G.R. No. 83820. May 25, 1990

JOSE B. AZNAR (AS PROVINCIAL CHAIRMAN OF PDP LABAN IN CEBU), PETITIONER, VS. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS AND EMILIO MARIO RENNER OSMENA, RESPONDENTS.

Decisions / Signed Resolutions May 25, 1990 EN BANC PARAS, J.:
Download PDF


PARAS, J.:


Before Us is a petition for certiorari assailing the
Resolution of the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) dated June 11, 1988, which
dismissed the petition for the disqualification of private respondent Emilio
“Lito” Osmena as
candidate for Provincial Governor of Cebu Province.

The facts of the case are briefly as follows:

On November 19, 1987, private respondent Emilio “Lito” Osmena filed his
certificate of candidacy with the COMELEC for the position of Provincial
Governor of Cebu Province in the January 19, 1988
local elections.

On January 22, 1988, the Cebu PDP-Laban Provincial Council (Cebu-PDP
Laban, for short), as represented by petitioner Jose
B. Aznar in his capacity as its incumbent Provincial
Chairman, filed with the COMELEC a petition for the disqualification of private
respondent on the ground that he is allegedly not a Filipino citizen, being a
citizen of the United States of America.

On January 27, 1988, petitioner filed a Formal Manifestation
submitting a Certificate issued by the then Immigration and Deportation
Commissioner Miriam Defensor Santiago certifying that
private respondent is an American and is a holder of Alien Certificate of
Registration (ACR) No. B-21448 and Immigrant Certificate of Residence (ICR) No.
133914, issued at Manila on March 27 and 28, 1958, respectively.  (Annex “B-1”).

The petitioner also filed a Supplemental Urgent Ex-Parte Motion for the Issuance of a Temporary
Restraining Order to temporarily enjoin the Cebu
Provincial Board of Canvassers from tabulating/canvassing the votes cast in
favor of private respondent and proclaiming him until the final resolution of
the main petition.

Thus, on January 28, 1988, the COMELEC en banc
resolved to order the Board tip continue canvassing but to suspend the
proclamation.

At the hearing before the COMELEC (First Division), the
petitioner presented the following exhibits tending to show that private
respondent is an American citizen: 
Application for Alien Registration Form No. 1 of the Bureau of
Immigration signed by private respondent dated November 21, 1979 (Exh. “B”); Alien Certificate of Registration No.
015356 in the name of private respondent dated November 21, 1979 (Exh. “C”); Permit to Re-enter the Philippines
dated November 21, 1979 (Ex. “D”); Immigration Certifitate
of Clearance dated January 3, 1980 (Exh.
“E”).  (pp. 117-118, Rollo)

Private respondent, on the other hand, maintained that he is a
Filipino citizen, alleging:  that he is
the legitimate child of Dr. Emilia D. Osmena, a Filipino and son of the late President Sergio Osmena, Sr.; that he is a holder of a valid and subsisting
Philippine Passport No. 0855103 issued on March 25, 1987; that he has been
continuously residing in the Philippines since birth and has not gone out of
the country for more than six months; and that he has been a registered voter
in the Philippines since 1965.  (pp.
107-108, Rollo)

On March 3, 1988, COMELEC (First Division) directed the Board of
Canvassers to proclaim the winning candidates. 
Having obtained the highest number of votes, private respondent was
proclaimed the Provincial Governor of Cebu.

Thereafter, on June 11, 1988, COMELEC (First Division) dismissed
the petition for disqualification for not having been timely filed and for lack
of sufficient proof that private respondent is not a Filipino citizen.

Hence, the present petition.

The petition is not meritorious.

There are two instances where a petition questioning the
qualifications of a registered candidate to run for the office for which his
certificate of candidacy was filed can be raised under the Omnibus Election
Code (B.P. Blg. 881), to wit:

“(1) Before election,
pursuant to Section 78 thereof which provides that:

‘Section 78.  Petition to deny
due course or to cancel a certificate
of candidacy.
  — A
verified petition seeking to deny due course or to cancel a certificate of
candidacy may be filed by any person exclusively on the ground that any
material representation contained therein as required under section 74 hereof
is false.  The petition may be filed
at any time not later than twenty-five
days from the time of the filing
of the certificate of candidacy and shall be decided, after the
notice and hearing, not later than fifteen days before the election.

and

“(2) After election, pursuant to Section 253
thereof, viz:

‘Sec. 253. 
Petition for quo warranto. 
— Any voter contesting the election of any Member of the
Batasang Pambansa,
regional, provincial or city officer on the ground of inelligibility
or of disloyalty to the Republic of the Philippines shall file a sworn petition
for quo warranto with the Commission within
ten days after the proclamation of the
results of the election.”

The records show that private respondent filed his certificate of
candidacy on November 19, 1987 and that the petitioner filed its petition for disqualification
of said private respondent on January 22, 1988. 
Since the petition for disqualification was filed beyond the twenty
five-day period required in Section 78 of the Omnibus Election Code, it is
clear that said petition was filed cut of time.

The petition for the disqualification of private respondent
cannot also be treated as a petition for quo warranto
under Section 253 of the same Code as it is unquestionably premature,
considering that private respondent was proclaimed Provincial Governor of Cebu only on March 3, 1988.

However, We deem it is a matter of
public interest to ascertain the respondent’s citizenship and qualification to
hold the public office to which has been proclaimed elected.  There is enough basis
for us to rule directly on the merits of the case, as the COMELEC did below.

Petitioner’s contention that private respondent is not a Filipino
citizen and, therefore, disqualified from running for and being elected to the
office of Provincial Governor of Cebu, is not
supported by substantial and convincing evidence.

In the proceedings before the COMELEC,
the petitioner failed to present direct proof that private respondent had lost
his Filipino citizenship by any of the modes provided for under C. A. No.
63.  Among others, these are:  (1) by naturalization in a foreign country;
(2) by express renunciation of citizenship; and (3) by subscribing to an oath
of allegiance to support the Constitution or laws of a foreign country.  From the evidence, it is clear that private
respondent Osmena did not lose his Philippine
citizenship by any of the three mentioned hereinabove or by any other mode of
losing Philippine citizenship.

In concluding that private respondent had been naturalized as a
citizen of the United States of America, the petitioner merely relied on the
fact that private respondent was issued alien certificate of registration and
was given clearance and permit to re-enter the Philippines by the Commission on
Immigration and Deportation.  Petitioner
assumed that because of the foregoing, the respondent is an American and
“being an American”, private respondent “must have taken and
sworn to the Oath of Allegiance required by the U.S. Naturalization Laws.”
(p. 81, Rollo)

Philippine courts are only allowed to determine who are Filipino citizens and who are not.  Whether or not a person is considered an
American under the laws of the United States does not concern us here.

By virtue of his being the son of a Filipino father, the
presumption that private respondent is a Filipino remains.  It was incumbent upon the petitioner to prove
that private respondent had lost his Philippine citizenship.  As earlier stated, however, the petitioner
failed to positively establish this fact.

The cases of Juan Gallanosa Frivaldo v. COMELEC et al, (G.R. No. 87193, June 21, 1989)
and Ramon L. Labo v. COMELEC et al (G.R. No. 86564,
August 1, 1989) are not applicable to the case at bar.

In the Frivaldo case, evidence shows
that he was naturalized as a citizen of the United States in 1983 per
certification from the United States District Court, Northern District of
California, as duly authenticated by Vice Consul Amado
P. Cortez of the Philippine Consulate General in San Francisco, California,
U.S. A.

Frivaldo expressly admitted in his
answer that he was naturalized in the United States but claimed that he was
forced to, embrace American citizenship to protect himself
from the persecution of the Marcos government. 
The Court, however, found this suggestion of involuntariness
unacceptable, pointing out that there were many other Filipinos in the United
States similarly situated as Frivaldo who did not
find it necessary to abandon their status as Filipinos.

Likewise, in the case of Labo, records
show that Labo was married to an Australian citizen
and that he was naturalized as an Australian citizen in 1976, per certification
from the Australian Government through its Consul in the Philippines.  This was later affirmed by the Department of
Foreign Affairs.

The authenticity of the above evidence was not disputed by Labo.  In fact, in a
number of sworn statements, Labo categorically
declared that he was a citizen of Australia.

In declaring both Frivaldo and Labo not citizens of the Philippines, therefore,
disqualified from serving as Governor of the Province of Sorsogon
and Mayor of Baguio City, respectively, the Court
considered the fact that by their own admissions, they are indubitably aliens,
no longer owing any allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines since they
have sworn their total allegiance to a foreign state.

In instant case, private respondent vehemently denies having
taken the oath of allegiance of the United States (p. 81, Rollo).  He is a holder of a valid and subsisting
Philippine passport and has continuously participated in the electoral process
in this country since 1963 up to the present, both as a voter and as a
candidate (pp. 107-108, Rollo).  Thus, private respondent remains a Filipino
and the loss of his Philippine citizenship cannot be presumed.

In the learned dissent of Mr. Justice Teodoro
Padilla, he stresses the fact that because Osmena
obtained Certificates of Alien Registration as an American citizen, the first
in 1958 when he was 24 years old and the second in 1979, he, Osmena should be regarded a having expressly renounced
Philippine citizenship.  To Our mind,
this is a case of non sequitur (It does not follow).  Considering the fact that admittedly Osmena was both a Filipino and an American, the mere fact
that he has a Certificate stating he is an American does not mean that he is
not still a Filipino.  Thus, by
way of analogy, if a person who has two brothers named Jose and Mario states or
certifies that he has a brother named Jose, this does not mean that he does not
have a brother named Mario; or if a person is enrolled as a student simultaneously
in two universities, namely University X and University Y, presents a
Certification that he is a student of University X, this does not necessarily
mean that he is not still a student of University Y.  In the case of Osmena,
the Certification that he is an American does not mean that he is not still a
Filipino, possessed as he is, of both nationalities or
citizenships.  Indeed, there is no
express renunciation here of Philippine citizenship; truth to tell, there is
even no implied renunciation of said citizenship.  When We consider
that the renunciation needed to lose Philippine citizenship must be
“express”, it stands to reason that there can be no such loss of
Philippine citizenship when there is no renunciation,
either “express” or “implied”.

Parenthetically, the statement in the 1987
Constitution that “dual allegiance of citizens is inimical to the national
interest and shall be dealt with by law” (Art.
IV, Sec. 5) has no
retroactive effect.  And while it is true
that even before the 1987 Constitution, Our country had already frowned upon
the concept of dual citizenship or allegiance, the fact is it actually
existed.  Be it noted further that under
the aforecited proviso, the effect of such dual
citizenship or allegiance shall be dealt with by a future law.  Said law has not yet been enacted.

WHEREFORE, the petition for certiorari is hereby
DISMISSED and the Resolution of the COMELEC is hereby AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.

Narvasa, Bidin,
Griño-Aquino, Medialdea, and Regalado, JJ., concur.

Feliciano, J., joins J. Sarmiento in his concurring
opinion.

Melencio-Herrera, Cruz, Padilla, JJ.,
see dissenting opinion.

Cortes, J. in the result.

Fernan, C.J., no part, formerly counsel for Osmeña Estate.

Gutierrez, Jr., J, no part.

Gancayco, J., on official leave.


Aznar vs COMELEC : 83820 : May 25, 1990 : J. Cruz : En Banc : Dissenting<br /> Opinion

Clean

6 pt
6 pt
0
3

MicrosoftInternetExplorer4

st1:*{behavior:url(#ieooui) }

/* Style Definitions */
table.MsoNormalTable
{mso-style-name:”Table Normal”;
mso-tstyle-rowband-size:0;
mso-tstyle-colband-size:0;
mso-style-noshow:yes;
mso-style-parent:””;
mso-padding-alt:0in 5.4pt 0in 5.4pt;
mso-para-margin:0in;
mso-para-margin-bottom:.0001pt;
mso-pagination:widow-orphan;
font-size:10.0pt;
font-family:”Times New Roman”;}

DISSENTING OPINION

CRUZ, J.:

I join Mr. Justice Padilla in his dissent.

It seems to me that when a person voluntarily registers as an
alien, he is in effect affirming that he is not a citizen.  The terms “citizen” and
“alien” are mutually exclusive from the viewpoint of municipal law,
which is what really matters in the case at bar.  Under this discipline, one is either a
citizen of the local state or he is not; and the question is resolved on the
basis of its own laws alone and not those of any other state.

One of the several modes of losing Philippine citizenship under C.A. No. 63 is by “express
renunciation” thereof.  In the case
of Frivaldo v. Commission on Elections, G.R. No. 87193, June 23, 1989, there was such renunciation when
the petitioner took an oath as a naturalized citizen of the United
States in which he renounced all allegiance
to all other states.  In the case of Labo
v. Commission on Elections, G.R. No. 86546, August 1, 1989, the petitioner not only took a similar
oath after his naturalization in Australia
but also executed other documents in which he stated that he was not a Filipino.

The fact that his naturalization was later revoked did not also
invalidate his disavowal of Philippine citizenship. “Express renunciation”
is a separate mode of
losing Philippine citizenship and is not necessarily dependent on “naturalization in a foreign
country,” which is another and different mode.

When a person rejects and divorces his wife to enter into a second marriage, he cannot
say he still loves her despite his desertion. 
The undeniable fact is that he has left her for another woman to whom he
has totally and solemnly
transferred his troth.  It does him no
credit when he protests he married a second time simply for material
convenience and that his heart still belongs to the wife he has abandoned.  At worst, it would reveal his sordid and
deceitful character.

By the same token, professing continued allegiance to the Philippines
after renouncing it because of its meager resources, or for other ulterior and
equally base reasons, is to me a paltry form of patriotism.  It is a sop
to the repudiated state and a slight
to the adopted state.  No matter how
noble this attitude may appear to others, it is to me nothing less than plain
and simple hypocrisy that we should not condone, let alone extol.

Coming now to the case at bar, I note first of all that no
naturalization is involved here as the private respondent claims to be a
citizen both of the Philippines
and of the United States.  The question I think we must answer is:  Was there an express renunciation of
Philippine citizenship by the private respondent when he knowingly and
voluntarily registered as an
alien with the Commission of Immigration and Deportation in 1958 and in 1979?

In Yu v. Commission of Immigration and Deportation, G.R. No.
83882, January 24, 1989, I
made the following observations in a separate opinion:

Regretfully, I cannot agree with the finding that the petitioner
has expressly renounced his Philippine citizenship.  The evidence on this point is in my view
rather meager.  Express renunciation of
citizenship as a mode of losing
citizenship under Com. Act No. 63 is an unequivocal and deliberate act with full awareness of its
significance and consequences.  I do not think the “commercial
documents he signed” suggest such categorical disclaimer.

That case is distinguished from the one before us now in that Yu
did not ask the Philippine government to register him as an alien, Gov. Osmeña
did.

It is my opinion that if the governor had confined himself to
simply seeking and using an American passport, these acts could not have by
themselves alone constituted a repudiation of Philippine citizenship.  The problem, though, is that he did more than
enjoy this legal convenience.  What he
actually did was register with the Philippine government as an alien within its
own territory, presumably so he could be insulated from the jurisdiction it
exercises over its nationals.  This was a
voluntary act.  As a citizen of the Philippines,
he was not required to register as an alien. 
Nevertheless, he chose to do so of his own free will.  By this decision, he categorically asked the
Republic of the Philippines
to treat him as an American and not a Filipino,
choosing to be an alien in this land that was willing to consider him its own.

C.A. No. 63 does not necessarily require that the express
renunciation of Philippine citizenship be made in connection with the
naturalization of the erstwhile Filipino in a foreign country.  Renunciation may be made independently of
naturalization proceedings.  Morever, no sacramental words are prescribed by
the statute for the express renunciation of Philippine citizenship.  As long as the repudiation is categorical
enough and the preference for the foreign state is unmistakable, as in the case
at bar, Philippine citizenship is lost.

The private respondent would have his cake and eat it too, but
this can never be allowed where Philippine citizenship is involved.  It is a gift that must be deserved to be retained.  The Philippines,
for all her modest resources compared to those of other states, is a jealous
and possessive mother demanding total love and loyalty from her children.  It is bad enough that the love of the dual
national is shared with another state; what is worse is where he formally
rejects the Philippines,
and in its own territory at that, and offers his total devotion to the other
state.

I am aware of the
praiseworthy efforts of Gov. Osmeña to improve the province
of Cebu, and also, I should add, of
the commendable record of Gov. Frivaldo and Mayor Labo in the administration of
their respective jurisdictions.  But that
is not the point.  The point is that it
is not lawful to maintain in public office any person who, although supported
by the electorate, is not a Filipino citizen. 
This is a relentless restriction we cannot ignore.

Regretfully, therefore, I must vote to GRANT the petition.


Aznar vs COMELEC : 83820 : May 25, 1990 : J. Melencio-Herrera : En Banc<br /> : Dissenting Opinion

Clean

6 pt
6 pt
0
3

MicrosoftInternetExplorer4

/* Style Definitions */
table.MsoNormalTable
{mso-style-name:”Table Normal”;
mso-tstyle-rowband-size:0;
mso-tstyle-colband-size:0;
mso-style-noshow:yes;
mso-style-parent:””;
mso-padding-alt:0in 5.4pt 0in 5.4pt;
mso-para-margin:0in;
mso-para-margin-bottom:.0001pt;
mso-pagination:widow-orphan;
font-size:10.0pt;
font-family:”Times New Roman”;}

DISSENTING OPINION

MELENCIO-HERRERA, J.:

I join the dissent of Messrs. Justices Isagani A. Cruz and
Teodoro R. Padilla.

While it may be that dual citizenship usually results from
accident of birth, a choice will have to be made by the individual concerned at
some point in time in his life, involving as it does the priceless heritage of
citizenship.

That election was made by private respondent
when, in 1958, at the age of 24, and in 1979, at 45, he obtained Alien
Certificates of Registration.
 
Registration as an alien is a clear
and unambiguous act or declaration that one is not a citizen.  If, in fact, private respondent was merely
compelled to so register because of the “uncooperativeness” of the
past regime, he could have, under the new dispensation, asked for the
cancellation of those Alien Certificates and abandoned his alienage, specially before he ran for public office in 1988.

The 1987 Constitution declares in no uncertain terms that “dual
allegiance of citizens is inimical to the national interest and shall be dealt
with by law” (Article IV, Section 5). 
That statement is but a reaffirmation of an innate conviction shared by
every Filipino.  The law referred to need
not be awaited for one to consider giving up the legal convenience of dual
citizenship.

Accordingly, I vote to grant the Petition.


Aznar vs COMELEC : 83820 : May 25, 1990 : J. Padilla : En Banc :<br /> Dissenting Opinion

Clean

6 pt
6 pt
0
3

MicrosoftInternetExplorer4

st1:*{behavior:url(#ieooui) }

/* Style Definitions */
table.MsoNormalTable
{mso-style-name:”Table Normal”;
mso-tstyle-rowband-size:0;
mso-tstyle-colband-size:0;
mso-style-noshow:yes;
mso-style-parent:””;
mso-padding-alt:0in 5.4pt 0in 5.4pt;
mso-para-margin:0in;
mso-para-margin-bottom:.0001pt;
mso-pagination:widow-orphan;
font-size:10.0pt;
font-family:”Times New Roman”;}

DISSENTING OPINION

PADILLA, J.:

I am constrained to dissent.

I start from the premise that the private respondent Emilio Mario
Renner Osmena enjoyed at one time dual citizenship,
i.e., Philippine and U.S. citizenships. 
He was born in the Philippines
of a Filipino father and an American (U.S.) mother.  However, his sworn application
for alien registration dated 21
November 1979 (Exh. B) filed with the
Philippine immigration authorities was, in
my view, an express
renunciation of his Philippine citizenship. 
As held in Board of Immigration Commissioners vs. Go Callano,[1]
express renunciation means a renunciation that is made known distinctly and
explicitly and not left to inference or implication.

Nothing can be more distinct and explicit than when a dual citizenship holder – like the
private respondent – of age, and with full legal capacity to act, voluntarily
and under oath applies with the Philippine Government
for registration as an alien, insofar as
his intention not to remain a
Filipino citizen is concerned.  And because of that distinct and explicit
manifestation of desire to be considered an alien in the
Philippines,
the Philippine immigration authorities issued to private respondent Alien
Certificate of Registration No. 015356 dated 21 November 1979 (Exh. C),
Permit to Re-enter the Philippines No.
122018 dated 21 November 1979 (Exh. D) and Immigration Certificate of Clearance No.
D-146483 dated 3 January 1980 (Exh. E).[2]

All the foregoing documents issued by the Philippine immigration
authorities to the private respondent at his request are predicated on the
proposition that private respondent is an alien under Philippine laws.  It should also be mentioned that, while not
marked as exhibit in the case at
bar, private respondent was likewise issued in Cebu City Native Born Certificate
of Residence No. 115883 on 21 November 1979 (as
verified from Immigration records).  This
document, copy of which is attached hereto as Annex A, is again predicated on
the proposition that private respondent is a duly-registered alien
American) residing in the
Philippines.

Another relevant document that merits attention is the Application
for Re-entry Permit executed and signed by private
respondent on 3 January 1980, again under oath, and
verified from the records at the CID, wherein private respondent expressly
stated that he is a U.S. national.  The importance of this document cannot be
underestimated.  For, if private
respondent believed that he is a Filipino
citizen, he would not have executed said Application for Re-entry Permit, since
it is the right of every Filipino citizen to return to his country (the
Philippines).  The fact, therefore, that
private respondent executed said sworn Application for Re-entry Permit, copy of
which is attached hereto as Annex B, is again abundant proof that he himself, no less, believed that he was, as he continuous to be, a resident alien (American)
in the Philippines.

It will further be noted that earlier, or
in 1958, private respondent had already registered
as an alien with the Bureau of Immigration under
the Alien Registration Act of 1950 (RA 562). 
Section 1 of said Act provides:

“SECTION 1. Aliens residing in the Philippines
shall, within thirty days after the approval of this Act, apply for
registration, in the case of those residing in the City of Manila, at the
Bureau of Immigration and in the case of those residing in other localities at
the offices of the city or municpal treasurers, or at
any other office designated by the President.  x x x.”[3]
(Emphasis supplied)

Accordingly, per certification of the Commissioner of Immigration
and Deportation Miriam Defensor-Santiago (Exh. A), issued on 26 January 1988, private respondent had
been issued ACR No. B-21-448 and ICR No. 13391 on 27 and 28 March 1958 respectively.  He, therefore, registered himself in the
Philippines as an alien twice; first, in
the year 1958, when he was 24 years old and again in 1979, when he was 45 years
old.  By twice registering
under oath as an alien with the
Bureau of Immigration, private respondent thereby clearly, distinctly and
explicitly manifested and declared that he was an alien (and, therefore, not a
Filipino citizen) residing in the
Philippines and under its laws.

At this point, and to be objectively fair to the private respondent,
a clarification should be made.  In his
Comment on the Petition at bar (Rollo, p. 81), it is stated by his counsel that he (private
respondent) was born in 1934 – hence, our mathematical conclusion that when he first registered as an alien in 1958, he
was 24 years old and in 1979 when he re-registered as an alien, he was 45 years
old.  However, private respondent’s
immigration records disclose that he was born in 1938 (not in 1934).  On the assumption that the year 1938 is the
correct year of birth of private respondent (and that his alleged year of
birth, 1934, as stated in his Comment at bar is erroneous), then in 1958, when
he first registered as an alien, he was 20 years old, while in 1979 when he
re-registered as an alien, he was 41 years old.

Still, his first
registration as an alien (at age 20) has to be taken, in my view, as an express
renunciation of his Philippine citizenship, because (1) at that time, he was
almost 21 years old – the age of majority, and (2) more importantly, under the
applicable Alien Registration Act (RA 562), an alien 14 years or
over has to register in person (and not through his
parents or guardian).  It provides:

“The parent or legal guardian of an alien who is less than
fourteen years of age, shall have the duty of registering such alien:  Provided, That whenever any such alien
attains his fourteenth birthday in the Philippines
he
shall, within fifteen days thereafter, apply person for
registration.” (Sec. 1, par. 2)

I take the above provision to mean that the choice by a dual
nationality holder on whether to remain a Filipino citizen or an alien has to be made at age 14, and private
respondent (although a bit late) made the choice
in
1958 (at age 20) in
favor of his U.S citizenship.

If all the foregoing acts
of express renunciation of Philippine citizenship had been made or filed by
private respondent elsewhere (not with the Philippine Government), there could
perhaps be some room for contention that vis-a-vis
the Philippine Government, private respondent had not renounced his Philippine
citizenship.  But said acts of express
renunciation were filed with the Philippine Government and done right in the
Philippines.  In turn, the Philippine Government, through the immigration
authorities, accepted and acted
on private respondent’s aforesaid representations, and registered and
documented him TWICE as an alien under Philippine law.

The policy of our laws has been, and with laudable reason, to
discourage dual citizenship, because this condition or status assumes as a necessary complement thereof dual allegiance at the same time to two (2) different countries.  As early as 16 September 1947, a unanimous Supreme Court, speaking thru
Mr. Justice Sabino Padilla in the celebrated case of Tan Chong vs.
Secretary of Labor
, rejected
the principle of jus soli
as determinative of Philippine citizenship, for the following reason, among
others:

“x x x.  Citizenship, the main integrate element of
which is allegiance, must not be taken lightly. 
Dual allegiance must be discouraged and prevented.  But the application of the principle of jus
soli to persons born in this country of alien
parentage would encourage dual allegiance which in the long run would be
detrimental to both countries of which such persons might claim to be
citizens.”[4]

This
policy found later expression in the 1987 Constitution which now
provides –

“Sec. 5.  Dual
allegiance of citizen is inimical to the national interest and shall be dealt
with by law.” (Article IV)

Dual citizenship, in my
considered opinion, must be
eschewed.  While having the “best of
two (2) worlds” maybe the result of birth or other factors accidentally brought about, the “dual
citizen” has to make a
choice at one time or another.  Having
two (2) citizenships is, as I see
it, similar in many ways to having two (2) legal spouses, when as a matter
of principle and sound public policy, fealty to only one (1) spouse is both compelling and certainly
desirable.

Gordon and Rosenfield in their book on Immigration Law and
Procedure
state:

“Dual nationality is universally recognized as an undesirable phenomenon.  It inevitably results in questionable
loyalties and leads to international conflicts. 
x x x.  Dual nationality also makes possible the use of citizenship as a badge of convenience
rather than of undivided loyalty.  And it
impairs the singleness of
commitment which is the hallmark of citizenship and allegiance.  A person should have a right to choose his
own nationality, and this choice should be honored by all countries.
  However, he should not be entitled to
claim more than one nationality
.”[5]
(Emphasis supplied)

Private respondent made a deliberate and decisive choice when he
asked the Philippine Government – which, like many other countries, considers
dual allegiance as against national or public interest – to register him at
least twice (and, therefore, unmistakably)
as an alien in this country.  That choice
pro tanto was a renunciation of his
Philippine citizenship.  The choice must
be respected as a conscious and knowledgable act a
discerning, distinguished and respected person who must be presumed to have
known the full import of his acts.

Finally, the last thing that should be said against the Court is
that it is inconsistent in its rulings. 
In the light of its recent decision in G.R. No. 86565 (Ramon L. Labo, Jr. vs. The Commission on Elections, et al.), I see
no valid justification for holding Mr. Labo an alien
under Philippine law while holding private respondent herein a Filipino
citizen.  For, as the majority states: 
“In fact, in a number of sworn statements, Labo
categorically declared that he was a citizen of Australia” (p. 7,
Decision).  And that is exactly what private respondent
did.  In a number of sworn statements, he
declared that he was a citizen of the United States.

To Mr. Labo, the Court said, “so be it, you are an Australian,” yet to the
private respondent, despite such sworn statements that he is a U.S. citizen,
the Court says, “never mind those sworn statements, you are still a
Filipino.” Sauce for the goose, as the saying goes, is sauce for the
gander.  The doctrinal basis of the
Court’s decisions should be built on the merits, not on distinctions that
really make no difference.

ACCORDINGLY, I vote to GRANT the petition and to declare the private respondent not
a Filipino citizen by his own
acts of express renunciation of such citizenship.


[1]
G.R. No. L-24530, October 31, 1968,
25 SCRA 890

[2]
Rollo, pp. 117-118

[3]
46 OG 11, 5367

[4]
79 Phil. 257

[5]
Volume 4, Nationality, 1989 ed., p. 11-12


Aznar vs COMELEC : 83820 : May 25, 1990 : J. Sarmiento : En Banc :<br /> Concurring Opinion

Clean

6 pt
6 pt
0
3

MicrosoftInternetExplorer4

st1:*{behavior:url(#ieooui) }

/* Style Definitions */
table.MsoNormalTable
{mso-style-name:”Table Normal”;
mso-tstyle-rowband-size:0;
mso-tstyle-colband-size:0;
mso-style-noshow:yes;
mso-style-parent:””;
mso-padding-alt:0in 5.4pt 0in 5.4pt;
mso-para-margin:0in;
mso-para-margin-bottom:.0001pt;
mso-pagination:widow-orphan;
font-size:10.0pt;
font-family:”Times New Roman”;}

CONCURRING OPINION

SARMIENTO, J.:

The majority seems
agreed that the private respondent has acquired American citizenship, only that he did not necessarily lose his Filipino citizenship.  The important question, however, inheres in how he obtained American
citizenship.  I find that there is a
dearth of facts here.

For, if the
private respondent became an American by naturalization,
he has lost Filipino citizenship
(Com. Act 63; Frivaldo v. COMELEC,
G.R. No. 87193, June 21, 1989; Labo v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 86564, August 1, 1989.) If he, however,
became one by the application of the
principle of jus soli, it is by
force of circumstances rather than choice. 
But he does not lose his Filipino citizenship, if he were
otherwise born of Filipino parents.

In the absence of evidence, we can not presume that he had ceased
to be a citizen of the Philippines,
simply because he is, at the same time, a citizen of the United
States. 
There must be a clear showing that he lost his
Filipino citizenship by any of
the means enumerated by Commonwealth
Act No. 63.  The fact that he had
obtained an alien certificate of registration, standing alone, does not amount
to “express renunciation.”