EULALIO M. RUIZ AND ILUMINADA RUIZ, PETITIONERS, VS. HON. DOROTEO N. CANEBA, THE CITY SHERIFF OF MANILA AND/OR HIS DEPUTIES, ZENAIDA SANGALANG AND ADOLFO CRUZ, RESPONDENTS.

This is a petition for certiorari and prohibition with
preliminary injunction and/or restraining order of the Order of the respondent
judge^[1]
dated July 27, 1988 in Civil Case No. 84-24032 entitled “Eulalio M. Ruiz and Iluminada M.
Ruiz vs. Zenaida S. Sangalang
and Adolfo Cruz” amending the May 15, 1986 decision of Judge Antonio M.
Martinez (now Justice of the Court of Appeals). 
The facts of the case are as follows:

Private respondents Zenaida Sangalang and Adolfo Cruz are common-law spouses and owners
in common of a 2-storey house and lots described in Transfer Certificate of
Title (TCT) No. 56053 of the Registry of Deeds of Caloocan
City but registered only in the name of Zenaida Sangalang.

Petitioners, the spouses Eulalio M.
Ruiz and Iluminada M. Ruiz are the lessees of Door
No. 1 of the aforesaid two storey house divided into 2 doors, for a monthly
rental of P650.00.

Sometime on November
19, 1982, Eulalio Ruiz and Zenaida Sangalang executed an
agreement where it was provided that Ruiz will buy the house and lot for the
sum of P175,000.00 under the following terms and conditions:

“That I, EULALIO M. RUIZ, of legal age, Filipino, married to Iluminada M. Ruiz, with residence and postal address at 399
Gen. Luna, Caloocan City, Metro Manila, Philippines, am
a tenant of MISS ZENAIDA S. SANGALANG and I agree to purchase the above
mentioned parcel of land from MISS ZENAIDA S. SANGALANG for the total amount of ONE HUNDRED AND SEVENTY FIVE
THOUSAND PESOS (175,000.00), Philippine Currency, to be paid as follows:  SIXTY FIVE THOUSAND PESOS (P65,000.00) down
payment and will assume the amount of balance of THIRTY ONE THOUSAND FIVE
HUNDRED PESOS (P31,500.00) with the BANK OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLAND, Marulas Branch, Metro Manila; that after payment of said
balance mortgage a balance of seventy eight thousand five hundred pesos
(P78,500.00) will be payable on or before December 31, 1983; my failure to
comply with the above conditions of payment, the said property above described
will be open for sale and all partial payments will be refunded by Miss Zenaida S. Sangalang“. (Rollo, p. 45)

It was also stipulated that the Ruiz spouses will continue paying
the monthly rental of P650.00 until the amount of P175,000.00 shall have been
fully satisfied.

There is no dispute that the following payments were made by
Ruiz:  P65,000.00 to Sangalang
as down payment and P21,119.62 to the Bank on the assumed mortgage.  There is disagreement however as to the
amount paid to Sangalang on the balance of
P78,500.00.  Sangalang
maintains that she received only P33,793.00 while Ruiz insists that they paid
P53,073.00.

Thus, the Ruiz spouses filed a complaint on April 24, 1984 for
specific performance with damages against Zenaida Sangalang and Adolfo Cruz. 
(Ibid, p. 14).

In any event, the trial court found that the Ruiz spouses failed
pay in full the balance of P78,500.00 on or before December 31, 1983 as stipulated and even on the
extended period of March 22, 1984. 
Hence, the Ruiz spouses are not entitled to their prayer for specific
performance with damages.  In the same breath, the trial court
decided that it is only fair that Zenaida Sangalang return/refund to the Ruiz spouses the payment
made by the latter.  Further, it ruled
that the Ruiz spouses shall continue to pay the agreed amount of rental in the
amount of P650.00 until the property is surrendered to Sangalang
(RTC decision, May 15, 1986, p. 7; Rollo, p. 48).

More specifically, the dispositive
portion of the decision reads:

“Wherefore, in view of all the foregoing, we hereby rule as
follows:

“1. Ordering the plaintiffs to pay defendant Zenaida Sangalang the amount of
P20,000.00 moral damages:

“2. Ordering plaintiffs to pay defendant Sangalang, attorney’s fees in the amount of P15,000.00; and
to pay the costs of suit; and

“3. Defendant Zenaida Sangalang is hereby ordered to return the payments made by
the plaintiffs pursuant to the Agreement.

SO ORDERED”. (Rollo, p. 48)

The Ruiz spouses appealed the decision to the Court of Apeals but the same was
dismissed for failure to pay the docket fee.  (Rollo, p. 162) On May 29, 1987, an entry of
judgment was made by the Court of Appeals.

On motion of the private respondents, respondent Judge issued an
order for the issuance of a writ of execution. 
(Ibid., p. 59).

The Clerk of Court, in his capacity as ex-oficio
city sheriff, caused the
execution of the 1st and 2nd paragraphs of the dispositive
portion of the May 15, 1986 decision without including in the writ, the
execution of the 3rd par. thereof in favor of the Ruizes.  A notice of levy as well as a notice of garnishment were both issued to the
petitioners.  (Rollo,
p. 51)

On September 2, 1987, the Ruiz spouses filed an “Ex-parte Motion for Execution of Decision Now Partly
Executed,” praying that a writ of execution be issued for par. 3 of the
said dispositive portion and that the sheriff be
ordered to make full execution of the decision by “off-setting”
and/or setting-off par. 3 as against pars. 1 and 2 thereof.  (Ibid, p. 92)

An order was issued by the respondent judge on September 8, 1987
the dispositive portion of which reads as follows:

“WHEREFORE, in view of the fact that a writ of execution has
already been issued and the same was enforced only with respect to paragraphs 1
and 2 of the dispositive portion of the decision
dated May 15, 1986, let a writ of execution be issued with respect to paragraph
3 of the said dispositive portion of the decision.

“SO ORDERED” (Rollo, p. 59)

The aforequoted order was reiterated by
the respondent judge in his order dated December 11, 1987 (Ibid., p. 60) after
an omnibus motion was filed by the petitioners on September 8, 1987.  (Ibid., p. 53)

As expected, the parties could not agree on the execution of the
decision, as regards par. 3 thereof; that is the amount to be returned by Sangalang to the Ruiz spouses.  Sangalang and
Adolfo Cruz on May 7, 1988 moved to amend said decision of May 15, 1986 which
they alleged to have clear disparities and evident ambiguities between the body
of said decision and the dispositive portion.

Thus, while the trial court is fully aware that a decision once
final and executory can no longer be amended or
corrected, it opted for the purpose of finally settling the claims of the
parties and thereby avoid multiplicity of suits, to amend the decision in
question, on July 27, 1988, the dispositive portion of which reads:

“WHEREFORE, Order is hereby issued directing:

“1.  the cancellation of lis pendens annotated at the back
of the title of the subject property by the Register of Deeds of Caloocan City;

“2.  the plaintiffs to pay the defendant the sum
of P1,500.00 monthly from May 15, 1986, the effective date of the decision up
to the date they vacate door no. 2;

“3.  the return of payments made by the plaintiffs
to defendant Zenaida Sangalang
which shall be without prejudice to off-setting of rental payments from
November 1982; and

“4.  the writ of possession be issued on the
property, subject matter of the rescission of the contract.

“SO ORDERED” (Rollo, p. 64)

Sangalang and Cruz filed a Motion for
Execution on the above-quoted order on September
1, 1988 (Ibid., p. 65) but before the day of the hearing of said motion, the
Ruiz spouses filed an “Urgent Motion to Cancel Hearing of Motion,”
(Ibid., p. 127).

On September 15, 1988, the    Ruizes filed the present petition.

In the resolution of the 2nd division of this Court dated January
10, 1990, the petition was given due course (Rollo,
p. 152-A).  Petitioners’ memorandum was
filed on April 11, 1990 (Ibid., p. 192) while respondents’ memorandum was filed
on March 30, 1990 (Ibid., p. 171).

The petition is impressed with merit.

The principal issue to be resolved in the instant petition
is:  whether or not there is an ambiguity
in the dispositive portion of the May 15, 1986
decision sufficient to warrant the questioned order of the respondent court
amending subject final and executory judgment.

There is no question that the Ruizes
failed to comply with the agreement and recission of
the contract is in order.  The parties
are also agreed that the Ruizes must return the
physical possession of the property to Sangalang
while the latter is obliged to return all partial payments made on the property
to the Ruizes in accordance with the agreement.  But the bone of contention in this case is
the exact amount to be returned by Sangalang to the
Ruiz spouses which was not spelled out by the trial court.  The Ruizes claim
that they are entitled to a refund of P124,192.62 plus 24% interest compounded
annually, the alleged legal rate under Central Bank Circular, or a total amount
of P169,414.95.

Sangalang, on the other hand, countered
that she received only the amount of P120,092.62 or a difference of P4,100.00
from that claimed by the Ruizes, let alone the
computation of interest.  Furthermore, Sangalang insists that she is entitled to a P1,500.00 a
month rental for Door No. 2 of said house which the Ruizes
occupied after the execution of the agreement (Rollo,
p. 166) instead of confining themselves to Door No. 1 which they used to occupy
and for which they have originally been paying rentals.

A careful study of the decision of the trial court of May 15,
1986 shows that aside from the fact that the refund ordered to be made by Sangalang was not specified in exact numbers, there appears
to be no ambiguity in the decision to such an extent as to warrant an amendment
of the dispositive portion.

From the total amount of P139,192.62 claimed by the Ruiz spouses
to have been actually paid to Sangalang, only the
amount of P15,000.00 in the form of dishonored checks have been discounted by
the trial court leaving a balance of P124,192.62; more specifically shown as
follows:

Downpayment
on Nov. 19, 1982 – – – –      P65,000.00

Payment to the Bank of P.I. – – – – – –
–     P21,119.62

Payment made to Zenaida

Sangalang
P53,073.00 less

P15,000.00 total sum of two

(2) dishonored checks – – – – – – – – –      P38,073.00

– – – – – – – – – –
– – – – – – –

Total Payments Made                                 P124,192.62

(decision, p. 2 & 3

Hence, it is evident
that this is the amount that Sangalang was ordered to
return to the Ruizes pursuant to par. 3 of the said dispositive portion.

The only set-off specified by the trial court in the assailed May
15, 1986 decision were the lost profits suffered by Sangalang
because of the annotation of the notice of lis pendens on her title by the Ruiz
spouses which were considered compensated by the increase in value of the
property due to the repair made by the latter. 
Moreover, it appearing that there was in fact a part execution of pars.
1 and 2 of the dispositive portion of the 1986
decision against the Ruizes, it is but proper that
the amount to be paid by Sangalang is the total
payments made by the petitioners in the amount of P124,192.62.

Anent the Ruizes’ claim of interest as
aforementioned, it has been held in the case of Santulan
v. Fule, 133 SCRA 762 (1984) that where the court
judgment which did not provide for interest is already final, there is no
reason to add interest in the judgment. 
Interest was not demanded by the Ruizes when
the case was pending before the lower court, hence, there is no reason for this
Court to grant such claim.  As ruled by
this Court, such claim is groundless since the decision and orders sought to be
enforced do not direct the payment of interest and have long become final (Canonizado v. Ordonez-Benitez, 149 SCRA 555[1987]).

Finally, as to Sangalang’s claim for
P1,500.00 as monthly rental for Door No. 2, the records show that such claim
was never raised in the trial court.  The
issue of additional rentals was brought up by Sangalang
only when the motion for execution of par. 3 of the dispositive
portion of the decision was filed by the Ruiz spouses (Rollo,
p. 189).  It is a basic rule that an
issue which was not raised in the court below cannot be raised for the first
time on appeal as it would be offensive to the basic rules of fair play,
justice and due process (Matienzo v. Servidad, 107 SCRA 276 [1981]; De la Santa v. CA, 140 SCRA
44, [1985]; Dihiansan v. CA, 157 SCRA 434 [1987]; Anchuelo v. CA, 147 SCRA 434 [1987]; Dulos
Realty and Dev’t. Corp. v. CA 157 SCRA 425 [1988];
Ramos v. IAC, GR No. 78282, July 5, 1989; Filipino Merchants vs. CA, GR No.
85141, Nov. 28, 1989).  Consequently, Sangalang’s claim cannot be granted.

Hence, since the May 15, 1986 decision has long become final and executory and in fact has been partly executed, the
respondent judge had lost its jurisdiction thereon (Marcopper
Mining Corp. vs. Briones, G.R. 77210, Sept. 19, 1988;
Baclayon et al. v. CA, G.R. No. 89132, Feb. 26,
1990).  He has exceeded his authority,
considering that the trial court has no authority to modify or vary the terms
and conditions of a final and executory judgment (Vda. de Nabong v. Sadang, 167
SCRA 232 [1988]; Commercial Credit Corporation vs. CA, 169 SCRA 1 [1989];
Christian Literature Crusade v. NLRC, 171 SCRA 712 [1989]).  What remains in his authority in relation
thereto is purely the ministerial enforcement or execution of the judgment
(Christian Lit. Crusade, supra; Baclayan vs.
CA supra.) Therefore, for having substantially affected the final and executory judgment such Order of the respondent judge dated
July 27, 1988 is null and void for lack of jurisdiction, including the entire proceedings held
for the purpose (Marcopper Mining vs. Briones, supra).

PREMISES CONSIDERED, (a)
the instant petition for certiorari and prohibition is hereby
GRANTED; (b) the Order of the respondent judge dated July 27, 1988 is hereby
DECLARED null and void ab initio; (c) respondent Sangalang
is hereby required to PAY petitioners-spouses Ruizes
the amount of P124,192.62; (d) petitioners Ruizes are
hereby required to VACATE the property in question and PAY P650.00 monthly as
rental as agreed upon and as required by the May 15, 1986 decision until they vacate the premises and (e) the
Register of Deeds of Caloocan City is hereby required
to CANCEL the lis pendens annotated on the title of subject property.

SO ORDERED.

Melencio-Herrera, (Chairman),
Padilla, Sarmiento,
and Regalado, JJ., concur.

^[1]
Regional Trial Court of the National Capital Judicial Region, Branch XX, Manila
presided over by Judge Doroteo N. Caneba