PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, PLAINTIFF-APPELEE, VS. SAID SARIOL Y MUHAMADING, ACCUSED-APPELLANT.

Said Sariol y Muhamading was charged with violation of Section 4,
Article 11 of R.A. 6425 or the Dangerous Drugs Act in an Information which
alleged:

“That on or about the 5th day of September, 1987, in the
Municipality of San Juan, Metro Manila, Philippines and within the jurisdiction
of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, without having been
authorized by law, did, then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously
sell, deliver and give away to another 4.37 grams of dried marijuana fruiting
tops placed in a plastic bag contained in two (2) sealed small plastic bags, a
prohibited drug, in violation of the above-cited law.” (Rollo, p. 7)

Upon arraignment on September
17, 1987, the accused pleaded
not guilty to the crime
charged.  Trial proceeded and the accused
was convicted as follows:

“WHEREFORE, the Court hereby sentences the accused, SAID
SARIOL Y MUHAMADING to suffer the penalty of reclusion
perpetua with all accessory penalties, to
pay a fine of P20,000.00 and to pay the costs.

“In the service of his sentence, the accused shall be credited in
full with the period of his preventive imprisonment.

“The two (2) sealed small plastic bags containing 4.37 grams
of dried marijuana fruiting tops, subject of the offense charged, are hereby
ordered turned over to the Dangerous Drugs Board Custodian, NBI, to be disposed
of according to law.” (Rollo, pp. 23-24)

The case is now before us on
appeal.  The accused-appellant
specifically assigns the following as errors committed by the trial court:

THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY
ERRED IN GIVING WEIGHT AND CREDENCE TO THE HIGHLY IMPROBABLE TESTIMONIES OF THE
PROSECUTION WITNESSES AND IN DISREGARDING THE EVIDENCE FOR THE DEFENSE.

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN
NOT ACQUITTING ACCUSED-APPELLANT OF THE OFFENSE OF VIOLATION OF SECTION 4,
ARTICLE II OF REPUBLIC ACT 6425, AS AMENDED, CONSIDERING THAT THE PROSECUTION
FAILED TO PROVE HIS GUILT BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT.  (Rollo, p. 41)

The trial court summarized the
factual scenario of the case in the following manner:

“x x x On September 5, 1987, at about 2:00 p.m., a confidential
informant came to the office of the Narcotics Investigation Unit in Camp Crame,
Quezon City and informed Cpt. Benjamin de los Santos, the Commanding Officer,
that a certain person with alias ‘Muslim’ was engaged in the illegal trading of
marijuana in the vicinity located at Road 7, First West, Camp Crame, San Juan,
Metro Manila.  Upon receipt of said
information, Cpt. de los Santos organized a team composed of T/Sgt. Roberto
Angeles as team leader, Sgt. Ellecer Tuyay, Sgt. Elmer Feliciano, Pat. Pedro
Tan and Pat. Ronnie Campita, all NARCOM agents, and dispatched said team in the
mission area in order to conduct a ‘buy bust’ operation to apprehend the
suspect who is the herein accused.  The
group, all clad in civilian clothes, arrived at the place of operation at
around 2:45 p.m. of the same date. 
T/Sgt. Angeles designated at once Pat. Campita to act as
‘poseur-buyer’.  He was furnished by Sgt.
Tuyay with two (2) five-peso bills previously marked with Serial Nos. FF 183869
and DD 445654 (Exhibit ‘I’) with which to buy marijuana from the accused alias
‘Muslim’.  At 3:00 p.m., Pat. Campita and
the confidential informant chanced upon the accused near Jennie’s Bakery along
said area.  They approached the accused
and the informant introduced Pat. Campita as a prospective buyer of marijuana.  The accused left awhile and came back shortly
with one (1) small transparent plastic bag containing marijuana dried leaves
which he delivered to Pat. Campita.  ‘The
latter in turn handed the ‘buy- bust’ money (two (2) five-peso bills) to the
accused.  At this point, Pat. Campita
made a pre-arranged signal to his other teammates nearby who immediately rushed
in and placed the accused under arrest. 
Recovered from the accused after he consented to a body search were the
‘buy-bust’ money of two (2) five-peso bills and another small transparent bag
containing marijuana dried leaves, the latter being voluntarily brought out by
the accused after rigid interrogation.

“The accused, together with the evidences confiscated from
him, was brought to the Office of the Narcotics Investigation Unit, NARCOM,
Camp Crame, Quezon City and there subjected to questioning.  Upon showing an identification card, accused
revealed his name as SAID SARIOL Y MUHAMADING alias ‘Muslim’.  After the accused was informed about the nature
of the charges against him and about his constitutional rights, accused
verbally admitted that he was engaged in marijuana trade as a means of
livelihood but refused to reduce in writing his verbal admission.  Meanwhile, Sgt. Elmer Feliciano prepared the
Booking Sheet and Arrest Report (Exhibit ‘C’), a receipt of the property seized
(Exhibit ‘A’) and a Statement regarding the constitutional rights of the
accused (Exhibit ‘D’), all of which were signed by the accused.  On the other hand, Patrolmen Campita and Tan
executed a Joint Affidavit dated September, 1987  (Exhibit ‘J’) concerning the surrounding
circumstances for the apprehension and arrest of the accused.

“The two (2) small transparent bags containing suspected
marijuana dried leaves were submitted to the PC Crime Laboratory for
examination upon request of P/Sgt. Francisco Yraola through a letter-request
dated September 5, 1987 (Exhibit ‘F’). 
Witness Cpt. Nelly Cariaga, a Forensic Chemist of the PC Crime Laboratory,
conducted microscopic and chemical examinations on the said specimens and
submitted Chemistry Report No. D-899-87 (Exhibit “H”) where she
categorically stated therein that the subject specimens were positive for
marijuana.

“Upon the other hand, the defense of the accused consisted of
a denial that he had sold the dried marijuana leaves to the NARCOM agent.  He related his version of the incident as
follows:  On September 5, 1987 at about
3:00 p.m., he went to a bakery along Road 7, First West, Camp Crame, Quezon
City since he was asked by his guardian to buy bread for merienda.  After buying bread and while on his way home,
two (2) persons approached him and told him that he was selling marijuana.  Immediately, they held him (accused) and
brought him to their service vehicle. 
While inside the vehicle, he was frisked and was surprised that
marijuana was found in his pocket which he knew very well at that time that it
(sic) contained no marijuana. 
Thereafter, accused was brought to the office of the NARCOM agents in
Camp Crame where he was allegedly mauled, boxed and forced to admit that he was
selling marijuana.  Since he refused to
sign his admission in writing, he was brought to a detention cell and was
detained for ten (10) days. 
Subsequently, he was brought to the Rizal Provincial Jail where he was
detained up to the present.

“On cross-examination, accused admitted having signed a
receipt for the marijuana and the marked money seized from him and also the
Booking Sheet and Arrest Report.  He
contended that the officers testified against him because they were able to
apprehend somebody who pointed to him as the one selling marijuana.  He further averred that although he was
maltreated by the NARCOM agents, he
nevertheless did not file a complaint against them for fear of reprisal.”
(pp. 16-19, Rollo).

The issue raised in this appeal is whether or not the trial court
erred in convicting the accused of the crime charged.

The answer is in the negative as we find no reason to reverse the
trial court’s findings which resulted in a judgment of conviction.  The appellant has failed to show that the
trial court committed an error in convicting the accused considering that the
testimonial as well as documentary evidence pointing to the guilt of the
accused-appellant has not been overcome or shown to be unreliable.

First, the accused-appellant was caught in flagranta delicto.  He was apprehended and positively identified
by the prosecution witnesses while peddling marijuana stuff to one of the
Narcom agents.

The circumstances surrounding the commission of the crime have
been clearly and adequately testified to by the prosecution witnesses who were
the very police officers conducting the buy-bust operation.  Their testimonies were corroborated by the
testimony of Forensic Chemist Nelly Cariaga as well as by documentary evidence
such as the receipt for marijuana, the marked money, and the Booking Sheet and
Arrest Report.

The main defense of the accused is denial.  The appellant’s bare denial cannot, however,
prevail over his positive identification by prosecution witnesses as actually
engaged in the sale of the contraband item. 
As held in several rulings of this Court, the unconvincing and bare
denial of the accused that he had not committed the crime is not sufficient to
overcome the positive testimonies of prosecution witnesses (See People v.
Pasco, Jr. 137 SCRA 137 [1985] and People v. Tuscano, 137 SCRA 203
[1985]).  Such denials constitute
self-serving negative evidence which cannot be accorded greater evidentiary
weight than the declarations of credible witnesses who testify on affirmative
matters (People v. Alcantara, G.R. No. 74737, July 29, 1988).

Aside from denying the charges, the appellant claims that he was
set up, mauled, boxed and forced to admit by the police officers who
interrogated him.  As aptly stated by the
trial court, the accused-appellant’s allegation of maltreatment is
inconsequential for guilt or innocence considering that no extrajudicial
confession was extracted from him.  His
conviction was based on other evidence.

The appellant explains that the reason the officers testified
against him is because his arrest was a mere off-shoot of the apprehension of
somebody else who pointed to him as the one selling marijuana.  He did not, however, present further evidence
to corroborate this rather implausible theory. 
Moreover, if it were true that the appellant suffered physical injuries
he should have filed a complaint for maltreatment.  He excuses himself by explaining that he did
not do so for fear of reprisal.  There is
no need to go into this issue as the conviction is not based on any admission
or confession but on more reliable proof than that which comes from the
accused’s declarations himself.

A careful consideration of the records shows that the prosecution
evidence substantially and convincingly proves the commission of the crime and
the arrest of the accused.

The Narcom agents who conducted the buy-bust operation did not
know the accused-appellant.  Their
apprehension of the accused came about only as a result of the information
given them by the confidential informer. 
There is not the slightest showing of an evil or bad motive on their
part.  We see no valid obstacle to the
application of the ruling in People v. Capulong, (160 SCRA
533 [1988]) that credence is accorded to the testimonies of prosecution
witnesses who are law enforcers for it is presumed that they have regularly
performed their duty in the absence of convincing proof to the contrary.  The appellant has not shown that the
prosecution witnesses were motivated by any improper motive other than that of
accomplishing their mission.

The accused-appellant likewise
questions the non-presentation of the confidential informer.  The matter of presentation of its witnesses
by the prosecution is not for the accused or, except in a limited sense, for
the trial court to control.  Discretion
belongs to the city or provincial fiscal as to how the prosecution should
present its case.  He has the right to
choose whom he should present as witnesses. 
(People v. Campana, 124 SCRA 271 [1983]).  Moreover, if the defense believes that there
are other witnesses who could have exculpated the accused, it should have
called for them even by compulsory process. 
(People v. Boholst, 152 SCRA 263 [1987])

It is evident that the appellant knew what he was going through
during the custodial investigation because he signed Exhibits A (Receipt of
Property Seized), C (Booking and Arrest Report), and D (Statement that accused was informed of his rights) and, at the
same time, refused to have his alleged verbal admission put into writing, aware
that it could be unfavorable to him.

The appellant however, claims that the above documents were
signed by him during custodial investigation without the assistance of counsel
and after being mauled.  These documents,
however, are not evidence of guilt insofar as the crime charged is
concerned.  They refer to procedures
which are followed after an arrest is effected but are not material in
determining the innocence or guilt of the accused.

Said Sariol further argues that it is improbable that he would
ply his illegal trade in broad daylight, publicly, and not far from Camp Crame
and for a measly sum of P10.00. 
Obviously, what the accused is trying to point out is that if the sale
of marijuana was his only means of livelihood, he would not risk
discovery.  This is a standard defense
which under the circumstances of this and similar cases has not been accorded
much credence.  Not a few drug
trafficking cases brought before the Supreme Court involved measly amounts of
P10, P20, etc. and most of the accused were found to be guilty beyond
reasonable doubt.  The amount involved
has not proved material to the existence of the trade considering the brisk
turn-over of profits and the fact that the volume of trads varies transaction to transaction.

In view of the above, we find no ground in this appeal to alter
the trial court’s findings and appreciation of the evidence presented (People
v. Claudio, 160 SCRA 646 [1988]).  The
trial court’s ruling on the credibility of prosecution witnesses is
sustained.  Imputation of improper
motives on the part of the witnesses has not been proved (People v. Panuelos,
136 SCRA 501 [1985]).

WHEREFORE, the
appealed judgment is hereby AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.

Fernan, C.J., (Chairman), Feliciano, Bidin, and Cortes, JJ., concur.