ALEXANDER REYES, ALBERTO M. NERA, EDGARDO M. GECA, AND 138 OTHERS, PETITIONERS, VS. CRESENCIANO B. TRAJANO, AS OFFICER-­IN-CHARGE, BUREAU OF LABOR RELATIONS, MED. ARBITER PATERN…

The officer-in-charge of the Bureau of
Labor Relations (Hon. Cresenciano Trajano) sustained the denial by the Med
Arbiter of the right to vote of one hundred forty-one (141) members of the
“Iglesia ni Kristo” (INK), all employed in the same company, at a
certification election at which two (2) labor organizations were contesting the
right to be the exclusive representative of the employees in the bargaining
unit. That denial is assailed as having
been done with grave abuse of discretion in the special civil action of certiorari
at bar, commenced by the INK members adversely affected thereby.

The certification election was authorized
to be conducted by the Bureau of Labor Relations among the employees of
Tri-Union Industries Corporation on October 20, 1987. The competing unions were the Tri-Union Employees Union-Organized
Labor Association in Line Industries and Agriculture (TUEU-OLALIA), and Trade
Union of the Philippines and Allied Services (TUPAS). Of the 348 workers initially deemed to be qualified voters, only
240 actually took part in the election, conducted under the supervision of the
Bureau of Labor Relations. Among the
240 employees who cast their votes were 141 members of the INK.

The ballots provided for three (3)
choices. They provided for votes to be
cast, of course, for either of the two (2) contending labor organizations, (a)
TUPAS and (b) TUEU-OLALIA; and, conformably with established rule and practice,^[1]
for (c) a third choice: “NO
UNION.”

The final tally of the votes showed the following results:

The challenged votes were those cast by
the 141 INK members. They were
segregated and excluded from the final count in virtue of an agreement between
the competing unions, reached at the pre-election conference, that the INK
members should not be allowed to vote “because they are not members of any
union and refused to participate in the previous certification elections.”

The INK employees promptly made known
their protest to the exclusion of their votes. They filed a petition to cancel the election alleging that it “was
not fair” and the result thereof did “not reflect the true sentiments
of the majority of the employees.” TUEU-OLALIA opposed the petition. It contended that the petitioners “do
not have legal personality to protest the results of the election,”
because “they are not members of either contending unit, but ** of the
INK” which prohibits its followers, on religious grounds, from joining or
forming any labor organization **.”

The Med-Arbiter saw no merit in the
INK employees’ petition. By Order dated
December 21, 1987, he certified the TUEU-OLALIA as the sole and exclusive
bargaining agent of the rank-and-file employees. In that Order he decried the fact that “religious belief was
(being) utilized to render meaningless the rights of the non-members of the
Iglesia ni Kristo to exercise the rights to be represented by a labor
organization as the bargaining agent,” and declared the petitioners as
“not possessed of any legal personality to institute this present cause of
action” since they were not parties to the petition for certification
election.

The petitioners brought the matter up
on appeal to the Bureau of Labor Relations. There they argued that the Med­-Arbiter had “practically
disenfranchised petitioners who had an overwhelming majority,” and
“the TUEU-OLALIA certified union cannot be legally said to have been the
result of a valid election where at least fifty-one percent of all eligible
voters in the appropriate bargaining unit shall have cast their votes.”
Assistant Labor Secretary Cresenciano B. Trajano, then Officer-in-Charge of the Bureau of Labor Relations, denied the
appeal in his Decision of July 22, 1988. He opined that the petitioners are “bereft of legal personality to
protest their alleged disenfranchisement” since they “are not
constituted into a duly organized labor union, hence, not one of the unions
which vied for certification as sole and exclusive bargaining
representative.” He also pointed out that the petitioners “did not
participate in previous certification elections in the company for the reason
that their religious beliefs do not allow them to form, join or assist labor
organizations.”

It is this Decision of July 22, 1988
that the petitioners would have this Court annul and set aside in the present
special civil action of certiorari.

The Solicitor General having expressed
concurrence with the position taken by the petitioners, public respondent NLRC
was consequently required to file, and
did thereafter file, its own comment on the petition. In that comment it insists that “if the workers who are
members of the Iglesia ni Kristo in the exercise of their religious belief
opted not to join any labor organization as a consequence of which they
themselves can not have a bargaining representative, then the right to be
represented by a bargaining agent should not be denied to other members of the
bargaining unit.”

Guaranteed to all employees or workers
is the “right to self-organization and to form, join, or assist labor
organizations of their own choosing for purposes of collective
bargaining.” This is made plain by no less than three provisions of the
Labor Code of the Philippines.^[2]
Article 243 of the Code provides as follows:^[3]

ART. 243. Coverage and employees right to self-­organization.–All
persons employed in commercial, industrial and agricultural enterprises and in
religious, charitable, medical, or educational institutions whether operating
for profit or not, shall have the right to self-organization and to form,
join, or assist labor organizations of their own choosing for purposes of
collective bargaining. Ambulant,
intermittent and itinerant workers, self-employed people, rural workers and
those without any definite employers may form labor organizations for their mutual
aid and protection.

Article 248 (a) declares it to be an
unfair labor practice for an employer, among others, to “interfere with,
restrain or coerce employees in the exercise of their right to
self-organization.” Similarly, Article 249 (a) makes it an unfair labor
practice for a labor organization to “restrain or coerce employees in the
exercise of their rights to self-organization **.”

The same legal proposition is set out
in the Omnibus Rules Implementing the Labor Code, as amended, as might be expected. Section
1, Rule II (Registration of Unions), Book V (Labor Relations) of the Omnibus
Rules provides as follows:^[4]

“SEC. 1. Who may join unions; exception. – All persons
employed in commercial, industrial and agricultural enterprises, including
employees of government corporations established under the Corporation Code as
well as employees of religious, medical or educational institutions, whether
operating for profit or not, except managerial employees, shall have the right
to self-organization and to form, join or assist labor organizations for
purposes of collective bargaining. Ambulant, intermittent and itinerant workers, self-employed people,
rural workers and those without any definite employers may form labor
organizations for their mutual aid and protection.

* * * *.”

The right of self-organization
includes the right to organize or affiliate with a labor union or determine
which of two or more unions in an establishment to join, and to engage in
concerted activities with co-workers for purposes of collective bargaining
through representatives of their own choosing, or for their mutual aid and
protection, i.e., the protection, promotion, or enhancement of their rights and
interests.^[5]

Logically, the rights NOT to
join, affiliate with, or assist any union, and to disaffiliate or resign
from a labor organization, is subsumed in the right to join, affiliate with, or
assist any union, and to maintain membership therein. The right to form or join a labor organization necessarily
includes the right to refuse or refrain from exercising said right. It is self-evident that just as no one
should be denied the exercise of a right granted by law, so also, no one should
be compelled to exercise such a conferred right. The fact that a person has opted to acquire membership in a labor
union does not preclude his subsequently opting to renounce such membership.^[6]

As early as 1974 this Court had occasion
to expatiate on these self-evident propositions in Victoriano v. Elizalde
Rope Workers’ Union, et al.,^[7]
viz.:

” * *    What the Constitution and Industrial Peace
Act recognize and guarantee is the ‘right’ to form or join associations. Notwithstanding the different theories
propounded by the different schools of jurisprudence regarding the nature and
contents of a ‘right,’ it can be safely said that whatever theory one
subscribes to, a right comprehends at least two broad notions, namely: first, liberty or freedom, i.e., the absence
of legal restraint, whereby an employee may act for himself without being
prevented by law; second, power, whereby an employee may, as he pleases, join
or refrain from joining an association. It is therefore the employee who should decide for himself whether he
should join or not an association; and should he choose to join, he himself
makes up his mind as to which association he would join; and even after he has
joined, he still retains the liberty and the power to leave and cancel his
membership with said organization at any time (Pagkakaisa Samahang Manggagawa
ng San Miguel Brewery vs. Enriquez, et al., 108 Phil. 1010, 1019). It is clear, therefore, that the right to
join a union includes the right to abstain from joining any union (Abo, et al.
vs. PHILAME [KG] Employees Union, et al., L-19912, January 20, 1965, 13 SCRA
120, 123, quoting Rothenberg, Labor Relations). Inasmuch as what both the Constitution and the Industrial Peace
Act have recognized, and guaranteed to the employee, is the ‘right’ to join
associations of his choice, it would be absurd to say that the law also
imposes, in the same breath, upon the employee the duty to join
associations. The law does not enjoin
an employee to sign up with any association.”

The right to refuse to join or be
represented by any labor organization is recognized not only by the law but
also in the rules drawn up for
implementation thereof. The original
Rules on Certification promulgated by the defunct Court of Industrial Relations
required that the ballots to be used at a certification election to determine which
of two or more competing labor unions would represent the employees in the
appropriate bargaining unit should contain, aside from the names of each union,
an alternative choice of the employee voting, to the effect that he desires not
to be represented by any union.^[8] And
where only one union was involved, the ballots were required to state the
question — “Do you desire to be represented by said union?” — as
regards which the employees voting would mark an appropriate square, one
indicating the answer, “Yes,” the other, “No.”

To be sure, the present implementing
rules no longer explicitly impose the requirement that the ballots at a
certification election include a choice for “NO UNION.” Section 8
(Rule VI, Book V of the Omnibus Rules) entitled “Marking and canvassing
of votes,” pertinently
provides that:

” ** (a) The
voter must write a cross (X) or a check (/) in the square opposite the union of
his choice. If only one union is involved, the voter shall make his cross or
check in the square indicating ‘YES’ or ‘NO.’

* * * *.”

Withal, neither the quoted provision nor
any other in the Omnibus Implementing Rules expressly bars the inclusion of
that choice of “NO UNION” in the ballots. Indeed, it is doubtful if the employee’s alternative right NOT to form, join or assist any labor organization or withdraw or resign
from one may be validly eliminated and he be consequently coerced to vote for
one or another of the competing unions and be represented by one of them. Besides, the statement in the quoted provision
that “(i)f only one union is involved, the voter shall make his cross or
check in the square indicating ‘YES’ or ‘NO,’ is quite clear acknowledgment of
the alternative possibility that the “NO” votes may outnumber the
“YES” votes — indicating that the majority of the employees in the
company do not wish to be represented by any union — in which case, no union
can represent the employees in collective bargaining. And whether the prevailing “NO” votes are inspired by
considerations of religious belief or discipline or not is beside the point,
and may not be inquired into at all.

The purpose of a certification
election is precisely the ascertainment of the wishes of the majority of the
employees in the appropriate bargaining unit: to be or not to be represented by a labor organization, and in the
affirmative case, by which particular labor organization. If the results of the election should
disclose that the majority of the workers do not wish to be represented by any
union, then their wishes must be respected, and no union may properly be
certified as the exclusive representative of the workers in the bargaining unit
in dealing with the employer regarding wages, hours and other terms and
conditions of employment. The minority
employees — who wish to have a union represent them in collective bargaining
— can do nothing but wait for another suitable occasion to petition for a
certification election and hope that the results will be different. They may not and should not be permitted,
however, to impose their will on the majority — who do not desire to have a
union certified as the exclusive workers’ benefit in the bargaining unit —
upon the plea that they, the minority workers, are being denied the right of
self-organization and collective bargaining. As repeatedly stated, the right of self-organization embraces not only
the right to form, join or assist labor organizations, but the concomitant,
converse right NOT to form, join or assist any labor union.

That the INK employees, as employees
in the same bargaining unit in the true sense of the term, do have the right of
self-organization, is also in truth beyond question, as well as the fact that
when they voted that the employees in their bargaining unit should be
represented by “NO UNION,” they were simply exercising that right of
self-organization, albeit in its negative aspect.

The respondents’ argument that the
petitioners are disqualified to vote because they “are not constituted
into a duly organized labor union” — “but members of the INK which
prohibits its followers, on religious grounds, from joining or forming any
labor organization” — and “hence, not one of the unions which vied
for certification as sole and exclusive bargaining representative,” is
specious. Neither law, administrative rule
nor jurisprudence requires that only
employees affiliated with any labor organization may take part in a
certification election. On the
contrary, the plainly discernible intendment of the law is to grant the right
to vote to all bona fide employees
in the bargaining unit, whether they are members of a labor organization or
not. As held in Airtime
Specialists, Inc. v. Ferrer-Calleja:^[9]

“In a certification election all rank-and-file employees in
the appropriate bargaining unit are entitled to vote. This principle is clearly stated in Art. 255 of the Labor Code
which states that the ‘labor organization designated or selected by the
majority of the employees in an appropriate bargaining unit shall be the
exclusive representative of the employees in such unit for the purpose of
collective bargaining.’ Collective bargaining covers all aspects of the
employment relation and the resultant CBA negotiated by the certified union
binds all employees in the bargaining unit. Hence, all rank-and-file employees, probationary or permanent, have a
substantial interest in the selection of the bargaining representative. The Code makes no distinction as to their
employment status as basis for eligibility in supporting the petition for
certification election. The law refers
to ‘all’ the employees in the bargaining unit. All they need to be eligible to support the petition is to belong to the
‘bargaining unit.'”

Neither does the contention that
petitioners should be denied the right to vote because they “did not
participate in previous certification elections in the company for the reason
that their religious beliefs do not allow them to form, join or assist labor
organizations,” persuade acceptance. No law, administrative rule or precedent prescribes forfeiture of the
right to vote by reason of neglect to exercise the right in past certification
elections. In denying the petitioners’
right to vote upon these egregiously fallacious grounds, the public respondents
exercised their discretion whimsically, capriciously and oppressively and
gravely abused the same.

WHEREFORE, the petition for certiorari
is GRANTED; the Decision of the then Officer-in-Charge of the Bureau of Labor
Relations dated December 21, 1987 (affirming the Order of the Med-Arbiter dated
July 22, 1988) is ANNULLED and SET ASIDE; and the petitioners are DECLARED to
have legally exercised their right to vote, and their ballots should be
canvassed and, if validly and properly made out, counted and tallied for the
choices written therein. Costs against
private respondents.

SO ORDERED.

Paras, Padilla, and Regalado,
JJ., concur.

Nocon, J., on leave.

^[1]
SEE footnote 5, infra

^[2]
As amended inter alia by R.A. Nos. 6715, 6725 and 6727

^[3]
Italics supplied

^[4]
Italics supplied

^[5]
ART. 247, Labor Code, as amended; SEE Fernandez
and Quiazon, Law of Labor Relations, p. 162

^[6]
To be sure, the right not to join a union, or discontinue membership therein,
is subject to certain qualifications or exceptions as, e.g., when there is a
closed shop or similar agreement in effect in the establishment, although it
has been held that such agreements are not applicable to any religious sect
which prohibits affiliation of their members in any labor organization (Sec.
4(a) (4), R.A. 875 [The Industrial Peace Act], as amended by R.A. No. 3350)

^[7]
59 SCRA 54, 66-67 (1974)

^[8]
SEE Fernandez and Quiazon, op. cit., pp. 499-501

^[9]
180 SCRA 749, 754 (1989)