ERLINDO CASANAYAN AND LOLITA BECIRA, PETITIONERS, VS. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS AND MIGUELA ANDRADE, RESPONDENTS.

This is a petition for review of a decision rendered by the Court
of Appeals on January 22, 1988, the dispositive portion of which reads:

WHEREFORE, the appealed judgment is hereby reversed and set aside
and another one is rendered declaring that plaintiff-appellant has the better
right of possession of the lot in question and ordering defendant-appellees to
vacate the portion of the land in their possession and surrendering the same to
plaintiff-appellant.  No damages and
costs.

The judgment reversed was rendered by the Regional Trial Court of
Isulan, Sultan Kudarat, on April 1, 1985, in an action filed against the
petitioners for recovery of possession of a parcel of land with damages, which
it dismissed.

The plaintiff alleged that she was the widow of Pascual Andrade, who was the settler-assignee of Lot
No. 558, Pls-208-D-13 (identical to and formerly identified as Lot 368-B,
Pls-208-D-13), located at Bo. Bambad, Isulan, Sultan Kudarat, containing an
area of 5 hectares as evidenced by a
certificate from the National Resettlement and Rehabilitation Administration
(NARRA).  From the time of its allocation
to him in 1951 until his death in 1956, they were in open, uninterrupted and
adverse possession of the land.  Pascual
had earlier filed a homestead application therefor with the defunct LASEDECO,
but no patent had been issued.  On
November 13, 1968, Miguela filed another homestead application in her own name
to supersede her husband’s
application.  Sometime in the year 1968,
the defendants, by means of stealth, strategy, force and intimidation,
succeeded in entering and occupying the 2-1/2 hectare eastern portion of Lot
No. 558.  She then filed a formal protest
with the District Land Officer of Land District Office No. VIII-12 at Buluan,
Cotabato, resulting in that office sending a notice to the defendant Erlindo
and his brother Bernardo
advising them to vacate the said property.

In their answer, the defendants averred that there was no showing
on the face of the NARRA certificate that Lot 368-B, Pls
208-D-13, was identical to Lot No. 558, Pls-208-D-13, the disputed lot.  As to whether Pascual was a settler-assignee of Lot No. 368-B, Pls 208-D-13 (not Lot
No. 558, Pls-208-13) as shown by that certificate, the best evidence would be
the records of the NARRA.  Lot No. 558,
Pls 208-D-13, had first been occupied and cultivated by the late Remigio
Casanayan, father of Erlindo and Bernardo, since 1952 up to the time when
Remigio was murdered.  Thereafter, the
brothers continued their father’s occupation and cultivation in the concept of
owners.  The alleged homestead
application of Pascual could not have been for Lot 558 but for another lot, for
as early as 1965, Erlindo had already filed a homestead application for Lot 558
with the Bureau of Lands.  Moreover, the
land was the subject of an earlier administrative case instituted by Miguela
before the Presidential Action Committee on Land Problems (PACLAP) of the
Province of Sultan Kudarat.  This body
found that the plaintiff was not entitled to the possession of the disputed
property and dismissed her complaint against Erlindo and Bernardo Casanayan.

After hearing, the trial court dismissed the complaint for
insufficiency of the plaintiff’s evidence and failure to exhaust administrative
remedies.^[1]
On appeal, as earlier stated, the decision was reversed and judgment was
rendered by the respondent court on January 22, 1988, in favor of the appellant.^[2]

The petitioners now urge this Court to set aside the said
judgment on the ground that the respondent court erred (a) in giving weight and
credence to Exhibits “A” and “C”; and (b) in not
considering the findings of the Presidential Action Committee on Land Problems.

In a petition for
review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, only questions of law may be
raised.  The factual findings of the
court a quo are generally considered conclusive upon this Court
in the absence of those exceptional circumstances that will justify a review
and possibly reversal of such findings. 
Among these are:  (1) when the
conclusion is grounded entirely on speculation, surmises and conjectures; (2)
when the inference is manifestly mistaken, absurd and impossible; (3) where
there is grave abuse of discretion; (4) when the judgment is based on a
misapprehension of facts; (5) when the appellate court, in making its findings,
went beyond the issues of the case, and the same are contrary to the admissions
of both the appellant and appellee; (6) when the findings of said Court are
contrary to those of the trial court; (7) when the findings are without citation
of specific evidence on which they are based; (8) when the facts set forth in
the petition as well as in the petitioner’s main and reply briefs are not
disputed by the respondents; and (9) when the findings of fact of the Court of
Appeals are premised on the absence of evidence and are contradicted on record.^[3]

At least one of such circumstances is present in the case at
bar.  The factual findings of the lower
court have been reversed by the appellate court, where the appellant has been
sustained as the lawful possessor of the lot in question.  It is also
submitted by the petitioners that the decision of the respondent court is not
supported by substantial evidence.

The decision of the respondent
court was based on the NARRA certificate and the letter of the Acting District Land
Officer to Erlindo and Bernardo Casanayan, which were attached to the complaint
and later offered as Exhibits “A” and “C,” respectively.

Exhibit “A” reads in full as follows:

Republic of the Philippines

NATIONAL RESETTLEMENT AND

REHABILITATION
ADMINISTRATION

ALLAH VALLEY SETTLEMENT
PROJECT

Banga,
Cotabato

OFFICE OF THE OVERALL SUPERINTENDENT

C E
R T I F I C A T E

February 20, 1956

TO WHOM IT MAY CONCERN:

This certifies that as per records in this Office Mr. Pascual Andrade
is a settler-assignee of Lot No. 368-B, located at Bambad, Norala, Cotabato
within Pls-208-D-13 as surveyed by the CERTEZA SURVEYING COMPANY, INC. for the
LASEDECO CP. 45.  This certifies further
that the above named settler has filed his application for homestead with the
defunct LASEDECO and the same is pending issuance of patent in the Bureau of
Lands, Manila.

This certificate is issued upon request of Mr. Andrade.

(SGD) EPIFANIO G.
TUPAS

T/ EPIFANIO G.
TUPAS

Officer-in-Charge,
AVP

Exhibit “C” reads in full as follows:

Republic of the Philippines

Department of Agriculture
and

Natural Resources

BUREAU OF LANDS

OFFICE OF THE DISTRICT LAND
OFFICER

Land District No. VIII-12

Buluan,
Cotabato

SUBJECT:

Homestead Application

Lot No. 558,
Pls-208-D-13

Miguela Andrade

Bambad, lsulan,
Cotabato

December 26, 1968

Messrs. Bernardo
Casanayan &

Erlindo Casanayan

Bambad, lsulan,
Cotabato

S i r :

A complaint has been received in this Office to the effect that you
have entered upon and occupied the land described in the above-noted
application of Mrs. Miguela Andrade.  As
the said land is already covered
by a subsisting public land application, the same is no longer open to entry by
anybody other than the applicant thereof.

In view thereof, it is requested that you vacate the premises
immediately, and leave the applicant in the peaceful possession and cultivation
of the same; otherwise, any improvements which may be introduced by you therein
will be considered as made at your
own risk.  However, if you are ascertaining some rights
over the land, you are requested to file a
protest in due form.

Very truly yours,

(SGD) BERNABE T. RECINTO

T/ BERNABE T.
RECINTO

Acting District
Land Officer

From these exhibits, the respondent court concluded that Miguela
(and her husband before her) was the lawful possessor of the disputed lot.

The petitioners challenge the said exhibits, contending that they
should not have been admitted because they had not been properly identified,
much less affirmed by the writers of the
said documents.  As such, they are mere
hearsay.  Moreover, they are not
admissible as exceptions to the hearsay
rule because they do not fulfill the requirements of Rule 130, section 38 (now
Section 44) of the Rules of Court reading as follows:

Entries in official records made in the performance of his duty by
a public officer of the Philippines, or by a person in the performance of a
duty specially enjoined by law, are prima facie evidence of the
facts stated therein.

The private respondent may have a point when she maintains that
the petitioners cannot now challenge the admission of these exhibits, not
having objected to them when they were formally offered.  The petitioners demur, invoking the
transcript, which shows that their counsel registered a continuing objection to
the said documents when they
were offered as part of the narration of witness Miguela Andrade.  That manifestation was not sufficient, of
course.  Objection to the admission of an
exhibit must be made at the time it is offered.^[4]
The record shows that the trial judge required the petitioners to submit
written objections to the plaintiff’s offer of exhibits but they never did.^[5]

But even assuming they were admissible, they are nevertheless not
sufficient to establish the private respondent’s claim of rightful
possession.  The mere certification that
Pascual Andrade was “a settler-assignee” of the disputed lot would
not necessarily prove that he was actually in possession of the lot, nor does
it show that such possession was personally known by the certifying officer or
related to him by official
information.  As for exhibit
“C,” the conclusion that the private respondent was the lawful
possessor of the subject land appears to have been made ex parte
and the petitioners were simply thereafter asked to vacate the property on the
ground that it was “already covered by a subsisting public land
application.” At any rate, the exhibits are only “prima facie
evidence of the facts stated therein,” which in our view has been disproved by the petitioners.

The respondent court failed to consider the substantial evidence
submitted by the petitioners to
prove their possession.  The decision of
the PACLAP, rendered after full hearing, declared that the private respondent’s
“claim to own the entirety of Lot 558 and her claim about the actual
possession and cultivation of Erlindo Casanayan and Bernardo Casanayan existing
on Lot 558 are both found to be without merit, hence dismissed and
closed.” In its resolution of August 22, 1975, it found:

As regards Lot 558, records show that Miguela Andrade filed her
Homestead Application for the same sometime in 1968 while Erlindo Casanayan
filed his own homestead application sometime in 1965.  The said “Certificate” of
allocation by the NARRA specifies to portion “B” only of the lot
which may refer to the actual occupation claimed by Miguela Andrade.

And in its resolution of August 25, 1975, it declared:

The Committee found that the land which was offered as a compromise
is a Public Land long occupied and cultivated by Erlindo Casanayan and Bernardo
Casanayan, both legitimate children of the late Remigio Casanayan.  Accordingly, Bernardo and Erlindo who have
been in actual possession and control of the said Public Land have applied for
a title for their respective occupation.

The respondent court should have considered the above factual
findings of the PACLAP, which was designated by PD 832 to investigate and rule
upon land problems and whose
decisions shall have the “force and effect of a regular administrative
resolution.” As such, this must be received with respect by the courts of
justice and even accepted as binding in the absence of proof
that they were arbitrarily reached. 
There is no such showing here.

Mention must finally be made of the Undertaking dated June 11,
1957, between Miguela Andrade and Remigio Casanayan, with the intervention of
the Bambad Settlers Association, where the parties agreed:

(b) To respect the
claim of the late PASCUAL ANDRADE to five (5) hectares of the EIGHT (8)
hectares, part of which is outside the claim of the Betita Bros. Ramie
Plantation and the rest is inside thereof; the portion of which is 2-1/2, more
or less, outside the claim of the Betita Bros. Ramie Plantation can be
immediately occupied and possessed by said Mrs. Miguela Vda. de Andrade and her
heirs; while the portion of 2-1/2 hectares of said claim which is contiguous to
the area of 2-1/2 hectares above-mentioned and inside said claim of the Betita
Bros. Ramie Plantation shall be  given
to the possession of said Mrs. Miguela 
Vda. de Andrade soon after the final survey thereof in the name of
Remigio Casanayan.

This would be another piece of evidence showing that, contrary to
the private respondent’s claim, she and her husband had been in possession of
the disputed land since 1951.  It further
bolsters the conclusion of the Court that the private respondent has failed to
prove her possession of the disputed land and that the evidence relied upon by
the respondent court was insufficient to sustain her claim.

It is hoped that the final protest filed by Miguela Andrade against the homestead application of Erlindo Casanayan will be resolved by the
Bureau of Lands with all possible dispatch.

WHEREFORE, the appealed decision of the respondent court
dated January 22, 1988, is REVERSED and it is hereby DECLARED, pending
determination of the conflicting homestead applications of the parties by the
Bureau of Lands, that the petitioners have the better right of possession of the land in
question.  Costs against the private
respondent.

SO ORDERED.

Narvasa, (Chairman), Griño-Aquino, and Medialdea, JJ., concur.

Gancayco, J., on leave.

^[1]
Through Judge Macario C. Camello.

^[2]
Penned by Justice Leonor Ines Luciano with Aldecoa and Lapeña, Jr., concurring.

^[3]
Apex Investment & Financing Corp. v. IAC, 166 SCRA 458 (citing
Tolentino v. De Jesus, 56 SCRA 167; Carolina Industries, Inc. v.
CMS Stock Brokerage, Inc.; 97 SCRA 734; Manero v. CA, 102 SCRA
817; Moran, Jr. v. CA, 133 SCRA 88; and Sacay v. Sandiganbayan,
142 SCRA 593).

^[4]
Rule 132, Sec. 36, Revised Rules on Evidence; lnterpacific Transit, Inc. vs. Aviles, 186 SCRA 385; Tabuena v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 85423, May 6, 1991.

^[5]
TSN, September 30, 1982, pp. 2-4.