STRONGHOLD INSURANCE COMPANY, INC., PETITIONER, VS. HON. COURT OF APPEALS AND FELICITAS RIVERA, RESPONDENTS.

Petitioner seeks reversal of the decision and resolution of the Court
of Appeals promulgated on February 19,
1988 and May 13, 1988,
respectively, in CA-G.R. SP No. 11664 which reversed the January 5, 1987 decision of the Insurance
Commission dismissing Felicitas Rivera’s complaint.

On July 24, 1981,
Cesar Rivera, a contract worker, was hired by Erectors, Inc. (Erectors) as
helper electrician at the International Airport Project in Baghdad,
Iraq.  In compliance with the rules and regulations
of the Ministry of Labor and Employment, Erectors secured a group accident
insurance from petitioner Stronghold Insurance Company, Inc. (Stronghold) for
all the contract workers it hired for deployment in Baghdad.  Under said insurance
policy, denominated as Personal Accident Insurance Policy No.
UPA-100001, Stronghold undertook to pay the covered contract worker P75,000.00 in case of a work- or accident- connected death.

On March 23, 1982,
Cesar Rivera died.  In his Certificate of
Death [Annex “A”], myocardial infarction, or what is commonly known
as heart attack, was listed as the disease or condition directly leading to his
death.  Thereafter, his remains were
transported back to the Philippines for burial, an International Certificate
for Transportation of Cadavers [Annex “B”] being issued by the
Ministry of Health of Iraq for that purpose.

Subsequently, the surviving wife of Cesar Rivera, private
respondent Felicitas Rivera, filed her claim with
Stronghold for death benefits under Insurance Policy No. UPA-100001.  Petitioner however refused to pay and satisfy
her claim.  Borne by the record is the
fact that on April 23, 1982
the body of the deceased was exhumed and autopsied by the National Bureau of
Investigations (NBI).  On the same date,
the NBI made the following findings embodied in its Exhumation Report [Annex
“G”]:

The remains are covered
with lime and in an advanced state of decomposition.  There was
previous autopsy except for the skull.

All thoracic organs as well as
the abdominal organs are missing except for a few loops of large
intestines.

Fractures, complete, ribs, 2nd, 3rd and 4th, alond
(sic) midaxillary line, right.

Brain, liquified.

*        *          *

CAUSE OF DEATH:  No cause of death can be given due to the
absence of internal organs.

*        *          *

On November 7, 1985 private respondent instituted an action
against Stronghold with the Insurance Commission docketed as I.C. Case No.
3021.  At the hearing of the case, Felicitas Rivera presented as witness a certain Rudy L. Buendia to support her claim that her husband died due to
an accident.  Buendia
testified that:  he was an electrician
employed at Baghdad International Airport; that on March 23, 1982, he was
walking behind Cesar Rivera; that they were carrying boxes of electrical
fittings; that Cesar Rivera tripped on the marble flooring causing his violent
fall; that his head hit the concrete floor; that he saw the upper right
forehead of Cesar Rivera bleeding; and he and three (3) other co-workers rushed
him to the hospital where he died on the same day [TSN, August 27, 1986, pp.
4-8 and 10.]

On January 5, 1987,
the Commission rendered judgment dismissing Felicitas
Rivera’s complaint.

However, on appeal by private respondent, the Court of Appeals
reversed the decision of the Insurance Commission.  The dispositive
portion of its decision reads as follows:

WHEREFORE, the appealed judgment dismissing the complaint and
counterclaim in I.C. Case No. 3021 is reversed insofar as it dismissed the
meritorious complaint of appellant; and instead, appellee
Stronghold Insurance Co., Inc. is hereby ordered to pay complainant-appellant Felicitas Rivera the sum of Seventy Five Thousand
(P75,000.00) Pesos under Policy No. UPA-100001;
and the additional amount of Five Thousand (P5,000.00)
Pesos, for and as attorney’s fees.  Costs against respondent-appellee.

SO ORDERED [CA Decision, p. 4; Rollo, p. 30.]

Petitioner’s
motion for reconsideration was denied by respondent court, hence, this petition
for review.  The following errors are assigned by
Stronghold:

1.  THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN HOLDING THAT
THE CAUSE OF THE DEATH OF CESAR RIVERA WAS ACCIDENTAL AND WITHIN THE COVERAGE
OF POLICY NO. UPA-100001.

2.  THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN DISTURBING THE
FINDINGS OF FACTS OF THE INSURANCE COMMISSION ON THE CREDIBILITY OF WITNESS
RUDY L. BUENDIA.

3.  THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN HOLDING THE PETITIONER
LIABLE TO PRIVATE RESPONDENT FELICITAS RIVERA.

4.  THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN AWARDING
ATTORNEY’S FEE TO PRIVATE RESPONDENT [Petition, p. 3; Rollo,
p. 8.]

On
November 9, 1988 the Court gave due course to the petition and required the parties to
submit their respective memoranda.  The
parties having complied with the submission of their memoranda, the case was
deemed submitted for decision.

The main issues for resolution in the instant case are (1)
whether or not the Court of Appeals erred in holding petitioner liable to
private respondent under Policy No. UPA-100001; and, (2) whether or not the
Court of Appeals ruled correctly in awarding attorney’s fees to private
respondent.

A resolution of the
first issue hinges on whether or not the respondent court committed reversible
error in its appreciation of the evidence. 
Indeed, the Court is faced with diametrically opposed conclusions of the
Insurance Commission and the Court of Appeals notwithstanding the fact that the
same set of evidence was presented before them. 
The Insurance Commission dismissed private respondent’s complaint after
concluding that the testimony of Buendia on the
alleged accidental fall of the deceased on March 23, 1982 should not be given
credence “for being inconsistent with the letter of Erectors, Inc. to
[Stronghold] requesting reconsideration of the denial of the claim”
wherein the accident was stated to have occurred on December 15, 1981.  These inconsistent dates,
according to the Insurance Commission, “creates doubt as to the
truth of complainant’s contention that Cesar Rivera’s death was
accidental.” [Insurance Commission Decision, pp. 5-6; Rollo, pp. 25-26.]

On the other hand, respondent appellate court found Buendia’s testimony supported by the NBI Exhumation Report
[Annex “G”] showing that the deceased had broken or fractured ribs as
sufficient to support the conclusion that the proximate cause of Cesar Rivera’s death was his accidental fall
on March 23, 1982 which
occurred in the course of his employment. 
Thus, according to the Court of Appeals, his death is covered by Policy No. UPA-100001 and his wife is
entitled to the P75,000.00 insurance benefit [CA
Decision, pp. 3-4; Rollo, pp. 29-30.]

In this petition for review, Stronghold contests the above
findings of the Court of Appeals.  It
insists that Cesar Rivera’s death was caused by myocardial infarction or heart
attack as clearly stated in his Certificate of Death [Annex “A”],
International Certificate for Transportation of Cadavers [Annex “B”]
and NBI Exhumation Report [Annex “G”.] Said cause of death is not
accidental and therefore, is not within the coverage of Policy No. UPA-100001.

Private respondent, on the other hand, strongly relies on Buendia’s testimony on the alleged accidental fall of Cesar
Rivera on March 23, 1982.

It is a basic rule
in evidence that each party in a case must prove his own affirmative
allegations [Sec. 1, Rule 131 of the Revised Rules of Court] by the degree of
evidence required by law.  In civil
cases, as in the present case, the degree of evidence required of a party in
order to support his claim is preponderance of evidence or that evidence
adduced by one party which is more conclusive and credible than that of the
other party [Municipality of Moncada v. Cajuigan, 21 Phil. 184
(1912).] It is therefore incumbent upon plaintiff who is claiming a right over
the insurance policy to prove his case. 
Corollary to this, defendant-insurance company must likewise prove its
own allegations to buttress its claim that it is not liable under the insurance
policy [Tai Tong Chuache & Co. v. Insurance
Commission, G.R. No. 55397, February 29, 1988, 158 SCRA 366.]

The Court finds that respondent appellate court did not commit
reversible error in ruling in favor of Felicitas Rivera.

Private respondent has clearly shown that an accident immediately
preceded the death of Cesar Rivera on March
23, 1982.  Felicitas
Rivera’s witness, Buendia, described in detail the
violent fall of Cesar Rivera.  The
NBI Exhumation Report [Annex “G”] showing that the 2nd, 3rd and 4th
ribs of the deceased were completely fractured is further proof of this violent
fall.  That Cesar Rivera was rushed to
the hospital for treatment but died on the same day was also recounted by Buendia on the witness’ stand.  These all point to the fact that his
accidental fall was the proximate cause or “that cause, which, in natural
and continuous sequence, unbroken by any efficient intervening cause, produces
the injury, and without which the result would not have occurred” [Vda. de Bataclan v. Medina, 102
Phil. 181, 186 citing 38 Am. Jur. 695-696] which led
to the death of Cesar Rivera although the immediate cause thereof may have been
myocardial infarction.  Such being the
case, his death is covered by Personal
Accident Policy No. UPA-100001 and is thus compensable [See Sec. 84 of the Insurance Code.]

Further, the Court finds
that the alleged inaccuracy between Buendia’s
testimony and Erectors’ letter to Stronghold [Record, pp. 34-35] regarding the
date of the occurrence of the accident is not sufficient to cast doubt on the
veracity of Felicitas Rivera’s claim.  The inconsistency in dates is not so material
in this case where the principal issue involved is the cause of death of the
deceased.  Moreover, petitioner Stronghold
had the opportunity to cross-examine Buendia on this
alleged inaccuracy when he took the witness’ stand but it did not do so.

On the other hand, as
correctly stated by the Court of
Appeals, the evidence for Stronghold is “short of what is convincing and
unmistakable.  It did not suffice to
disprove [Felicitas Rivera’s] thesis that the
proximate cause of death of her late husband was a service connected accident,
within the coverage of the insurance policy contract of [Stronghold].” [CA
Decision, p. 4; Rollo, p. 30.]

That the
death certificate lists down myocardial infarction as the cause of death is not
conclusive.  A death certificate is conclusive evidence
only as
to the fact of death of the
deceased.  In this jurisdiction, the rule
is that a death certificate, if duly registered with the Civil Register, is
considered a public document and the entries found therein are presume
correct [Art. 410 of the Civil Code; Tolentino v. Paras, G.R. No. L-43905, May 30, 1983, 122 SCRA 525 citing In re Mallare, Adm.
Case No. 533, September 12, 1974, 59 SCRA
45.]

In the instant case an examination of
the record would reveal that Cesar Rivera’s death certificate [Annex
“A”] was not registered with the Civil Register and hence, cannot be
considered a public document as would make applicable the presumption that the
entries found therein are correct.  Even
granting that the death certificate is registered with the Civil Register so
much so that the above-mentioned presumption is made to apply, the Court had
occasion to state that this presumption “is merely disputable and will have to
yield to more positive evidence establishing their inaccuracy” [Tolentino v. Paras, supra.] Here, private respondent’s witness, Buendia,
was able to show by testimony that Cesar Rivera died from an accident.

Apropos is the statement of the Court of Appeals, to wit:

The mere fact that
the cause of death written on the Certificate of Death (Exh.
“E”) is “myocardial Infarction” does not effectively negate
the insurance claim under consideration. 
It did not rule out the plausibility of appellant’s theory that the real
and proximate cause of death was said accident inflicting the head wounds referrd (sic) to.  Of
course, the probability of a heart attack which contributed to the passing away
of the late Cesar Rivera is not discounted but even such supervening event
could be categorized as work connected and did not render the latter’s demise
outside the coverage and protection of the insurance contract. . . . [CA
Decision, p. 3; Rollo, p. 29.]

Petitioner further relies on the International Certificate for
Transportation of Cadavers [Annex “B”] issued by the Ministry of
Health of Iraq through a certain Dr. F.J. Jurji
wherein it is stated that Cesar Rivera died on March 23, 1982 due to myocardial
infarction.  However, this piece of
evidence cannot be utilized to establish the cause of death of private
respondent’s husband.  It is clearly
provided in said certificate that the same is issued only to secure the
transportation of the corpse of Cesar Rivera.

Neither could petitioner Stronghold rely on the NBI Exhumation
Report [Annex “G”] to support its claim that the cause of death of
Cesar Rivera is myocardial infarction. 
Precisely, the body of the deceased was exhumed and autopsied by the NBI
to establish the cause of death of Cesar Rivera.  This is bolstered by the fact that in the
Exhumation Report, myocardial infarction was listed only as the alleged cause
of death of the deceased.  Moreover, the NBI’s
finding with respect to the fractured ribs suffered by the deceased is more
compatible with Felicitas Rivera’s theory that her
husband’s death was caused by his accidental
fall.

In fine, the Court finds that respondent Court of Appeals did not
err in its appreciation of evidence in favor of private respondent and, hence,
it committed no reversible error in reversing the decision of the Insurance
Commission.

Finally, petitioner Stronghold raises as an error respondent
court’s award of P5,000.00 attorney’s fees.  It contends that there is no
basis for such award as it “did not
commit any unjustified act upon which private respondent could be
entitled to attorney’s fees.  In
order that private respondent could be entitled to attorney’s fees,
petitioner’s stand shall (sic) be so untenable as to amount to gross and
evident bad faith.” [Petition, p. 8; Rollo, p. 13.]

On the other hand, private respondent is of the view that P5,000.00 award of attorney’s fees is “so minimal and it
is justified and reasonable under the circumstances” [Comment, p. 10; Rollo, p. 56.]

In Abrogar v. Intermediate
Appellate Court [G.R. No. 67970, January 15, 1988, 157 SCRA 57]
the Court had occasion to state that “[t]he reason for the award of
attorney’s fees must be stated in the text of the court’s decision, otherwise,
if it is stated only in the dispositive portion of
the decision, the same must be disallowed on appeal.” [at
p. 61 citing Mirasol v. dela
Cruz, G.R. No. L-32552, July 31, 1978,
84 SCRA 337.]

A perusal of the Court of Appeals’ decision would reveal its
failure to state in the text the
justification for its award of the P5,000.00
attorney’s fees found in the dispositive portion of
the decision.  And in the absence of a statement why attorney’s fees were awarded, the same
should be disallowed and deleted.

WHEREFORE, the
petition is DENIED and the decision of the Court of Appeals is
hereby AFFIRMED with the modification that the P5,000.00 award of attorney’s fees in favor of private
respondent is deleted.

SO ORDERED.

Fernan, C.J., Gutierrez, Jr.,
Feliciano, and Bidin,
JJ., concur.