LOS HIJOS DE I. DE LA RAMA, PLAINTIFFS AND APPELLANTS, VS. ERIBERTO MIJARES, DEFENDANT AND APPELLEE.
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Los Hijos de I. de la Rama versus Mijares
The Case
This is a suit on promissory notes brought by Los Hijos de I. de la Rama against Eriberto Mijares, on notes aggregating four thousand five hundred dollars executed by the defendant in favor of D. Esteban de la Rama. It matters for a Bar candidate not because of the notes themselves, but because of what happened to the case on its way up: the transition from the old procedural law to the Code of Civil Procedure of 1901, and the question of who bears the consequence when a trial judge, after judgment, applies the wrong procedure and sends the case up in the wrong manner. The Supreme Court never reached the merits. It reversed and remanded for a new trial, and the reasoning on procedural error and its consequences is the enduring lesson.
Procedural History
The suit was commenced on the fourth day of January, 1900, by an executive action. Objections were made, and after the termination of that executive action, a complaint in an ordinary declarative action was filed on the twenty-first of October, 1901. The case was heard in the Court of First Instance of Occidental Negros. The proceedings from the filing of the complaint up to the time of trial were apparently had in accordance with the provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure of 1901. But at the stage after the rendition of judgment, the judge adopted the provisions of the old Code of Civil Procedure and granted an appeal in accordance therewith. The case then reached the Supreme Court by appeal, but not by bill of exceptions as it should have been, and even the provisions of the former law were not observed, because the evidence was not sent up with the original papers. The Supreme Court, finding the record too confused to decide the case on its merits, reversed and remanded for a new trial.
Facts
The defendant, Eriberto Mijares, executed certain promissory notes aggregating four thousand five hundred dollars, payable to D. Esteban de la Rama. The plaintiffs, Los Hijos de I. de la Rama, sued on those notes in the Court of First Instance of Occidental Negros.
The suit began in January 1900 as an executive action. Objections were raised, and after that executive action terminated, the plaintiffs filed a complaint in an ordinary declarative action in October 1901. The case was tried, and judgment was rendered.
After judgment, the trial judge granted an appeal under the old Code of Civil Procedure rather than under the new Code of 1901. The appeal came up without a bill of exceptions, and the evidence was not sent up with the original papers. The record arrived in such a confused state that the Supreme Court could not determine the case on its merits.
Issues
- Whether or not the trial judge erred in granting an appeal under the old Code of Civil Procedure after the trial and judgment had proceeded under the Code of Civil Procedure of 1901.
- Whether or not that procedural error should be charged against the appellant, so as to defeat the appeal.
- Whether or not the Supreme Court could decide the case on its merits given the confused state of the record.
Applicable Provisions
Paragraph 4 of section 795 of the Code of Civil Procedure of 1901 provides:
Where the trial has not been already commenced all future procedure in such actions and special proceedings pending in a court at the date of the adoption of the new Code shall be in accordance with the provisions of the Code of 1901, so far as this act may be conveniently applicable to the conduct of such actions or proceedings.
This is the transitional provision that governs which procedure applies to actions pending when the new Code took effect, and it is the basis for the Court's treatment of the judge's choice of the old procedure.
Ruling
On the first issue, the Court held that the proceedings from the filing of the complaint up to the time of trial were apparently had in accordance with the Code of 1901, but that after the rendition of judgment the judge adopted the old Code and granted an appeal in accordance therewith. That was error, because the case should have come up by bill of exceptions. The Court, however, read the transitional provision as permitting the old procedure where the new law may not be conveniently applicable, and it presumed that the judge acted under the discretion allowed him by that provision.
On the second issue, the Court held that the error resulting from the judge's act in requiring the case to be brought up under the old procedure should not be charged to the appellant, so that the ends of justice may not be defeated. This followed its earlier ruling in Bustillos versus Garbanzos, decided on the fourth of December, 1902, on an appeal from the same court and similar in character.
On the third issue, the Court found that the record was in such a confused state that it was impossible to determine the case upon its merits. It therefore found it necessary, as in the former cases, to reverse and remand the case to the Court of First Instance for a new trial. The cost of the appeal was adjudged against the appellant.
Doctrine
First, under the transitional provision, where the trial has not yet commenced, future procedure in pending actions follows the new Code so far as it may be conveniently applicable; but the law permits procedure under the old law when the new law may not be conveniently applicable, and the Court will presume that the judge acted within the discretion allowed by that provision.
Second, a procedural error committed by the trial judge in requiring the case to be brought up under the old procedure is not charged to the appellant, so that the ends of justice may not be defeated. Procedural missteps of the court below should not be visited on the party who had no hand in them.
Third, where the record is so confused that the case cannot be determined on its merits, the proper course is to reverse and remand for a new trial rather than to speculate on the merits.
Disposition
The judgment was reversed and the cause remanded to the Court of First Instance for a new trial, with the cost of the appeal adjudged against the appellant.
Remember This
The line worth memorizing is that the error resulting from the act of the judge in requiring the case to be brought up under the old procedure should not be charged to the appellant, so that the ends of justice may not be defeated. Examiners use this case on the transitional effect of the Code of Civil Procedure of 1901 and on the rule that a lower court's procedural error is not the appellant's fault and calls for remand rather than dismissal.