REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, PETITIONER, JOSE D. CAMPOS, JR., PETITIONER-INTERVENOR, VS. THE HONORABLE SANDIGANBAYAN, FIRST DIVISION, TEODORO Q. PENA, GORGONIO MACARIOLA, ORLAND…

The petitioner charges the Sandiganbayan
with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in
denying its motion to drop Jose D. Campos, Jr. as defendant in its complaint
for reconveyance, reversion, accounting, restitution
and damages filed against Jose D. Campos, Jr. and the other defendants in Civil
Case No. 0010.

The antecedent facts are stated by the Solicitor General as
follows:

“1.     On July 22, 1987,
petitioner filed with respondent Court a complaint for reconveyance,
reversion, accounting, restitution and damages against Alfredo (Bejo) T. Romualdez, Ferdinand E. Marcos, Imelda R. Marcos, Jose D. Campos, Jr. and forty five (45) other
defendants including the above-named private respondents, docketed thereat as
Civil Case No. 0010 (PCGG 11), seeking to ‘recover from them ill-gotten wealth
consisting of funds and other property which they [acting singly or
collectively and] in unlawful concert with one another, had acquired and
accumulated in flagrant breach of trust and of their fiduciary obligations as
public officers, with grave abuse of right and power and in brazen violation of the Constitution and laws of the Republic of the Philippines’,
including the misappropriation and theft of public funds, plunder of the
nation’s wealth, extortion, blackmail, bribery, embezzlement and other acts of corruption, betrayal
of public trust and brazen abuse of power, as more fully described in the
Complaint thus ‘resulting in their unjust enrichment during defendant Ferdinand
E. Marcos’ 20 years of rule from December 30, 1965 to February 25, 1986, first
as President of the Republic of the Philippines under the 1935 Constitution
and, thereafter, as one-man ruler under martial law and Dictator under the 1978
Marcos-promulgated Constitution x x x at the expense and to the grave and irreparable damage of
Plaintiff and the Filipino people’.  (pp. 2-3, complaint).

“2.     Summonses were
subsequently issued in due time by the respondent Court against defendants
therein.

“3.     Sometime in the
later part of August 1987, defendant Jose D. Campos, Jr., having been served
with summons on August 5, 1987, filed with the respondent Court an undated
‘Manifestation and Motion to
Dismiss Complaint with Respect to Jose D. Campos’ praying that he be removed as
party defendant from the complaint on the grounds that he had ‘voluntarily
surrender(ed) or turn(ed) over [any share in his name on any of the
corporations referred to, aside from disclaiming any interest, ownership or
right thereon] to the Government of the Republic of the Philippines’, and that
he was ‘entitled to the immunity granted by the Presidential Commission on Good
Government pursuant to Executive Order No. 14, under the Commission’s
Resolution dated May 28, 1986 x x x
to Mr. Jose Y. Campos (and) his family’ he ‘being a member of the immediate family of Jose Y.
Campos.’ Xerox copy of said Manifestation and Motion, etc., is hereto attached
as Annex “C” hereof.

“4.     On September 23,
1987, petitioner filed with the respondent Court a ‘Motion’ seeking to drop
defendant Jose D. Campos, Jr. from the Complaint on the ground that the
Presidential Commission on Good Government (PCGG for short) had, in a
Resolution dated May 28, 1986, granted immunity to Mr. Jose Y. Campos and his
family, which immunity necessarily extends to defendant Jose D. Campos, Jr. who
is the son of said Mr. Jose Y. Campos. 
Xerox copy of said Motion is hereto attached as Annex ‘D’
hereof.

“5.     The private
respondents opposed petitioner’s motion. 
Defendant Jose D. Campos, Jr. filed his reply.

“6.     Meanwhile, on
January 28, 1988, petitioner filed with the respondent Court an
Amended/Expanded Complaint, xerox copy of which is
hereto attached as Annex ‘E’ hereof.

“7.     On February 8, 1988, respondent Court
issued a Resolution (Annex ‘A’ hereof) which, as abovestated, denied petitioner’s and Jose D. Campos, Jr.’s motions to drop him from the complaint.

“8.     On March 7, 1988, defendant Jose D.
Campos, Jr. filed a ‘Motion for Reconsideration of the Resolution Dated February 8, 1988’, xerox
copy of which is hereto attached as Annex ‘F’ hereof.

“9.     On March 10,
1988, petitioner also filed its separate ‘Motion for Reconsideration’ of the
Resolution of February 8, 1988, xerox copy of which
is hereto attached as Annex ‘G’ hereof.

“10.   On August 18, 1988, respondent Court
issued a Resolution (Annex ‘B’ hereof) denying petitioner’s and
defendant Jose D. Campos, Jr.’s motions for reconsideration.  A copy of the Resolution was received by the Office of the Solicitor General
on August 24, 1988.”
(pp. 4-8, Rollo)

The original petition was against the Sandiganbayan
and six private respondents who opposed the motion to drop Campos, Jr. from the complaint.

Upon motion, we allowed Jose D. Campos, Jr. to file a
petition-in-intervention.

In a resolution dated March
29, 1988, we issued a temporary restraining order ordering
the Sandiganbayan to cease and desist from proceeding with Civil Case No. 0010.

The main issue in the
instant petition hinges on whether or not the petitioner can validly drop Jose
D. Campos, Jr. as party-defendant in
Civil Case No. 0010 by virtue of
the PCGG’s grant of immunity in favor of his father
Jose Y. Campos and the latter’s family.

The Sandiganbayan ruled in the negative.  It denied the Republic’s and petitioner Jose D.
Campos, Jr.’s
motions for reconsideration on the following grounds.

“1)     The PCGG did not
then and does not now have the power to grant civil immunity;

“2)     Even if it did, the grant of immunity
itself rendered in the PCGG’s resolution dated May 28, 1986 has not been shown to
cover the transactions involving the corporations and or properties for which
Jose D. Campos, Jr., is now sought to be
held accountable, i.e., Metroport Services, Inc.;

“3)     The fact is that
nowhere, either in the original motions or in the Motion for Reconsideration
before this Court has it been shown that, save for the alleged unqualified
immunity, there no longer exists any demandable claim against Jose D. Campos,
Jr., arising from the transactions resulting in his being impleaded
thereon.  In other words, were it not for
the supposed grant of immunity, Jose D. Campos, Jr., would remain liable in the
matter of Metroport Services, Inc., and for the 60%
which Alfredo (Bejo) Romualdez
acquired therein according to paragraph 14(c) of the Complaint (supra) which
does not appear to have been restored or compensated for.” (p. 54, Rollo)

The petitioner contends otherwise.  The Solicitor General asserts that the name
of Jose D. Campos, Jr. was included as defendant in the complaint through
mistake or oversight and that pursuant to section 11, Rule 3 of the Revised Rules of Court it has
a right to drop him as defendant without prior consent of any party.  The Solicitor General also maintains that
although the defendants in the case were charged solidarily,
Campos, Jr. was not an
indispensable party since Article 1216 of the Civil Code allows the petitioner
as solidary creditor to choose among the solidary debtors against whom it will enforce collection.

Jose Campos, Jr. adds that the petitioner’s
motion to drop him as defendant should be considered as one filed under section
1, Rule 17 of the Revised Rules of Court thus giving it the absolute right to dismiss the action by mere notice of
dismissal.

Above all these
technicalities, the petitioner maintains that the resolutions of the Sandiganbayan which ruled that the PCGG does not have the
power to grant civil immunity frustrated the earnest efforts at recovery of
ill-gotten wealth recognized in the Constitution, and Executive Orders Numbers
1, 2, 14 and 14-A.  The petitioner
contends that the non-observance of the immunity provision granted by the PCGG
will hinder the voluntary cooperation of known Marcos cronies to enter into amicable settlements or compromises with respect to the recovery of ill-gotten
wealth.  The petitioner also argues that
the PCGG’s power to grant criminal immunity under Section 5 of Executive Order
No. 14 carries with it the implied power to enter into compromises and amicable
settlements in line with its duty to recover ill-gotten wealth expeditiously,
efficiently and effectively.

Given these considerations, the petitioner insists that the May
28, 1986 resolution of the PCGG
which granted immunity from both civil and criminal prosecution to Jose Y. Campos and
his family is a valid official act of the PCGG and since Jose Campos, Jr. is a legitimate son
of Jose Y. Campos, he must be deemed covered by the grant of immunity.

Furthermore, petitioner-intervenor Campos,
Jr. states that the Sandiganbayan
has no jurisdiction to determine the validity of the grant of immunity and
release from civil liability to the intervenor as there is no dispute between him and
the PCGG.  Thus, Campos,
Jr. argues that “Except in a litigation arising from a disagreement between the one claiming to be a
beneficiary and the PCGG/Republic, the Sandiganbayan
is without competence to
review the validity or extent of the PCGG granted and the Republic supported
grant of immunity from criminal prosecution and release from civil liability.” (p. 216, Rollo)

We first ascertain
whether or not the Sandiganbayan has
jurisdiction to look into the validity of the immunity granted by the
PCGG to Jose Y. Campos which was
extended to his son, petitioner-intervenor herein,
Jose Campos, Jr.

Executive Order No. 14 defines
“the jurisdiction over cases involving the ill-gotten wealth of
former President Ferdinand E. Marcos, Mrs. Imelda R. Marcos, members of their immediate family, close relatives,
subordinates, close and/or business associates, dummies, agents and nominees.” Section 2 thereof provides that the PCGG shall file all such cases,
whether civil or criminal, with
the Sandiganbayan, which shall have exclusive and original jurisdiction
thereof.” In the case of Presidential
Commission on Good Government v. Pena
(159 SCRA 556 [1988]), the court interpreted the Sandiganbayan’s jurisdiction
under this statute to extend to “all cases of the
commission x x x, and all incidents arising
from, incidental to, or
related to (them), such cases necessarily
fall likewise under the Sandiganbayan’s
exclusive and original jurisdiction subject
to review on certiorari exclusively
by the Supreme Court.”
(pp. 561-562; Underlining supplied). 
Likewise, in the case of Bataan
Shipyard & Engineering Co.,
Inc. v. Presidential Commission on Good
Government, (150 SCRA 181 [1987])
we said:

“It should also by now be
reasonably evident from what has thus far been said that the PCGG is not, and was never intended to act
as, a judge.  Its general function is to conduct investigations in order
to collect evidence establishing
instances of ‘ill-gotten wealth;’ issue sequestration, and such
orders as may be
warranted by the evidence thus collected and as may be necessary to preserve
and conserve the assets of which it takes custody and control and
prevent their disappearance, loss or
dissipation; and eventually file
and prosecute in the proper court of competent jurisdiction all
cases investigated by it as may be warranted by its findings.  It does not try and decide, or hear and
determine, or adjudicate with any character
of finality or compulsion, cases involving
the essential issue of whether or not property should be forfeited and
transferred to the State because ‘ill-gotten’ within the meaning of the
Constitution and the executive orders. 
This function is reserved to the designated court, in this case, the Sandiganbayan.  (Ex. Ord. No. 14)”

The powers of the PCGG are not unlimited.  Its jurisdiction over cases involving ill-gotten wealth must be
within the parameters stated in Executive Order No. 14.  Necessarily, the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan which is tasked to handle the ill-gotten
wealth cases must include the jurisdiction to determine whether or not the PCGG exceeded its power to grant
immunity pursuant to the provisions of Executive Order No. 14.

We now decide the pivotal issue which is the extent, if any, of the
PCGG’s power to grant civil immunity.

Section 5 of Executive Order No. 14 provides:

“SECTION 5.  The Presidential Commission on Good
Government is authorized to grant immunity from criminal prosecution to any
person who testifies to the unlawful manner in which any respondent, defendant
or accused has acquired or accumulated the property or properties in question
in cases where such testimony is necessary to prove violation of existing
laws.”

Since the aforecited provision mentions
the grant of immunity only in criminal prosecutions and under certain
circumstances, the Sandiganbayan concluded that the
PCGG does not have the power to grant civil immunity much less extend the civil immunity granted to Jose Y. Campos to his son Jose Campos, Jr.

The conclusion is erroneous.

A cursory reading of Executive Order No. 14 shows that the PCGG
is authorized to file both criminal and civil cases against
persons suspected of having acquired ill-gotten wealth.  Section 3 thereof provides:

“SECTION 3.  Civil suits for restitution, reparation of
damages, or indemnification for consequential damages, forfeiture proceedings
provided for under Republic Act No. 1379, or any other civil actions under the
Civil Code or other existing laws, in connection with Executive Order No. 1 dated February 28, 1986 and
Executive Order No. 2 dated March 12, 1986, may be filed separately from and
proceed independently of any criminal proceedings and may be proved by a
preponderance of evidence.”

This provision, together with section 5 of the law in relation to
the purposes for which the PCGG was created must be taken into consideration in
determining whether or not the PCGG has authority to grant civil immunity.

“x x x
Legislative intent must be ascertained from a consideration of the statute as a
whole.  The particular words, clauses and
phrases should not be studied as detached and isolated expressions, but the
whole and every part of the statute must be considered in fixing the meaning of
any of its parts and in order to
produce a harmonious whole (Araneta v. Concepcion, 99 Phil. 709; Tamayo
v. Gsell, 35 Phi. 953; Lopez v. El Hogar Filipino, 47 Phil. 249; Chartered Bank v. Imperial,
48 Phil. 931).  A statute must be so
construed as to harmonize and give effect to all its provisions whenever possible
(People v. Polmon, 86 Phil. 350).  The meaning of the law, it must be borne in
mind, is not to be extracted from any single part, portion or section or from
isolated words and phrases, clauses or sentences but from a general
consideration or view of the act as a whole (82 C.J.S., Section 345, pp.
699-700).  Every part of the statute must
be interpreted with reference to the context. 
This means that every part of the statute must be considered together
with the other parts, and kept subservient to the general intent of the whole
enactment, not separately and independently (Tamayo
v. Gsell, 35 Phil. 953).  More importantly, the doctrine of associated
words (Noscitur
a Sociis) provides that where a particular
word or phrase in a statement is ambiguous in itself or is equally susceptible
of various meanings, its true meaning may be made clear and specific by
considering the company in which it is found or with which it is associated (Co
Kim Cham v. Valdez Tan Keh
& Dizon, 75 Phil. 371).” (Aisporna v. The Court of Appeals, 113 SCRA 459
[1982])

It is crystal clear from the law that the PCGG may file an
independent civil action separate from the criminal action.  Hence, section 5 thereof which empowers the PCGG to grant criminal immunity
must be interpreted to relate only to a criminal action
and not to a civil action.  In
case of a civil action, the power to grant immunity or the making of the
decision not to file a civil case or to drop one already in progress
must be related to section 3 of the law which specifically provides for the
procedures and the applicable laws in the prosecution of civil suits.

The well-settled doctrine is
that amicable settlements and/or compromises are not only allowed but
actually encouraged in civil cases. 
Article 2028 of the Civil Code categorically states:  “A compromise is a contract whereby the
parties, by making reciprocal concessions, avoid a litigation
or put an end to one already commenced.” On the other hand, there is no
similar general rule in criminal prosecutions. 
Immunity must be specifically granted.

In the instant case, the PCGG issued a resolution dated May 28, 1986, granting immunity from
both civil and criminal prosecutions to Jose Y. Campos and his family.  The pertinent provisions of the resolution
read as follows:

“3.0.  In consideration
of the full cooperation of Mr. Jose Y. Campos to this Commission, his voluntary
surrender of the properties and assets disclosed and declared by him to belong
to deposed President Ferdinand E.
Marcos to the Government of the Republic of the Philippines, his full,
complete and truthful disclosures, and his commitment to pay a sum of
money as determined by the Philippine Government, this Commission has decided
and agreed:

“3.1.  To grant to Mr. Jose Y. Campos, his
family, Mariano K. Tan and Francisco de
Guzman immunity from criminal prosecutions, as provided in Section 5 of
Executive Order No. 14.

“3.2.  To release
Mr. Jose Y. Campos, his family, Mariano K. Tan and
Francisco de Guzman from any and all civil liabilities
with respect to all matters arising from
his/their past relationship with deposed
President Ferdinand E. Marcos.

“3.3.  To exclude Jose Y.
Campos, his family, Mariano K. Tan and Francisco de Guzman from the complaint
filed by the Solicitor General with the Commission docketed as Republic of the Philippines
v. Ferdinand E. Marcos, et al., PCGG
I.S. No. 1 for graft and corrupt practices and other issues related to public service.
x x x.
(Underscoring supplied.)” (pp. 18-19, Rollo)

Undoubtedly, this resolution embodies a compromise agreement
between the PCGG on one hand and Jose Y. Campos on the other.  Hence, in exchange for the voluntary
surrender of the ill-gotten properties acquired by the then President Ferdinand
E. Marcos and his family which
were in Jose Campos’ control, the latter and his family were given full
immunity in both civil and criminal prosecutions.  In the absence of an express prohibition, the
rule on amicable settlements and/or compromises on civil cases under the Civil
Code is applicable to PCGG cases.  This is the proper interpretation of the law
in the light of the purposes enumerated in Executive Order No. 14, to wit:

“x x x the vital task of the Commission involves the just and expeditious recovery of such ill-gotten
wealth in order that the funds, assets
and other properties may be used
to hasten national economic recovery;

“x x
x the overriding considerations of national interest
and national survival require that the Presidential Commission on Good Government
achieve its vital task efficiently and effectively, with due regard to the
requirements of fairness and due process;”

Since petitioner-intervenor Jose
Campos, Jr. is a legitimate son of Jose Y. Campos, the full immunity granted to
the latter and his family must also extend to the former pursuant
to the May 28, 1986
resolution of the PCGG.

We note that the law
governing the issues raised in this petition calls for
the setting aside of technical rules when necessary to achieve the purposes behind the the
PCGG’s creation.

It is to be reiterated that paragraph 2 of section 3,
of Executive Order No. 14 reads:

x x
x              x x x                 x x x

“The technical rules of procedure and evidence shall not be strictly applied to the civil cases
filed hereunder.”

Section 7 hereof also provides:

“SECTION 7.  The provisions of this Executive Order shall
prevail over any and all laws, or parts thereof, as regards the investigation,
prosecution, and trial of cases for violations of laws involving the
acquisition and accumulation of ill-gotten wealth as mentioned in Executive order Nos. 1 and 2.”

A settled rule on construction is found in the case of Leveriza v. Intermediate Appellate
Court, (157 SCRA 282
[1988]):

“x x x
that another basic principle of statutory construction mandates that general
legislation must give way to special legislation on the same subject, and
generally be so interpreted as to embrace only cases in which the special
provisions are not applicable (Sto. Domingo v. De los Angeles,
96 SCRA 139), that a specific statute prevails over a general statute (De Jesus
v. People, 120 SCRA 760) and that where two statutes are of equal theoretical
application to a particular case, the one designed therefor
specially should prevail (Wil Wilhensen,
Inc. v. Baluyot, 83 SCRA 38)

On this score alone, the Sandiganbayan’s
rejection of the petitioner’s motion on the ground that dropping Campos, Jr.
as defendant in the civil case would amount to a violation of the Rules of
Court is based on shaky ground.

The Sandiganbayan’s objections will
hamper PCGG efforts in this and similar cases.

By virtue of the PCGG’s May 28, 1986
resolution, Jose Campos, Jr. was given full
immunity from both civil and criminal
prosecutions in exchange for the “full cooperation of
Mr. Jose Y. Campos to this Commission,
his voluntary surrender of the
properties and assets disclosed
and declared by him to belong to deposed President Ferdinand E. Marcos to the Government of the Republic of the Philippines, his full, complete and truthful disclosures,
and his commitment to pay a sum of money as
determined by the Philippine Government.” In addition, Campos,
Jr. had already waived and surrendered to
the Republic his registered equity interest in the Marcos/Romualdez corporations involved in
the civil case.  Thus, as far as the
petitioner is concerned, it had already released Campos, Jr. from all criminal and civil liabilities
in connection with His association with the said
corporations.  Under the law, civil
liabilities would include restitution and damages in favor of the government.

It is immaterial whether or not Campos,
Jr. was given specific or individual immunity from his liabilities as regards
the Marcos/Romualdez corporations, the subject matter
of Civil Case No. 0010.  The grant of
full immunity to Campos, Senior and
his family covers all of Campos,
Jr.’s liabilities, criminal or civil, arising from association with the Marcoses including transactions with the corporations involved in the said civil case.

Even from the viewpoint of procedure, the PCGG was right when it
filed a motion to drop Jose Campos, Jr. as defendant in the civil case.  Section 11, Rule 3 of the Rules of Court states:

“SECTION 11, RULE 3.  Misjoinder and non-joinder of parties.  – Misjoinder of
parties is not ground for dismissal of an action.  Parties may be dropped or added by order
of the court on motion of any party or
of its own initiative at any stage
of the action and on such terms
as are just.  x x x (Underlining supplied)”

We
interpreted this rule in the case
of Lim Tanhu v. Ramolete, 66 SCRA 425 (1975):

“x x x the
latter rule does not comprehend whimsical and irrational dropping or adding of parties in a complaint.  What it really contemplates is erroneous or
mistaken non-joinder and misjoinder
of parties.  No one is free to join anybody in a complaint in court
only to drop him unceremoniously
later at the pleasure of the plaintiff. 
The rule presupposes that the original inclusion had been made in the
honest conviction that it was proper and the subsequent dropping is requested
because it turned out that such inclusion
was a mistake.  And this is the reason why the rule ordains that the
dropping be on such terms as are
just’ – just to all the other parties.”

There is nothing whimsical or capricious in dropping the
petitioner-intervenor from the complaint.  Quite the contrary, it is based on sound and
salutary reasons.

As discussed earlier, the PCGG’s motion
to drop Campos, Jr. as defendant in
Civil Case No. 0010 has legal basis under Executive Order No. 14.  The fact that Campos, Jr. and all the other
defendants were charged solidarily in the complaint
does not make him an indispensable party. 
We have ruled in the case of Operators Incorporated v.
American Biscuit Co., Inc., [154 SCRA 738 (1987)]
that “Solidarity does not make a solidary
obligor an indispensable party in a suit filed by the creditor.  Article 1216 of the Civil Code says that the
creditor ‘may proceed against anyone of the solidary debtors or some or all of them simultaneously.’”

There is no showing that the dropping of Jose Campos, Jr. as
defendant would be unjust to the other defendants in the civil case because,
the other defendants can still pursue the case and put up their defenses.  In the case of Lim Tanhu
v. Ramolete, (supra), the main reason why we
did not allow the dropping of two defendants who were charged solidarily with the other remaining defendants, despite the motion of the plaintiff, is the fact
that the latter filed such motion after the two remaining defendants
defaulted.  Thus, we said:

“x x x In the case at
bar, there is nothing in the record to legally justify the dropping of the non-defaulted defendants, Lim
and Leonardo.  The motion of October 18, 1974 cites none.  From all appearances, plaintiff just decided
to ask for it, without any relevant explanation at all.  Usually, the court
in granting such a motion inquires for the reasons and in the appropriate
instances directs the granting of some form of compensation for the trouble
undergone by the defendant in answering the complaint, preparing for or
proceeding partially to trial, hiring counsel and making corresponding expenses
in the premises.  Nothing of these, appears in the order in question.  Most importantly, His Honor ought to have
considered that the outright dropping of the non-defaulted defendants Lim and
Leonardo, over their objection at that, would certainly be unjust not only to
the petitioners, their own parents, who would in consequence be entirely
defenseless, but also to Lim and Leonardo themselves who would naturally
correspondingly suffer from the eventual judgment against their parents.  Respondent court paid no heed at all to the
mandate that such dropping must be ‘on such terms as are just’ – meaning to all
concerned with its legal and factual effects.”

There is no similar reason in this case.

Moreover, as correctly stated by the herein petitioner:  “Under the law, the solidary debtor who pays shall have
a right of action against the others for the amount of their respective
shares.  And, with the dropping of a
defendant who pays his share, the other solidary
co-defendants are also benefited to the extent of that paid share.  Truly, each solidary
debtor ends up paying his own share, including the defendant who had
been dropped.  Hence, there is no
injustice.” (p. 28, Rollo)

WHEREFORE, the instant petition is hereby
GRANTED.  The questioned resolutions of
the Sandiganbayan are REVERSED and SET ASIDE.  The Sandiganbayan
is ordered to drop Jose Campos, Jr. as defendant in Civil Case No. 0010.  The temporary restraining order issued on November 29, 1988 is made permanent
insofar as Jose D. Campos, Jr. is concerned.  No costs.

SO ORDERED.

Fernan, C.J., Narvasa,
Melencio-Herrera, Cruz, Gancayco,
Padilla, Bidin, Cortes, Grino-Aquino,
Medialdea, and
Regalado, JJ., concur.

Sarmiento, J., dissents in a separate opinion.

Paras and
Feliciano, JJ., no
part.