G.R. No. 85044. June 03, 1992
MACARIO TAMARGO, CELSO TAMARGO AND AURELIA TAMARGO, PETITIONERS, VS. THE HON. COURT OF APPEALS; THE HON. ARISTON L. RUBIO, RTC JUDGE, BRANCH 20, VIGAN, ILOCOS SUR; VICTOR BUNDOC…
FELICIANO, J.:
On 20 October 1982, Adelberto Bundoc, then a minor of 10 years of
age, shot Jennifer Tamargo with an air rifle causing injuries which resulted in
her death. Accordingly, a civil complaint for damages was
filed with the Regional Trial Court, Branch 20, Vigan, Ilocos Sur, docketed as
Civil Case No. 3457-V, by petitioner Macario Tamargo, Jennifer’s adopting
parent, and petitioner spouses Celso and Aurelia Tamargo, Jennifer’s natural
parents, against respondent spouses Victor and Clara Bundoc, Adelberto’s
natural parents with whom he was living at the time of the tragic incident. In addition to this case for damages, a
criminal information for Homicide through Reckless Imprudence was filed
[Criminal Case No. 1722-V] against Adelberto Bundoc. Adelberto, however, was acquitted and exempted from criminal
liability on the ground that he had acted without discernment.
Prior to the incident, or on 10 December 1981, the spouses Sabas
and Felisa Rapisura had filed a petition to adopt the minor Adelberto Bundoc in
Special Proceedings No. 0373-T before the then Court of First Instance of
Ilocos Sur. This petition for adoption
was granted on 18 November 1982, that is, after Adelberto had shot and
killed Jennifer.
In their Answer, respondent spouses Bundoc, Adelberto’s natural
parents, reciting the result of the foregoing petition for adoption, claimed that
not they, but rather the adopting parents, namely the spouses Sabas and Felisa
Rapisura, were indispensable parties to the action since parental authority had
shifted to the adopting parents from the moment the successful petition for
adoption was filed.
Petitioners in their Reply contended that since Adelberto Bundoc
was then actually living with his natural parents, parental authority had not
ceased nor been relinquished by the mere filing and granting of a petition for
adoption.
The trial court on 3 December 1987 dismissed petitioners’
complaint, ruling that respondent natural parents of Adelberto indeed were not
indispensable parties to the action.
Petitioners received a copy of the trial court’s Decision on 7
December 1987. Within the 15-day reglementary
period, or on 14 December 1987, petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration
followed by a supplemental motion for reconsideration on 15 January 1988. It
appearing, however, that the motions failed to comply with Sections 4 and 5 of
Rule 15 of the Revised Rules of Court — that notice of the motion shall be
given to all parties concerned at least three (3) days before the hearing of
said motion; and that said notice shall state the time and place of hearing — both
motions were denied by the trial court in an Order dated 18 April 1988. On 28 April 1988, petitioners filed a notice
of appeal. In its Order dated 6 June
1988, the trial court dismissed the notice of appeal, this time ruling that the
notice had been filed beyond the 15-day reglementary period ending 22 December
1987.
Petitioners went to the Court of Appeals on a petition for mandamus and certiorari
questioning the trial court’s Decision dated 3 December 1987 and the Orders
dated 18 April 1988 and 6 June 1988. The Court of Appeals dismissed the petition, ruling that petitioners had
lost their right to appeal.
In the present Petition for Review, petitioners once again
contend that respondent spouses Bundoc are the indispensable parties to the
action for damages caused by the acts of their minor child, Adelberto
Bundoc. Resolution of this Petition
hinges on the following issues: (1) whether or not petitioners, notwithstanding
loss of their right to appeal, may still file the instant Petition; conversely,
whether the Court may still take cognizance of the case even though
petitioners’ appeal had been filed out of time; and (2) whether or not the
effects of adoption, insofar as parental authority is concerned, may be given
retroactive effect so as to make the adopting parents the indispensable parties
in a damage case filed against their adopted child, for acts committed by the
latter when actual custody was yet lodged with the biological parents.
1. It will be recalled that petitioners’ motion (and supplemental
motion) for reconsideration filed before the trial court, not having complied
with the requirements of Section 13, Rule 41, and Section 4, Rule 15, of the
Revised Rules of Court, were considered pro forma and hence did
not interrupt and suspend the reglementary period to appeal: the trial court held that the motions, not
having contained a notice of time and place of hearing, had become useless
pieces of paper which did not interrupt the reglementary period.[1]
As in fact repeatedly held by this Court, what is mandatory is the service of
the motion on the opposing counsel indicating the time and place of hearing.[2]
In view, however, of the nature of the issue raised in the
instant Petition, and in order that substantial justice may be served, the
Court, invoking its right to suspend the application of technical rules to
prevent manifest injustice, elects to treat the notice of appeal as having been
seasonably filed before the trial court, and the motion (and supplemental
motion) for reconsideration filed by petitioner in the trial court as having
interrupted the reglementary period for appeal. As the Court held in Gregorio
v. Court of Appeals:[3]
“Dismissal of appeal purely on technical grounds is frowned upon
where the policy of the courts is to encourage hearings of appeal on their
merits. The rules of procedure ought
not be applied in a very rigid technical sense, rules of procedure are used
only to help secure not override, substantial justice. If a technical and rigid enforcement of the
rules is made, their aim would be defeated.”[4]
2. It is not disputed that Adelberto Bundoc’s voluntary act of
shooting Jennifer Tamargo with an air rifle gave rise to a cause of action on
quasi-delict against him. As Article
2176 of the Civil Code provides:
“Whoever by act or omission causes damage to another, there being
fault or negligence, is obliged to pay for the damage done. Such fault or negligence, if there is no
pre-existing contractual relation between the parties, is called a quasi-delict
x x x.”
Upon the other hand, the law imposes civil liability upon the
father and, in case of his death or incapacity, the mother, for any damages
that may be caused by a minor child who lives with them. Article 2180 of the Civil Code reads:
“The obligation imposed by article 2176 is demandable not only for
one’s own acts or omissions, but also for those of persons for whom one is
responsible.
The father and, in case of his death or incapacity, the mother, are
responsible for the damages caused by the minor children who live in their
company.
x x x x x x x x x
The responsibility treated of in this Article shall cease when the
person herein mentioned prove that they observed all the diligence of a good
father of a family to prevent damage.” (Underscoring
supplied)
This principle of parental liability is a
species of what is frequently designated as vicarious liability, or the
doctrine of “imputed negligence” under Anglo-American tort law, where a person
is not only liable for torts committed by himself, but also for torts committed
by others with whom he has a certain relationship and for whom he is
responsible. Thus, parental liability
is made a natural or logical consequence of the duties and responsibilities of
parents – their parental authority – which includes the instructing, controlling
and disciplining of the child.[5] The
basis for the doctrine of vicarious liability was explained by the Court in Cangco
v. Manila Railroad Co.[6] in
the following terms:
“With respect to extra-contractual obligation arising from
negligence, whether of act or omission, it is competent for the legislature to
elect — and our Legislature has so elected — to limit such liability to cases
in which the person upon whom such an obligation is imposed is morally culpable
or, on the contrary, for reasons of public policy, to extend that liability,
without regard to the lack of moral culpability, so as to include responsibility
for the negligence of those persons whose acts or omissions are imputable,
by a legal fiction, to others who are in a position to exercise an absolute
or limited control over them. The
legislature which adopted our Civil Code has elected to limit
extra-contractual liability — with certain well-defined exceptions — to
cases in which moral culpability can be directly imputed to the persons to be
charged. This moral responsibility
may consist in having failed to exercise due care in one’s own acts, or in having
failed to exercise due care in the selection and control of one’s agents or
servants, or in the control of persons who, by reasons of their status, occupy
a position of dependency with respect to the person made liable for their
conduct.”[7]
(Underscoring supplied)
The civil liability imposed upon parents for the torts of their
minor children living with them, may be seen to be based upon the parental
authority vested by the Civil Code upon such parents. The civil law assumes that when an unemancipated child living
with its parents commits a tortious act, the parents were negligent in the
performance of their legal and natural duty closely to supervise the child who
is in their custody and control. Parental liability is, in other words, anchored upon parental authority
coupled with presumed parental dereliction in the discharge of the duties
accompanying such authority. The
parental dereliction is, of course, only presumed and the presumption can be
overturned under Article 2180 of the Civil Code by proof that the parents had
exercised all the diligence of a good father of a family to prevent the damage.
In the instant case, the shooting of Jennifer by Adelberto with
an air rifle occured when parental authority was still lodged in respondent
Bundoc spouses, the natural parents of the minor Adelberto. It would thus follow that the natural
parents who had then actual custody of the minor Adelberto, are the indispensable
parties to the suit for damages.
The natural parents of Adelberto, however, stoutly maintain that
because a decree of adoption was issued by the adoption court in favor of the
Rapisura spouses, parental authority was vested in the latter as adopting
parents as of the time of the filing of the petition for adoption that
is, before Adelberto had shot Jennifer with ad air rifle. The Bundoc spouses contend that they were
therefore free of any parental responsibility for Adelberto’s allegedly
tortious conduct.
Respondent Bundoc spouses rely on Article 36 of the Child and
Youth Welfare Code[8]
which reads as follows:
“Article 36. Decree of
Adoption. — If, after considering the report of the Department of Social
Welfare or duly licensed child placement agency and the evidence submitted
before it, the court is satisfied that the petitioner is qualified to maintain, care for, and
educate the child, that the trial custody period has been completed, and that
the best interests of the child will be promoted by the adoption, a decree
of adoption shall be entered, which shall be effective as of the date the
original petition was filed. The
decree shall state the name by which the child is thenceforth to be known.”
(Underscoring supplied)
The Bundoc spouses further argue that the
above Article 36 should be read in relation to Article 39 of the same Code:
“Art. 39. Effect of
Adoption. –The adoption shall:
x x x x x x x
x x
(2) Dissolve the authority vested in the natural parents,
except where the adopter is the spouse of the surviving natural parent;”
x x x x x x x x x”
(Underscoring supplied)
and urge that their parental authority
must be deemed to have been dissolved as of the time the petition for adoption
was filed.
The Court is not persuaded. As earlier noted, under the Civil Code, the basis of parental liability
for the torts of a minor child is the relationship existing between the parents
and the minor child living with them and over whom, the law presumes, the
parents exercise supervision and control. Article 58 of the Child and Youth Welfare Code, re-enacted this rule:
“Article 58 Torts — Parents and guardians are responsible
for the damage caused by the child under their parental authority in
accordance with the Civil Code.” (Underscoring supplied)
Article 221 of the Family Code of the
Philippines[9]
has similarly insisted upon the requisite that the child, doer of the tortious
act, shall have been in the actual custody of the parents sought to be held
liable for the ensuing damage:
“Art. 221. Parents and
other persons exercising parental authority shall be civilly liable for the
injuries and damages caused by the acts or omissions of their unemancipated
children living in their company and under their parental authority
subject to the appropriate defenses provided by law.” (Underscoring supplied)
We do not believe that parental authority is properly regarded as
having been retroactively transferred to and vested in the adopting parents,
the Rapisura spouses, at the time the air rifle shooting happened. We do not consider that retroactive effect
may be given to the decree of adoption so as to impose a liability upon the
adopting parents accruing at a time when the adopting parents had no actual
or physical custody over the adopted child. Retroactive effect may perhaps be given to the granting of the
petition for adoption where such is essential to permit the accrual of some
benefit or advantage in favor of the adopted child. In the instant case, however, to hold that parental authority had
been retroactively lodged in the Rapisura spouses so as to burden them with
liability for a tortious act that they could not have forseen and which they
could not have prevented (since they were at the time in the United States and
had no physical custody over the child Adelberto) would be unfair and
unconscionable. Such a result,
moreover, would be inconsistent with the philosophical and policy basis
underlying the doctrine of vicarious liability. Put a little differently, no presumption of parental dereliction
on the part of the adopting parents, the Rapisura spouses, could have arisen
since Adelberto was not in fact subject to their control at the time the tort
was committed.
Article 35 of the Child and Youth Welfare Code fortifies the
conclusion reached above. Article 35
provides as follows:
“Art. 35. Trial Custody. –
No petition for adoption shall be finally granted unless and until the adopting
parents are given by the courts a supervised trial custody period of at
least six months to assess their adjustment and emotional readiness for the
legal union. During the period of
trial custody, parental authority shall be vested in the adopting parents.”
(Underscoring supplied)
Under the above Article 35, parental
authority is provisionally vested in the adopting parents during the period of
trial custody, i.e., before the issuance of a decree of adoption, precisely
because the adopting parents are given actual custody of the child during such
trial period. In the instant case,
the trial custody period either had not yet begun or had already been completed
at the time of the air rifle shooting; in any case, actual custody of Adelberto
was then with his natural parents, not the adopting parents.
Accordingly, we conclude that respondent Bundoc spouses,
Adelberto’s natural parents, were indispensable parties to the suit for damages
brought by petitioners, and that the dismissal by the trial court of
petitioners’ complaint, the indispensable parties being already before the
court, constituted grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Petition for Review is
hereby GRANTED DUE COURSE and the Decision of the Court of Appeals dated 6
September 1988, in C.A.-G.R. No. SP-15016 is hereby REVERSED and SET
ASIDE. Petitioners’ complaint filed
before the trial court is hereby REINSTATED and this case is REMANDED to that
court for further proceedings consistent with this Decision. Costs against respondent Bundoc
spouses. This Decision is immediately
executory.
SO ORDERED.
Gutierrez, Jr., (Chairman), Bidin, Davide, Jr., and Romero, JJ., concur.
[1]
Pojas v. Hon. Gozo-Dalole, 192 SCRA 575 (1990).
[2]
Fecundo v. Berjamen, 180 SCRA 235 (1989); Filipinas Fabricators and
Sales, Inc. v. Magsino, 157 SCRA 469 (1988).
[3]
72 SCRA 120 (1976).
[4]
Id., at 126.
[5]
See in this connection, Art. 311, 316, 357, Civil Code; Exconde v.
Capuno, 101 Phil. 843 (1957).
[6]
38 Phil. 768 (1918).
[7]
Id., at 775-776.
[8]
Presidential Decree No. 603, dated 10 December 1974.
[9]
Executive Order No. 209, dated 6 July 1987.