G.R. No. 84966. November 21, 1991
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, PETITIONER, VS. THE COURT OF APPEALS AND ANTONINA GUIDO, MAURO CASTANEDA, MARGARITA GUIDO, GRACIANO L. AMANTE, FELIZA GUIDO, ANTONIO AQUINO, CRISANT…
MEDIALDEA, J.:
This petition seeks the review of the decision of the Court of
Appeals in C.A.-G.R. CV No. 12933 entitled “Republic of the Philippines,
Plaintiff-Appellants, versus Antonina Guido, et al.,
Defendants-Appellees,” which affirmed the
decision of the Regional Trial Court, National Capital Region, Branch CLV,
stationed in Pasig, declaring the authenticity of Decreto No. 6145 and Transfer Certificate of Title No.
23377 of the Registry of Deeds of Morong, Rizal.
The facts of the case are as follows:
The Republic of the Philippines, represented by the Solicitor
General, filed on August 22, 1979, a complaint for declaration of nullity of Decreto No. 6145, the owner’s duplicate copy of TCT No.
23377 and all titles derived from said decree; and the declaration of the
parcel of land covered by the decree as belonging to the state, except so much
thereof as had been validly disposed of to third persons. The complaint was amended on October 12, 1979. It was docketed as Civil Case No. 34242 of
the Court of First Instance of Rizal. The complaint alleged inter alia, that:
“15. The alleged Decree No. 6145 issued on September 10, 1911 and the alleged
owner’s copy of Transfer Certificate of Title No. 23377 issued on May 12, 1933, both in the name of
Francisco and Hermogenes
Guido, and which supposed owner’s duplicate was made the basis of the
administrative reconstitution of Transfer Certificate of Title No. (23377)
RT-M-0002 on March 29, 1976, or about 43 years later, are false, spurious and
fabricated and were never issued by virtue of judicial proceedings for
registration of land, either under Act No. 496, as amended, otherwise known as
the Land Registration Act, or any other law, x x x.” (pp. 91-92, Rollo)
Named defendants were: 1) Antonina, Margarita, Feliza, Crisanta and Candida, nee Guido, who claim to be the heirs
of Francisco Guido and whose spouses were joined as defendants; 2) Esperanza,
Alfredo (who died during the pendency of this case
and who was substituted by his heirs), Eufronia, Gliceria, Priscilla, Profetiza,
Buenaventura, Buensuceso and Carlos, all surnamed
Guido, who claimed to be the heirs of Hermogenes
Guido and whose respective spouses were joined as defendants; 3) Spouses Jose
and Emiliana Rojas; 4) Pacil
Development Corporation; and 5) Interport Resources
Corporation.
The defendants, herein private respondents, denied that Decreto No. 6145 and TCT No. 23377 were false and
spurious. They consistently claimed
(from the trial court up to this Court) that the parcel of land covered by the
questioned documents is a portion of the vast Hacienda de Angono
owned by their predecessor-in-interest, Don Buenaventura Guido y Sta. Ana;
that Don Buenaventura Guido left a portion of the hacienda (porcion
del plano 11-627) to his heirs, Francisco and Hermogenes Guido; that the subject matter of the petition
is only a portion of plano 11-627, consisting of an
area of 3,181.74 hectares and covered by Decreto No.
6145, issued on September 1, 1911 in the name of the heirs of Buenaventura
Guido y Sta. Ana (Francisco and Hermogenes Guido);
that on June 12, 1912, an Original Certificate of Title (OCT No. 633) was
issued on the basis of Decreto No. 6145; that the
original title was subsequently cancelled and in lieu thereof, Transfer Certificate
of Title No. 23377 was issued on May 12, 1933; that the heirs of Francisco and Hermogenes Guido adjudicated among themselves the estate
left by their predecessors and transferred one-half portion thereof to Jose
Rojas sometime in 1942, as contained in an Extra-judicial Settlement of Estate
with Quitclaim dated December 17, 1973.
The parties, however, admit that on August 20, 1974, the heirs of Buenaventura Guido,
represented by their lawyer, requested the then Land Registration Commission
(now Land Registration Authority) to issue the corresponding original
certificate of title based on Decreto 6145. The request was denied on January 8, 1976.
On March 29, 1976,
Alfredo Guido, representing the other heirs, filed a petition (Exhibit
“I-I”-1, p. 180, Records) for reconstitution of TCT No. 23377 with
the Registry of Deeds of Morong. The petition alleged that the original of
Transfer Certificate of Title No. 2337 could not be located in the files of the
Registry of Deeds of Rizal after he and his co-heirs
sought the registration of their Extra-judicial Settlement with Quitclaim dated
December 17, 1973. The petition was supported by the owner’s
duplicate copy of the title.
The petition for administrative reconstitution of TCT No. 23377
was granted and a reconstituted certificate of title [TCT (23377) RT-M-0002]
was issued dated March 29, 1976.
After the reconstitution, the heirs presented before the Registry
of Deeds of Morong the Extra-judicial Settlement of
Estate with Quitclaim which they executed on December 17, 1973 in favor of Jose Rojas and which they
had earlier presented for registration.
Subsequently, the entire parcel of land covered by the decree was
subdivided into twenty-one (21) lots and twenty-one (21) different certificates of titles were issued in lieu of the
reconstituted TCT No. 23377. The named
heirs and now spouses Jose and Emilia Rojas sold the
property to Pacil Management Corporation and new
titles were issued in favor of the buyer on June 25, 1976.
However, on August 26, 1976,
Pacil Management Corporation reconveyed
all the twenty one lots to the former owners.
On August 25, 1978,
fourteen (14) of these twenty-one (21) lots were exchanged with shares of
stocks of Interport Resources Corporation. On April
21, 1980, all the named heirs renounced their rights over the
property in favor of their co-heir Alfredo Guido, Sr. in exchange for monetary
considerations.
It appears that the only parties with existing interests in the
property subject of this case are Interport Resources
Corporation, the Heirs of Alfredo Guido, Sr. and spouses Jose Rojas and Emilia Rojas.
After trial, the court a quo rendered judgment dismissing the complaint and declaring Decree
No. 6145 and TCT No. 23377, genuine and authentic. The pertinent portion of the decision states:
“Considering that Decree 6145 and TCT No. 23377 are genuine
and authentic, the decree cannot now be reopened or revived.
‘A decree of registration binds the lands (sic), quiets title
thereto, is conclusive upon all persons and cannot be reopened or revived after
the lapse of one year after entry of the decree.’ (Ylarde
v. Lichauco, 42 SCRA 641)
“WHEREFORE, premises considered, this case is hereby
dismissed. Likewise, the counter claims
of the defendants are dismissed.
The decision of the trial court was appealed by the Solicitor
General to the Court of Appeals which affirmed said decision on July 12, 1988 (pp. 149-154, Rollo).
On July 16, 1988,
the Solicitor General filed a motion for reconsideration of the decision of the
Court of Appeals. In the same motion, he
prayed for an alternative judgment declaring the decree and its derivative
titles authentic except with respect to such portions of the property which
were either: 1) possessed and owned by bona
fide occupants who had already acquired
indefeasible titles thereto; or 2) possessed and owned by bona fide
occupants and their families with lengths of possession which amounted to
ownership (p. 224, Rollo).
The motion for reconsideration was denied by the appellate court
in a resolution dated September 14,
1988, which reads:
“After careful consideration of the motion for reconsideration
and defendants-appellees‘ opposition thereto, we find
no cogent reason to justify the reversal of Our Decision dated July 12, 1988,
hence, the motion is DENIED.
“Likewise DENIED, is the alternative prayer to modify the
afore-mentioned Decision ‘to the extent that the recognition of the
authenticity of Decree No. 6145 and TCT No. 23371 shall not affect and
prejudice the parcels of land already
possessed and owned by bonafide occupants who have
already acquired indefeasible titles thereto,’ for to grant said alternative prayer would be to run
roughshod over Our decision averred to.” (p. 80, Rollo)
This petition before Us was
filed on October 14, 1988
with the same prayer for the declaration of nullity of Decreto
No. 6145 and TCT No. 23377 as in the complaint before the Regional Trial Court
and in the appeal before the Court of Appeals.
The prayer for an alternative judgment first brought to the Court of
Appeals in the motion for reconsideration of its decision was also reiterated,
thus:
“In the alternative, judgment be rendered on equitable
grounds, modifying the aforesaid Decision dated July 12, 1988 of the respondent
Court of Appeals, that the recognition of the authenticity of Decree No. 6145
and TCT No. 23377 shall be valid only to the extent of the area of land in
question not possessed and owned by bonafide
occupants with indefeasible registered titles of ownership or with the length
of possession which has ripened to title of ownership thereto.” (p. 54, Rollo)
On May 19, 1989, private respondent Interport
Resources Corporation filed a manifestation that on May 15, 1989, it entered
into an Agreement with the Presidential Commission on Urban Poor (PCUP) for the
disposition of five hundred (500) hectares of the property involved in this
case for the use of deserving urban poor and to help the government in its
objective of alleviating the squatter problem in Metro Manila area. In the same manifestation, it also stated
that Interport Resources had agreed to accept the
alternative prayer of petitioner (pp. 301-304, Rollo). Counsel
for private respondents Jose and Emiliana Rojas filed
a joint Comment (p. 324, Rollo) manifesting no
objection to the granting of petitioner’s alternative prayer. The illegitimate heirs of private respondent
Alfredo Guido, Sr., represented by *Atty. Gilbert
M. Fabella, filed a separate comment in which
they manifested that there is no legal basis for the recognition of any alleged
right of those occupants who were able to secure titles over portions of the
Hacienda de Angono (pp. 571-574, Rollo). The
other set of heirs of private respondent Alfredo Guido, Sr. conceded in their
comment, to a portion of petitioners’ alternative prayer, that is, only insofar
as it would benefit those occupants in the property who obtained certificates
of titles to specific portions thereof (p. 428, Rollo).
In their joint memorandum (pp. 624-635, Rollo), all of the private respondents
submitted that they had unanimously agreed to accept the alternative prayer of
the petitioner, thus:
“Since December 4,
1990 up to this submission favorable developments have occurred in
the relationship between the group denominated as the legitimate heirs of
Alfredo Guido, Sr. represented herein by the Laurel Law Offices and the other
group of heirs represented by Executrix Claraminda Anselmo Guido and Claraminda
Guido represented herein by *Atty.
Gilbert M. Fabella.
These developments have prompted the latter group to withdraw as they
hereby withdraw using this Joint Memorandum signed by their counsel *Atty. Gilbert M. Fabella as
the venue, their opposition to the Alternative Prayer. With the signature of their counsel, they now
manifest before this Honorable Supreme Court their adherence to the position of
all the other private respondents, i.e., accepting the Alternative Prayer of
the petition, adopting Interport’s Manifestation and
Motion under date of May 16, 1989 and
praying likewise that judgment be rendered based on said Alternative
Prayer.”
In this petition, the petitioner alleged that respondent
appellate court committed serious errors and committed grave abuse of
discretion in rendering its decision more specifically:
“a) in concluding and ruling that petitioner RP ‘failed
to satisfy the requirements of preponderant proof in support of its theory’
when, on the contrary, it has satisfactorily adduced more than sufficient
evidentiary and conclusive proof, demonstrating convincingly that both
documents in question, purporting, respectively, to be a Decreto
No. 6145 and Transfer Certificate of Title No. 23377, covering a vast area of
land, so called “Hacienda Angono,” located
in Binangonan, Rizal, are
fake and spurious; and
“b) in denying and riding “roughshod” over
the alternative prayer in the Motion for Reconsideration (Annex “F”)
to modify the main CA Decision (Annex “A”), despite the justifiably
legal and equitable grounds for respondent Court of Appeals to grant the same,
since there is evidentiary basis pointing to the alarming situation with
disastrous consequences, if and when the CA Decision (Annex “A”)
would be arbitrarily and fully
implemented, by way of cadastral chaos,
multiplicity of suits and loss of public faith in the Torrens System as well as
the ensuing grandscale dispossession and social
displacement of several hundreds of bonafide
occupants and their families who had already secured indefeasible registered
titles to portions of the so-called Hacienda Angono.
It is the contention of petitioner that respondent Court of
Appeals committed serious errors in the assessment of the evidence on record
and acted with grave abuse of discretion in concluding that the Republic failed
to satisfy the requirements of preponderant proof in support of its theory.
In civil cases, the party having the burden of proof must
establish his case by a preponderance of evidence. Stated differently, the general rule in civil
cases is that a party having the
burden of proof of an essential fact must produce a preponderance of evidence
thereon (I Moore on Facts, 4, cited in Vicente J. Francisco, The Revised Rules
of Court in the Philippines, Vol. VII, Part II, p. 542, 1973 Edition). By preponderance of evidence is meant simply
evidence which is of greater weight, or more convincing than that which is
offered in opposition to it (32 C.J.S., 1051).
The term ‘preponderance of evidence’ means the weight, credit and value
of the aggregate evidence on either side and is usually considered to be
synonymous with the terms ‘greater weight of evidence’ or ‘greater weight of
the credible evidence.’ Preponderance of the evidence is a phrase which, in the
last analysis, means probability of the
truth. Preponderance of the evidence
means evidence which is more
convincing to the court as worthy of belief than that which is offered in
opposition thereto. x x x.” (20 Am. Jur., 1100-1101)
The matter of determining which party had the preponderant
evidence is within the province of the trial court before whom the evidence of
both parties are presented. The decision
of who to believe and who not to believe goes to the credibility of a witness
which, likewise, is within the province of the trial court.
All the facts and circumstances of the case must properly be
considered in determining the weight of evidence (20 Am. Jur.,
1027). In weighing the evidence of
witnesses, the trial court takes into consideration all the surrounding facts
and circumstances of the case on trial including the means of knowledge of the
witnesses, their true intentions, their seeming honesty or lack of it, their
respective opportunities for seeing and knowing the things about which they
testify, their conduct upon the witness stand, their manner of testifying, etc.
We have carefully gone through
the records of this case and there is no reason for this Court to reverse the
decisions of both the court a quo and the appellate court. Both courts were one in concluding that the
preponderance of evidence is in favor of the theory presented by the private respondents, i.e., the authenticity of the questioned
documents.
Petitioner’s primary
witness was Francisco Cruz, Jr., a
document examiner of the PC
Crime Laboratory. The trial court
summarized his testimony as follows:
“x x x. He found that as to Transfer Certificate of
Title No. 23377, the signature above the printed words Register of Deeds reveal
fundamental divergencies in that the questioned
signature was written on a slow and drawn manner, and no gradation of the ink
lines of the up and down stroke whereas the standard signatures are executed
with smooth and fluent manner, habitual speed, firmness of the strokes, and
show gradation of the ink lines; the questioned and standard signatures have
different slants, different initial and
different strokes. As to the
printing in the questioned and standards TCTs, they
have different printing characteristics, defects, spacing size and length. Regarding the red seal on the TCT, the
questioned seal is dark red in color, while the standards are bright red and on
exposure to ultra-violet lamp the questioned seal has ho fluorescence reaction
while the standards give red reactions.
As to the paper the surface of the questioned TCT has a deep brown
discoloration and did not penetrate
inward indicative of artificial aging.
Regarding Decree No. 6145, Francisco Cruz, Jr. testified that as to
the signature and ink used are still intensely dark without the indication of
fading of color or oxidation and appear fresh while the ink used in the
standards are faded or discolored due to oxidation, the signatures in the
questioned and standard decrees have different shading, divergent strokes and
pen-lifts. On the dry seal, the
borderline reeds of the questioned seal are sharp while in the standards they
are dull, there are 77 surrounding beads in the questioned seal while there are
97 in the standards, the distances between letters are different in the
questioned and standard documents indicating they were not impressed by one and the same machine. As to the rubber stamp name, RALPH E. McPIE, the color of the ink in the questioned signature is
reddish while in the standards they are blue; they have different
characteristics indicating they were not from one and the same machine. With respect to the rubber stamp Received,
the ink used in the questioned document is pink-red while the standards faded
violet, the rubber stamp have different characteristics, size and s[acing of
letters; the paper used in the questioned decree has no water mark. (pp., 151-152, Rollo).
The testimony of Francisco Cruz was corroborated by the report
dated December 15, 1980 of
Segundo A. Tabayoyong, NBI Chief Document Examiner
and Chief, Questioned Documents Station.
However, Tabayoyong was not presented in
court.
The private respondents, on the other hand, presented Atty. Desiderio Pagui, former Chief,
Questioned Documents Section of the NBI.
In 1975, even before the complaint for declaration of nullity of Decreto 6145 and TCT. No. 23377 was filed in court, he was
requested by the Land Registration Commission to examine and verify the
authenticity of Decree No. 6145. The
court a quo summarized
his testimony as follows:
“x x
x. He
declared that the NBI received a request for examination of Decree 6145 from
the Land Registration Commission which was forwarded to him and after his
examination and investigation, he made a report, Questioned Document Report No.
476-675 dated August 22, 1975 approved by Ernesto G. Brion,
Chief Criminalistics Division and noted by Lorenzo Brion, Deputy Director for Technical Services, NBI. He found that there are significant
similarities in handwriting characteristics existing between the questioned and
standard signatures RALPH E. McPIE in the decree such
as proportion of the base and
height alignment, made in fact and unconscious movement; lateral spacing;
consistent peculiar sight upward tendency of the signature; gradation of pen
pressure, presence of pen emphasis and tapering of lines; individual highly
developed letter designs; line quality; natural variation, i-dots,
periods and dash; and location of crossings of strokes and that there are no
significant dissimilarities in writing characteristics. There are similarities in type face designs
existing between the typewritings appearing in the
questioned and standard documents indicating that the decrees were typed from
the same brand or kind of typewriter.
Further, he testified the Decree 6145 shows natural brownish coloration
(unartificially) indicative of aged document similar
with the decrees executed in 1910, 1911 and 1912 on file in the vault section,
LRC, the figure in writing in “Samp
Receipt” in Decree 6145 shows general characteristics with those figures
in writing on Stamp Receipt in decrees executed in 1910, 1911 and 1912; the dry
seal disclose similarities in general characteristics and the stamped signature
in questioned decree and standard decrees have identical similarities. As a consequence of all these findings, he
concluded that Decree No.6145 is genuine.
He also testified on the authenticity of the owner’s duplicate of TCT
23377, as follows: He testified further
that he likewise examined Transfer Certificate of Title No. 23377 and after a
comparative examination between TCT No. 23377 and various exemplars he found
that there are significant similarities in handwriting characteristics between
the questioned and exemplar signatures above the printed word “Register of
Deeds” indicating that the signatures were written by one and the same
person. There are significant
similarities in type printing impressions between the questioned typed printed
words and the corresponding exemplars indicating that the printed words in the
questioned TCT and different exemplars were impressed from the same printing
machine. As to the dry seal impressions,
there are significant similarities between the questioned and exemplar dry seal
impressions, although the questioned dry seal appears darker while the
exemplars are lighter in color as variance in color is affected by different
conditions of storage. Likewise, the
variance in color of the documents could be attributed to the different
conditions when the documents were kept in file. All these findings of the witness were
likewise explained by way of various charts and photo-enlargements. (pp. 152-153, Rollo)
We are confronted here
with varying testimonies of two expert witnesses. However, We agree with the court a quo
and respondent appellate court in
giving more weight to the testimony of Atty. Desiderio
Pagui than to that of Mr. Francisco A. Cruz. Their respective educational and work
background speak of the differing levels of their qualifications and competence
to testify as expert witnesses.
Francisco Cruz, a Document Examiner of the PC Crime Laboratory, is a
BSBA graduate who had examined not less than 10,000 documents. Atty. Pagui, on the
other hand, is the former Chief of the Questioned Document Section of the NBI
an LLB and B.S. Criminology graduate, and had examined about 50,000 questioned
documents. The court a quo
observed, and We note this fact, that Atty. Pagui
testified in a straight-forward manner while Mr. Cruz wavered in answering some
pertinent questions. We also note from
the transcript of stenographic notes that Pagui’s
answers to some technical qustions reveal his
authority as a document and handwriting witness, which cannot be said of
Francisco Cruz.
Atty. Pagui
was first to render a report on these questioned documents. On August 22, 1975, upon the request of the Land Registration Commission, he, then, Chief of the NBI,
Questioned Documents Section, conducted his investigation and submitted his
report finding these documents authentic.
At the time he made the investigation, he was impartial and not
conscious of any impending case before the court. Four (4) years later, in 1979, another
request for investigation, this time from the Office of the Solicitor General,
was received by the NBI. He was
disappointed and disgusted by the reaction of then NBI Director who pretended
not to have known about the existing NBI report on Decreto
6145. This, according to Pagui was one of the reasons for his early retirement from
the NBI (TSN, March 27, 1984, pp. 39-45).
On December 15, 1980, the NBI rendered another report (Exhibit
“M”) finding Decreto No. 6145 not genuine,
signed by Segundo Tabayoyong, who was appointed NBI
Chief Document Examiner and Chief of the Questioned Documents Section after the
retirement of Atty. Pagui. It is noteworthy that, Mr. Tabayoyong was one of those who conformed with the previous
report of the NBI submitted by Atty. Pagui in 1975 as
claimed by the latter and which was not contradicted by the petitioner.
The petitioner also alleged that Decree No. 6145, solitary in its
hidden isolation and detached from the expediente
of the land registration case, surfaced 64 years later under mysterious and
bizarre circumstances.
The circumstances surrounding the appearance of Decree 6145 was
far from mysterious. Racquel
Marfori, a witness for the petitioner, who was then
Chief of the Ordinary Decree Section of the Division of Original Registration,
Land Registration Commission testified that her office’ function is to receive
copies of decrees, certified copies of titles from the Registers of Deeds,
papers and documents from the Courts, the Bureau of Lands and other agencies
and keeps circulars and memoranda issued by the office and from the Department
of Justice. She further testified that
on September 4, 1954, then LRC Commissioner Antonio Noblejas
issued Circular No. 4, instructing all Registers
of Deeds to forward all copies of decrees in their possession for custody to
the LRC to complete the records of the Commission. As appearing in the record book of inventory
in the LRC, among the decrees forwarded to their office is Decree 6145
(TSN, October 26, 1982, pp. 54-55). She
likewise categorically stated that in the course of investigation of this case,
a copy of Decree 6145 was found in the vault section of the Commission (Ibid,
p. 66).
Petitioner’s witness Mr. Jose Cruz, testified that the alleged
GLRO number stated on the decreto pertains to a tract
of land owned by Victorio Banaag
and not Buenaventura Guido; that said property was located in Bulacan and not in Rizal and that
TCT No. 25829 was issued in that case and not OCT 633 as alleged by the private
respondents, However, on cross-examination, he said that TCT No. 26829 of Banaag did not contain any decree number nor GLRO
number. He also admitted that indeed
Decree No. 6145 was issued on September 1, 1911 in GLR Record No. 2350.
“Q: In
your report Mr. Cruz appearing on page 2 thereof, I am quoting a portion of
your report appearing on page 2 thereof, second paragraph: ‘Alfredo Guido one of the heirs of Hermogenes
Guido, petitioned for the reconstitution of the original Transfer Certificate
of Title No. 23377 of the Register of Deeds of Rizal
and issuance of new original Transfer Certificate of Title, etc., etc.’ and
furthermore, this is the portion that I am going to ask you of: ‘but upon verification it appears that the
original of said Transfer Certificate of Title No. 23377 bearing Book T-94,
Page 177 could not be located in the files of the Register of Deeds of Rizal.’ Do you remember having stated that in your report
which I am showing to you?
“A: Yes
sir, I cannot find the original Transfer Certificate of Title on file with the
Register of Deeds of Pasig.
“Q: So,
this statement of Mr. Guido in his petition for reconstitution is correct?
“A: Yes
sir.
“Q: And
also on the same page under the
heading findings, you stated and I quote:
‘In the Ordinary Decree Book that Court of Land Registration Record No.
2350 was approved on August 26,
1977 and issued Decree No. 6145 on September 1, 1911 for a parcel of land
located in the province of Rizal, but the name of
owner, area and the municipality it is located was not mentioned.’ And you
further stated and I quote: ‘It shows
that CLR Record No. 2350 was really issued Decree No. 6145 on September 1,
1911.’ Do you affirm those statements you made?
“A: Yes
sir.
“Q: In
other words, there was really such a decree issued on September 1, 1911?
“A: Yes
sir.
“Q: In
fact Mr. Cruz, in one of your annexes to Exhibit ‘C’ which is your report and
which has been marked in this proceedings as Exhibit ‘C-7’, it would appear
that there is such a Record 2350, correct?
“A: Yes
sir.
“Q: In
the Province of Rizal?
“A: Yes
sir.
“Q: And
there was a decree issued on August 26, 1906 as appearing in the column date
okay for decree, is that correct?
“A: Yes
sir.
“Q: Moreover,
it states in the last colum that the decree was
issued on September 1, 1911?
“A: Yes
sir.
“Q: Bearing
the Decree No. 6145?
“A: Yes
sir.
“Q: And
it is equally true Mr. Cruz that Decree 6145 from your investigation was among
those old documents and decrees found in the Vault Section of the Land
Registration Commission, is that correct?
“A: That
appears to be in the vault Section because Justice Kapunan
was the one who gave me that decree.
“Q: And
Justice Kapunan I suppose told you that it came from
the Vault Section of the Land Registration Commission that is why in your
report, the one in the Vault Section where salvage and issued Decrees are kept
shows that Decree No. 6145 was found in their files, is that correct?
“A: Yes
sir.” (TSN, pp. 18-22, Hearing of June 9, 1982)
The testimonies of the municipal treasurers and tax assessors
that none of the private respondents registered in their names big tracts of
land nor paid any property tax corresponding to large tracts of land was
sufficiently explained by private respondents.
Originally, the property subject of this case was wholly owned by the
heirs, herein private respondents Guidos, pro-indiviso. The title
to this land was never registered in their individual names. Decree No. 6145 was issued in the name of
“Herederos de Buenaventura Guido y Sta. Ana
(Francisco and Hermogenes Guido)” while TCT No.
23377 was registered in the name of his two sons, Francisco and Hermogenes Guido.
The declaration of property dated 1941 (Exhibit 8) and the property
taxes (Exhibits 11, 11-A to 11-F for defendants) were all in the name of Don
Buenaventura Guido y Sta. Ana. In fact, even after the reconstitution
of TCT No. 23377 on March 29,
1976 and its subsequent subdivision into 21 different titles, these parcels
were still registered in the name of the heirs of Francisco and Hermogenes Guido (See TCT Nos. M-00789, M-00846 to
M-00866).
Alfredo Guido, Sr., during his lifetime, testified that the
owner’s duplicate copy of TCT No.
23377 (Exhibits “5” and “5-A” for defendants) was given to
him by Joaquin Guido who is the son of Justo Guido,
the latter appearing to be a brother of Don Buenaventura Guido. Thus,
“q. Will you explain to us
how Exhibits 5 and 5-A came into your possession?
“a. It
was given to me by Joaquin Guido, my uncle.
“q. Will
you relay to this Hon. Court under what circumstances this document was given
to you by your uncle?
“a. I sued Joaquin Guido and his brother
because they wanted to get the possession and administration of Hacienda de Angono, sir.
“q. Where
did you file the case?
“a. In
Pasig, sir.
“q. Who
is Joaquin Guido?
“a. He
is the son of Justo Guido, sir.
“q. What
happened to the case you file?
“a. Nothing
happened, they just kept silent. When
Joaquin Guido testified in Court he said he cannot deny that we are his nephews
and even pointed and identified us in
Court giving their names. Joaquin Guido
even testified that he is already old and he does not want his conscience to
bother him.
“q. Will
you relay to us under what circumstances your uncle Joaquin Guido gave you
these documents?
“a. Joaquin
Guido went to our house in Cardona,
one Sunday and he said, Alfredo I have documents here regarding that land and I
will give it to you but help me because I am sick and I want to be
treated. I said, I do not have much
money but if you like, I will bring you to the office of Jose Roxas, you bring all those documents in your possession.
“q. Was
that proposal of yours to go to the office of Mr. Roxas
materialized?
“a. Yes, sir, we proceeded to Cinerama.
“q. What
transpired while you were at the office of Mr. Roxas
at Cinerama?
“a. Mr.
Roxas checked the documents and he said to Joaquin
Guido, I will give you the help you were asking.
“ATTY. MENDOZA
The original of these
documents is now in the possession of the LRC, I will reserve my examination of
the witness on that point, your Honor.
“q. What
happened when Mr. Roxas checked the documents?
“a. He
asked Mr. Joaquin Guido to return.
“q. Did
he return thereafter?
“a. yes,
sir, after three days, more or less.
“q. What
happened when he returned to the office of Mr. Roxas?
“a. He
was given the amount of P30,000.00, sir.
“q. What
happened after the money was given to Joaquin Guido?
“a. He
left, sir.
“q. Is
that payment to Mr. Joaquin Guido evidenced by any document?
“a. A
check, sir.
“q. We
request that this check No. 16459 HO of the Republic Bank, Escolta
dated March 29, 1976 for P30,000.00 x x x.” (pp. 33-40, TSN,
August 22, 1983).
The petitioner suspects that the circumstances attending the
issuance of the reconstituted TCT 23377 was not regular. It alleged that the petition for reconstitution
was filed and approved on the same day and the reconstituted title issued also
on the same day. When presented on the
stand, Atty. Priscilla M. Tech, then Register of Deeds of Rizal
(Morong Branch), who issued the reconstituted title
clarified that the reconstituted title was not issued on the same day the
petition was filed. The reconstituted
title was actually issued days after the petition for reconstitution was filed
although the reconstituted title showed that it was released on the same day
the petition was filed in accordance with Section 56* of Act
496. Be that as it may, the fact alone
that the petition for reconstitution was approved on the same day that it was
filed did not render the approval suspect.
In administrative reconstitution of a certificate of title supported by
the owner’s duplicate copy of the title, no other requisite was required under
Section 6 of Republic Act 26
unlike in judicial reconstitution under Section 12 of the same law. The Register of Deeds correctly granted the
reconstitution on the basis of private respondents owners’ duplicate copy of
TCT No. 23377.
In civil cases, it is a well settled rule that the appellate
court will not reverse a finding of fact
by the trial court made upon conflicting testimony and depending largely
upon the credibility of witnesses who testified in the presence of the court,
unless the court failed to take into consideration some material fact or
circumstance or to weigh accurately all of the material facts and circumstances
presented to it for consideration (Baltazar, et al.
v. Alberto, 33 Phil. 336; See also Garcia v. Garcia de Bartolome,
63 Phil. 425; Melliza v. Towle,
34 Phil. 347; Caragay v. Urquiza,
53 Phil. 79; Jai-alai Corp. of the Philipiines v. Ching Kiat Biek,
et al., G.R. L-7969, March 30, 1960; Tui Bon Hui v. Republic, L-8370, November 19, 1956; Neyra v. Neyra, 76 Phil.
298). In the instant case, We do not see
any reason for the application of the exception to the just cited rule. Moreover, questions of authenticity being one
of fact, this Court will not disturb the conclusions of the Court of Appeals (Egao v. CA, G.R No. 79787, June 29, 1989, 174 SCRA 484),
especially when said appellate court merely affirmed the findings of the court a
quo which conducted the trial, had the
opportunity to observe the demeanor of the principal witnesses (the handwriting
and document experts), assessed their ability to answer technical questions
calling for the application of their special education and training.
No less than this Court in the case of Guido, et al., v. de Borja, et al., G.R. No. 4013, February 4, 1909, 12 Phil.
718 declared the existence of Hacienda de Angono and
recognized the ownership thereof by the “Guidos”
when it affirmed the decision of the then Court of First Instance of the
Province of Rizal, that:
“1. That the ownership and possession of the
hacienda of Angono, as it appears described in the
decision of said court, in accordance with the amended complaint, pertains to Justo Guido, Juliana Guido, Buenaventura Guido and other
participants with them in said hacienda; by virtue thereof the court below
ordered the defendants to restore said possession to the plaintiffs.”
The Solicitor General also faulted respondent appellate court from denying their
alternative prayer seeking the modification of its decision by rendering
judgment declaring Decreto 6145 and TCT 23377 valid
and genuine except with respect to such portions of the property which were
either: 1) possessed and owned by bona
fide occupants who had already acquired indefeasible titles thereto; or
2) possessed by bona fide occupants for such length
of time as to amount to ownership without having obtained certificates of
titles thereto.
Anent the alternative prayer of the petitioner, We find no legal
basis for the declaration of the questioned documents as valid only with
respect to such portions of the property not possessed and owned by bonafide occupants with indefeasible registered titles of
ownership or with lengths of possession which had ripened to ownership. Having been found valid and genuine, Decreto No. 6145 therefore, possessed all the attributes of
a decree of registration. Section 31 of
the Property Registration Decree (P.D. 1529), second paragraph provides:
The decree of registration
shall bind the land and quiet title thereto, subject only to such exceptions or
liens as may be provided by law. It
shall be conclusive upon and against all persons, including the National
Government and all branches thereof, whether mentioned by name in the
application or notice, the same being included in the general description
“To al whom it may concern”.
Likewise, TCT No. 23377, having been found true and authentic
also possessed all the attributes of a torrens
certificate of title. By express
provision of Section 47 of P.D 1529, no title to registered land in derogation
to that of the registered owner shall be acquired by prescription or adverse
possession. To declare that the decree
and its derivative titles is valid but only with respect to the extent of the
area described in the decree not possessed by occupants with indefeasible
registered titles or to possessors with such lengths of possession which had
ripened to ownership is to undermine the people’s faith in the torrens titles being conclusive as to all matters contained
therein. The certificate serves as
evidence of an
indefeasible title to the
property in favor of the person whose names appear therein. After the expiration of the one year period
from the issuance of the decree
of registration upon which it is based, it becomes incontrovertible (see case
of Pamintuan v. San Agustin, 43 Phil. 558; Reyes and Nadres v. Borbon and Director of
Lands, 50 Phil. 791, Sy Juco v.
Francisco, O.G. p. 2186, April 15, 1957, Brizuela v.
de Vargas, 53 O.G. 2822, May 15, 1957), unless subsequent to the issuance of
the decree a third party may be able to show that he acquired title thereto by
any of the means recognized by law.
It should be noted however, that prior to the reconstruction of TCT
No. 23377 on March 29, 1976, [there was] no record in the Office of the
Register of Deeds of Rizal show of the existence of
any registered title covering the land area subject of this case. The Court takes judicial notice of the fact
that prior to said date, certain portions of the area were in the possession of
occupants who successfully obtained certificates of titles over the area
occupied by them. There were also
occupants who had not obtained certificates
of titles over the area possessed by them but the lengths of their possession
were long enough to amount to ownership, had the land been in fact
unregistered. This fact is admitted by
the parties.
Although prescription is unavailing against private respondents
because they are holders of a valid certificate
of title, the equitable presumption of laches may be
applied against them for failure to assert their ownership for such an
unreasonable length of time (only in 1976) against subsequent occupants. The record showed that it was only in 1974 when they tried to obtain an
original certificate of title. When
rebuffed by the LRC, they applied for a reconstitution of a TCT only in 1976.
In the recent case of Lola v. CA, G.R. No. L-46573, Nov. 13, 1986, 145 SCRA 439, citing the
cases of Pabalete v. Echarri,
Jr., G.R. No. L-24357, 37 SCRA 518, 521, 522 quoting Mejia de Lucas v. Gamponia, 100 Phil. 277, it was held that “although
the defense of prescription is unavailing to the petitioners (Pablo and Maxima
Lola) because, admittedly, the title to Lot No. 5517 is still registered in the name of the respondent
(Dolores Zabala), still the petitioners have acquired title to it by virtue of the
equitable principle of laches due to the respondent’s
failure to assert her claim and ownership for thirty two (32) years.”
Moreover, conscious of
the resulting “largescale dispossession and
social displacement of several hundreds of bona fide occupants
and their families” which the Solicitor General pointed out, the private respondents
agreed unanimously to accept the alternative prayer of the petitioner in their
joint memorandum (pp. 624-636, Rollo). This agreement by private respondents takes
the form of a waiver. Though a valid and
clear right over the property exists in their
favors, they seemingly have voluntarily abandoned the same favor
of: 1) those who possessed and actually
occupied specific portions and obtained torrens
certificates of titles, and 2) those who possessed certain specific portions
for such lengths of time as to amount to full ownership. The waiver, not being contrary to law,
morals, good customs and good policy,
is valid and binding on the private respondents.
However, with respect to
the second set of possessors, whose alleged bona fide occupancy
of specific portions of the property is not evidenced by Torrens Titles,
it is imperative that their claims/occupancy be duly proven in an appropriate
proceeding.
ACCORDINGLY, the decision of the Court of Appeals in
CA-G.R. No. 12933 is AFFIRMED subject to the herein declared superior rights of
bona fide occupants with registered titles within the area
covered by the questioned decree and bona fide occupants therein
with lengths of possession which had ripened to ownership, the latter to be
determined in an appropriate proceeding.
SO ORDERED.
Fernan, C.J., Melencio-Herrera,
Gutierrez, Jr., Feliciano, Padilla, Bidin, Grino-Aquino, Regalado, and Davide, Jr.,
JJ., concur.
Narvasa, J., no part, counsel of a party in Court a quo.
Cruz, J., no
part, one of the counsel is my former law firm.
Paras, and Romero, JJ., no
part, did not participate in the deliberations.
*
changed from Atty. M. Fabella to Atty. Gilbert M. Fabella.
* changed
from Atty. Gilbert Fabella to Atty. Gilbert M. Fabella.
* Act 496. Sec. 56. x x x. They
shall be regarded as registered from the
time so noted, and the memorandum of
each instrument when made on the certificate
of title to which it refers shall
bear the same date:
x x x.