988 but only revealed to the Court on September 29, 1988 by
respondent’s counsel, did not lose jurisdiction over the nature and subject
matter of this case because it may entertain this case thru the allegations in
the body of the petition on the determination as to who is entitled to the
custody of the dead body of the late Vitaliana Vargas
as well as the burial or interment thereof, for the reason that under the
provisions of Sec. 19 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, which reads as follows:
‘Sec. 19. Jurisdiction in civil cases. – Regional Trial
Courts shall exercise exclusive
original jurisdiction:
(1) In all civil
actions in which the subject of the litigation is incapable of pecuniary
estimation;
x x x x x
x x
x x
(5) In all actions
involving the contract of marriage and marital relations;
(6) In all cases not within
the exclusive jurisdiction of any court, tribunal, person or body exercising
judicial or quasi-judicial functions;
x x
x x
x x x x x“
it so provides that the Regional Trial
Court has exclusive original jurisdiction to try this case. The authority to try the issue of custody and
burial of a dead person is within the lawful jurisdiction of this Court because
of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129
and because of the allegations of the pleadings in this case, which are enumerated
in Sec. 19, pars. 1, 5 and 6 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129.”
Thereafter, the court a quo proceeded as in ordinary
civil cases and, in due course, rendered a decision on 17 January 1989,[6]
resolving the main issue of whether or not said court acquired jurisdiction
over the case by treating it as an action for custody of a dead body, without the petitioners
having to file a separate civil
action for such relief, and without
the Court first dismissing the original petition for habeas corpus.
Citing Sections 19 and 20 of Batas Pambansa
Blg. 129 (the Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1981),[7]
Sections 5 and 6 of Rule 135 of the Rules of Court,[8]
Articles 305 and 308 in relation to Article
294 of the Civil Code and Section 1104 of the Revised Administrative Code,[9]
the decision stated:
“x x x. By a mere reading of the petition the
court observed that the allegations in the original petition as well as in the
two amended petitions show that Vitaliana Vargas has
been restrained of her liberty and if she
were dead then relief was prayed for the custody and burial of said dead
person. The amendments to the petition
were but elaborations but the ultimate facts remained the same, hence, this
court strongly finds that this court has ample jurisdiction to entertain and
sit on this case as an action for custody and burial of the dead body because
the body of the petition controls and is binding and since this case was
raffled to this court to the exclusion of all other courts, it is the primary
duty of this court to decide and dispose of this case. x x x.”[10]
Satisfied with its jurisdiction, the respondent court then
proceeded to the matter of rightful custody over the dead body, (for purposes
of burial thereof). The order of
preference to give support under Art. 294 was used as the basis of the
award. Since there was no surviving
spouse, ascendants or descendants, the brothers and sisters were preferred over
petitioner who was merely a common law spouse, the latter being himself legally
married to another woman.[11]
On 23 January 1989,
a new petition for review with application for a temporary restraining order and/or preliminary injunction was
filed with this Court (G.R. No. 86470).
Raised therein were pure questions of law, basically identical to those
raised in the earlier petition (G.R. No. 85140); hence, the consolidation of
both cases.[12]
On 7 February 1989, petitioner filed an urgent motion for the issuance of an
injunction to maintain status quo pending appeal, which this Court denied in a resolution dated 23 February 1989
stating that “Tomas Eugenio has so far failed to
sufficiently establish a clear legal right
to the custody of the dead body of Vitaliana
Vargas, which now needs a decent
burial.” The petitions were then submitted for decision without further
pleadings.
Between the two (2) consolidated petitions, the following issues
are raised:
1. propriety of a habeas corpus proceeding
under Rule 102 of the Rules of Court to recover custody of the dead body of a
25 year old female, single, whose nearest surviving claimants are full blood
brothers and sisters and a common law husband.
2. jurisdiction of the RTC over such
proceedings and/or its authority to treat the action as one for
custody/possession/authority to bury the deceased/recovery of the dead.
3. interpretation of par. 1, Art. 294 of the
Civil Code (Art. 199 of the new Family Code) which states:
‘ART. 294. The claim for
support, when proper and two or more persons are obliged to give it, shall be
made in the following order:
(1) From the spouse;
x x x’
Section 19, Batas Pambansa Blg. 129 provides
for the exclusive original jurisdiction of the Regional Trial Courts over civil
cases. Under Sec. 2, Rule 102 of the
Rules of Court, the writ of habeas corpus may be granted by a Court of First
Instance (now Regional Trial Court). It
is an elementary rule of procedure that what controls is not the caption of the
complaint or petition; but the allegations therein determine the nature of the
action, and even without the prayer for a specific remedy, proper relief may
nevertheless be granted by the court if the facts alleged in the complaint and
the evidence introduced so warrant.[13]
When the petition for habeas corpus was filed before the court a
quo, it was not certain whether Vitaliana was dead or
alive. While habeas corpus is a
writ of right, it will not issue as a matter of course or as a mere perfunctory operation on the filing of the
petition. Judicial discretion is
exercised in its issuance, and such facts must be made to appear to the judge
to whom the petition is presented as, in his judgment, prima facie
entitle the petitioner to the writ.[14]
While the court may refuse to grant the writ if the petition is insufficient in
form and substance, the writ should issue if the petition complies with the
legal requirements and its averments make a prima facie case for
relief. However, a judge who is asked to
issue a writ of habeas corpus need not be very critical in looking into the petition
for very clear grounds for the exercise of this jurisdiction. The latter’s power to make full inquiry into
the cause of commitment or detention will enable him to correct any errors or
defects in the petition.[15]
In Macazo and Nunez vs. Nunez,[16]
the Court frowned upon the dismissal of a
habeas corpus petition filed by a
brother to obtain custody of a minor sister, stating:
“All these circumstances notwithstanding, we believe that the
case should not have been dismissed.
The court below should not have overlooked that by dismissing the
petition, it was virtually sanctioning the continuance of an adulterous and
scandalous relation between the minor and her married employer, respondent Benildo Nunez,
against all principles of law and morality.
It is no excuse that the minor has expressed preference for remaining with said respondent, because the
minor may not chose to continue an illicit relation that morals and law
repudiate.
x x x x x x x x x
“The minor’s welfare being the paramount consideration, the
court below should not allow the technicality, that Teofilo
Macazo was not originally made a party, to stand in the way of its giving the child full protection. Even in a habeas corpus proceeding the court had power to award
temporary custody to the petitioner herein, or some other suitable person, after summoning and hearing all parties
concerned. What matters is that the
immoral situation disclosed by the records be not allowed to continue.”[17]
After the fact of Vitaliana’s death was
made known to the petitioners in the habeas corpus proceedings, amendment of the petition for habeas corpus, not dismissal, was proper to avoid multiplicity of suits. Amendments to pleadings are generally favored
and should be liberally allowed in furtherance of justice in order that every
case may so far as possible be determined on its real facts and in order to
expedite the trial of cases or prevent circuity of
action and unnecessary expense, unless there are circumstances such as inexcusable delay or the taking of
the adverse party by surprise or the like, which justify a refusal of
permission to amend.[18]
As correctly alleged by respondents, the writ of habeas corpus as a remedy became moot and academic due
to the death of the person allegedly restrained of liberty, but the
issue of custody remained, which the court a quo had to resolve.
Petitioner claims he is the spouse contemplated under Art. 294 of
the Civil Code, the term spouse used therein not being preceded by any
qualification; hence, in the absence of such qualification, he is the rightful
custodian of Vitaliana’s body. Vitaliana’s
brothers and sisters contend otherwise.
Indeed, Philippine Law does not recognize common law marriages. A man and woman not legally married who
co-habit for many years as husband and wife, who represent themselves to the
public as husband and wife, and who are reputed to be husband and wife in the community where they
live may be considered legally
“married” in common law jurisdictions but not in the Philippines.[19]
While it is true that our laws do not just brush aside the fact
that such relationships are present in our society, and that they produce a community of properties and interests
which is governed by law,[20]
authority exists in case law to the effect that such form of co-ownership
requires that the man and woman living together must not in any way be
incapacitated to contract marriage.[21]
In any case, herein petitioner has a subsisting marriage with another woman, a
legal impediment which disqualified him from even legally marrying Vitaliana. In Santero vs. CFI of Cavite,[22]
the Court, thru Mr. Justice Paras, interpreting Art.
188 of the Civil Code (Support of Surviving Spouse and Children During
Liquidation of Inventoried Property) stated:
“Be it noted however that with respect to ‘spouse’, the same must
be the ‘legitimate spouse’ (not common-law spouses …)”.
There is a view that
under Article 332 of the Revised Penal Code, the term “spouse”
embraces common law relation for purposes of exemption from criminal liability
in cases of theft, swindling and malicious mischief committed or caused
mutually by spouses. The Penal Code
article, it is said, makes no distinction between a couple whose cohabitation
is sanctioned by a sacrament or legal tie and another who are husband and wife de
facto.[23] But
this view cannot even apply to the facts of the case at bar. We
hold that the provisions of the Civil Code, unless expressly providing to they
contrary as in Article 144, when referring to a “spouse” contemplate
a lawfully wedded spouse. Petitioner vis-a-vis Vitaliana was not a lawfully-wedded spouse
to her; in fact, he was not legally capacitated to marry her in her
lifetime.
Custody of the dead body of Vitaliana
was correctly awarded to her surviving brothers and sisters (the Vargases). Section
1103 of the Revised Administrative Code provides:
“Sec. 1103. Persons
charged with duty of burial. – The
immediate duty of burying the
body of a deceased person, regardless of the ultimate liability for the expense
thereof, shall devolve upon the persons hereinbelow
specified:
x x
x
“(b) If the deceased was an unmarried man or woman, or a child, and left any kin,
the duty of burial shall devolve upon the nearest of kin of the deceased, if they
be adults and within the Philippines
and in possession of sufficient means to defray the necessary expenses.”
WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is AFFIRMED. Both petitions are hereby DISMISSED. No Costs.
SO ORDERED.
Fernan, C.J., Narvasa,
Melencio-Herrera, Gutierrez, Jr., Cruz, Paras, Feliciano, Bidin, Sarmiento, Cortes, Medialdea, and Regalado, JJ., concur.
Gancayco and Grino-Aquino, JJ., on leave.
* Hon. Alejandro Velez, presiding.
[1]
Rule 16 (Motion to Dismiss):
SECTION 1. Grounds. – Within the
time for pleading a motion to dismiss the action may be made on
any of the following grounds:
(a) x x x
(b) That the court has no jurisdiction over the
nature of the action or suit;
Rule 72 (Subject Matter
and Applicability of General Rules)
x x x
SECTION 2. Applicability of rules of
civil actions. – In the absence of
special provisions, the rules provided for in ordinary actions shall be, as
far as practicable, applicable in
special proceedings.
[2]
3 and 11 October 1988 orders, Record of Regional Trial Court
Proceedings, pp. 74, 75 & 102
[3]
ART. 305. The duty and the right to make
arrangements for the funeral of a relative
shall be in accordance with the order established for support, under article
294. In case of descendants of the same
degree, or of brothers and sisters,
the oldest shall be preferred. In
case of ascendants, the paternal shall have a better right.
ART. 308. No human remains shall be retained, interred,
disposed of or exhumed without the consent of the persons mentioned in Articles
294 and 305.
[4]
Record of RTC Proceedings, pp. 296-297
[5]
Ibid., p. 338
[6]
Record of RTC Proceedings, p.
577
[7]
Supra
[8]
Sec. 5 – Inherent power of courts; Sec.
6 – means to carry jurisdiction into effect.
[9]
Sec. 1104. Right of custody to body – Any person charged
by law with the duty of burying
the body of a deceased person is entitled to the custody of such body for the
purpose of burying it, except when an inquest is required by law for the
purpose of determining the cause of death; and, in case of death due to or
accompanied by a dangerous communicable disease, such body shall until buried
remain in the custody of the local board of health or local health officer, or
if there be no such, then in the custody of the municipal council.
[10]
G.R. No. 86470, Rollo
at 34
[11]
Annexes 7 & 8, Petition, G.R. No.
85140, Rollo at 85 and 86
[12]
Resolution of 26
January 1989, G.R.
No. 85140, Rollo at 114
[13]
Ras v. Sua, G.R. No. L-23302, September 25, 1968, 25 SCRA 158-159; Nactor v. IAC,
G.R. No. 74122, March 15, 1988, 158 SCRA 635
[14]
39 Am. Jur.,
2d, Habeas Corpus § 129
[15]
Ibid., § 130
[16]
G.R. No. L-12772, 24 January 1959, 105 Phil. 55
[17]
Ibid.
[18]
PNB vs. CA, G.R. No. L-45770, 30 March
1988, 159 SCRA 933
[19]
Fiel vs. Banawa,
No. 56284-R, March 26, 1979, 76 OG 619
[20]
Article 144 of the Civil Code provides:
When a man and a woman live together as husband and wife, but they are not married, or their marriage is void from the beginning,
the property acquired by either or both of them through their work or industry
or their wages and salaries shall be governed by the rules on
co-ownership.
[21]
Aznar, et al. vs. Garcia, et al., G.R. Nos.
L-11483-84, 14 February 1958, 102 Phil. 1055.
[22]
G.R. Nos. 61700-03, September
24, 1987, 153 SCRA
728
[23]
People vs. Constantino,
No. 01897-CR, September 6, 1963, 60 O.G. 3603