LUFTHANSA GERMAN AIRLINES, PETITIONER, VS. COURT OF APPEALS AND TIRSO V. ANTIPORDA, SR., RESPONDENTS.

In this petition for review on certiorari, the Court is confronted
with the issue of whether or not petitioner Lufthansa German Airlines which
issued a confirmed Lufthansa ticket to private respondent Antiporda covering a
five-leg trip aboard different airlines should be held liable for damages
occasioned by the “bumping-off” of said private respondent Antiporda
by Air Kenya, one of the airlines contracted to carry him to a particular
destination of the five-leg trip.

Tirso V. Antiporda, Sr. was an associate director of the Central
Bank of the Philippines and a registered consultant of the Asian Development
Bank, the World Bank and the UNDP. He
was contracted by Sycip, Gorres, Velayo & Co. (SGV) to be the institutional
financial specialist for the agricultural credit institution project of the
Investment and Development Bank of Malawi in Africa. According to the letter of August 30, 1984 addressed to Antiporda
from J. F. Singson of SGV, he would render his services to the Malawi bank as
an independent contractor for which he would be paid US$9,167 for a 50-day period
commencing sometime in September 1984. For the engagement, Antiporda would be provided one round-trip economy
ticket from Manila to Blantyre and back with a maximum travel time of four days
per round-trip and, in addition, a travel allowance of $50 per day, a travel
insurance coverage of P100,000 and major hospitalization with AFIA and an
accident insurance coverage of P150,000.^[1]

On September 17, 1984, Lufthansa, through SGV, issued ticket No.
3477712678 for Antiporda’s confirmed flights to Malawi, Africa. The ticket particularized his itinerary as
follows:

Carrier                  Flight                           Date                       
Time               Status

Manila to Singapore                SQ                               081                              25-9-84                        1530                            OK

Singapore to Bombay             LH                                695                              25-9-84                        2200                            OK

Bombay to Nairobi                  KQ                               203                              26-9-84                        0215                            OK

Nairobi
to Lilongwe                  QM                              335                              26-9-84                        1395                            OK

Lilongwe to Blantyre                QM                              031                              26-9-84                        1600                            OK

Thus, on September 25, 1984, Antiporda took the Lufthansa flight
to Singapore from where he proceeded to Bombay on board the same airline. He arrived in Bombay as scheduled and waited
at the transit area of the airport for his connecting flight to Nairobi which
was, per schedule given him by Lufthansa, to leave Bombay in the morning of
September 26, 1984. Finding no
representative of Lufthansa waiting for him at the gate, Antiporda asked the
duty officer of Air India how he could get in touch with Lufthansa. He was told to call up Lufthansa which
informed him that somebody would attend to him shortly.

Ten minutes later, Gerard Matias, Lufthansa’s traffic officer,
arrived, asked for Antiporda’s ticket and told him to just sit down and
wait. Matias returned with one Leslie
Benent, duty officer of Lufthansa, who informed Antiporda that seat in Air
Kenya Flight 203 to Nairobi had been given to a very important person of Bombay
who was attending a religious function in Nairobi. Antiporda protested, stressing that he had an important
professional engagement in Blantyre, Malawi in the afternoon of September 26,
1984. He requested that the situation
be remedied but Air Kenya Flight 203 left for Nairobi without him on
board. Stranded in Bombay, Antiporda
was booked for Nairobi via Addis Ababa only on September 27, 1984. He finally arrived in Blantyre at 9:00
o’clock in the evening of September 28, 1984, more than a couple of days late
for his appointment with people from the institution he was to work with in
Malawi.

Consequently, on January 8, 1985, Antiporda’s counsel wrote the
general manager of Lufthansa in Manila demanding P1,000,000 in damages for the
airline’s “malicious, wanton, disregard of the contract of carriage.”^[2]
In reply, Lufthansa general manager Hagen Keilich assured Antiporda that the
matter would be investigated.

Apparently getting no positive action from Lufthansa, on January
21, 1985, Antiporda filed with the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City a
complaint against Lufthansa which was docketed as Civil Case No. Q-43810.

The lower court,^[3]
guided by the Supreme Court ruling in KLM Dutch Airlines v.
Court of Appeals, et al.,^[4]
found that Lufthansa breached the contract to transport Antiporda from Manila
to Blantyre on a trip of five legs. It
said:

“The threshold issue that confronts this Court is:

Was there a breach of obligation by the defendant in failing to
transport the plaintiff from Manila to Blantyre, Malawi, Africa?

The defendant admits the issuance and validity of Ticket No.
3477712678 (Exh. B). However, it denies
its obligation to transport the plaintiff to his point of destination at
Blantyre, Malawi, Africa. Defendant
claims that it was obligated to transport the plaintiff only up to Bombay.

This case is one of a contract of carriage. And the ticket issued by the defendant to
the plaintiff is the written agreement between the parties herein. Ticket No. 3477712678 particularizes the
itinerary of the plaintiff x x x.

x x x                                  x x x                             x x x

From the ticket, therefore, it is indubitably clear that it was the
duty and responsibility of the defendant Lufthansa to transport the plaintiff
from Manila to Blantyre, on a trip of five legs.

The posture taken by the defendant that it was Air Kenya’s, not
Lufthansa’s, liability to transport plaintiff from Bombay to Malawi, is
inacceptable. The plaintiff dealt exclusively
with the defendant Lufthansa which issued to him the ticket for his entire trip
and which in effect guaranteed to the plaintiff that he would have sure space
in Air Kenya’s flight to Nairobi. Plaintiff, under that assurance of the defendant, naturally, had the
right to expect that his ticket would be honored by Air Kenya, to which, in the
legal sense, Lufthansa had endorsed and in effect guaranteed the performance of
its principal engagement to carry out plaintiff’s scheduled itinerary previously
and mutually agreed upon by the parties. Defendant itself admitted that the flight from Manila, Singapore,
Bombay, Nairobi, Lilongwe, Blantyre, Malawi, were all confirmed with the
stamped letters ‘OK’ thereon. In short,
after issuing a confirmed ticket from Manila to Malawi and receiv(ing) payment
from the plaintiff for such one whole trip, how can the defendant now deny its
contractual obligation by alleging that its responsibility ceased at the Bombay
Airport?

The contract of air transportation was exclusively between the
plaintiff Antiporda and the defendant Lufthansa, the latter merely endorsing
its performance to Air Kenya, as its subcontractor or agent. The fourth paragraph of the ‘Conditions of
Contracts’ of the ticket (Exh. B) issued by Lufthansa to plaintiff indubitably
shows that the contract was one of continuous air transportation from Manila to
Blantyre, Malawi.

‘4. x x x carriage to be performed hereunder by several successive
carriers is regarded as a single operation.’

This condition embodied in the ticket
issued to plaintiff is diametrically opposed to the defense theory that
Lufthansa’s liability is only limited up to Bombay.”

Pursuant to the above reasoning, the lower court held that
Lufthansa cannot limit its liability as a mere ticket issuing agent for other
airlines and only to untoward occurrences on its own line.

The lower court added that under the pool arrangement of the
International Air Transport Association (IATA), of which Lufthansa and Air
Kenya are members, member airlines are agents of each other in the issuance of
tickets and, therefore, in accordance with Ortigas v. Lufthansa,^[5]
an airline company is considered bound by the mistakes committed by another
member of IATA which, in behalf of the former, had confirmed a passenger’s
reservation for accomodation.

In justifying its award of moral and exemplary damages, the lower
court emphasized that the breach of contract was “aggravated by the
discourteous and highly arbitrary conduct of Gerard Matias, an official of
petitioner Lufthansa in Bombay.” Its factual findings on the matter are
the following:

“x x x. Bumped off from his connecting flight to
Nairobi and stranded in the Bombay Airport for 32 hours, when plaintiff
insisted on taking his scheduled flight to Nairobi, Gerard Matias got angry and
threw the ticket and passport on plaintiff’s lap and was ordered to go to the
basement with his heavy luggages for no reason at all. It was a difficult task for the plaintiff to
carry three luggages and yet Gerard Matias did not even offer to help him. Plaintiff requested accomodation but Matias
ignored it and just left. Not even
Lufthansa office in Bombay, after learning plaintiff’s being stranded in Bombay
and his accomodation problem, provided any relief to plaintiff’s sordid situation. Plaintiff had to stay in the transit area
and could not sleep for fear that his luggages might be lost. Everytime he went to the toilet, he had to
drag with him his luggages. He tried to
eat the high-seasoned food available at the airport but developed stomach
trouble. It was indeed a pathetic sight
that the plaintiff, an official of the Central Bank, a multi-awarded
institutional expert, tasked to perform consultancy work in a World Bank funded
agricultural bank project in Malawi instead found himself stranded in a foreign
land where nobody was expected to help him in his predicament except the
defendant, who displayed utter lack of concern of its obligation to the
plaintiff and left plaintiff alone in his misery at the Bombay airport.”

Citing Air France v. Carrascoso,^[6]
the lower court ruled that passengers have a right to be treated with kindness,
respect, courtesy and consideration by the carrier’s employees apart from their
right to be protected against personal misconduct, injurious language,
indignities and abuses from such employees.

Consequently, the trial court ordered Lufthansa to pay Antiporda
the following:

(a)  
the amount of P300,000.00 as moral damages;

(b)  
the amount of P200,000.00 as exemplary damages; and

(c)  
the amount of P50,000.00 as reasonable attorney’s fees.

With costs against the defendant.”

Lufthansa elevated the case to the Court of Appeals arguing that
it cannot be held liable for the acts committed by Air Kenya on the basis of
the following:

(a)
it merely acted as a
ticket-issuing agent in behalf of Air Kenya; consequently the contract of
carriage entered into is between respondent Antiporda and Air Kenya, to the
exclusion of petitioner Lufthansa;

(b)  
under sections (1) and (2) Article 30 of the Warsaw
Convention, an airline carrier is liable only to untoward occurences on its own
line;

(c)  
the award of moral and exemplary damages in addition to
attorney’s fees by the trial court is without basis in fact and in law.

The Court of Appeals not convinced with Lufthansa’s appeal,
affirmed the decision of the trial court sought to be reviewed.

Explained the Court of Appeals: although the contract of carriage was to be performed by several air
carriers, the same is to be treated as a single operation conducted by
Lufthansa because Antiporda dealt exclusively with it which issued him a
Lufthansa ticket for the entire trip. By issuing a confirmed ticket, Lufthansa in effect guaranteed Antiporda
a sure seat with Air Kenya. Private
respondent Antiporda, maintained the Court of Appeals, had the right to expect
that his ticket would be honored by Air Kenya which, in the legal sense,
Lufthansa had endorsed and, in effect, guaranteed the performance of its
principal engagement to carry out his five-leg trip.

The appellate court also ruled that Lufthansa cannot rely on
Sections (1) and (2), Article 30 of the Warsaw Convention^[7]
because the provisions thereof are not applicable under the circumstances of
the case.

Sections (1) and (2), Article 30 of the Warsaw Convention
provide:

“Art. 30 (1). In the
case of transportation to be performed by various successive carriers and
falling within the definition set out in the third paragraph of Article I, each
carrier who accepts passengers, baggage, or goods shall be subject to the rules
set out in the convention, and shall be deemed to be one of the contracting
parties to the contract of transportation insofar as the contract deals with
that part of the transportation which is performed under his supervision.

(2) In the case of transportation of this
nature, the passenger or his representative can take action only against the
carrier who performed the transportation during which the accident or
the delay occurred, save in the case where, by express
agreement, the first carrier has assumed liability for the whole journey. (Underscoring supplied)

According to the Court of Appeals, Antiporda’s cause of action is
not premised on the occurrence of an accident or delay as contemplated under
Section 2 of said Article but on Air Kenya’s refusal to transport him in order to
accomodate another. To support this
ruling, the Court of Appeals cited the Supreme Court ruling in KLM Royal
Dutch Airlines v. Court of Appeals,^[8]
which held, inter alia, that:

“1.  The applicability insisted upon by the KLM of Article
30 of the Warsaw Convention cannot be sustained. That article presupposes the occurrence of either an accident or
a delay, neither of which took place at the Barcelona airport; what is here
manifest, instead, is that the Aer Lingus, through its manager there, refused
to transport the respondents to their planned and contracted destination.”

The Court of Appeals concluded that Lufthansa cannot, thus,
invoke Sections (1) and (2), Article 30 of the Warsaw Convention to evade
liability.

Failing to obtain a favorable decision, Lufthansa filed this
petition for review on certiorari anchored on the following arguments:

“1.  The respondent court erred as a matter of law
in refusing to apply the Warsaw Convention to the instant case.

2.    Respondent court’s ruling that Lufthansa had
deceived private respondent has no factual or legal basis.

3. The respondent court erred as a matter of
law in affirming the trial court’s award of moral damages in the face of this
Court’s rulings concerning moral damages in cases of breach of contract.

4. The respondent court erred as a matter of
law in affirming the trial court’s award of exemplary damages for lack of legal
or factual basis therefor.”

The arguments propounded by petitioner Lufthansa cannot suffice
to reverse the appellate court’s decision as prayed for. Lufthansa raised four assignments of error
but the focal point at issue has been defined by us at the inception of this ponencia.

Lufthansa maintains that its liability to any passenger is
limited to occurrences in its own line, and, thus, in the case at bench, its
liability to Antiporda is limited to the extent that it had transported him
from Manila to Singapore and from Singapore to Bombay; that therefrom,
responsibility for the performance of the contract of carriage is assumed by
the succeeding carriers tasked to transport him for the remaining leg of his
trip because at that stage, its contract of carriage with Antiporda ceases,
with Lufthansa acting, no longer as the principal in the contract of carriage, but
merely as a ticket-issuing agent for the other carriers.

In further advancing this line of defense, Lufthansa invoked
Section 2, Article 30 of the Warsaw Convention^[9]
which expressly stipulates that in cases where the transportation of passengers
or goods is performed by various successive carriers, the passenger can take
action only against the carrier which performed the transportation,
during which the accident or delay occurred. Lufthansa further advanced the theory that
this provision of the Warsaw Convention is applicable to the present case,
contrary to the decision of the Court of Appeals which relied on the Supreme
Court ruling in KLM Royal Dutch Lines.^[10]
For Lufthansa, “bumping-off” is considered delay since delay would
inevitably result therefrom. It
implored this Court to re-examine our ruling in KLM and take heed of
jurisprudence^[11]
in the U.S. where “delay,” unlike in our ruling in KLM, contemplates
the instance of “bumping-off.” In KLM, we held that the term
“delay” does not encompass the instance of “bumping-off,”
the latter having been defined as refusal to carry or transport a passenger.

On his part, private respondent Antiporda insists that he entered
with Lufthansa an exclusive contract of carriage, the nature of which is a
continuous carriage by air from Manila to Blantyre Malawi; that it did not
enter into a series of independent contracts with the carriers that transported
him for the remaining leg of his trip.

The basis for such claim is well founded. As ruled by the trial court, with the Court
of Appeals concurring favorably, Antiporda was issued a confirmed Lufthansa
ticket all throughout the five-leg trip. The fourth paragraph of the “Conditions of Contract”
stipulated in the ticket indubitably showed that the contract of carriage was
considered as one of continuous air transportation from Manila to Blantyre,
Malawi, thus:

“4. x x x
carriage to be performed hereunder by several successive carriers is regarded
as a single operation.”

In light of the stipulations expressly specified in the ticket
defining the true nature of its contract of carriage with Antiporda, Lufthansa
cannot claim that its liability thereon ceased at Bombay Airport and thence,
shifted to the various carriers that assumed the actual task of transporting
said private respondent.

We, therefore, reject Lufthansa’s theory that from the time
another carrier was engaged to transport Antiporda on another segment of his
trip, it merely acted as a ticket-issuing agent in behalf of said carrier. In the very nature of their contract,
Lufthansa is clearly the principal in the contract of carriage with Antiporda
and remains to be so, regardless of those instances when actual carriage was to
be performed by various carriers. The
issuance of a confirmed Lufthansa ticket in favor of Antiporda covering his
entire five-leg trip aboard successive carriers concretely attests to
this. This also serves as proof that
Lufthansa, in effect guaranteed that the successive carriers, such as Air Kenya
would honor his ticket; assure him of a space therein and transport him on a
particular segment to this trip. This
ruling finds corroboration in the Supreme Court decision in KLM,^[12]
where the same issues were confronted, thus:

“x x x                         x x x                             x x x

The passage tickets of the respondents provide that the carriage to
be performed thereunder by several successive carriers ‘is to be regarded as a
single operation,’ which is diametrically incompatible with the theory of the
KLM that the respondents entered into a series of independent contracts with the
carriers which took them on the various segments of their trip. This position of KLM we reject. The respondents dealt exclusively with the
KLM which issued them tickets for their entire trip and which in effect
guaranteed to them that they would have sure space in Aer Lingus flight
861. The respondents, under that
assurance of the internationally prestigious KLM, naturally had the right to
expect that their tickets would be honored by Aer Lingus to which, in the legal
sense, the KLM had indorsed and in effect guaranteed the performance of its
principal engagement to carry out the respondents’ scheduled itinerary
previously and mutually agreed upon between the parties.”

On the issue of whether the Warsaw Convention, particularly
Section 2, Article 30 thereof is applicable herein, we agree with the Court of
Appeals in ruling in the negative. We
reiterate what has been settled in KLM:

“1.  The applicability insisted upon by the KLM of
article 30 of the Warsaw Convention cannot be sustained. That article presupposes the occurrence of
either an accident or a delay, neither of which took place at the Barcelona
airport; what is here manifest, instead, is that the Aer Lingus, through its
manager there, refused to transport the respondents to their it planned and
contracted destination. x x x”

Lufthansa prays this court to take heed of jurisprudence in the
United States where the term “delay” was interpreted to include
“bumping-off” or failure to carry a passenger with a confirmed
reservation. These decisions in the
United States are not controlling in this jurisdiction. We are not prepared, absent reasons of
compelling nature, to entertain an extended meaning of the term
“delay,” which in KLM was given its ordinary
signification. “Construction and
interpretation come only after it has been demonstrated that application is
impossible or inadequate without them. The ordinary language of a statute must be given its ordinary meaning
and limited to a reasonable interpretation.”^[13]
In its ordinary sense, “delay” means to prolong the time of or
before; to stop, detain or hinder for a time, or cause someone or something to
be behind in schedule or usual rate of movement in progress.^[14]
“Bumping-off,” which is the refusal to transport passengers with
confirmed reservation to their planned and contracted destinations, totally
forecloses said passengers’ right to be transported, whereas delay merely
postpones for a time being the enforcement of such right.

Consequently, Section 2, Article 30 of the Warsaw Convention
which does not contemplate the instance of “bumping-off” but merely
of simple delay, cannot provide a handy excuse for Lufthansa as to exculpate it
from any liability to Antiporda. The
payment of damages is, thus, deemed warranted by this Court. We find no reversible error in the lower
court’s award of moral and exemplary damages, including attorney’s fees in
favor of Antiporda.

Article 2220 of the Civil Code provides:

“ART. 2220. Willful
injury to property may be a legal ground for awarding moral damages if the court
should find that, under the circumstances, such damages are justly due. The same rule applies to breaches of
contract where the defendant acted fraudulently or in bad faith.”

According to the findings of the appellate court which affirmed
that of the lower court, the reasons given by the witnesses for Lufthansa for
private respondent’s being “bumped off” at Bombay airport were
conflicting.

Observed the Court of Appeals:

“If there was really no seat available because of
over-booking, why did Lufthansa confirm the ticket of the
plaintiff-appellee? It has to be
pointed out that the confirmed ticket is up to Blantyre, Malawi, not only to
Bombay.

If the plaintiff-appellee was not in the list of passengers of
Kenya Airways (the connecting flight) then Lufthansa must have deceived him in
Manila because according to Gerard Matias, the passengers booked by Kenya
Airways for Boeing 707 were 190 passengers when the plane could accommodate
only 144 passengers considering that the name of plaintiff-appellee was not in
the list. If that was the situation,
Lufthansa by the issuance of its ticket should have not assured the
plaintiff-appellee that he could get the connecting flights as scheduled. Surely, Lufthansa before confirming the
ticket of the plaintiff-appellee must have confirmed the flight with Kenya
Airways. If it was impossible to get a
seat upon its own investigation in Bombay, then it should have not confirmed
the ticket of the plaintiff-appellee. It is the defendant-appellant who was negligent in the performance of
its duties, and plaintiff-appellee was just plainly deceived.

Since the ticket was marked O.K., meaning confirmed, therefore
plaintiff-appellee must have a definite seat with Kenya Airways but it was lost
or given to another person. It is not
true therefore, that plaintiff-appellee’s name was not in the list of Kenya
Airways. Besides, why should Lufthansa
allow a passenger to depart from the Philippines with a confirmed ticket,
without instructing its Bombay office to reserve a seat with Kenya Airways for
its connecting flight? In spite of the
confirmation, Nelda Aquino testified that plaintiff-appellee was stranded in
Bombay because he did not get a seat with Kenya Airways, and his name did not
appear in the list of passengers. Then
contrary to the testimonies of Berndt Loewe and Gerard Matias that the
obligation of the defendant-appellant is only up to Bombay and the reason why
plaintiff-appellee was not in the list of passengers is because of
overbooking. Nelda Aquino contrary to
the testimonies of the two, testified that the reason for the bumping off is
that the seat was given to another passenger, to wit:

‘Q     Did you know or eventually learned later
that the name of Antiporda was not in the list of confirmed passengers?

A     I
only learned from the office at Bombay that it was given to other
passenger which I only learned from the office at Bombay.

Q    Who
informed you that the seat of Mr. Antiporda was
given to other passenger?

A     From
our international officer.

Q    Who
is he?

A     Our
Sales Manager.

Q    Is
he your Sales Manager in Bombay?

A     Yes,
our Manager.’

If Nelda Aquino knew that the reason for the bumping off is that
the seat was given to another, how come Berndt Loewe, passenger Sales Manager
of defendant, Gerard Matias, an employee of defendant-appellant in Bombay did
not know the said reason why the name of plaintiff-appellee did not appear in
the list of passengers? It is either
they knew the truth but because they wanted to escape liability they pretended
not to know the truth.”

Clearly, bad faith attended the performance of the contract of
carriage, for even while Antiporda was in Bombay, representatives of Lufthansa
already tried to evade liability first, by claiming that the contract of
carriage between Lufthansa and Antiporda ceased at Bombay airport, in disregard
of the fact that Antiporda was holding a Lufthansa ticket for the entire
five-leg trip; second, despite Berndt Loewe’s knowledge that Antiporda’s seat
was allowed to be given to another passenger, the same suppressed the
information and feigned ignorance of the matter, presenting altogether another
reason why Antiporda was not listed in the manifest, i.e. that Air Kenya Boeing
707 was overbooked, notwithstanding clear proof that Lufthansa in Manila
confirmed his reservation for said flight.

Antiporda is likewise entitled to the award of exemplary damages
on the basis of Article 2232 of the Civil Code which provides:

“ART. 2232. In
contracts and quasi-contracts, the court may award exemplary damages if the
defendant acted in a wanton, fraudulent, reckless, oppressive, or malevolent
manner.”

There is every indication that Lufthansa,
through its representatives in Bombay, acted in a reckless and malevolent
manner in dealing with Antiporda.

As found by the trial court:

“The breach of the guarantee was aggravated by the
discourteous and highly arbitrary conduct of Gerard Matias, an official of
Lufthansa in Bombay. Bumped off from
his connecting flight to Nairobi and stranded in the Bombay Airport for 32
hours, when plaintiff insisted on taking his scheduled flight to Nairobi,
Gerard Matias got angry and threw the ticket and passport on plaintiff’s lap
and was ordered to go to the basement with his heavy luggages for no reason at
all. It was a difficult task for the plaintiff
to carry three luggages and yet Gerard Matias did not even offer to help
him. Plaintiff requested accommodation
but Matias ignored it and just left. Not even Lufthansa office in Bombay, after learning plaintiff’s being
stranded in Bombay and his accomodation problem, provided any relief to
plaintiff’s sordid situation. Plaintiff
has to stay in the transit area and could not sleep for fear that his luggages
might be lost. Everytime he went to the
toilet, he had to drag with him his luggages. He tried to eat the high-seasoned food available at the airport but
developed stomach trouble. It was
indeed a pathetic sight that the plaintiff, an official of the Central Bank, a
multi-awarded institutional expert, tasked to perform consultancy work in a World
Bank funded agricultural bank project in Malawi instead found himself stranded
in a foreign land where nobody was expected to help him in his predicament
except the defendant, who displayed utter lack of concern of its obligation to
the plaintiff and left plaintiff alone in his misery at the Bombay
airport.”

These findings of the trial court were affirmed by the Court of
Appeals on the ground that there are no cogent reasons to justify a contrary
finding. The same holds true with this
Court. The findings of fact of lower
courts are binding on us and will not be generally disturbed on appeal.^[15]
In affirming the lower court’s award of damages to Antiporda, we take into
account his high position in the government, coupled with the fact that he
failed to meet his professional commitment in Blantyre, Malawi due to the
“bumping off” incident accompanied by rude and discourteous behavior
on the part of airline officials who should have been the first to attend to
his travel needs.

WHEREFORE, the petition for review is hereby DENIED and
the decision of the Court of Appeals AFFIRMED.

Costs against petitioner.

SO ORDERED.

Bidin, (Acting Chairman), and
Vitug, JJ., concur.

Feliciano, J., on leave.

Melo, J., no part.

^[1]
Exh. “A.”

^[2]
Exh. “N” or “3.”

^[3]
Presided by Judge Luis L. Victor.

^[4]
No. L-31150, July 22, 1975, 65 SCRA
237.

^[5]
L-28773, June 30, 1975, 64 SCRA 610.

^[6]
L-21438, September 28, 1966, 18 SCRA
155.

^[7]
International Air Transportation – Convention
and Additional Protocol Between the United States of America and other Powers.

^[8]
Supra.

^[9]
Supra.

^[10]
Supra.

^[11]
Welgel, et al. v. Mexicana
Airlines, Inc., No. 86, C3409, July 7, 1986, 20 Aviation Cases 17, 302;
Harpalani, et al. v. Air India, Inc. No. 85, C244, September 30, 1985,
19 Aviation Cases, 17, 887.

^[12]
Supra.

^[13]
Republic Flour Mills v.
Commissioner of Customs, L-28463, May 31, 1971, 39 SCRA 269.

^[14]
Webster’s Third New International
Dictionary, p. 595.

^[15]
Barillo v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 55691, May 21, 1992, 209 SCRA 130;
Caubang v. People of the Philippines, G.R. No. 62634, June 26, 1992, 210
SCRA 377.