THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE, VS. GLENN HATTON, DEFENDANT-APPELLANT.

Accused-appellant, Glenn Hatton, was charged with the crime of murder,
for the death of one Faustino Algarme, in a complaint signed by P/Cpl. Jose C.
Custorio of the Catarman Police Station. The complaint read as follows:

“That on or about the 29th day of August, 1986 at about 7:30
in the evening, more or less, in the municipality of Catarman, province of
Northern Samar, Philippines and within the preliminary jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the above-named accused armed with a knife commonly known as
‘Dipang’ with intent to kill thru treachery and evident premeditation, without
any provocation and justifiable motive, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully
and feloniously attack, assault and stab one FAUSTINO ALGARME with the knife he
provided himself for the purpose hitting him at the back and inflicting upon him
mortal wound which wound caused his death.

“CONTRARY TO LAW.” (p. 1. Records)

Upon arraignment, accused-appellant, duly assisted by his counsel
pleaded, not guilty to the charge (p. 65, Records).

According to the principal witnesses for the prosecution, Edgardo
Ongue and Romeo Basierto, the incidents surrounding the death of Algarme were
as follows:

The town of Catarman, Northern Samar was celebrating its fiesta
on that day of August 29, 1986. The
victim, Faustino Algarme and three (3) of his friends, namely: Jesus Aboda, Romeo Basierto and witness
Edgardo Ongue were on their way to the house of Engr. Corbillo after drinking
two (2) bottles of beer each at Aileen’s Restaurant. The group walked abreast Algarme, who was on the extreme left at
the edge of Bonifacio street, with Ongue, Basierto and Aboda, in that order, to
his right. It was about seven (7)
o’clock in the evening. When they
neared the CLAO office, they noticed two (2) men coming towards their
direction. One was short and stocky and
the other was tall. While the tall man
was one step behind them, he tapped the shoulder of Faustino Algarme with his
left hand and stabbed him with his right hand. Algarme shouted for help and called “Romy (Basierto), please help
me I was struck.” At that moment, Ongue gazed at the tall man who tried to
pull back the knife from the victim’s back. Ongue did not know the man who stabbed Algarme, but he took notice of
his mestizo features. The tall man
failed to get the knife. Then he ran
towards the corner of a house owned by Nonong Hatton, (TSN, April 28, 1987, pp.
2-8).

Another witness for the prosecution, Romeo Basierto testified
that as soon as the tall man stabbed Algarme, he ran and Basierto chased him
(p. 11, TSN, May 26, 1987). Basierto
recognized the tall man who stabbed Algarme when the latter turned his face
towards him (p. 21, TSN, May 26, 1987). He recognized the accused because both of them were residents of
Catarman.

Edgardo Ongue brought the victim to the hospital where he died of
“massive hemorrhage secondary to stab wound (Exh. “H”). Meanwhile, Basierto reported the incident to
the police headquarters. Three
policemen, one of whom was identified as Titing Varela, accompanied him to the
scene of the crime where they beamed their flashlights towards the house of
Nonong Hatton where he believed the tall man and his companion entered (p. 12,
TSN, May 26, 1987).

According to Ongue, the day after the incident when he went to
the police station to shed light on the incident, he narrated to the police
officers what really transpired. He
told them that the features of the assailant was still in his memory and that
if they can show or present a person who will fit his description, he can
identify him. He waited at the police
station from 8:00 to 11:00 o’clock but the police failed to present any person
to him. On the second day after the
incident, he was picked-up from his office and made to identify their suspect
who turned out to be the accused-appellant. The latter was sitting on a bench in the police station and a policeman
pointed to him as their suspect. (pp.
24-26, TSN, April 28, 1987).

The accused-appellant interposed the defense of alibi. He testified that on that same night, from
6:00 p.m. to 10:30 p.m., he was in the house of his friend Eddie Laguitan. They were joined by their friends Eric
Parnam, Edgar Maningcay, Marlon Acibar, Jaime Mijares and a girl named
Imelda. Since it was the town fiesta
and the baptism of the niece of Eddie Laguitan, they were invited by Eddie for
some snacks and drinks. During the
entire period, he got up only twice to go to the comfort room. His testimony was corroborated by Mrs.
Laguitan, Eddie’s mother, who served them, and another person who was with the
group, Jaime Mijares.

The accused-appellant denied having stabbed the victim. He categorically stated also that he was
left-handed.

After trial, judgment was rendered finding the accused-appellant
guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime charged. The dispositive portion of which the decision states:

“WHEREFORE, the court hereby finds the accused Glenn Hatton
GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of murder, defined and penalized
under Article 248, paragraph 1, of the Revised Penal Code. There being neither in attendance mitigating
nor aggravating circumstance, said accused is hereby sentenced to suffer the
penalty of RECLUSION PERPETUA, to indemnify the heirs of Faustino Algarme in
the amount of P30,000.00 including the amount of P10,000.00, hospitalization
and burial expenses, and to pay the costs.

“The knife, Exh. ‘C,’ is hereby ordered confiscated, to be
disposed of in accordance with regulations.

“SO ORDERED.” (p. 111, Records)

From the judgment of conviction, accused­-appellant filed this
appeal.

In his brief, the following issues were raised by him in the
assignment of errors:

“I. The accused-appellant was condemned before
he was heard by a court that allied itself with the prosecution, in violation
of the constitutional right to due process of law.

“II. The trial court erred in holding that the accused-appellant’s being
left-handed is a detail ‘comparatively trivial and does not destroy the
credibility of the witness or his testimony.’

“III. The trial court erred in holding the
identification of the accused-appellant as the victim’s attacker is positive
and convincing considering that no courtroom identification was made, and the
said identification was based solely on a pre­-trial line-up of sorts,
conducted in violation of the accused-appellant’s right to counsel, and in a manner filled with
innumerable ‘suggestive influences.’

“IV. The lower court erred in not giving credence
to the evidence presented by the accused-appellant.

“V. The lower court erred in holding that the accused-appellant is guilty
beyond reasonable doubt.” (pp. 6-7, Appellant’s Brief)

The accused-appellant objected to the conduct of the judge during
trial. He alleged that the judge
manifested bias and partiality in hearing the case. The judge allegedly asked leading questions and various points not
asked by the fiscal when the prosecution presented its first witness. He practically took over the task of
conducting the direct examination, asking fifty one (51) questions while the
fiscal asked only a total of twenty-five (25) questions. The judge also asked another forty (40)
questions during cross-examination and practically took over the task of re­direct
examination. The same attitude was
displayed by the judge during the entire trial of the case.

Likewise, the accused-appellant pointed out that after the direct
examination of the first witness for the defense, Jaime Mijares, the judge took
the task of conducting the cross-examination by asking fifty-nine (59)
questions while the Fiscal only asked nine (9) questions.

We read the transcript of stenographic notes and indeed, it is
true that the judge was overzealous in controlling the conduct of the
hearing. He asked more questions than
did counsel of the accused or the fiscal. It is conceded though that the trial judge did not manifest any bias in
favor of the prosecution in asking the witnesses for the prosecution nor any
hostility or malice against the defense witnesses. We note also that the questions asked by the court were
clarificatory questions aimed to paint a clearer picture of what was testified
to by the witnesses. As we held in
People v. Ibasan, Sr. G.R. No. L-61652, June 22, 1984: 129 SCRA 695:

“x x x. It is not denied that the court had at certain points
conducted its own questioning during the proceedings. The records, however, show that the court’s questions did not
amount to interference as to make the case for the prosecution and deprive the
accused of their defense. The questions
of the judge addressed to the witnesses and the accused were merely to clarify
certain points and confirm certain statements. The number of times that a judge intervenes is not necessarily an
indication of bias. It cannot be taken
against a judge if the clarificatory questions he propounds happen to reveal
certain truths which tend to destroy the theory of one party.

“As held in the case of Ventura v. Yatco (105 Phil. 287)
‘Judges are not mere referees like those of a boxing bout, only to watch and
decide the results of a game; they should have as much interest as counsel in
the orderly and expeditious presentation of evidence, calling attention of
counsel to points at issue that are overlooked, directing them to ask questions
that would elicit the facts on the issues involved, clarifying ambiguous
remarks by witnesses, etc.’

“A judge may properly intervene in the trial of a case to
promote expedition and avoid unnecessary waste of time or to clear up some
obscurity (People v. Catindihan, 97 SCRA 196; Par. 14 Canons of Judicial
Ethics; Administrative Order No. 162 dated August 1, 1946, 42 O.G. 1803). In this respect, the record shows no
irregularity in the conduct of the trial judge.”

The counsel for the accused pointed out also that the decision
was rendered by the judge on June 19, 1987 when it was only on June 29, 1987
when the accused-appellant and another witness for the defense, Jaime Mijares,
was presented as a witness in court. This fact allegedly showed the bias of judge who already adjudged the
accused guilty before hearing his defenses.

It appears from the record of this case that the decision was
dated June 29, 1987. The transcript of
stenographic notes showed, however, that the last hearing was conducted the
next day, June 30, 1987. It appears to
the court that the date appearing in the decision was only a typographical
error. There was no irregularity in the
promulgation of the decision. The
record reveals that the promulgation of the decision was set on July 7, 1987
(p. 104, Record) after both parties submitted their respective
testimonial and documentary evidence. Moreover, the decision reflected that the trial judge took into
consideration the defense of the accused and the testimony of his witnesses in
arriving at his decision.

After a careful study of the case, We hold that the judgment of
conviction must be reversed.

First, the witness for the prosecution positively stated that the
victim was stabbed with a knife using the right hand of the assailant. The accused-appellant on the other hand
testified that he is left-handed. The
accused-appellant takes exception to the finding of the trial court that:

“x x x. Even if such claim is true, it was not quite
demonstrated that from the location of the wound, the relative positions of
assailant and victim and the trajectory of the blow considering the internal
organ pierced thereby, the injury could not have been inflicted by a
right-handed person. It appears,
however, that the location of the injury is compatible with the relative
positions of the assailant and victim as established by the prosecution. At any rate, such detail is considered
comparatively trivial and does not destroy the credibility of the witness or
his testimony (People v. Pielago, 140 SCRA 418).” (p. 109, Records)

We are of the considered opinion that the matter of the
accused-appellant being left-handed and the testimony of the prosecution
witness that the assailant delivered the fatal blow with his right hand is not
a trivial matter. A left-handed person
cannot be expected to deliver a thrust with the same intensity using his right
hand. The intensity of the blow can be
deduced from the fact that the assailant failed to remove the knife after the
thrust despite his attempt, as testified to by witness, Ongue (p. 7, TSN, April
28, 1987). In fact, the knife was
deeply embedded with such force that it had to be removed in the hospital (p.
5, TSN, April 28, 1987). It is
erroneous for the trial judge to conclude that there was no direct proof that
from ‘the location of the wound, the relative positions of assailant and victim
and the trajectory of the blow considering the internal organ pierced thereby,
the injury could not have been inflicted by a right-handed person.’ What could
be a more positive proof of this fact than the categorical statement of the
prosecution witnesses who saw the incident and who categorically stated that
the assailant delivered the fatal blow with his right hand. Is is unnatural for a left handed person to
use his right hand in accomplishing a tough act as stabbing another. It is also hard to believe that the left
handed assailant can deliver a stab blow with the same force as that of his
right, as in this case.

Second, in People v. Llaneras, et al., G.R. No. 89117, June 19,
1991, We held that “(T)here is no law requiring a police line-up as
essential to a proper identification (People v. Espiritu, G.R. No. 80406,
November 20, 1990). Thus, even if there
was no police line-up, there could still be proper identification as long as
such identification was not suggested to the witnesses by the police.”

The prosecution through witness Ongue, made it appear that the
latter identified the accused-appellant in a police line-up. The details however, showed otherwise. On direct examination by the court, he said:

“COURT:

“Q:      What
time did you see him in the police station for that identification?

“A:      In
the morning, one day after the incident.

“Q:
     How many hours after the incident?

“A:      I
could not exactly remember the hours, Your Honor.

“Q:
     Was it the day after the incident?

“A:      A
day after the incident. Yes, Your
Honor.

“Q:      You
mean to say it was the following morning that you saw him at the police
station?

“A:      Not
exactly because the police was not able to bring him the following morning, it
was the other day.

“Q:
     After the incident?

“A:
     Yes, Your Honor.”

On cross-examination, the trial court propounded the following
questions.

“COURT:

“Q:
     You said that you were able to
recognize Glenn Hatton at the police station two mornings after the incident,
did you not say so?

“A:
     Yes sir.

“Q:   Why,
what transpired at the police station when you went there? You relate to the court what procedure was
followed by the police in your investigation and in your identification of
Glenn Hatton, that is the point of the question?

“A: When I went to the police station to
shed light of (sic) the incident I was made to tell on how the incident
happened by the police who was assigned on us to ask questions and I narrated
to them all what really had transpired and because of the feature that was in
my memory about the person who struck the victim that night I was able to tell
them that if they can show me or present to me person who will fit the same
person in my memory I can identify and describe the assailant.

“Q:
     You mean to say you describe(d) the
feature of the assailant to the police?

“A:
     Yes, sir.

“Q:
     Thereafter, what did the police do
after you described the feature of the assailant?

“A:
     They said they have already some
suspect in mind.

“Q:
     Did you know at the time that you
were being investigated by the police that you knew already the suspect they
had?

“A.
     At that time, not yet, your Honor.

“Q:
     Right after you described the feature
of the assailant what did the police do?

“A:
     They begun hunting for their suspect.

“Q:
     How long did you stay inside the
police station?

“A:   I
went there 8:00 o’clock in the morning and probably I was able to go back to
the office around 11:00 o’clock already because it was already ready for
dinner. (sic)

“Q: So that from. 8:00 to 11:00 o’clock in
the morning that you were at the police station you were never confronted with
the presence of the accused at the police station?

“A:
     Not yet, your Honor.

“Q:
     By the way, when was that
investigation that you were made to relate to the police of what happened?

“A:
     Just after the incident the following
morning. I could not exactly remember
the date but it was the following morning after.

“Q: Alright, what transpired next in
connection with this case after that investigation the following morning after
the incident? What resulted in the
investigation?

“A:
     When they were able to produce their
suspect I was again picked up from the office and made to identify the person.

“Q:
     When was that when you were picked up from the office?

“A:
     It was two days after already.

“Q:
     Who picked you up?

“A:
     A policeman.

“Q:
     Where were you brought?

“A:
     To the police station.

“Q:
     The same police station where you
narrated the incident?

“A:
     Yes, sir.

“Q:
     What transpired there at the police
station this time?

“A:
     I told them that he is the same
fellow.

“Q:
     You describe to the court what
procedure was followed after you arrived at the police station?

“A: The accused Glenn Hatton was just sitting along the bench there and a policeman told me that he is their suspect and I immediately looked at him. Although he was wearing long sleves polo at the time of the incident but I immediately identified him and told the police that he is really the one who stabbed the victim.

“Q:      You mean to tell the court that you only identified the accused after the police indicated
him to you to be one of their suspect?

“A:
     Yes, sir.

“Q:
     So you had no idea that he was the
assailant before the police indicated him to you as one of their suspects?

“A: I had
the idea of his feature only but not his name, but when he was presented to me
for identification and looked at him it came into my memory that he really is
the person who stabbed the victim that night. In other words, Your Honor, when I looked at him he fits the same
feature to the person I saw that night.

“Q:
     Just before the police indicated him
to you to be among the suspects you already saw him?

“A:
     During the incident I saw him.

“Q:   During
that morning just before the police pointed to you that he is one of the
supects you already saw him? In other
words, that very morning before the police pointed him to you to be one of the
suspects you already saw him?

“A:      Not
yet because there were many people sitting along the benches.

“Q:
     So before the police
pointed him to you you had no idea
that the assailant was one among those
seated on the bench?

“A: Not yet, Your Honor, but when the police asked me to identify who among those persons seated on the bench and when looked at them I immediately identify the accused Glenn Hatton to be the person who stabbed Faustino Algarme that night.

“Q:     How
many persons were seated on the bench?

“A:
     I cannot exactly remember, Your
Honor, but the bench is full of persons seated along the bench.

“Q:      More
or less, how many?

“A:      About
ten persons.

“Q:
     From among the ten
persons seated on the bench the policeman
indicated to you the accused?

“A:
     The police told me
that among those persons seated at his
right is one of their suspects, and
I was made to identify the accused.

“Q:      On
that bench approximately were seated ten persons according to you?

“A:
     Yes, Your Honor.

“Q:
     How many persons
bearing mestizo’s feature seated on that
bench where the accused also sat?

“A:
     Only one.

“Q: So it is now clear
to the court that from these persons
approximately 10 in number seated on that
bench you were made to point out
and identify the assailant of Faustino
Algarme?

“A:
     Yes, Your Honor.” (pp. 6-27,
TSN, April 28, 1987). (underscoring
ours).

There is every reason to doubt the regularity of the
identification by Ongue of the accused-appellant. From his testimony, it is clear that he did not positively
identify the accused-appellant. At the
time of the incident he made a very fleeting glance on the person who stabbed
the victim. At that moment, he had the
impression that the assailant was a mestizo. During the proceedings in the police station where he was supposed to
identify the assailant, he identified the accused-appellant as allegedly the
person who stabbed the deceased, not because he was certain that the
accused-appellant was really the assailant but because he was the only mestizo
in the station and because he was pointed to the policemen as their suspect. The fact is that the accused-appellant was
not identified in a police line-up. He
was pointed to by the police as their suspect. He being the only mestizo in the station, Ongue pointed to him as
“the man.” From all indications, the identification of
accused-appellant by Ongue was suggested by the police and this is
objectionable. We quote hereunder a
portion of the decision of the U.S. Supreme Court expressing its misgivings on
the identification of a suspect in a police line-up where the influence of
improper suggestion is strong.

“x x x. A major factor contributing to the high incidence of
miscarriage of justice from mistaken identification has been the degree of
suggestion inherent in the manner in which the prosecution presents the suspect
to witnesses for pre-trial identification. A commentator has observed that [t]he influence of improper suggestion
upon identifying witnesses probably accounts for more miscarriages of justice
than any other single factor-perhaps it is responsible for more such errors
than all other factors combined. x x
x. Suggestion can be created
intentionally or unintentionally in many subtle ways. And the dangers for the suspect are particularly grave when the
witness’ opportunity for observation was insubstantial, and thus his
susceptibility to suggestion the greatest.

“Moreover, ‘[i]t is a matter of common experience that, once a
witness has picked out the accused at the line-up, he is not likely to go back
on his word later on, so that in practice the issue of identity may (in the
absence of other relevant evidence) for all practical purposes be determined
there and then, before the trial.’

“x x x.

“What facts have been disclosed in specific cases about the
conduct of pretrial confrontations for identification illustrate both the
potential for substantial prejudice to the accused at that stage and the need
for its revelation at trial. A
commentator provides some striking examples:

“‘In a Canadian case . . . the defendant had been picked out
of a line-up of six men, of which he was the only Oriental. In other cases, a black-haired suspect was
placed among a group of light-haired persons, tall suspects have been made to
stand with short non-suspects, and, in a case where the perpetrator of the
crime was known to be a youth, a suspect under twenty was placed in a line-up
with five other persons, all of whom were forty or over.’

“Similarly state reports, in the course of describing prior
identifications admitted as evidence of guilt, reveal numerous instances of
suggestive procedures, for example, that all in the line-up but the suspect
were known to be identifying witness, that the other participants in a line-up
were grossly dissimilar in appearance to the suspect, that only the suspect was
required to wear distinctive clothing which the culprit allegedly wore, that
the witness is told by the police that they have caught the culprit after which
the defendant is brought before the witness alone or is viewed in jail, that
the suspect is pointed out before or during a line-up, and that the
participants in the line-up are asked to try on an article of clothing which
fits only the suspect.” (U.S. v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218; 18 L ed. 2d 1149. 87
S Ct. 1926).

Seeking shelter under the just quoted U.S. v. Wade case, the
accused-appellant also argued that when he was presented in a line-up of sorts
he was not represented by a counsel. This allegedly violates his constitutional right to counsel during
custodial investigation.

This argument raised by appellant has no merit. The doctrine enunciated in the case of U.S.
v. Wade is that the presence of counsel is indispensable in a
post-indictment line-up. In that case,
the accused had already been arrested and a lawyer already appointed to
represent him. It was fifteen days
after his arrest and the appointment of a lawyer to represent him when he was
presented in a police line-up to be identified by the prosecution witness. There was no doubt that Wade in that case
was already under custodial investigation where his right to counsel already
attached.

“Since it appears that there is grave potential for prejudice,
intentional or not, in the pre-trial lineup, which may not be capable of
reconstruction at trial, and since presence of counsel itself can often avert
prejudice and assure a meaningful confrontation at trial, there can be little
doubt that for Wade the post-indictment lineup was a critical stage of the
prosecution at which he was ‘as much entitled to such aid [of counsel] . . . as
at the trial itself.’” (United States Supreme Court Reports, Lawyer
Edition, vol. 18, p. 1163).

In the instant case, Hatton was brought to the police station
only to be identified, by a witness to the killing of Algarme. Technically, he was not yet under custodial
investigation.

“The right to counsel attaches upon the start of an
investigation, i.e., when the investigating officer starts to ask questions to
elicit information and/or confessions or admissions from the
respondent/accused. At such point or
stage, the person being interrogated must be assisted by counsel to avoid the
pernicious practice of extorting false or coerced admissions or confessions
from the lips of the person undergoing interrogation, for the commission of an
offense.”

“x x x.”

“As aptly observed,
however, by the Solicitor General, the police line-up (at least, in this case)
was not part of the custodial inquest, hence, petitioner was not yet entitled,
at such stage, to counsel. The
Solicitor General states:

‘When petitioner was identified by the complainant at the police
line-up, he had not been held yet to answer for a criminal offense. The police line-up is not a part of the
custodial inquest, hence, he was not yet entitled to counsel. Thus, it was held that when the process had
not yet shifted from the investigatory to the accusatory as when police
investigation does not elicit a confession the accused may not yet avail of the
services of his lawyer (Escobedo v. Illinois of the United States Federal
Supreme Court, 378 U.S. 478, 1964). Since
petitioner in the course of his identification in the police line­-up had not
yet been held to answer for a criminal offense, he was, therefore, not deprived
of his right to be assisted by counsel because the accusatory process had not
yet set in. The police could not have
violated petitioner’s right to counsel and due process as the confrontation
between the State and him had not begun. In fact, when he was identified in the police line-up by complainant, he
did not give any statement to the police. He was, therefore, not interrogated at all as he was not facing a
criminal charge. Far from what
professes, the police did not, at that stage, exact a confession to be used
against him. For it was not he but the
complainant who was being investigated at that time. He ‘was ordered to sit down in front of the complainant while the
latter was being investigated’ (par. 3 .03, Petition). Petitioner’s right to counsel had not
accrued.’ ” (Gamboa v. Cruz, G.R. No. L-56291, June 27, 1988, 162 SCRA
642).

Third, the other prosecution witness who identified the
accused-appellant as the knife wielder was Romeo Basierto. He claimed in his testimony that at the time
the victim was stabbed, he did not at once recognize him (p. 5, TSN, June 30,
1987). However, when he chased him, he
recognized the man as the herein accused-appellant when the latter turned his
face towards Basierto before he allegedly entered the house of Nonong Hatton
(p. 7, ibid). He knew the accused
appellant because they were both residents of Catarman. However, as the defense counsel pointed out
in the cross-examination, Basierto never mentioned the name of the
accused-appellant in the sworn statement he executed on the 2nd of September
1986. In fact, he categorically stated
that he did not recognize the man who stabbed Algarme. We quote hereunder the pertinent portion of
his affidavit:

“x
x x.

“Q
–    Will you narrate to this investigator
what transpired on that date and time

“A
– While the four of us were on our way to the house of Engr. Corbilla on
that particular date and time, passing near the CLAO office, we met two persons
of which one was tall and the other was short. When the tall one got abreast with Faustino Algarme who was walking at
the edge of the street, he tapped Faustino by the shoulder and immediately
delivered a blow at Faustino and at this instance he shouted for help saying
that he was stabbed. I backed out a
little to see what happened because I was hidden from view by Edgardo Ongue and
I saw this tall man ran towards the corner near the house of Nonong Hatton and
upon nearing the entrance of the fence of the house of Nonong Hatton, this tall
man together with the short man who was following him got lost and I believe
they entered the entrance of the fence to the house of Nonong Hatton. After this, I went to the police station.

“Q –    Did
you recognize the man who stabbed Faustino?

“A – No sir, but this morning, Edgardo
Ongue who was the one who saw the face of this tall man who
stabbed Faustino identified this man at the police station who later turned out to
be Glenn Hatton the son of Nonong
Hatton,” (underscoring ours)

While an affidavit being taken ex parte is almost
incomplete and often inaccurate (People v. Avanzado, 158 SCRA 427) the affiant
Basierto could not have omitted the identity of accused-appellant as the
knife-wielder if it were true that he was able to identify him at that time he
gave chase. The matter of the identity
of the knife-wielder could not have been omitted by him considering its
importance in the resolution of the death of his friend.

While Basierto’s other companions brought the victim to the
hospital, he allegedly went to the police station to report the incident (TSN,
p. 11, Ibid). The police on duty,
Alfredo Nocha, however, testified that there was no entry in the police blotter
regarding the death of Algarme in the evening of August 29, 1986. There was an entry in the police blotter on
August 30, 1986 that at 8:10 in the morning, a certain Vicente Rojas reported
the stabbing of Algarme by an unidentified man.

More importantly, the accused-appellant was not positively
identified in court. True, his name was
referred to by both Basierto and Ongue in their respective direct
testimonies. However, he was not
identified in Court. The failure of the
prosecution witness to positively identify the assailant in court is fatal to
the prosecution’s cause. Pre-trial
identification is not sufficient.

While it is true that the defense of alibi is weak, it holds true
only if the prosecution’s evidence is strong. The better rule is, the prosecution must rely on the strength of its own
evidence and not on the weakness of the defense (People v. Solis, et al., 182
SCRA 182 (1990); People v. Buenaflor, 181 SCRA 225 (1990), People v.
Rodrigueza, G.R. No. 95902, Feb. 4, 1992). With the exclusion of the pre-indictment identification of the
accused-appellant and the failure of the prosecution witnesses to positively
identify him in court, the case against him must fail.

ACCORDINGLY, The appealed decision is reversed. Accused-appellant is ACQUITTED on reasonable
doubt.

SO ORDERED.

Cruz, (Chairman), Grino-Aquino, and
Bellosillo, JJ., concur.