THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE, VS. ARNULFO CENDANA Y REYES, ACCUSED-APPELLANT.

In the early morning of November
24, 1986, the Police Station at Sta. Barbara, Pangasinan
received a report that a man was found
dead on the field near the ricemill of a Mrs. Thelma
Bautista at Barangay Ventinilla
West, Sta. Barbara, Pangasinan.  Upon investigation, policemen found the
cadaver, identified to be that of Dominador Manongdo, lying prostrate
on the ground with one gunshot wound
on the head.

Subsequently, accused-appellant Arnulfo
Cendana y Reyes was apprehended and later charged
with the crime of murder “thru illegally possessed firearm” on the
basis of the following information:

That on or about November 23, 1986, in the evening at a ricefield in barangay Ventinilla West,
municipality of Sta. Barbara, province of Pangasinan,
Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the
above-named accused, armed with an unlicensed shotgun, with intent to kill,
with treachery and evident premeditation, did then and there, wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously shoot one Dominador Manongdo y Loresco, inflicting upon him a gunshot wound which caused
his instantaneous death, to the damage and prejudice of his heirs.

Contrary to Article 248 of the Revised Penal
Code.  [Record, p. 1.]

Upon arraignment, accused-appellant pleaded not guilty.  The pre-trial conference was terminated on November 2, 1987 after which, trial
proceeded.

The trial judge convicted
accused-appellant in a decision dated June 3, 1988, the dispositive
portion reading as follows:

WHEREFORE, the Court finds accused Arnulfo
Cendana y Reyes guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the
crime of Murder thru Illegally Possessed Firearm, and considering that the
Crime of Murder was committed with the use of an unlicensed firearm (shotgun,
Exhibit “H”), the accused is sentenced to suffer the penalty of
Reclusion Perpetua with all the accessory penalties
provided by law, to indemnify the heirs of the deceased Dominador
Manongdo y Loresco the sum
of P30,000.00, and to pay the costs.

The firearm is ordered confiscated and forfeited in favor of the
Government, and the Clerk of this Court is ordered to turn over the firearm to
the nearest Constabulary Command. 
[Record, p. 121.]

Not agreeing with the findings of the trial court, accused-appellant appeals to this Court
raising the following assignment of errors:

I.        The trial court
erred in convicting the accused even without proof beyond reasonable doubt.

II.       The trial court
erred in not appreciating the defense of the accused.

III.      The trial court
erred in convicting the accused based on shaky and crude circumstantial
evidence.  [Rollo,
p. 43.]

At the outset, it is noted that the Solicitor General filed a
manifestation recommending the acquittal of accused-appellant.  He asserts that the alleged admission made by
the accused-appellant and the gun seized from him are both inadmissible in
evidence for having been obtained in violation of accused-appellant’s
constitutional rights.  He further asserts that after the exclusion
of such evidence, the remaining evidence of the prosecution is clearly
insufficient to support a conviction based on proof beyond reasonable
doubt.  [Rollo,
pp. 84-85.]

We agree.

To support its judgment
of conviction, the trial court relied mainly on the testimonies of the Police
Station Commander Sgt. Amadeo Asuncion, Pat. Alden Poserio,
and Pat. Fernando Quinto, who were the police officers investigating the case.  Their testimonies sought to prove the
following:  After the cadaver was brought
to the morgue and later to a funeral parlor for autopsy, they went back to the
place where the body was found and after interviewing some people, received
information that accused-appellant was seen before the incident carrying a gun [TSN, November 3, 1987, p. 8.] When they went to
accused-appellant’s house, he was not around and so they picked up one of his brothers, Antonio Cendana, who informed them that accused-appellant was at
Pogo District in Dagupan City [TSN, November 3, 1987,
pp. 8-9; February 1, 1988, pp. 5-6.] Not knowing where such place was, they
forced Antonio Cendana to accompany them to the house
where accused-appellant could be found [TSN, November 3, 1987, p. 9; February 1, 1988, p. 6.] Upon their arrival, Sgt. Asuncion and Pat. Quinto entered the
house while Pat. Poserio remained outside [TSN, November
3, 1987, p. 10.]
They were able to arrest accused-appellant who afterwards admitted to them that
he was the one who shot the victim [TSN, February 1, 1988, p. 7.] They also recovered a homemade
shotgun which, according to Pat. Quinto, was
voluntarily handed to them by accused-appellant [TSN, November 4, 1987, p. 4]
but according to Sgt. Asuncion was handed to them by a woman relative of
accused-appellant upon the latter’s instructions [TSN, February 1, 1988, p. 7.] They then proceeded
to the NBI, Dagupan City where accused-appellant was
subjected to a paraffin test and the recovered firearm surrendered for ballistics
examination [TSN, November 3, 1987, p. 11; February 1, 1988, p. 8.] From the
NBI, they proceeded to the Sta. Barbara Police Station where accused was
thereafter detained [TSN, November 3, 1987, p. 12; February 1, 1988, p. 8.] No written statement was taken from accused-appellant [TSN, November 3, 1987, p. 12.]

From the foregoing
narration of events, we note the following:

(1)  That there was no eye
witness to the killing of the victim Dominador Manongdo;

(2) That the accused-appellant was apprehended by the police
investigators on the basis of information obtained from unidentified persons
that accused-appellant was seen carrying a
gun before the incident;

(3)  That the
accused-appellant was apprehended by the police officers without any warrant of
arrest;

(4)  That the shotgun was
recovered without a search warrant from the house where accused-appellant was
arrested; and

(5)  That the alleged
statement made by accused-appellant to the police officers admitting to the
commission of the offense and
made after has arrest, was used as the main basis for his conviction.

I.

Section 5. Rule 113 of the 1985 Rules of
Criminal Procedure enumerates the instances when a peace officer or a private
person may arrest a person without a
warrant:

(a)     When, in his presence,
the person to be arrested has committed, is actually committing, or is
attempting to commit an offense;

(b)     When an offense has in
fact just been committed, and he has personal knowledge of facts indicating
that the person to be arrested has committed it; and

(c)     When the person to be
arrested is a prisoner who has escaped from a penal establishment or place
where he is serving final judgment or temporarily confined while his case is
pending, or has escaped while being transferred from one confinement to
another.

The facts of the case do not warrant the applicability of
paragraphs (a) and (c).  Moreover, in paragraph (b), the only instance under which
accused-appellant’s case could possibly fall, what is essential is that the person making
the arrest has personal knowledge of the facts indicating that the
arrestee is responsible for an offense which has just been committed [People v. Burgos, G.R. No. 68955, September 4, 1986, 144 SCRA 1.]
Accused-appellant was arrested one day after the killing of the victim and only
on the basis of information obtained by the police officers from unnamed
sources.  These above-mentioned
circumstances clearly belie a lawful warrantless arrest.

Considering that the
arrest of accused-appellant herein was unlawful, any search conducted on his
person or place of arrest which is an incident thereof, was also unlawful
[People v. Burgos, supra.] Perforce, any evidence
recovered during the unlawful search, being made without a warrant, becomes
inadmissible in evidence against accused-appellant and the shotgun which was
allegedly the fatal weapon cannot be presented against him [Nolasco
v. Pano, G.R. No. 69803, January 30, 1987, 147
SCRA 509.]

Section 20, Article IV of
the 1973 Constitution ordains that:

No person shall be compelled to be a witness against himself.  Any person under investigation for the
commission of an offense shall have the right to remain silent and to counsel,
and to be informed of such right.  No
force, violence, threat, intimidation, or any other means which vitiates the
free will shall be used against him.  Any
confession obtained in violation of this
section shall be inadmissible in evidence.

The Court elaborated on the scope of this right in the case of Morales,
Jr. v. Enrile [G.R. No. 61016, April
26, 1983, 121 SCRA 538], thus:

At the time a person is arrested, it shall be the duty of the
arresting officer to inform him of the reason for the arrest and he must be
shown the warrant of arrest, if any.  He
shall be informed of his constitutional rights to remain silent and to counsel,
and that any statement he might make, could be used against him.  The person arrested shall have the right to
communicate with his lawyer, a relative,
or anyone he chooses by the most expedient means – by telephone if possible –
or by letter or messenger.  It shall be
the responsibility of the arresting officer to see to it that this is
accomplished.  No custodial investigation
shall be conducted unless it be in the presence of
counsel engaged by the person arrested, by any person on his behalf, or
appointed by the court upon petition either of the detainee himself or by
anyone on his behalf.  The right to
counsel may be waived but the waiver shall not be valid unless made with the
assistance of counsel.  Any statement
obtained in violation of the procedure herein laid down whether exculpatory or inculpatory, in whole or in part, shall be inadmissible in
evidence.  [At p. 554.]

This procedure served as the guideline in subsequent cases
(People v. Ramos, G.R. No. 59318, May 16, 1983, 122 SCRA 312; People v. Galit, G.R. No. 51770, March 20, 1985, 135 SCRA 465.] In
the present case, it is clear from the record that at the time that
accused-appellant was arrested, he was not apprised of the right to remain
silent and to counsel, and to be informed of such rights, before he supposedly admitted to the killing of the
deceased.  As can be gleaned from the
testimony of Sgt. Asuncion:

Q:   Were you able to locate Arnulfo
Cendana?

A:    Yes, sir.

Q:   Where?

A:    At the house of one of his relatives, sir.

Q:   What happened when you arrived in that house?

A:    When we arrived in the house I asked one of
the occupants of the house the whereabouts of Arnulfo
Cendana and I told one of my men to surround the
house.  I tried to went (sic) up to the
house but I saw Arnulfo Cendana
trying to escape so I told him “agka ombabatik ta paltogen
taka”, which means don’t run or else I will shoot you”.

Q:   What happened when you warned Arnulfo Cendana not to escape?

A:    He stopped and he raised his hands.

Q:   What happened next?

A:    I asked him if he was the one who is
responsible about the incident, the killing incident.  At first he denied
it but later on when I talked to
him in calm manner he admitted that
he was responsible and then I asked him where is the gun that he used.

Q:   What did he tell you?

A:    At first he denied
it but later on he told to one
of his relatives to get the gun,
sir.  [TSN, February 1, 1988, pp. 6-7; Underscoring supplied.]

The failure of the police investigators to apprise
accused-appellant of his constitutional rights makes inadmissible their testimonies that the accused-appellant admitted to
the commission of the offense and pointed to the location of the shotgun [Art. III, sec. 12, par. 3, Constitution.]

With the exclusion of these alleged admissions of the accused-appellant, we must look into the
other evidence taken against the accused-appellant which led to a judgment of
conviction against him by the trial
court.  Only if this is sufficient to
convince the Court without any reasonable doubt that he committed the offense
charged can the judgment of conviction rendered against him be affirmed.

II.

The trial court took into account the following reports as
clear indications that it was accused-appellant who fired the shotgun which
killed Dominador Manongdo:
(1) the postmortem report, as testified to by the Municipal Health Officer, Dr.
Leonard Carbonell, to the effect that “the
cause of death of the deceased is intracranial injuries with intracranial hemorrhage secondary to gunshot wound”
[TSN, November 5, 1987, p. 43]; (2) Chemistry Report No. C-86-1205, as testified to by Ma. Carina Javier, an NBI
Forensic Chemist, to the effect that the examination of the paraffin casts of
accused-appellant yielded positive results for specks in both hands, indicating
that gunpowder nitrates were present [TSN, December 22, 1987, pp.
53-54]; and  (3) the ballistics report, as testified to by Irineo Ordiano, Jr., an NBI Senior Ballistician, to the effect that the homemade shotgun
allegedly recovered from the accused-appellant
is serviceable [TSN, January 20, 1988, p. 64.]

A careful analysis of the
postmortem report will show that the gunshot wound sustained by the
deceased Dominador Manongdo is indeed
compatible with what could be
inflicted by a shotgun.  However, such a
finding assumes no significance in connection with a finding of the guilt of
accused-appellant unless the firing of the shotgun could positively be
linked to him.

Neither is the ballistics
report any support to the conclusion that accused-appellant is guilty of the
commission of the offense.  All that the
NBI ballistics report establishes is that the shotgun which was submitted to it
for examination is still serviceable. 
Although this could have been done facilely by the crime laboratory,
there was no finding as to whether or not the shotgun has just been
recently fired.  Therefore, instead of
bolstering the case for the prosecution, it instead raises the doubt that the tested shotgun may not have been the
same shotgun which was used to shoot at and kill the deceased Manongdo.

The only other evidence left with which to establish the guilt of accused-appellant is the positive
result obtained from the
paraffin casts taken from his hands.  If
this was supported by other evidence before the Court, then the presence of
gunpowder nitrates on the hands of accused-appellant could have been a strong
indication that it was he who fired the gun which killed the
deceased.  However, this does not obtain
in the case at bar.  Likewise of note is
the plausible reason proferred by the
accused-appellant that he tested positive for gunpowder burns because he took a
turn at firing at coconut fruits with an armalite of
a military man who was likewise a guest at a party given by his kumpare [TSN, April 6, 1988, p. 7.]

The absence of any
eyewitness to the commission of the offense and the exclusion of the admissions
allegedly made by accused-appellant and the fruits thereof, calls into
application Rule 133, section 5 of the Rules of Court which states:

Sec. 5. 
Circumstantial evidence,
when sufficient. – Circumstantial evidence is
sufficient for conviction if:

(a)     There is more than one
circumstance;

(b)     The facts from which
the inferences are derived are proven; and

(c)     The combination of all
the circumstances is such as to produce a conviction beyond reasonable doubt.

There being only one
circumstance indicative of the guilt of the accused, i.e. the paraffin casts of
accused-appellant’s hands yielded positive for gunpowder burns, the above requisites are not satisfied.  The case of the prosecution definitely fails.

WHEREFORE, finding
that the guilt of the accused-appellant has not been proved beyond reasonable
doubt, the decision of the lower court is reversed and the accused-appellant is
hereby ACQUITTED.

SO ORDERED.

Fernan, C.J., Gutierrez, Jr., and Bidin, JJ., concur.

Feliciano, J., on leave.