CIELITO T. SANTOS, PETITIONER, VS. COURT OF APPEALS, HON. FRANCISCO X. VELEZ, PRESIDING JUDGE, RTC, BRANCH 57, MAKATI, METRO MANILA, AND RHODERICK CASIS, RESPONDENTS.

Santos versus Court of Appeals

The Case

This is a petition for review brought by Cielito Santos against the Court of Appeals, the presiding judge of a regional trial court in Makati, and Rhoderick Casis. The dispute began as a simple action for forcible entry over a house and lot in Parañaque, but it grew into a question of civil procedure that every litigator must know: when is an order of a municipal trial court in an ejectment case final and therefore executory, and when is it merely interlocutory and thus open to correction? The case matters because it draws the line between an order that finally settles the only issue in an ejectment suit, which is possession, and an order that merely rules on an incidental matter. It also reminds us that once an order becomes final and executory, execution issues as a matter of right.

Procedural History

Rhoderick Casis filed a complaint for forcible entry with the municipal trial court, which issued a restraining order against Santos. After hearings, the municipal trial court denied the writ of preliminary mandatory injunction, vacated the restraining order, and held that possession must be restored to Santos. Casis moved for reconsideration, and the motion was denied. Casis then filed a petition for certiorari with the regional trial court, which dismissed it on the ground that the proper remedy was appeal, not certiorari. That dismissal was appealed to the Court of Appeals, which affirmed the dismissal, and the matter reached the Supreme Court on a petition for review, which was later denied.

Because no appeal had been taken from the two orders of the municipal trial court, Santos moved for their execution. The municipal trial court granted the motion and issued a writ of execution. Casis then filed a petition for certiorari with preliminary injunction before the regional trial court, which issued a writ of preliminary injunction to preserve the status quo. Santos elevated the matter to the Court of Appeals, which affirmed the regional trial court and ruled that the two orders could not be final and executory because they were unquestionably interlocutory. Hence this petition for review before the Supreme Court.

Facts

A house and lot in B. F. Homes, Parañaque, was originally registered in the name of Nenita Suroza and was mortgaged to the spouses Oscar and Cecilia Reyes. Upon Suroza's insistence, Cielito Santos, through his mother Josefina Santos, redeemed the property for 180,000 pesos, and the mortgagee executed a deed of release of mortgage. On the same day, Suroza executed a deed of sale in favor of Santos.

When Santos tried to register the deed of sale, he discovered that Suroza had filed a petition for reconstitution of her title, claiming it was lost. In truth, she had delivered her owner's duplicate copy to the mortgagees as security. Later, the same property was sold to Rhoderick Casis, and a new title was issued in his favor on the basis of the reconstituted title.

Claiming that Santos had driven him and his family from the premises, Casis filed a complaint for forcible entry before the municipal trial court. After protracted hearings, the court found that Santos, not Casis, had the better right of prior possession, and it ordered that possession be restored to Santos. No appeal was taken from that order or from the order denying reconsideration.

Issues

• Whether or not the orders of the municipal trial court in the ejectment case were final and executory, and therefore could no longer be enjoined.
• Whether or not the Court of Appeals erred in ruling that those orders were merely interlocutory.

Applicable Provisions

Section 50 of Act Number 496, the Land Registration Act, provides:

The act of registration shall be the operative act to convey and affect the land.

The municipal trial court discussed this provision but held it inapplicable, because Suroza had already parted with her ownership before the later sale to Casis.

Ruling

On the first issue, the Supreme Court ruled in favor of Santos. The Court held that the municipal trial court had already disposed of the only issue in the ejectment case, which is possession. Although the orders granted injunctive relief, they finally disposed of the case because they categorically declared Santos entitled to possession on the basis of evidence presented in protracted hearings. The Court defined a final order as one that finally disposes of a case, leaving nothing more to be done by the court in respect thereto. Since no appeal was taken, the order became final and executory, and as the law explicitly provides, execution shall issue as a matter of right.

On the second issue, the Court reversed the Court of Appeals. The appellate court had ruled that the orders were unquestionably interlocutory, but the Supreme Court found that there were no more points in issue to be adjudicated, so the orders were final. The Court also noted the municipal trial court's finding that the registration of the later deed of sale and the issuance of a transfer certificate of title in favor of Casis did not vest in him any right of possession, because Suroza had already lost whatever right or interest she had in the property by reason of the earlier sale to Santos.

Doctrine

An order in an ejectment case that finally disposes of the only issue of possession is a final order, even if it also grants injunctive relief. A final order or judgment is one that finally disposes of a case, leaving nothing more to be done by the court in respect thereto. Once such an order becomes final and executory because no appeal was taken, execution issues as a matter of right, and it may no longer be enjoined. Registration under Section 50 of Act Number 496 is the operative act that conveys and affects land, but it cannot vest rights in a vendee where the vendor had already parted with ownership by a prior sale.

Disposition

The petition was granted, the decision of the Court of Appeals was reversed and set aside, and the records were remanded to the municipal trial court for the enforcement of the writ of execution.

Remember This

Memorize this line: a final order is one that finally disposes of a case, leaving nothing more to be done by the court, and once final, execution issues as a matter of right. Examiners use this case to test the distinction between final and interlocutory orders in ejectment suits, and the rule that registration cannot confer rights that the vendor no longer had.