SERGIO MEDADO, POLICARPIO MAGLASANG, LUISITO LAURON, ELISEO QUINAPUNDAN, PRIMO MELENDRES, REMEGIO LAURON, RESTITUTO LAURON, GENEROSO LAURON, IGNACIO IBALE, RODOLFO OSWA, JOVENO …

On March 5, 1987, Sheriff Leahmon V. Tolo sold on execution
the following properties of the private respondents to satisfy a judgment for backwages in favor of the workers (herein petitioners) in
NLRC Case No. RAB-VII-7-128:

(1) a 47,422-sqm. parcel
of land in Barrio Tayud, Consolacion,
Cebu, covered by OCT No.
0-13268 in the name of Vicente S. Sandoval, plus

(2) the following properties of Sandoval
Shipyard, Inc.:

a) 
a fabrication office;

b) 
a fiberglass fabrication plant;

c) 
a bodega;

d) 
a water tank; and

e)  a generating set.

Alleging that the sale was irregular as it included properties
not specified in the notice of auction sale, Vicente Sandoval and Sandoval
Shipyard Inc. filed in the Regional Trial Court, Branch 22, in Cebu City, an action against Sheriff Tolo
and the workers/judgment creditors (Medado, et al.)
to annul the auction sale (Civil Case No. CEB-6141).  They asked the court to issue a writ of
preliminary mandatory injunction to return the possession of the shipyard
properties to them.

The defendants workers, on the other hand, filed a motion to
dismiss the complaint on the ground that it was merely an offshoot of a labor
case in the National Labor Relations Commission (hereafter NLRC), hence, the
NLRC, not the RTC, has jurisdiction.  The
court denied the motion to dismiss in its order date August 26, 1987.

On March 10, 1988,
Sheriff Tolo asked for a hearing on his affirmative
defense of lack of jurisdiction, and prayed for the dismissal of the
complaint.  He was directed by the court
to formalize his motion to dismiss and to amplify it with a memorandum of authorities.

On the basis of the final deed of sale which Tolo
executed in favor of the dismissed workers, the latter, on April 8, 1988, forcibly entered and seized the
Sandoval Shipyard premises and ousted more than 170 employees and their
families.  On April 11, 1988, Sandoval applied to the trial
court for a writ of preliminary mandatory injunction to restore him or Sandoval
Shipyard, Inc. in the possession of the shipyard premises pending determination
of the legality of the sheriff’s sale thereof. 
The sheriff’s motion to dismiss and the plaintiff’s petition for
injunction were jointly heard by the court on May 6, 1988 (p. 27, Rollo).

On May 9, 1988,
the trial court, through RTC Judge Fortunato Vailoces, dismissed the complaint for lack of jurisdiction.

Sandoval filed a petition for certiorari in this Court
(G.R. No. 83182).  We referred it to the
Court of Appeals (CA-G.R. SP No. 14780) for proper determination and
adjudication.

On August 17, 1988,
the Court of Appeals reversed the trial court’s order of dismissal and ordered
it to “proceed with the trial of aforesaid case (Civil Case No. CEB-6141),
and upon the filing of the proper bond by petitioners, a writ of preliminary
mandatory injunction be issued to restore possession of the properties subject
of this petition to the petitioners [Sandoval, et al.]” (p.
31, Rollo).

The Court of Appeals rationalized that in seeking to nullify the
auction sale, and to have the certificate of sale declared null and void, the
petitioners “are clearly asserting their title to the real property in
question” and “asking for the quieting of their title” (p. 29, Rollo),
hence, the complaint falls within the exclusive original jurisdiction of the
Regional Trial Court as provided in Section 9, subparagraph 2, B.P. Blg. 129.  It found
the seizure of the shipyard complex by the respondents to be “a taking of the law into their
own hands,” and “a material and substantial invasion not only of the
very substantial rights of the petitioners, but also of those of the 170
employees” (p. 30, Rollo).  The Court of Appeals issued a mandatory
injunction to “prevent further serious damage to petitioners x x x, extend much needed relief
and alleviate the worsening conditions of the 170 employees who were wrongfully
excluded from their work” (p. 31, Rollo).

In due time the respondents-workers appealed by certiorari
to this court praying that we annul the judgment of the Court of Appeals and
confirm Judge Vailoces’ order.

The petition for review is meritorious.  The Court of Appeals’ ruling on the
jurisdictional issue is erroneous.  Sandoval’s
action to annul the execution sale was, for all intents and purposes, a motion
to quash the writ of execution in NLRC Case No. RAB-VII-7-128.  We ruled in Abbott vs. NLRC,
145 SCRA 207, that “the NLRC has the authority to
look into the correctness of the execution of its decision.” Pursuant to
Article 244(b) of the Labor Code, we further ruled in Pucan
vs. Hon. Eduardo Bengzon, 155 SCRA 692, that “any irregularities
in the issuance of the alias writ of execution should be referred to the same
administrative official or tribunal which rendered the decision being executed,
for, despite the finality of the decision, the Minister (now Secretary) of
Labor retains control over its execution and implementation so that resort to
regular courts would be an untenable recourse.” Therefore, the trial
court, through Judge Vailoces, properly dismissed
Sandoval’s complaint in Civil Case No. CEB-6141.

Nevertheless, the Court of Appeals correctly annulled the
sheriff’s sale and ordered the return of the shipyard properties to Sandoval
for the second alias writ of execution, which was issued by the Labor Arbiter,
was excessive, hence, null and void. 
Conformably with our decisions in Mercury Drug Co. vs. Court of Industrial Relations
(April 30, 1974), 56 SCRA 694, and in Feati
University Faculty Club vs. Feati University (August
15, 1974), 58 SCRA 395, the workers are
entitled to backwages for a period only of not
more than three (3) years from the date of their unlawful dismissal.  The original decision awarded them backwages amounting to P98,778 for
a period of two years and seven months.  However,
in the second alias writ of execution issued by Labor Arbiter Bonifacio Tumamak on November 10,
1986, the award had blown up to P 614,510, spanning a period of 13 years!

Mansalay Catholic High School vs. NLRC, G.R. No. 82741, April
18, 1989, is
explicit:  “Any decision or order
granting backwages in excess of three (3) years is
null and void as to the excess.” As the second alias writ of execution was
null and void, it infects the auction sale made by Sheriff Tolo
under it.

The NLRC’s
en banc resolution dated May 16, 1988 in NLRC Case No. RAB-VII-7-128 directed the
Labor Arbiter:

“1. To limit the award of backwages due
the    complainants?appellees to three (3) years’ salaries/wages without
qualifications or deductions, computed in the manner prescribed in this
Resolution; and

“2. To reinstate herein individual complainants-appellees to their former positions in the appellant
company without loss of seniority rights.  However, should reinstatement be already
impracticable, to let appellant company pay the individual complainants-appellees their separation pay, on top of the backwages, which shall be at one (1) month’s salary/wages
for every year of service.” (p. 38, Rollo
of G.R. No. 83490.)

which we affirmed
in our resolution dated August 29, 1988 in G.R. No. 83490 “Sergio Medado, et al. vs. NLRC, En Banc.” Its effort
to harmonize the original decision in the case with applicable law and jurisprudence, is permissible under settled doctrine, to
wit:

“When after judgment has been rendered and has become final
and executory, facts and circumstances transpire
which render its execution impossible or unjust, the interested party may ask the court to modify and alter the
judgment to harmonize the same with justice and the law.” (Jose Ocampo vs. Hon. Conrado
Sanchez, et al., 97 Phil. 472.)

“It has been repeatedly held, and it is now well settled in
this jurisdiction, that when after judgment has been rendered and the latter
has become final, facts and circumstances transpire which render its execution
impossible or unjust, the interested party may ask the court to modify or alter
the judgment to harmonize the same with justice and the facts (Molina vs. De la
Riva, 8 Phil. 569; Behn, Meyer & Co. vs. McMicking, 11 Phil.
276; Warner Barnes & Co. vs. Jaucian, 13 Phil. 4;
Espiritu vs Crossfield and Guash, 14 Phil.
588; Flor Mata vs. Lichauco
and Salinas, 36 Phil. 809).” (City of Butuan vs. Ortiz, 3 SCRA 659).

WHEREFORE, the Court hereby sets aside the decision dated August 17, 1988 of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 14780 insofar as it ordered the Regional Trial Court
to hear and decide Civil Case No. CEB-6141.  The trial court’s dismissal of said case is
affirmed.

The order of the Court of Appeals requiring the petitioners to
return the shipyard properties to the private respondents is affirmed.  The NLRC is directed execute and implement
without further delay its resolution dated May 16, 1988 in NLRC Case No. RAB-VII­-7-128.  No pronouncement as to costs.

SO ORDERED.

Narvasa, (Chairman), Cruz, and Medialdea, JJ., concur.

Gancayco, J., on leave.