THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE, VS. OCTAVIO JUANGA, DEFENDANT-APPELLANT.

Octavio Juanga,
herein accused-appellant seeks a review of the decision of the Regional
Trial Court of
Iloilo City,
Branch 24, finding him guilty of murder.

An information
was filed charging Octavio Juanga
with murder committed as follows:

“That on or
about March 5, 1982, in the municipality of Leganes,
province of Iloilo, and within the jurisdiction of this Court, the above named
accused, taking advantage of the nighttime, armed with homemade shotgun (pugakhang)
with treachery evident premeditation and with a decided purpose to kill, did
then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously attack, assault and shoot one Mamerto Peñaflor Jr., with said weapon with which he was then
provided, thereby inflicting upon the
latter gunshot wounds on the vital parts of his body which caused his death thereafter.”
(Orig. Records, p. 1)

On arraignment, the accused entered a plea of not guilty through
counsel.

Trial proceeded with the prosecution presenting evidence on the
following facts as attending the commission
of the crime:

“On March 5, 1982,
at about 5:30 o’clock in the
afternoon, Esperidion Dapitas,
Jr. met Mamerto Peñaflor,
Jr. at the Poblacion of Leganes,
Iloilo.  He invited Mamerto
for a drink of one bottle of beer at the public market.  Mamerto acceded
(pp. 14-15, 19, tsn, Nov. 19, 1984).

“While Espiridion and Mamerto
were drinking beer, appellant Octavio Juanga went inside the place where the two were.  Mamerto invited Octavio to have a drink with them.  Octavio refused the
invitation.  Mamerto
then placed his arm around the shoulder of Octavio
but the latter brushed aside the former’s arm.  Afterward,
(sic) Mamerto attempted to shake hand with Octavio at the same time telling him to forget what
happened in the past between them.  Octavio evaded the hand of Mamerto
and left the place without saying anything (pp. 15-16, tsn,
ibid)

“After Octavio left, Esperidion and Mamerto continued
with their drinking.  At that instance, Esperidion asked Mamerto what
happened between him and Octavio.  Mamerto replied
that he and Octavio had a fist fight two days ago in
which Octavio was at the receiving end until somebody
came to pacify them (pp. 17-18, tsn, ibid).

“After about thirty minutes Esperidion
and Mamerto decided to go to the town plaza where
there was a fair and stayed there
for about one hour twenty minutes.  From
the plaza, they proceeded to the house of Elvira Galo
at Sitio Bulangan, Brgy. Guinobatan, Leganes, Iloilo.  They met Claro
Cesama in said house. 
While they were there, Elvira served them with beer.  At about 7:45
o’clock that night, Octavio entered the
house of Elvira as if looking for somebody. 
Mamerto again invited Octavio
to drink but the latter declined the offer and left.  About thirty minutes later, Octavio again went inside the house of Elvira also as if
looking for somebody.  After about two
minutes, Octavio left (pp. 5, 21-24, tsn, ibid)

“Moments later, Mamerto asked
permission from Esperidion to urinate.  Esperidion followed
Mamerto toward the footwalk
near a banana plant at the back of the kitchen of said house.  When Esperidion was
about four and half arms length from Mamerto who was
urinating, he saw Octavio pointing something at Mamerto.  Almost at
the same time, Octavio whispered to Mamerto and a gunshot rang out.  Mamerto turned
around and collapsed with blood oozing from his right clavicle and with his
private part still visible.  Esperidion forthwith went to help Mamerto
by craddling him (pp. 6-8, 26-30, tsn,
ibid).  At the same time, Thelma Dapitas who was then looking for her son Esperidion, passed by said place and saw Octavio still holding a gun with his right hand (pp. 7-8, tsn, November 12,
1984).  Octavio
then ran toward the road going to the house of Ex-Mayor Jagunap.  Esperidion pursued Octavio.  Esperidion stayed for about three minutes outside the house
of the Ex-Mayor waiting for Octavio to come out.  Esperidion left when
he saw Octavio with a companion proceeding toward the
ricefield (pp. 10-11, tsn,
ibid; pp. 9-10, tsn, Nov. 12, 1984)

“Esperidion and Claro
brought Mamerto to the hospital.  Dr. Tito Doromal
conducted an autopsy on the cadaver of Mamerto and
found the cause of his death as ‘hemorrhage due to multiple pellet wounds
located on his right upper chest.’  (Exhs. “A”,
pp. 3-5, tsn, March 1, 1985).”
(Appellee’s Brief, pp. 3-7)

The defense on the other hand, presented the following version
supporting the accused-appellant’s plea of not guilty:

“In his defense, accused testified that he was with his father
attending to their farm the whole day of March
5, 1982.  He stopped working
only at about 5:00 p.m. to comply
with his father’s bidding to buy viand at the poblacion.  He did buy the viand as instructed but asked
a cousin, Wilson Juanga, to bring said viand to their
house.  He then proceeded to the
irrigation to see if there was water and later decided to go to the poblacion.  Along the
way, he met Conrado Abao
and while both of them were passing by the house of ex-mayor Esperidion Jagunap, the latter,
who was at the gate of his house, engaged them in a conversation and thereafter
invited them inside the house.  A certain
Dante Guinalon was with them in the conversation
outside the mayor’s house.  He too was
invited by the mayor inside the house.  While inside the mayor’s house, he watched
television until 9:00 p.m. when he
decided to leave.  He arrived home at
about 9:30 and the following morning,
he was informed by his father that Mamerto Peñaflor, Jr. was shot at the cockpit.  On March
8, 1982, he proceeded to Manila
where he was then employed with General Milling Corporation (Exh. 1) returning only on January 22, 1984.

“Accused’s claim that he worked in
the farm the whole day of March 5, 1982
or up to 5:00 p.m. of that day is
corroborated by his father, Roman.  His
other allegation that he was at the ex-mayor’s house from 7:30 p.m. to 9:00 p.m.
is corroborated by the ex-mayor himself, Esperidion Jagunap and by Dante Guinalon.”
(Record, pp. 417- 420)  (Rollo, p. 48)

On the basis of the evidence presented, the trial court rendered
a decision convicting the accused as charged. 
The decision is now the subject of this
appeal.  The dispositive
portion of the decision reads:

“WHEREFORE, the Court finds the accused Octavio
Juanga, guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime
of murder as defined and penalized under Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code,
the qualifying circumstance of treachery having been present in the commission
of the crime, but without any modifying circumstances, and hereby sentences him
to reclusion perpetua with all the accessory penalties provided by law, to indemnify the
heirs of Mamerto Peñaflor,
Jr. the sum of Thirty Thousand Pesos (P30,000.00) Philippine currency as
compensatory damages for the latter’s death, to pay the sum of P12,344 as
funeral and burial expenses, P3,000 as actual expenses, P5,000 as moral
damages, P10,000 representing legal fees and the costs.

“Octavio Juanga
should be credited in full for the period of his preventive imprisonment,
should there be any, if he agrees voluntarily in writing to abide by the
disciplinary rules imposed upon convicted prisoners, otherwise, four fifths
(4/5) thereof.” (Rollo, pp. 420-421)

Not satisfied with the decision of the trial court, the
accused-appellant raises two issues for our determination, namely:

I

THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN
UNDULY RELYING ON THE TESTIMONY OF PROSECUTION WITNESS ESPERIDION DAPITAS, JR.,
NOT ONLY BECAUSE IT DID NOT HEAR THE TESTIMONY OF SAID WITNESS BUT ALSO BECAUSE
OF THE INHERENT INCREDIBILITY OF THE SAID WITNESS AND THE IMPROBABILITY OF HIS
TESTIMONY.

II

THE LOWER
COURT ERRED IN FINDING THAT THERE WAS POSITIVE
IDENTIFICATION OF THE ACCUSED AND THAT THE DEFENSE OF ALIBI CANNOT PREVAIL OVER
THE SAME.” (Appellant’s Brief, pp. 43-44)

After a thorough examination of the records of the case, we hold
that there is no reversible error in the trial court’s relying on the
testimonies of the prosecution witnesses. 
The fact that the Judge who decided the case was not the one who heard
the witnesses testify does not weaken the finding that the evidence is conclusive of the guilt of the
accused-appellant.  In People v. Abaya, G.R. No. 80885, May 17, 1990 we stated that “xxx
the mere fact that Judge Alfredo C. Flores did not preside at the trial of this
case in its entirety, having taken over only when the last defense witness was
to be presented did not detract from the validity, much less the correctness of
this decision.  The full record was
available to him.  It is evident from the
knowledgeable and analytical decision he has written that he thoroughly
examined the testimonial and documentary evidence before him and carefully
assessed the credibility of the witnesses with the seasoned perceptiveness he
has developed as a trial judge.” The appellant has not shown any
convincing reasons why the same rule should not apply in this case.

It is not an unusual practice for a Judge who did not try the
case to decide it.  Not a few cases have
been decided by Judges who did not conduct the trial in its entirety.  Weighing of the evidence of a case is not
confined to testimonial evidence; it includes the totality of the evidence
presented by both the prosecution and the defense, both testimonial and
documentary.

The accused-appellant raises the improbability of the testimonies
of the prosecution witnesses.  Juanga claims that Thelma Dapitas
did not actually see him shoot Peñaflor.  Moreover, he states that, according to her
testimony, there were eight (8) other persons near her who were one arm’s
length away from her and where she in turn was 5 arm’s length away from Juanga.  He assails
the fact that not one among those eight (8) persons was presented as witness.

There is nothing irregular about this.

It is up to the
parties to determine for themselves whether it is necessary to present
corroborating evidence or to rely alone on
its principal evidence (People v. Zabala, 86
Phil. 251 [1950]; People v. Salazar, 58 SCRA 468 [1974]).

The fact remains that the accused was positively identified by
Thelma Dapitas as the person with a gun immediately
after Peñaflor was shot.  She heard a shot and immediately after, she saw Juanga
with a gun in his right hand.  She was
able to recognize him because of the reflection of light from the nearby
houses.

More important, however, was the presence of eyewitness Esperidion Dapitas, Jr. during
the shooting incident and who testified as to its details.  Esperidion was only
three arms length from the victim when he saw the accused-appellant shoot Mamerto Peñaflor Jr. with the home-made shotgun.  The presence of Esperidion
was not rebutted by controverting evidence.

In questioning Esperidion’s positively identifying him as the assailant,
the appellant points to some alleged
inconsistencies in his testimonies such as that Esperidition
testified that he saw and met Pat. Kwan at the incident before
he ran after Juanga.  This was later contradicted he claims, by a
later testimony of Esperidion that he saw Pat. Kwan after
he ran after Juanga.

Whatever may be the seeming inconsistency, it is reconciliable by the fact that Esperidion
was consistent in testifying that he met Pat. Kwan only when he returned from
the body of Peñaflor after pursuing the appellant up
to the house of Juanga, the ex-mayor.  The other
alleged contradictions are even more inconsequential and easily explained.  We apply the well-settled rule that minor
inconsistencies will not affect the credibility of witnesses (People v. Pacala, 58 SCRA 370, [1974]; People v. Clemente,
58 SCRA 742 [1974])

Juanga’s defense of alibi, although
corroborated by Jagunap and Guinalon
is unavailing as against his positive identification by the prosecution
witnesses and the absence of physical impossibility of his being at the scene
of the crime.  The house of ex-Mayor Jagunap where he claims he was at the time of the incident
is only 400 meters away from the scene of the crime.  Alibi, thus, cannot prevail (People v.
Garcia, 141 SCRA 336 [1986]; People v. Parilla, 144
SCRA 454, [1986]).

The prosecution witnesses whose integrity is being questioned by
the accused have no motive to falsely testify against the accused.  On the contrary, it is the appellant who had
a motive to kill Peñaflor.  As related by the victim to prosecution witness Esperidion Dapitas, Jr., Juanga and Peñaflor had an earlier fist fight where Juanga was bested. 
This angered the accused to the point that the victim’s reconciliatory
moves were pointedly ignored.

It is true that motive in the instant case does not have to be
proved considering the positive identification by the prosecution witnesses of
the accused-appellant.  However, the fist
fight, the brushing off of the attempts to reconcile, and the appellant’s sizing
up the situation immediately before the shooting add to the correctness of the
decision.  It is an established
jurisprudential rule that as between the positive declaration of the
prosecution witnesses and the negative denials of the accused, the former
deserves more credence (People v. Espejo, et al.,
G.R. No. 88662, June 18, 1990 citing People v. Macabenta,
170 SCRA 298, [1989]; People v. de Jesus, 145 SCRA 521, [1986]; People v.
Plaza, et al. 140 SCRA 277, [1985]).

Finally, we hold that the crime committed was murder qualified by
alevosia, the accused having shot the victim
from behind without warning (People v. Acosta, G.R. No. 70133, July 2,
1990).  This is shown by the suddenness
of the attack.  (People
v. Maranan, 146 SCRA 243 [1986]).

WHEREFORE, premises
considered, the decision appealed from
is hereby AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.

Fernan, C.J., (Chairman), Feliciano, Bidin, and Cortes, JJ., concur.