MANILA ELECTRIC COMPANY, PETITIONER, VS. NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION & RAMON L. MERIS, RESPONDENTS.

This petition for certiorari seeks to annul the decision dated
May 18, 1988, of the National Labor Relations Commission ordering the
petitioner, Manila Electric Company (Meralco), to reinstate the complainant,
Ramon L. Meris, as a probationary employee for a period of five (5) months with
backwages from March 23, 1987 to April 17, 1987.

In a complaint filed by respondent Ramon L. Meris against the
petitioner on March 30, 1987, the former charged the latter with illegal
dismissal and prayed for reinstatement with full backwages. Petitioner’s defense to the charge was that
“the termination of the complainant’s probationary employment is sanctioned
by Section 6, Rule 1, Book VI of the Rules and Regulations implementing the
Labor Code, which provides that “the service of an employee who has been
engaged on probationary basis may be terminated x x x when he fails to qualify
as a regular employee in accordance with the reasonable standards prescribed by
the employer.”

The facts of the
case as found by the Labor Arbiter and adopted by the NLRC are as follows:

“x x x the complainant was hired by the respondent company as a
probationary employee under a probationary Employment Agreement for a period of
five (5) months starting November 17, 1986, wherein, he was assigned as a messenger and given a monthly salary
of P1,130,00 and an allowance of P580.00. His work among others, was
to file pleadings in court, serve summons for execution, verify or
follow-up cases in court and other related matters under the legal
department. That on March 23, 1987 (after 4 months)*,
he received a memorandum dated March 19, 1987, from the personnel
Administration Division advising him of the termination of his probationary
employment effective March 23, 1987.

“From the foregoing facts just stated, it behooves upon us
to determine whether the dismissal of complainant was for a just and valid
cause or not.

“Respondent avers that the work activities of complainant
were monitored by his supervisors namely Guillermo F. Estabaya and Alfredo J.
Fernandez, who ‘x x x observed
and determined that complainant could not meet the standard performance
required and explained to
him;’ ‘that respondents’ complaint in Civil Case No. 54326, entitled ‘Manila Electric
Company vs. Victoria
Manufacturing Corp.,’ was ordered dismissed with prejudice due to the failure of
complainant to pay the sheriff’s fee which was one of his functions x x x;’ ‘that there were instances of late delivery, service and filing
of urgent and vital documents outside company premises; he frequently
did not follow what was instructed for
him to accomplish; his performance was way below what was
required of him; notwithstanding efforts and instructions to make him work according to the
level of efficiency required of him,
he failed or ignored the same;’
that there were instances that he failed to report back at the close of the
office hours after performing his official tasks; that he does not follow instructions;
that he usually takes taxis instead of jeepneys or buses at company
expenses; and that he does not cooperate with
his co-employees with an attitude
of answering back his superiors.

“It is
apparent from the records that before
complainant was terminated he was never furnished with a
written notice containing a statement
of the causes for termination and was likewise denied
ample opportunity to be heard and to
defend himself with
the assistance of his representative if he so desires, thus — depriving complainant his right to due process, which makes the
dismissal illegal. While it may be true
that complainant was hired on a probationary basis, yet — we cannot deny him
the right to security of tenure which may be terminated only for a just cause or when authorized by
existing laws or when he
fails to qualify as a regular employee in accordance with reasonable standards
made known to him upon his engagement.

“As regards the claim of respondent that complainant usually comes late and that he often fails to return after an official outside
trip particularly on December 15 & 24 1986; January 2; 5; 17 (Sat) 19; 20;
26; and 29; February 12; 16; 18; 24; 26 and 27; and March 2, 1987, respondent
failed to present complainant’s daily attendance records allegedly because,
‘The daily attendance pads during the period November 20, 1986 to March 23,
1987 were not being
retained as those are not being utilized for payroll preparation; hence these were disposed
of every end of the payroll period.’ The best proof to establish
that complainant’s daily attendance leaves much to be desired would have been his
daily time records, but respondent was not able to submit these despite the
issuance of a subpoena duces tecum to them upon the request of complainant
himself, which to our mind militates against respondent’s position that
complainant often comes late in the morning. What was submitted among others, were the time sheets and overtime
notices of complainant. x x x.” (pp. 162-164, Rollo.) (Underscoring
ours.)

On December 28, 1987, the labor arbiter rendered judgment,
disposing as follows:

‘WHEREFORE, premises considered, respondent Manila Electric
Company, with main office and postal address at Lopez Building, Meralco Center,
Ortigas Avenue, Pasig, Metro Manila, is hereby ORDERED to REINSTATE complainant
RAMON L. MERIS to his former position
as a regular employee with all the benefits
and privileges appertaining thereto and to PAY him the amount of TEN THOUSAND
TWO HUNDRED SIXTY PESOS (P10,260.00) by way of six (6) months backwages without any qualification nor
deduction.” (pp. 129-130, Rollo; emphasis supplied.)

This was affirmed on appeal by Meralco to the NLRC, but with the
modification that “appellant is ordered to reinstate complainant as a probationary employee for a period of five
(5) months with backwages from March 23, 1987 to April 17, 1987.”

The basis for the termination of private respondent’s
probationary employment was his inability to meet the standard of performance
required of him. Thus, the legality or
illegality of the dismissal hinges on whether or not that ground existed.

In finding that private respondent was illegally dismissed, the
NLRC, in its decision of May 18,
1988, said:

“It goes without saying that it behooves upon appellant to exercise and give more
freedom to probationary employees new as they are in the company and unaware of
the nuances of their work and work habits. They need more attention. And
they should, within the period of probation, be made aware of whatever mistakes
they commit in the performance of their duties. The supervisor should personally confront them if they commit
mistakes. And discipline them when
warranted. It cannot be gainsaid that
for the period of five (5)* months,
appellee as probationary
employee could not cope up with his
work. If he could not, then the
dismissal could have come earlier and respondent should not have waited for five (5)* months to terminate his
services. As it is everybody, except
appellee, was informed of his evaluation.” (p. 167, Rollo.)

On the other hand, the Office of the Solicitor General in its
comment stated as follows:

“Private respondent was dismissed without prior hearing on
March 23, 1986, close to a month prior to the expiration of his probationary
term on April 17, 1986. He was
dismissed on the ground that he failed to meet the required standard performance. As to what was
the standard of performance which private respondent was required to meet, petitioner has not disclosed. Nor had
petitioner advised private respondent
of such required standard of performance at the time it hired private
respondent.

“Even a
probationary employee
is covered by the security of tenure guarantee of the Constitution (Euro–Lima, Phil.,
Inc. vs. NLRC, 156 SCRA 78). A probationary employee cannot be
dismissed before the end of his probationary employment on the basis alone of a sweeping statement that he failed to meet the
required standard performance. He is
entitled to know what standards of performance he did not meet before he could be
dismissed prior to the expiration of his contract (Biboso vs. Victorias Milling, 76 SCRA 250). (pp. 235-236, Rollo.)

The petitioner assails these findings of the labor arbiter and
the NLRC. It contends that the
dismissal of the private respondent was not illegal because it was done during
his probationary employment period after he was found unfit for the position of
messenger that he was occupying in the petitioner’s legal department. Petitioner invokes Art. 280 of the Labor
Code which provides that:

“Probationary Employment – Probationary employment shall not exceed six
months from the date the employee started working, unless it is covered by an
apprenticeship agreement stipulating a longer period. The services of an employee who has been engaged on a probationary
basis may be terminated for a just cause or when he fails to qualify as a
regular employee in accordance with reasonable standards made known by the
employer to the employee at the time of his engagement.”

We find merit in the petition. The very
findings of fact of the labor arbiter and respondent NLRC reveal that the
private respondent’s superiors in the petitioner’s legal department where he
was employed as a messenger, were dissatisfied with his performance. He was neglectful of his duties. He frequently “played hookey,” taking
the rest of the day off and not returning to the office after having performed
his errands.

The NLRC gravely abused its discretion in holding that the
dismissal of the private respondent after a probationary period of five (5)
months instead of six (6), as provided in Art. 280 of the Labor Code, was
illegal, and in ordering his reinstatement as probationary employee for a
period of five (5) months, or a total of nine (9) months of probationary
employment. The provision of Art. 280
that “probationary employment shall not exceed six (6) months” means
that the probationary employee may be dismissed for cause at any time before
the expiration of six (6) months after hiring. If after working for less than six (6) months, he is found to be unfit
for the job, he can be dismissed. But
if he continues to be employed longer than six (6) months, he ceases to be a probationary employee and
becomes a regular or permanent employee.

The records show that private respondent’s superiors did exert
reasonable efforts to instruct him and apprise him of “the standard of
performance required and explained to him” but “he frequently did not
follow what was instructed for him to accomplish.” “Notwithstanding
efforts and instructions x x x his performance was very below what was required
of him.” He was also uncooperative toward his co-employees; and
disrespectful to his superiors. Under
the circumstances, we find there was sufficient cause for terminating his
probationary employment after only four (4) months.

However, as he was never apprised of the charges against him
before he was actually discharged, and no administrative investigation was
undertaken so he could have presented his side and defended himself, the
company is liable to indemnify him for damages for its breach of the legal
procedure. In Wenphil vs. NLRC, G.R.
No. 80587, Feb. 8, 1989, we ruled that said damages shall be in the sum of P1,000.

WHEREFORE, the petition for certiorari is
granted. The decision of the National
Labor Relations Commission ordering the reinstatement of the private respondent
as a probationary employee for a period of five (5) months with backwages is
hereby set aside. However, the
petitioner is ordered to indemnify the private respondent for damages in the
sum of P1,000. No costs.

SO ORDERED.

Narvasa, (Chairman), Cruz, Gancayco, and Medialdea, JJ., concur.

*
Words in parenthesis supplied.

*
Four (4) months only.