OLIVIA S. PASCUAL AND HERMES S. PASCUAL, PETITIONERS, VS. ESPERANZA C. PASCUAL-BAUTISTA, MANUEL C. PASCUAL, JOSE C. PASCUAL, SUSANA C. PASCUAL­-BAUTISTA, ERLINDA C. PASCUAL, WEN…

This is a petition for review on certiorari which seeks to
reverse and set aside: (a) the decision
of the Court of Appeals^[1] dated
April 29, 1988 in CA-G.R. SP. No. 14010 entitled “Olivia S. Pascual and
Hermes S. Pascual v. Esperanza C. Pascual-Bautista, Manuel C. Pascual, Jose
Pascual, Susana C. Pascual-Bautista, Erlinda C. Pascual, Wenceslao C. Pascual,
Jr., et al.” which dismissed the petition and in effect affirmed the
decision of the trial court and (b) the resolution dated July 14, 1988 denying
petitioners’ motion for reconsideration.

The undisputed facts of the case are as follows:

Petitioners Olivia and Hermes both surnamed Pascual are the
acknowledged natural children of the late Eligio Pascual, the latter being the
full blood brother of the decedent Don Andres Pascual (Rollo, petition, p. 17).

Don Andres Pascual died intestate on October 12, 1973 without any
issue, legitimate, acknowledged natural, adopted or spurious children and was
survived by the following:

(a)        
Adela Soldevilla de Pascual, surviving spouse;

(b)        
Children of Wenceslao Pascual, Sr., a brother of the full
blood of the deceased, to wit:

Esperanza
C. Pascual-Bautista

Manuel
C. Pascual

Jose
C. Pascual

Susana C. Pascual-Bautista

Erlinda C. Pascual

Wenceslao
C. Pascual, Jr.

(c)     Children of Pedro Pascual, brother of the
half blood of the deceased, to wit:

Avelino Pascual

Isoceles Pascual

Loida Pascual-Martinez

Virginia Pascual-Ner

Nona Pascual-Fernando

Octavio Pascual

Geranaia
Pascual-Dubert;

(d)    Acknowledged natural children of Eligio
Pascual, brother of the full blood of the deceased, to wit:

Olivia S. Pascual

Hermes S. Pascual

(e)   Intestate of Eleuterio T. Pascual, a brother
of the half blood of the deceased and represented by the following:

Dominga M. Pascual

Mamerta P. Fugoso

Abraham S. Sarmiento, III

Regina Sarmiento-Macaibay

Eleuterio P. Sarmiento

Dominga P. San Diego

Nelia P. Marquez

Silvestre M. Pascual

Eleuterio M. Pascual

(Rollo, pp. 46-47)

Adela Soldevilla de Pascual, the surviving spouse of the late Don
Andres Pascual, filed with the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 162 (CFI of
Rizal, Br. XXIII), a Special Proceeding, Case No. 7554, for administration of
the intestate estate of her late husband (Rollo, p. 47).

On December 18, 1973, Adela Soldevilla de Pascual filed a
Supplemental Petition to the Petition for Letters of Administration, where she
expressly stated that Olivia Pascual and Hermes Pascual, are among the heirs of
Don Andres Pascual (Rollo, pp. 99-101).

On February 27, 1974, again Adela Soldevilla de Pascual executed
an affidavit, to the effect that of her own knowledge, Eligio Pascual is the
younger full blood brother of her late husband Don Andres Pascual, to belie the
statement made by the oppositors, that they are not among the known heirs of
the deceased Don Andres Pascual (Rollo,
p. 102).

On October 16, 1985, all the above-mentioned heirs entered into a
COMPROMISE AGREEMENT, over the vehement objections of the herein petitioners
Olivia S. Pascual and Hermes S. Pascual, although paragraph V of such
compromise agreement provides, to wit:

“This Compromise Agreement shall be without prejudice to the
continuation of the above-entitled proceedings until the final determination
thereof by the court, or by another compromise agreement, as regards the claims
of Olivia Pascual and Hermes Pascual as legal heirs of the deceased, Don Andres
Pascual.” (Rollo, p. 108)

The said Compromise Agreement had been entered into despite the
Manifestation/Motion of the petitio­ners Olivia Pascual and Hermes Pascual,
manifesting their hereditary rights in the intestate estate of Don Andres
Pascual, their uncle (Rollo, pp. 111-112).

On September 30, 1987, petitioners filed their Motion to
Reiterate Hereditary Rights (Rollo, pp. 113-­114) and the Memorandum in Support
of Motion to reiterate Hereditary Rights (Rollo, pp. 116-130).

On December 18, 1987, the Regional Trial Court, presided over by
Judge Manuel S. Padolina issued an order, the dispositive portion of which
reads:

“WHEREFORE, premises considered, this Court resolves as it is
hereby resolved to Deny this motion reiterating the hereditary rights of Olivia
and Hermes Pascual” (Rollo, p. 136).

On January 13, 1988,
petitioners filed their motion for reconsideration (Rollo, pp. 515-526),
and such motion was denied.

Petitioners appealed their case to the Court of Appeals docketed
as CA-G.R. No. 14010 (Rollo, p. 15).

On April 29, 1988, the respondent Court of Appeals rendered its
decision the dispositive part of which reads:

“WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED. Costs against the petitioners.

“SO ORDERED.” (Rollo, p. 38)

Petitioners filed their motion for reconsideration of said
decision and on July 14, 1988, the Court of Appeals issued its resolution
denying the motion for reconsideration (Rollo, p. 42).

Hence, this petition for review on certiorari.

After all the requirements had been filed, the case was given due
course.

The main issue to be resolved in the case at bar is whether or
not Article 992 of the Civil Code of the Philippines, can be interpreted to
exclude recognized natural children from the inheritance of the deceased.

Petitioners contend that they do not fall squarely within the purview of Article 992 and
of the doctrine laid down in Diaz v. IAC (150 SCRA 645 [1987]) because being
acknowledged natural children, their illegitimacy
is not due to the subsistence of a prior marriage when such children
were under conception (Rollo, p. 418).

Otherwise stated they say the term “illegitimate”
children as provided in Article 992 must be strictly construed to refer only to
spurious children (Rollo, p. 419).

On the other hand, private respondents maintain that herein
petitioners are within the prohibition of Article 992 of the Civil Code and the
doctrine laid down in Diaz v. IAC is applicable to them.

The petition is devoid of merit.

Pertinent thereto, Article 992 of the Civil Code, provides:

“An illegitimate child has no right to inherit ab intestato from the legitimate children and relatives of his father or
mother; nor shall such children or relatives inherit in the same manner from
the illegitimate child.”

The issue in the case at bar, had already been laid to rest in
Diaz v. IAC, supra, where this Court ruled that:

“Article 992 of the Civil Code provides a barrier or iron
curtain in that it prohibits absolutely a succession ab intestato between the illegitimate
child and the legitimate children and relatives of the father or mother of said
legitimate child. They may have a
natural tie of blood, but this is not recognized by law for the purposes of
Article 992. Between the legitimate
family and illegitimate family there is presumed to be an intervening
antagonism and incompatibility. The
illegitimate child is disgracefully looked down upon by the legitimate family;
the family is in turn hated by the illegitimate child; the latter considers the
privileged condition of the former, and the resources of which it is thereby
deprived; the former, in turn, sees in
the illegitimate child nothing but the product of sin, palpable evidence of a
blemish broken in life; the law does no more than recognize this truth, by
avoiding further grounds of resentment.”

Eligio Pascual is a legitimate child but petitioners are his
illegitimate children.

Applying the above doctrine to the case at bar, respondent IAC
did not err in holding that petitioners herein cannot represent their father Eligio
Pascual in the succession of the latter to the intestate estate of the decedent
Andres Pascual, full blood brother of their father.

In their memorandum, petitioners insisted that Article 992 in the
light of Articles 902 and 989 of the Civil Code allows them (Olivia and Hermes)
to represent Eligio Pascual in the intestate estate of Don Andres Pascual.

On motion for reconsideration of the decision in Diaz v. IAC,
this Court further elucidated the successional rights of illegitimate children,
which squarely answers the questions raised by the petitioner on this point.

The Court held:

“Article 902, 989, and 990 clearly speaks of successional
rights of illegitimate children, which rights are
transmitted to their descendants upon their death. The descendants (of these illegitimate children) who may inherit
by virtue of the right of representation may be legitimate or
illegitimate. In whatever manner, one
should not overlook the fact that the persons to be represented are themselves illegitimate. The three named provisions are very clear on
this matter. The right of
representation is not available to illegitimate descendants of legitimate
children in the inheritance of a legitimate grandparent. It may be argued, as done by petitioners,
that the illegitimate descendant of a
legitimate child is entitled to represent by virtue of the provisions of
Article 982, which provides that ‘the grandchildren and other descendants shall
inherit by right of representation.’
Such a conclusion is
erroneous. It would allow intestate
succession by an illegitimate child to the legitimate parent of his father or
mother, a situation which would
set at naught the provisions of Article 992. Article 982 is inapplicable to the instant case because Article
992 prohibits absolutely a succession
ab intestato between the illegitimate child and the legitimate children and relatives of the father
or mother. It may not be amiss to state
Article 982 is the general rule and Article 992 the exception.

“The rules laid down in Article 982 that ‘grandchildren and
other descendants shall inherit by right of representation’ and in Article 902
that the rights of illegitimate children x x x are transmitted upon their death
to their descendants, whether legitimate or illegitimate are subject to
the limitation prescribed by Article 992 to the end that an
illegitimate child has no right to inherit ab intestato from the
legitimate children and relatives of his father or mother.” (Amicus
Curiae’s Opinion by former Justice Minister Ricardo C. Puno, p. 12). Diaz v. Intermediate Apellate Court, 182
SCRA 427; pp. 431-432; [1990]).

Verily, the interpretation of the law desired by the petitioner
may be more humane but it is also an elementary rule in statutory construction
that when the words and phrases of the statute are clear and unequivocal, their
meaning must be determined from the language employed and the statute must be
taken to mean exactly what it says. (Baranda v. Gustilo, 165 SCRA 758-759 [1988]). The courts may not speculate as to the probable intent of the
legislature apart from the words (Aparri v. CA, 127 SCRA 233 [1984]). When the law is clear, it is not susceptible
of interpretation. It must be applied
regardless of who may be affected, even if the law may be harsh or
onerous. (Nepumoceno, et al. v. FC, 110
Phil. 42). And even granting that
exceptions may be conceded, the same as a general rule, should be strictly but
reasonably construed: they extend only
so far as their language fairly warrants, and all doubts should be resolved in
favor of the general provivions rather than the exception. Thus, where a general rule is established by
statute, the court will not curtail the former nor add to the latter by implication
(Samson v. C.A. 145 SCRA 654 [1986]).

Clearly the term “illegitimate” refers to both natural
and spurious.

Finally under Article 176 of the Family Code, all illegitimate
children are generally placed under one category, which undoubtedly settles the
issue as to whether or not aknowledged natural children should be treated
differently, in the negative.

It may be said that the law may be harsh but that is the law
(DURA LEX SED LEX).

PREMISES CONSIDERED, the petition is DISMISSED for lack of
merit and the assailed decision of the respondent Court of Appeals dated April
29, 1988 is AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.

Melencio-Herrera, (Chairman), Padilla, Regalado, and Nocon, JJ., concur.

^[1]
Penned by Associate Justice Pedro A. Ramirez and concurred in by Associate
Justices Serafin E. Camilon and Minerva P. Gonzaga-Reyes.