PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE, VS. ELPIDIO DEMECILLO AND ROGELIO CRISMAL, ACCUSED-APPELLANTS.

Before us is an appeal certified by the Court of Appeals from a
judgment of conviction of the crime of arson rendered by the Regional Trial
Court of Lanao del Norte, Branch IV, Iligan
City in Criminal Case No. 1083.

Appellants, Elpidio Demecillo and Rogelio Crismal were sentenced
by the Regional Trial Court, applying the indeterminate sentence law, to serve
the penalty of imprisonment of from two (2) years and four (4) months as
minimum to eight (8) years as maximum and to indemnify the offended party, Anacita
Fuentes in the sum of P1,000.00 without subsidiary
penalty in case of insolvency.

The appellate court, after a thorough review of the facts and the
evidence presented, upheld the credibility of the testimonies of the
prosecution witnesses and found that the appellants were guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of committing the crime of arson.  Furthermore, it scrutinized the penalty
imposed by the trial court and instead, imposed the penalty of Reclusion
Temporal to Reclusion Perpetua.  The appellate court ruled:

“The penalty imposed by the trial court needs correction.  Paragraph 5 of Article 321 of the Revised
Penal Code has already been repealed and superseded by P.D. 1613, dated March
7, 1979.

Appellants, had they studied the law on the matter, should not have
appealed.  As it is, they gambled on an
acquittal which, on the basis of the facts, they had no chance of winning at
all, at the risk that the penalty imposed by the trial court may be raised by the appellate court, as in
the case at bar.

Under Section 3 of P.D. 1613, the penalty of Reclusion Temporal
to Reclusion Perpetua shall be imposed if the property burned is
any inhabited house or dwelling.  Under
Section 4 of the same law, the penalty
shall be imposed in its maximum period if the offender is motivated by spite or
hatred towards the owner or occupant of the property burned.  The facts in the case at bar show that
appellants were motivated by spite or hatred towards the owner or occupant of
the house burned.  At any rate, the court
a quo also found
that the aggravating circumstance
of night time attended the
commission of the crime.  The penalty of Reclusion
Temporal to Reclusion
Perpetua should, therefore, be
imposed in its maximum period, which is Reclusion Perpetua.

WHEREFORE, pursuant to Article VIII, Section 5, of the New
Constitution of the Philippines
which took effect on February 2, 1987
upon its ratification in a plebiscite held for that purpose, which provides:

“‘The Supreme Court shall have the following powers:

xxx                                 xxx                               xxx

(d)          All criminal
cases in which the penalty imposed is reclusion perpetua or higher.’”

and Section 13,
Rule 124, Rules of Court, which states:

“‘Whenever a Criminal Cases Division should be of the opinion that
the penalty of death or life imprisonment should be imposed in a case, the said
Division after discussion of the evidence and the law involved, shall render
judgment imposing the penalty of either death or reclusion perpetua (should be
reclusion perpetua or higher) as the circumstances warrant, refrain from entering
judgment and forthwith certify the case and elevate the entire record thereof
to the Supreme Court for review.’”

and finding accused-appellant
guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the
crime of arson as penalized by Section 3 of P.D. 1613 in
its maximum period or Reclusion
Perpetua, we certify this case to the Supreme Court for final
determination and appropriate action.” (Underscoring supplied; Rollo, pp.
46-48)

We find from the foregoing that the Court of Appeals satisfied
the requirement laid down by this Court in People v. Daniel,
86 SCRA 511 (1978) through Chief Justice Fred Ruiz Castro:

“ACCORDINGLY, this Court directs that, henceforth, should the Court
of Appeals be of the opinion that the penalty of death or reclusion perpetua
(life imprisonment) should be imposed in any criminal cases appealed to it
where the penalty imposed by the trial court is less than reclusion perpetua,
the said Court, with a comprehensive written analysis of the evidence and discussion of the law involved, render judgment expressly and explicitly
imposing the penalty of either death or reclusion perpetua as the
circumstances warrant, refrain from entering judgment, and forthwith certify
the case and elevate the entire record thereof to this Court for review.”

and which interprets
the second paragraph of Section 12 of Rule 124 of the Rules of Court, now
Section 13 of the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure as amended:

Section 13.

xxx                            xxx                               xxx

“Whenever the Court of Appeals should be of the opinion that the
penalty of reclusion perpetua or higher should be imposed in a case, the Court
after discussion of the evidence and the law involved, shall render judgment
imposing the penalty of reclusion perpetua or higher as the circumstances
warrant, refrain from entering judgment and forthwith certify the case and
elevate the entire record thereof to the Supreme Court.”

There being a judgment rendered imposing reclusion perpetua but
not entered and only certified to this Court, we are constrained to proceed
with the review of the entire records of the criminal case.

The information filed against the appellants alleged:

“That on or about April 7, 1986, in the City of Iligan,
Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the said
accused, conspiring and confederating together and mutually helping each other,
did then and there wilfully, unlawfully
and feloniously burn the house and properties therein belonging to one Anacita
Fuentes, and as a result thereof caused a total of P15,000.00 worth of properties belonging to the said Anacita
Fuentes were burned, to the damage and prejudice of the said
Anacita Fuentes in the aforesaid sum of P15,000.00, Philippine Currency.”
(Original Record, p. 9)

The evidence for the prosecution and the defense as well as the
conclusions derived as summarized by the trial court are
as follows:

“The prosecution presented Aurelio Tuastomban who testified that at
around 7:00 o’clock in the morning of April 7, 1986 he went to the farm of
Vicente Fuentes to gather firewood and at around 6:00 o’clock in the evening of
the same day he ate his supper and planned to sleep in the house of Vicente
Fuentes; that at around 6:30 in the evening he felt the call of nature and went to the fishpond which is about 50
meters away from the house and when he was about to return to the house he saw
some eight (8) persons in the
house of Vicente Fuentes and identified two (2) of them as Rogelio Crismal and
Elpidio Demecillo, the two accused; that these two held lighted dried coconut
leaves and burned the house of Vicente Fuentes. 
The house was completely burned down together with all the properties
and belongings of the owner therein at around 7:00
o’clock that April 7, 1986.

Anacita Fuentes testified that on April 7, 1986 her house located
at Tipanoy, Iligan City was burned and she identified the picture of the house
(Exh “A”); that she declared the said house for taxation purposes (Exhibit
“B”); that the total value of the house burned was P15,000.00 but it did not
include farm equipment as she had left these with a neighbor; that prior to
April 7, 1986 when the house was burned, there was an incident between her
family and the accused on March 19, 1986 when her house was stoned and the
persons responsible even tried to burn the house but they were frustrated when
a PC soldier called by her son arrived; that they filed a complaint with the PC
regarding the stoning of the house and the attempt to burn the house and the
persons responsible namely:  Elpidio
Demecillo and Rogelio Crismal together with their companion Alfredo Ylaya
begged for forgiveness and offered to repair the house so the complaint was
dropped and their house was repaired.

The defense presented as their first witness Avelino Crismal, the
son of the accused Rogelio Crismal, who testified that his family is living in
the land of former Fiscal Salvador Laya; that sometime on April 7, 1986 at
around 7:00 o’clock in the evening he fetched water and while near the house of
Vicente Fuentes he saw the son of Vicente Fuentes, by the name of Romeo Fuentes
and Aurelio Tuastomban setting fire to the house of Vicente Fuentes and he
asked them why they were burning the house and the two ran away; that he
immediately ran because he was afraid that he might be implicated in the
burning of the house; that the first time he saw the fire it was already big
and had reached the roof of the house; that he immediately reported the matter
to a certain Felix Sacay, their neighbor, who in turn, reported the matter to
the barangay councilman; that he himself stayed in their house because there
was nobody left there.  According to him
when he first saw the fire he was only about two arms length from the house and
before that he did not see the fire because he was walking with his eyes to the
ground.

Elpidio Demecillo, the accused testified that on April 7, 1986 at
about 5:00 o’clock he and his brother Emilio Demecillo went to the Iligan City
Hospital to secure a medical certificate for the injuries received by his
brother when the latter was manhandled by a PC soldier named Jose Laruan who
was brought to their place by Romeo Fuentes when the latter complained that he
was threatened with a bolo by Emilio Demecillo. 
He identified the medical certificate issued to him (Exhibit “1”); that
when they went home from crossing Tipanoy where they got off from the jeep at
past 7:00 o’clock in the evening and while walking on their way home they were
met by Dominador Formentora and Felix Sacay who informed them that the house of
Vicente Fuentes was burned down.  After
having been informed of the burning of the house they reported the matter to
the PC headquarters.  In reporting to the
PC headquarters he was accompanied by Isidro Cabahug and Florencio Nahuman and
it was already around 8:00 o’clock in
the evening.  He denied setting fire to
the house of Vicente Fuentes.  However,
he admitted to repairing the house of Vicente Fuentes after it was destroyed by
stoning on March 19, 1986
and he also admitted that there is a dispute regarding the boundary of his
landholding and the land of Vicente
Fuentes.

The next witness presented by the accused was Felix Sacay who
testified that on April 7, 1986
at around 7:00 o’clock in the evening
Alvino Crismal reported to him that the house of Vicente Fuentes was burned by
Romeo Fuentes and Aurelio Tuastomban.  He
immediately proceeded to the house of the barangay councilman Loren Nahuman but
he did not see him there and so he proceeded to the house of another barrio
councilman Edwin Andrade and they were instructed to report the matter to the
PC headquarters.  They reported to the PC
headquarters together with Edwin Andrade, Emilio and Elpidio Demecillo, a
certain Julito, Rogelio Crismal and Isidro Cabahug.  However, although he and Vicente Fuentes and
the latter’s wife were in good terms he never informed them of the burning of their
house nor informed them that their son Romeo was the one who burned the house.

Judelyn Bulocan testified that she is a neighbor of Vicente
Fuentes; that sometime on March 20, 1986 Romeo Fuentes and his mother entrusted
to her their personal belongings at their house at Olas, Mahayahay, Iligan
City; that aside from the personal properties a saw and a goat were also left
in her custody; that there (sic) properties were left with her because on March
19, 1986 the house of the Fuentes family was stoned by certain persons whom she
could not identify; that she knew of the stoning of the house because she could
hear the impact of the stones landing on the house and which was frightening
and she and her children even hid because they were afraid; that the stoning
lasted for about 30 minutes to 1 hour; that when the house was burned on April
7, 1986 the personal properties of the Fuentes family were in her house and not
in the house which was burned.

Rogelio Crismal testified that on April 7, 1986 at around 5:00
o’clock in the afternoon he was at Tipanoy because he was brought there by
Elpidio Demecillo who took his brother to the Iligan City Hospital to be
examined; that he waited there at Tipanoy for them and Emilio Demecillo and his
brother Elpidio arrived at 7:30 o’clock in the evening; that when these two
arrived they proceeded towards Olas, Mahayahay, Iligay City but on the way they
were met by Felix Sacay, Isidro Cabahug and a certain Doming who informed them
that the house of Vicente Fuentes was burned down.  They went to the PC headquarters and reported
the matter.  He testified that he is also
a tenant of Fiscal Salvador Laya and there is some boundary dispute on the land
of Vicente Fuentes and his
landholding.

The prosecution through the eye-witness Aurelio Tuastomban has
clearly identified the accused Rogelio Crismal and Elpidio Demecillo as among
those who burned the house.  There seems
to be no reason for the court to doubt the testimony of Aurelio Tuastomban who,
even according to the two accused, has no motive or reason to testify falsely
against them.  Furthermore as testified
not only by the witness for the prosecution but even admitted by the accused
and their witnesses there was an on-going dispute on the boundary of the
landholdings of the accused and the land of Vicente Fuentes and some violent
incidents already happened prior to April 7, 1986 wherein the house which was
burned down was stoned by the accused Rogelio Crismal and Elpidio Demecillo
together with their companion Alfredo Ylaya. 
As testified to by Anacita Fuentes whose testimony the court finds to be
credible, she overheard the accused say while they were repairing the house
that they are repairing it now but later they will burn it.  Obviously they were resentful for having been
made to repair the house.  This
resentment of the accused Elpidio Demecillo deepened when his brother Emilio
Demecillo was manhandled by a PC soldier who went to the area when the son of
Vicente Fuentes complained to the PC headquarters that he was chased with a
bolo by Emilio Demecillo.  Together with
the dispute concerning their boundaries the accused have all
the motive to burn the house.  The
denial by the two accused and their alibi that at around 7:00 o’clock when the house was burned they were at
crossing Tipanoy cannot prevail over the positive identification by the witness
Aurelio Tuastomban who identified them as among those who burned the
house.  The alibi cannot also stand because
according to the accused Rogelio Crismal at around 7:00 o’clock in the evening
they were at crossing Tipanoy which is just a mere 10 minute walk to the place
where the house was burned.  The
accused’s contention that it was Romeo Fuentes together with the witness
Aurelio Tuastomban who burned the house cannot merit acceptance by the court
considering that even as early as March 20, 1986 the family of Vicente Fuentes
was already concerned over their property and they have to take out their
personal belongings out of the house because they were afraid these might be
lost or destroyed due to the stoning incident wherein the two accused were
involved.” (Original Records, pp. 83-90)

The appellants raised the following errors in their appeal:

I

“THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN AFFIRMING THE RULING OF THE TRIAL
COURT IN GIVING CREDIT TO THE SOLE TESTIMONY OF PROSECUTION WITNESS AURELIO
TUASTOMBAN AND IN RELYING ON SAID TESTIMONY AS BASIS FOR THE IDENTIFICATION OF
ACCUSED-APPELLANTS AS PERPETRATORS OF THE CRIME.

II

“THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN AFFIRMING THE DECISION OF THE TRIAL
COURT IN NOT FINDING THAT THE EVIDENCE FOR THE PROSECUTION IS INSUFFICIENT TO
CONVICT THE ACCUSED-APPELLANTS OF THE CRIME CHARGED IN THE INFORMATION.”
(Rollo, p. 63)

III

“THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN IMPOSING THE PENALTY OF RECLUSION
PERPETUA BY APPLYING SEC. 3 OF P.D. 1613.” (Rollo, p. 70)

A thorough examination of the facts of the case shows that the
grounds relied upon by the accused-appellants are without merit.

Appellants mainly contend that the following facts as testified
by Aurelio Tuastomban were unbelievable and unreliable:  (1) that he saw eight (8) persons but was
only able to identify two (2) of them; (2) that he could, in the darkness of
the night, vividly count eight (8) persons at the scene of the crime and name
two (2) of them; and (3) that having seen the alleged perpetrators, he could
have prevented the commission of the crime by calling their attention.

We find, however, that the testimony of Tuastomban is untarnished
by any tint of doubt.  Tuastomban was able
to identify only the appellants because they are his neighbors while the six
(6) others are not (TSN, June 23, 1986, p. 14). 
He could identify the two
despite the darkness of the night because he saw them carrying burning dried
coconut leaves which they used to set the house on fire (TSN, June 23, 1986,
pp. 13, 16).  The glowing flame naturally
shed light on their faces and made them easily recognizable from a distance of
15 meters away where Tuastomban was (ibid, p. 13).  Moreover, Tuastomban could not reasonably
alarm and stop the perpetrators because the latter were superior in strength and number.  He
also heard them say that they were going to kill anyone who would jump
from the house while it was on fire (ibid). 
The testimony of prosecution witness, Tuastomban, has intrinsic
credibility.

As can be gleaned
from the facts presented and as admitted by appellant Rogelio Crismal (TSN,
June 24, 1986, p. 35), no motive on the part of Tuastomban for falsely
identifying the appellants can be deduced. 
This being so, the statements of Tuastomban are entitled to full faith
and credit (People v. Berbal, G.R. No. 71527, August 10, 1989; People v.
Espinosa and Jundoy, G.R. No. 72883, December 20, 1989).

As correctly found by the trial court, it was in fact the accused
appellants who had their own reasons for committing the crime and denying such
commission.  The records show that there
was an on-going dispute involving the appellants and their landlord (a certain
Fiscal Laya) on the one hand, and the family of Vicente Fuentes on the other,
regarding the boundaries of land, which fact is admitted by both appellants in
their oral testimonies.  The rift between
the two parties became more manifest when on March 19, 1986 (before the burning
incident), the appellants, together with one Alfredo Ylaya stoned the house of
Vicente Fuentes in Olas, Mahayahay, Iligan City.  One of the children of Fuentes reported the
matter to the Philippine Constabulary (PC) and Vicente Fuentes filed a complaint
against them.  The appellants apologized
and offered to repair the house.  As a
result, the complaint was dropped.

However, Anacita Fuentes, the wife of Vicente, testified that
while the appellants were repairing the house, she heard them say that they
will burn the house at the next opportunity (TSN, June 23, 1986, p. 20).  This means that appellants harbored ill will
resulting from the humiliation of having to pay for the damage they had
done.  The antipathy was all the more
intensified when the brother of appellant Demecillo, Emilio, was mauled by a PC
soldier upon the complaint of the son of Vicente Fuentes of having been chased
by Emilio with a bolo.

The appellants have not successfully presented compelling grounds
to overturn the findings of the trial court on the credibility of the testimony
of the prosecution witnesses and the clear and positive identification of the
appellants as the perpetrators of the crime of arson.  Well-settled is the rule that the factual
findings of the trial court, which had all the opportunity to observe the
behavior and demeanor of the witnesses and weigh all the evidence presented,
are accorded great respect and weight in the absence of a clear showing of
arbitrariness and misapprehension of the facts (People v. Panuelos, 136 SCRA
501, [1985]; People v. Abonada, 169 SCRA 530 [1989]; People v. Maghanoy, G.R.
Nos. 67170-72, December 15, 1989; People v. Corrales, G.R. No. 76922, February
21, 1990).

The appellants claim that the trial court erred in not finding
that the prosecution evidence is insufficient to prove their guilt beyond
reasonable doubt.  They adduce that
Tuastomban was actually a participant in committing the crime of arson because
as alleged by the defense witness, Alvino Crismal, Tuastomban and Romeo Fuentes
(son of Vicente) were the ones who burned the house.  They say that Romeo Fuentes had plans to burn
his father’s house which was worth only P350.00 that is why he and his mother,
Anacita, left their personal belongings in the house of Judelyn Bulocan.

The Court rules otherwise. 
The version given by the defense appears to be a fabrication of what
transpired before and during the burning incident if only to exculpate them
from guilt.  The testimony of Alvino
Crismal on which appellants rely heavily was correctly rejected by the trial court in this wise:

“The testimony of Alvino
Crismal is also unbelievable.  He
is just a mere 14 year old child, who
is smaller than his age and claimed to have asked Romeo Fuentes why he burned the house and
yet at the same breath, he also
claimed to have run away immediately because he was afraid to be
implicated.  If he was afraid, why did he
call the attention of Romeo Fuentes.  His
testimony that he first saw the fire when he was only about two arms
length from the house is beyond human experience.  If he was going towards the house that evening, and considering that it was already 7:00 o’clock and dark, he could have even seen the fire
from a far distance.  His reason
that he was looking towards the ground while walking and therefore did not see the fire from afar is very flimsy and
incredible since one who walks at night especially in the farm would try
to see where he was going.  There is no doubt therefore in the mind of
the court that the two accused Elpedio
Demecillo and Rogelio Crismal were responsible for the burning of the house.”
(Original Records, p. 90)

The court does not find any ground averred by the appellants that
is plausible enough to convince us that Romeo Fuentes and Aurelio Tuastomban
planned and burned the house of Vicente. 
It is more in accord with reason and human experience to believe that
Romeo and Anacita transferred their belongings on March 20, 1986, the day after the stoning incident, to the
house of a neighbor in order to prevent another possible destruction by the
appellants.  The defense testimony that
there were eight (8) of them including the appellants who were out there in the
streets at about 7:00 p.m. on April 7, 1986 to report the occurrence of a fire
to the authorities only confirms the prosecution’s theory that the appellants
and six (6) other men were involved in the burning incident on that same night.

Not even the defense of alibi can surmount the strong evidence
for the prosecution.  The allegation that
appellants were at crossing Tipanoy, which is a mere 10 minutes walk away from
the house of the Fuenteses in Olas, Mahayahay can not totally eliminate the
possibility that the appellants were physically present at the exact time and
place when and where the crime
was committed (People v. Javier, G.R.
No. 70997, February 28, 1990; People v. Idnay, 164 SCRA 358 [1988]; People v.
Asuncion and Aguinaldo, G.R. No. 83870, November 14, 1989; People v. Tamayo, et
al., G.R. Nos. 79418-21, March 20, 1990). 
Alibi cannot prevail against the positive identification of the accused
by the prosecution (People v. Tamayo, et al. supra).

The Court notes that the appellants admit the weakness of the
defense of alibi but they insist that their conviction must be based on clear and
positive evidence of the prosecution.  We
find that the appellants keep on begging the question regarding the sufficiency
of the prosecution evidence before both the appellate court and this Court.  Premises considered,
the Court rules that the prosecution evidence has met the requirement of moral
certainty enough to satisfy the conscience and reason that the appellants
committed the crime of arson; hence, the appellants are guilty of committing
said crime beyond reasonable doubt (People v. Padilla, G.R. No. 72709, August
31, 1989).

The appellants further question the imposition by the Court of
Appeals of the penalty of reclusion perpetua under Section 3 of
Pres. Decree No. 1613 by arguing that they were not properly informed of the
offense of arson under the said law. 
There is no merit in this argument. 
It is well-settled that the accused may be convicted of a crime and
sentenced to a penalty stated therefor so long as the facts alleged in the
information and proved at the trial shall constitute the crime for
which he is convicted even though different from
the crime designated and charged in the information (Santos v. People, G.R. No.
77429, January 29, 1990).

In this case, the crime charged is arson as defined under the
Revised Penal Code.  There was no change
as to the designation and nature of the crime. 
The amendment refers to an increase in penalty depending on the facts
of the offense as committed.  The Court
of Appeals correctly amended the trial court judgment such that the appellants
should be convicted of arson as provided under Section 3 of Pres. Decree No.
1613 which amended the law on arson in the Revised Penal Code on March 7, 1979
long before the commission of the offense in this case.  The power of the Court of Appeals to review a
judgment of the trial court in a criminal case includes the power to scrutinize
the penalty imposed (Section 13, Revised 1985 Rules on Criminal
Procedure).  The penalty imposable under
Section 3 of Pres. Decree No. 1613 is reclusion temporal to reclusion perpetua.  However, Section 4 prescribes that if the
crime was motivated by spite or hatred, the penalty shall be imposed in its
maximum period.  The motive is clear in
this case.

WHEREFORE, the appealed judgment of the trial court
as certified by the Court of Appeals is modified in that the accused-appellants
ELPIDIO DEMECILLO and ROGELIO CRISMAL are hereby found guilty beyond reasonable
doubt of the crime of arson as defined in Section 3 of Presidential Decree No.
1613 and sentenced to serve the penalty in the maximum period or reclusion perpetua.  The
order to indemnify the offended party the sum of P1,000.00
without subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency is AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.

Fernan, C.J., (Chairman), Feliciano, Bidin, and Cortes, JJ., concur.