SPOUSES FREDILLO GUILLEN AND LEONA SANTIAGO GUILLEN, AND RANULFO B. GUILLEN, PETITIONERS, VS. COURT OF APPEALS, IGMEDIO SANTIAGO, EPETACIO SANTIAGO, DIOSDADO SANTIAGO, SILVESTRE…

The decision^[1]
dated December 10, 1987 of
the Court of Appeals, which reversed and set aside the decision^[2]
dated October 31, 1985 of
the Regional Trial
Court of Iloilo
City in Civil Case No. 14580,
entitled, “lgmedio Santiago,
et al. vs. Leona Santiago, et al.”, is challenged in this petition for
review on certiorari.

On August
24, 1982, the
private respondents, as plaintiffs,
filed before the Regional
Trial Court of Iloilo City a verified complaint for annullment of lease agreement,
delivery of possession, and damages against the petitioners as defendants.  In their complaint, the private respondents averred that they are, together
with their sister, Leona Santiago-Guillen, who
is married to her co-petitioner, Fredillo Guillen, the lawful and absolute co-owners of several
properties, one of which is an unregistered parcel of land, converted into a
fishpond, with an area of 66,620 square meters located at Barosbos,
Carles, Iloilo.  The co-ownership is evidenced by a “Deed
of Extra-judicial Partition and Agreement of Subdivision” dated June 26, 1981.  After the execution of the partition
agreement, the Guillen spouses requested that they be
allowed to retain possession of the entire fishpond until the end of 1981 after
which they (the Guillens) would immediately deliver
to the private respondents their respective shares thereof.  At the end of 1981, however, the Guillens did not deliver as promised.  It turned out that on October 29, 1980, they leased the property to Ranulfo Guillen (likewise a
defendant in the trial court and a petitioner herein), a brother of Fredillo Guillen.  The private respondents charged that the
lease was null and void because they did not consent thereto.  They claimed that the lease was executed to
deprive them of their shares in the fishpond as well as in the annual rentals thereof.^[3]

In their answer with
counterclaim, the Guillen spouses alleged that the fishpond in controversy was acquired by them on June 18, 1963 from
Manuel Bellosillo who had purchased it at a public
auction sale conducted by the Iloilo provincial sheriff in connection with a criminal case involving the plaintiffs Igmedio, Epitacio, Flaviano, and Diosdado (among the
private respondents herein), all brothers of Leona, in which the said property
was offered as a bond and was subsequently forfeited by the government.  They claimed that from June 18, 1963 up to the filing of the complaint, they actually possessed the
property as owners, received the fruits therefrom,
paid the realty taxes thereon, and caused it to be declared in their
names.  They claimed further that the plaintiffs (the herein private
respondents) had lost their right to redeem the property by prescription and/or
laches, and that the deed of extra-judicial partition
and agreement of subdivision was
procured through force and fraud.^[4]

At the pre-trial
conference conducted by the trial court on June 22, 1983,^[5] the parties agreed on the following
points:  that they were co-owners of the
property in question which was originally owned by their father, the late Tomas
Santiago, and that the property had been the subject of a writ of execution by
virtue of a criminal case filed
against plaintiffs lgmedio Santiago, et al.,
resulting in the sale of the property and its purchase by Manuel Bellosilio in a public auction sale.  The existence of a redemption certificate,
dated June 1, 1963, executed
in favor of Leona Santiago-Guillen, over the said
property, was admitted, and so with the payment by Leona of the realty taxes thereon.  The parties acknowledged the existence of the
lease agreement, dated October 29,
1980, signed by Leona and defendant Ranulfo
Guillen, as well as the “Deed Of Extra-Judicial
Partition And Agreement Of
Subdivision,” dated June 26, 1981,
covering not only the fishpond in controversy but also the other properties of
the late Tomas Santiago.^[6]

Accordingly, the trial
court limited the issues of the case to the following:

a) Whether after the sale at public auction of the herein Lot No.
30, all the heirs or only one of them had exercised the right of redemption
from the awardee, Manuel Bellosillo.

b) Whether prescription
and/or laches lie against the plaintiffs as only the
defendant Leona Santiago Guillen had exercised, as
she did exercise the right of redemption.

c) Whether the existing Deed of Extra-Judicial Partition and
Agreement of Subdivision dated June 26, 1981, as well as the lease agreement
dated October 29, 1980, were (sic) valid; assuming that the lease insofar as
the plaintiffs’ share is concerned is
upheld, whether plaintiffs are bound by the terms and
conditions therein set forth; and

d) Whether parties are
entitled to damages prayed for in the respective pleadings.^[7]

At the trial, private
respondent Igmedio Santiago testified that the
redemption effected by petitioner Leona Santiago-Guillen
was for and on behalf of all the co-owners of all the properties sold at public
auction, as evidenced by a
document, dated October 28, 1971, executed by Manuel Bellosillo,
the purchaser, in which the latter acknowledged his receipt of the
sum of P9,123.40 as redemption price of all the properties,
including Lot 30, the contested fishpond,^[8] of the late Tomas Santiago.  Bellosillo, who was
called to the witness stand, testified that Leona personally redeemed the
property from the Iloilo provincial sheriff in 1963 and that he (Bellosillo)
had knowledge that the herein private respondents had agreed to, and
authorized, Leona to pay the redemption price.^[9]

When Leona Santiago-Guillen’s turn at the witness stand came, she testified
that the redemption price did not come from the plaintiffs, her brothers and
sisters.  She averred that the plaintiffs
failed to raise the necessary amount corresponding to their respective shares,
and showed no intention or redeeming the properties, thus
compelling her to redeem
personally the properties with her own funds. 
She further claimed that her signature appearing on the
“Deed Of Extra-Judicial Partition And Agreement of Subdivision” was procured
through force and intimidation; moreover, the said document was not formally
executed and completed as the other plaintiffs refused to sign the same.^[10]

Leona’s testimony was corroborated
by her husband, Predillo.  The other defendant (also a petitioner here) Ranulfo B. Guillen, when called
to testify, said that he leased the disputed fishpond fully aware that the Guillen spouses purchased the same from Manuel Bellosillo and that, to his knowledge,
the said spouses were never disturbed in their occupancy of the said property.^[11]

On October 31, 1985, the trial court, convinced that the
redemption of the fishpond was made by Leona alone and that her brothers and
sisters had already lost their
rights by prescription and/or laches, decided in favor of the petitioners, dismissing the case and ordering the private respondents to pay the petitioners
P5,000.00 as attorney’s fees,
including the costs of the suit.

The private respondents appealed the trial court’s decision to
the respondent Court of Appeals.  In turn, the appellate court, finding that
the subject property is co-owned
by the parties–the Santiagos
and their sister, Leona Santiago-Guillen–held that neither prescription nor laches had set in, pursuant to Article 494 of the new Civil
Code.  It ruled that the redemption of
the property in controversy caused by Leona Santiago-Guillen
was not for herself alone but also for all the other co-owners.  Consequently, on December 10, 1987, it reversed the decision of the lower court
and declared as null and void the lease agreement dated October
29, 1979 anent the
shares of the private respondents.  It
also confirmed the inclusion of the property in question, Lot 30, in the deed of extra-judicial partition
and agreement of subdivision dated June 26, 1981. 
Furthermore, it ordered the petitioners to deliver the possession to the
private respondents of their respective shares in Lot 30, the fishpond, in accordance with the
deed of extra-judicial partition and agreement of subdivision, subject to
Petitioner Leona Santiago-Guillen’s right of
reimbursement from the private respondents of their respective shares in the
redemption cost of P2,253.40.^[12]

The petitioners moved for
a reconsideration of the appellate court’s decision, but their motion was
denied in a resolution dated April
21, 1988.^[13] Hence, this petition.

Now the petitioners
contend before us that the appellate court committed a grave error in
supplanting with its own findings those established by the trial
court.  In fine, the petitioners posit
that since the fishpond was redeemed from Manuel Bellosillo
by Leona Santiago-Guillen solely with her money and
in her personal capacity, it (the property) had ceased to be a
co-ownership.  Moreover, because of her kins‘ failure to exercise their right to redeem the
property from Bellosillo within one year from the
date of the sale, they are barred by prescription from claiming co-ownership
over the property.

Finally, the petitioners argue that the co-ownership had been
effectively repudiated when Leona Guillen exercised
rights of dominion thereon as early as June
18, 1963 upon its redemption by her from Bellosillo.  Prescription
and laches therefore lie against the private
respondents.

Verily, the fate of this petition hinges on the resolution of two
issues, namely:  whether or not
petitioner Leona Santiago-Guillen, by her acts, has
acquired exclusive ownership over Lot 30–the fishpond
in dispute–to the exclusion of the private respondents; and whether or not,
the private respondents’ action has prescribed.

There is no question as
to the nature of the property being contested by the parties.  It is an unregistered, and hence, untitled,
parcel of real property, a fishpond to be precise, measuring 66.620 square
meters and denominated as Lot 30,
PCAOM 478-D, Carles, Iloilo. 
The property was originally owned by Tomas Santiago, father of
petitioner Leona Santiago-Guillen and the private
respondents.  When Tomas died, the property became part and
parcel of his estate which, by mode of succession, was inherited in common by
his compulsory heirs–Leona and the private respondents.  While still co-owned by the aforementioned
parties, the property was offered as a bond in a criminal case involving some
of the private respondents particularly, Igmedio, Epitacio, Flaviano, and Diosdado.  The
property was later levied on execution and forfeited by the government in the
said criminal case and sold at a public auction to Manuel Bellosillo.  These facts are admitted by the parties.

Conflict, however, arose
when the property was redeemed by Leona. 
The petitioners claim that the redemption was made by Leona for herself
alone and not for and on behalf of all co-owners.  As such, she assumed exclusive ownership over
the property, rendering the co-ownership non-existent.  Moreover, the lapse of considerable length of
time before the private respondent instituted the action questioning the title
and possession of petitioner Leona Santiago-Guillen
has allowed prescription to set in, The title acquired by Leona therefore has
become unassailable insofar as the private respondents are concerned.  The trial court agreed with the petitioners
on this matter.  The appellate court,
however, ruled otherwise, saying that the redemption was carried out by Leona
not for herself alone but also on behalf of her co-owners, the private
respondents.

We are satisfied with the
correctness of the assailed decision.  No
reversible error has been committed by the respondent court.

The petitioners’ position
can not be sustained.  Their contention
that the redemption of the property from Manuel Bellosillo
was by, and for petitioner Leona Santiago-Guillen
alone, is flawed.  Manuel Bellosillo, himself, disclosed the untenability of the petitioners’ arguments.  In a document executed by him on October
28, 1971, Bellosillo acknowledged receipt of the sum of P9,123.40
from petitioner Leona Santiago-Guillen and the
private respondents “for (the) repurchase of all the lands of
the late Tomas Santiago.”^[14]
Among the “lands” is the fishpond in controversy.  Further, in his testimony, Bellosillo categorically stated that the property was not
redeemed from him by Leona alone.

Q.   Do
you know this parcel of land, Lot 30 situated at Barosbos,
Municipality of Carles, which is the subject matter of this case?

A.    Yes,
sir.

Q.   You know this because you pur­chased this in
public auction sale sometime in 1962?

A.    Yes,
sir.

Q.   By the way, do you know the previous owners
of this property?

A.    The previous owners were Anacleto
(sic) and Tomas Santiago, who were the parents of plaintiffs.

Q.   By the way, are (you) still the owner of this
lot subject matter of this case?

A.    No more because they already repurchased
this land from me.

COURT:

Who are they?

A.    They are Lourdes, Felisa,
Leona, Silvestra, all surnamed Santiago.

(t.s.n. pp. 4-5, December 3, 1984).^[15]

[Emphasis ours.]

Lourdes, Felisa, and Silvestra
are among the herein private respondents.

As to the reason why only the name of petitioner Leona Santiago-Guillen
appears in the redemption certificate issued by the provincial sheriff of
Iloilo, again, the testimony of Bellosillo while
under cross-examination provides us illumination.

Q.   But
you stated a while ago that it was Lourdes,
Felisa, Silvestra and Leona
all surnamed Santiago who redeemed
the property from you.  Now, it was Leona, which is which now?

A.    The four persons, namely:  Lourdes, Felisa,
Leona and Silvestra came to me and offered to redeem
the property but I told them that it is better that we have to go to the office
of the provincial sheriff, but because of the expenses in going to Iloilo City
in the Office of the sheriff, we decided that only Leona and myself who will go
together to the Office of the provincial sheriff and redeem the property.

(t.s.n. pp. 7-8, December 3, 1984)^[16].

[Emphasis ours.]

It
is thus shown that the other private respondents did not accompany Leona and Bellosillo to the office of the provincial sheriff for
purely economic reasons — they simply wanted to save on travelling
expenses.

Arrayed against the
contention of the petitioners, the testimony of Bellosillo,
needless to say, gains the upperhand.  We find no reason to doubt Bellosillo’s testimony, coming, as it did, from a
disinterested person who had nothing to gain from the
controversy.  On this score, the trial
court’s decision, for failure to consider a fact of great import to the
case–the Bellosillo testimony–was correctly
reversed.  On the other hand, the
findings of facts of the appellate court being amply supported by
evidence on record, must be accorded due respect and deserves finality.

Anent the claim of
prescription by the petitioners, suffice it to say that the same is untenable
in view of the explicit provisions of
the ultimate paragraph of Article
494 of the new Civil Code, which state:

No prescription shall run in
favor of a co-owner or co-heir against his co-owners or co-heirs so long as he expresssly or impliedly recognizes the co-ownership.

Co-owners can not acquire by prescription the share of the other
co-owners absent a clear repudiation of the co-ownershsip
which is communicated to the other co-owners.^[17]
“A mere silent possession by a co-owner, his receipt of rents, fruits or
profits from the property, the erection of buildings and fences and the
planting of trees thereon; and the payment of land taxes, can not serve as
proof of exclusive ownership, if it is not borne out by clear, complete and
conclusive evidence that he exercised acts of possession which unequivocally
constituted an ouster or deprivation of the rights of the other
co-owners.”^[18]
On this score, the petitioners have not only
failed to show any definite proof indicating effective repudiation of the
co-ownership over the property:  on the
contrary, petitioner Leona Santiago-Guillen even
affixed her signature on the deed of extra-judicial partition and agreement of
subdivision dated June 26, 1981.  By
this act, Leona unequivocably affirmed her
recognition of the existing co-ownership.

Finally, Leona’s pretense that her signature in the deed of
extra-judicial partition and agreement of subdivision was obtained by force and
intimidation fails to impress us.  As
correctly observed by the respondent appellate court, being the youngest of the
brood does not prove the presence of
duress or intimidation.^[19] More important, good faith and regularity are always presumed in the
execution of contracts and agreements. 
The burden of proving otherwise falls on the party claiming it, in this instance, the petitioners. 
Considering that the petitioners had failed to present any proof beyond
their naked assertion, the presumption stands.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED.  The decision dated December
10, 1987 of the
respondent Court of Appeals is hereby AFFIRMED.

Costs against the petitioners.

SO ORDERED.

Paras, (Acting Chairman), Padilla, and Regalado, JJ., concur.

Melencio-Herrera, J., (Chairman), on leave.

^[1]
Ejercito, Bienvenido C.,
J., ponente; Chua, Segundino
G. and Lapena, Nicolas P., Jr., JJ., concurring.

^[2]
Rendered by Judge Bethel Katalbas-Moscardon.

^[3]
Rollo, 29-30, 42.

^[4]
Id., 30-31, 42.

^[5]
Id., 31.

^[6]
Id., 31-32.

^[7]
Id., 31-32.

^[8]
Id., 32.

^[9]
Id.

^[10]
Id.

^[11]
Id., 34.

^[12]
Id., 41-47.

^[13]
Id., 48.

^[14]
Id., 46.

^[15]
Id., 136.

^[16]
Id., 136-137.

^[17]
Mariano vs. De Vega, L-59974, March
9, 1987, 148 SCRA 342.

^[18]
TOLENTINO, The Civil Code of the Philippines,
Vol. 11, p. 173 (1963).

^[19]
Rollo, id., p.47.